











This thesis has been submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for a postgraduate degree 
(e.g. PhD, MPhil, DClinPsychol) at the University of Edinburgh. Please note the following 
terms and conditions of use: 
• This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, which are 
retained by the thesis author, unless otherwise stated. 
• A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without 
prior permission or charge. 
• This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the author. 
• The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the author. 
• When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
Upper-Middle-Class 
Complicity in the National 
Socialist Phenomenon in 
Germany 
David Robert White 
PhD (History) 




The original research element of this thesis consists of the study of an etnerging· 
professional association of senior 1nanagerial e1nployees in business and industry in 
Wei1nar Gern1any. This association~ which went by the narne of VELA, Verein)gung 
der leitenden Angestellten, or the Organisation of Leading Salaried En1ployees, was 
founded in Decen1ber 1918, and continued in existence until Dece1nber 1934. 
Utilising a con1plete collection of VELA's hi-1nonthly 1nembers' periodical, the 
deveJop1nent of a coherent ideology of elitis1n is traced fro1n 1919 to 1933, with the 
en1phasis upon the crystallisation of a world-view compatible and congruent with 
that of National Socialis1n by 1924/25. Political convergence with, and suppott for, 
the Nazi Party then foil owed so1ne time after the onset of the Great Depression. A 
detailed study of the process of Gleichschaltung, or co-ordination, in the spring and 
smnn1er of 1933 is used to i1lustrate how easily, readily and enthusiastically VELA 
etnbraced the coining of a N·ew Order in the Third Reich. 
The thesis of co1nplicity in the rise of National Socialisn1 is extended to the 
wider upper tniddle classes by enlisting the support of recent research into the 
professions, the nexus of bourgeois Vereine (clubs and societies) which covered 
Weimar Gennany, and electoral analysis, especia11y that relating to the Reichstag 
eJection of Ju1y 1932. This material, cotnbined with evidence of the huge 
overrepresentation of the upper 1niddle classes at every level of leadership within the 
Nazi Party, is used to challenge the long-he1d vievv that National Socialism was a 
petit-bourgeois phenmnenon. The resultant interpretation contends that it was the 
well-educated and well-off upper 1niddle classes who were not only the socio-
economic sector of Gennany which \Vas most likely to support the Nazi Party, but 
\vere also the NSDAP's pritne movers and shakers, its 1nost itnportant leadership 
con1ponent and, perhaps 1nost significantly of aiJ, forgers of its very ideology. It is 
further argued that National Socialist thought did not just e1nerge fro1.n within the 
Nazi Party itself, but also gre\v up auton01nously and conte1nporaneously \vithin the 
various milieux of Weimar Germany's upper tniddle classes. An analysis of the 
nature of National Socialist ideo1ot:,YJ contends that the NSDAP's elitist, 
undemocratic \Vorld-view, based on the Social Darwinist principle of the survival 
and prospering of the best and fittest, was not guided by an atavistic Blut-und-Boden 
(blood-and-soil) outlook, but was in fact a forward-looking and modern doctrine 
which en1braced technoloi:,ry and industry jn order to fulfil one of its most basic goals 
- the fighting of modern wars to gain Lehen.sraunz, or Jiving space, for the superior 
Aryan Gennan race. The upper n1iddJe classes in general, and senjor managers in 
particular, were very n1uch part of the Jnodern world and their e]itist thinking was 
inforn1ed by a technocratic, n1eritocratic and achievement-oriented vision. The latter 
two eletnents of that vision indicate that their thinking was also infused \vith liberal 
beliefs, and it is the final contention of this thesis that Jjberalis1n has a dark side to it, 
so dark that it can be attributed as one of the feeder streatns which infonned the 




I would like to thank the fo11owing tor their help and support which 1nade it 
possible for n1e to write thesis. The staff at the St{/iung ~Ves(jtilisches 
~Virtschaftsarchiv in Dortn1und were extre.mely helpful during the three weeks I 
spent there trying to track do\vn the whereabouts of an organisation I knew tnust 
exist, but of which no one seemed to have any records. Without their aid in achieving 
that first breakthrough, none of the research in this thesis would have been possible. 
My gratitude is also due to the (in.iversitiits- und Stadtsbibliothek of Cologne, vvhere 
I finally found the research 1naterial; allowing me to photocopy in excess of 2,000 
pages of archival docwnentation was of tre1nendous help. Thanks are also extended 
to the J)eufsche A nge.~;,·tellten-Gewerkschc{ft of Ha1n burg, and its fonner head, Bernd 
Anders, to the Inter-Library Loan Service, to the National Library of Scot]and, to 
Edinburgh University Library and to the Fitzpatrick Library in the History 
Depart1nent ofEdinburgh ·university. Dr Jill. Stephenson, my vastly kno~vledgeable 
and wise supervisor, deserves a special tnention for her inspiration and clear-sighted 
guidance. I would also like to acknowledge the aid extended by Professor I-farry 
Dickinson in obtaining for 1ne a Moira McLeod bursary which financed me for four 
years. Finally, 1ny f:,rreatest debt of all is to Laura Aitken, n1y hugely supportive 
partner, for her encouragetnent and belief. 
Contents 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 1 
Chapter 1 The Great Escape of the Upper Middle Class in the 
l-Iistoriography ofWejtnar and Nazi Germany ..................... l8 
Chapter 2 Ideology and its Political Location: National Sociahsn1 
and Liberalis1n ................................................................. , ... 57 
Chapter 3 Party-Political Analysis, Modernity and the Culture of 
Business in the Wei1nar Repubhc ...................................... 111 
Chapter 4 The Formation and Self-Conception of VELA .................. 149 
Chapter 5 VELA 1920-23: from Self-Definition to 
Self-hnpo11ance ................................................................. 171 
Chapter 6 1924: VELA and the Wider {Jpper Middle Class. Ideological 
Develop1nents in Mid-Decade ........................................... 202 
Chapter 7 VELA 1925-1928: Ideological Consolidation and 
Political Rmnblings ........................................................... 228 
Chapter 8 VELA 1929-1932: Political Choice .................................. 256 
Chapter 9 1933: VELA and the Coming of the Third Reich ............. 275 
Chapter 10 Conclusion ......................................................................... 307 
IJibliograJ>hy ............................................................................................ 3 16 
Introduction 
The central purpose of this thesis is to contribute to the chalJenge that has 
etnerged over the last twenty years to the previously long and widely held theory that 
the rise of the Nazi Party, its policies during the Third Reich and its very ideology 
were largely a lower-middle-class phenotnenon. (1 I One direction of attack has focused 
upon the greater level of support received by the Nazis from the working classes, 
rural labourers and the unemployed than was previously conceded_l21 Frmn about 
1982, with the publication of ruchard l-Iamilton' s Who Voted for Hitler, there has also 
been a challenge from the other direction, arguing that the upper middle classes 
endorsed and etnbraced the NSDAP (Nationa!sozia/istische Deutsche Arbeile!]Jartei) 
tnuch more than the lower-tniddle-class thesis allowed. PI 
The work of historians such as Michael Kater, Konrad Jarausch and Jane 
Kaplan, atnong others, has shown how deeply involved members of the 
Bi/dungshiirgertun1, the educated bourgeoisie or upper middle class, were in 
supporting the Nazi Party and in both marginalising and destroying its perceived 
enemies.Hl However, rather less has been said about another section of the upper 
middle class, its salaried senior-management component who, by and large, worked in 
the big-business sector. This is not the same group who were the subject of debate 
over big business and its support for Nazism, carried on by, inter alios, Henry Ashby 
Turner and David Abrahams,l51 but rather those who were one or two rungs below the 
owners and entrepreneurs - the managers of their businesses. This latter group 
provides the subject matter for the original research component of this thesis. The 
third section, the entrepreneurial upper middle class, or owners of tnedium-sized 
businesses, is an as yet very under-researched area. 
The focus of this study ts upon the ideological component of National 
Socialism, although a certain amount of attention is necessarily paid to the 
tnembership of, and electoral support for, the NSDAP. A counter-thesis to the idea 
that Nazism was a petit-bourgeois political movement and doctrine emerges, 
suggesting that the upper tniddle classes were far more complicit in its thinking, while 
also providing the bulk of its leadership. This is not to say that I am intending to 
replace one quasi-deterministic socio-economic theory with another, but rather to 
suggest that a certain sector of early 20th-century Gennan society, whose economic 
and social muscle had been growing for several decades, now seized the opportunity 
to translate that strength into greater power, including the political, under the stressful 
and unique conditions of German society in the 1920s and 1930s. Germany was not 
the only country in which the upper middle classes \Vere finding their power and 
influence on the increase; this was a universal phenomenon among capitalist societies 
of the world at this juncture, but each produced a different outcome depending upon 
the political and social circumstances of each nation. In the case of Germany, these 
circumstances inclined a greatly disproportionate number of the upper middle classes 
to vote Nazi, join the Party, supply its leadership, identify with its Weltanschauung or 
world-view, and ultimately collude in its policies of discrimination and destruction. 
Because this study largely focuses on the years up to 1933, it is not pmiicularly 
concerned with aggressive nationalism or anti-Semitistn, although these were of 
course two central and indispensable elements of National Socialism. Aggressive 
ilnperialist nationalism grew out of aggressive revisionist nationalism, the latter 
being of much greater concern and electoral attraction for the German population at 
large in the 1920s and early 1930s than any wish to annex the SudetenJand or 
Bohemia and Moravia, far less the western lands of the Soviet Union. Although a 
desire to conquer and colonise land in the east was evident in Mein Kc.unpf,
161 
invading 
and subjugating the neighbours was not a central plank of the NSDAP' s pre-1933 
electoral progran11nes; neither was eliJninationist anti-Semitistn, despite I-litler' s 
lengthy vitriolic tirades against the Jews in the satne book. 171 While accepting I an 
Kershaw' s argument that Fiitler, personally, had already, by 1924/25 at the latest, 
incorporated into his Weltanschauung the link between war against the Soviet Union 
for Lebensraum, or living space, and the destruction of the Jews, Daniel Goldhagen's 
contention that German anti-Semitism was more insidious and virulent than prejudice 
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against Jews elsewhere in Europe, and that the German people were therefore latently 
and inherently 'eliminationist anti-Semites', is both fatuous and racist.P!I 
Not only was anti-Jewishness not pushed to any great extent by the Nazis during 
the Weimar years outside of the circles of the faithful,l9l but I would contend that, 
apart from doctors and lawyers who had their own intra-professional crises to deal 
with, until about 1933/34, the upper middle classes as a whole were among the least 
receptive of the major socio-economic groups to the appeal of anti-Semitism. The 
anti-J ewish pogroms of 193 3 were largely unauthorised and carried out at the 
instigation of the SA, an organisation whose rank-and-file membership was largely 
working class and whose proportion of upper-middle-class adherents was small, even 
among its senior ranks.floJ Anti-:Semitism evolved gradually in intensity and virulence 
during the Third Reich in the broader context of escalating racial discrimination and 
hatred, building upon an already high base-level of anti-Jewish bigotry inherited from 
previous European history and encouraged by the personal antipathy, and indeed 
sociopathy, towards the Jews ofthe topmost echelons ofthe NSDAP.1 11l 
Through a re-exa1nination of electoral studies unde11aken by several historians 
in the 1980s, by references to works on specific professions and on the network of 
clubs an_d societies (Vereine) which existed during the Wei1nar Republic, and by 
means of a case study of the largely under-researched area of upper management in 
Gennan business, I hope to add to the evidence that the upper middle classes had 
more links to the Nazi Party than was generally recognised in the historiography of 
National Socialism until fairly recently. 1--Iowever, this study has both narrower and 
wider implications than this might imply. It is not n1y intention to create a new 
interpretation of history based upon a tnodel of class conflict as the driving force of 
social change. On the other hand I do recognise that political opinions and 
\Vorld-views are indeed influenced by one's social and econon1ic position in society. 
In the case of the upper middle classes in Gennany in the 1920s and 1930s, I would 
contend that their place in society inclined them towards supporting the NSDAP, not 
neces~arily immediately, and sometimes via other right-wing splinter political parties 
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which acted as stepping stones on their way to the Nazis.' 121 More importantly, this 
process was also precipitated through the refining and bringing to prominence of 
certain strands of their underlying world-views. 
It is here that the wider implications emerge, since it is explicit within my 
analysis that it was certain facets of liberalism which provided much of the ideological 
basis which tnotivated so many of the upper middle classes to embrace National 
Socialism. On the assumption that the majority of the German upper middle classes 
were inclined towards liberalism of one sort or another, an assertion that is well 
backed up by a wealth of historical studies of both liberalism and the bourgeoisie in 
Germany from the middle of the 19th century until the Weimar period,l 13l it is my 
contention that this major socio-economic group was ideologically, and therefore 
politically, more susceptible to certain core elements of the National Socialist 
Weltanschauung than almost any other sector. 
An elen1ent of this study centres upon . a critique of the philosophical 
underpinning of liberalism and upon one of the tnajor out growths from this canon of 
thought in Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries - liberal elitistn, 
characterised by its adherence to possessive individualism,1' 4 l by its intense 
nationalistn, by its hostility to egalitarianism and universal democracy, and by its faith 
in the superior spiritual, cultural and political abilities of elite leaderships. Contained 
within this ideological construct are beliefs in achievement and performance 
(Leistung), meritocracy, progress and social mobility.11 51 None of these ideals in any 
way requires or prompts anti-Setnitic or any other racial prejudice, and may in fact 
mi1itate against them. That the German upper middle classes were anti-Semitic is not 
being denied here~ nor is the fact that they became increasingly so in a National 
Socialist state in which they prospered and with whose aims and methods they came 
more and tnore to identify. The source of their prejudice against Jews came from an 
intellectual and cultural heritage separate from their liberal ideology, and was 
encouraged and magnified during the Third Reich by the selfish advantages it 
conferred upon them to clear away rivals in their professions and businesses. Cultural 
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or religious anti-Semitism, widespread among the Wilhelmine bourgeoisie, had 
already begun to transmute into racial anti-Semitism in the late 19th century, so it 
took only a short step to embrace the wider ethnic and Social Darwinist 
underpinnings of National Socialism that justified the programmes of Aryanisation 
which proliferated after March 1933.1161 Belief in a meritocracy was, to some extent, a 
patina beneath which the more basic acquisitive and self-aggrandising tenets of 
possessive and lai.r.,·sez1aire individualism could shelter and gradually emerge in the 
increasingly cotnpassionless Third Reich, thereby creating a self-soothing reassurance 
of virtue, while simultaneously paying lip servive to the loudly acclaimed demand and 
assettion of the public face of National Socialism that 'the common good takes 
precedence over self-interest' (Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz).1 171 
However, genuine belief in the above-mentioned tenets of achievement, 
performance, meritocracy, progress and social mobility, coupled with an acceptance 
of hierarchy, an advocacy of strong leadership, and a belief in the inevitability and 
desirability of elites, were the principal factors which made it possible for liberals to 
make the political and ideological transition to National Socialism so easily. Yet, for 
decades, liberalism has long been accepted, as much as socialisn\ as the antithesis of 
Nazism. How is this to be explained? The answer lies in a re-examination of what 
German liberalism's most central values were and, indeed, of what liberalism in 
general has meant to liberals over the last 150 or more years. Late 20th-century liberal 
democracy and social liberalism are very different creatures from classical liberalism 
or econotnic liberalism, both of which are nowadays associated with right-wing 
conservatism, and both of which are much closer to mainstream German liberalism of 
the Weimar era. These are altogether harsher, more dog-eat-dog ideologies. From 
about 1928, once they had abandoned their early anti-capitalism,1'x1 the Nazis were 
effectively espousing a meritocracy, albeit one with very strong racial criteria, which 
was to operate within the bounds of a competitive capitalist system. Yet the concept 
of a meritocracy, like the concept of Leistung or achievement, was part of the very 
heart and soul of liberalism. Thus, far from being the antithesis of the DVP (Deutsche 
Volk.\partei, or German People's Party), the Weimar right-wing liberal party, the 
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NSDAP appears to have been closer to it in ideological outlook in many important 
respects than it was to the conservative DNVP (Deutschnationale Volk.spartei, or 
German National People's Party).1191 
Again, of course, not all liberals were predisposed to making the ideological 
move towards Nazistn. For those whose beliefs were largely founded upon political 
liberalism, and even more so upon social liberalism, it is more probable that their 
world-views would incline them to find National Socialistn both brutal and profoundly 
unprogressive. These two forms of liberalism are more inspired by ideas of tolerance, 
democracy and relative equality than the cut-throat world of unbridled individualism, 
hierarchy and consequential differential rights which characterise econotnic liberalism. 
Nevertheless, politicalliberalistn has not always been synonymous with the acceptance 
of full political democracy. Universal equal suffrage was opposed by most 
19th-century European liberals, and even in the early 20th century, many viewed it as 
merely a means towards creating a society and polity more in tune with a deeper, 
more fundmnental belief in individualism and meritocracy, or as a way of thwarting 
revolutionary socialism and egalitarianism. 1201 If the democratic system was perceived 
not to be delivering the 'rule of the worthy' (as pat1icularly n1any in the upper middle 
classes believed in the late Weimar era), then it would be \VOI1h sacrificing this 
relatively new tnachinery and replacing it with a more effective one. 
It is for these reasons that I put forward the thesis that it was far more the result 
of an upper-middle-class 'revolution' in the 20th century than the lack of a bourgeois 
one in the 19th century which 1nade the Nazi takeover of power possible, and that this 
\Vas even more of a liberal phenomenon than a conservative one. This theory receives 
a measure of corroboration from the observation that the conservative DNVP vote 
held up much better than the two liberal parties' vote in the last five years of the 
Weimar Republic. And where did that lost liberal vote go? It went to the Nazi Party, 
sometimes directly, sotnetimes via a vote for the proliferation of single-interest 
splinter parties which blossomed around 1928 to 1930, only to vanish almost 
completely in 1932 and 1933.121J 
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Two quotations may serve to illutninate the opinions I am expressing. The first 
is frotn Alexander Herzen, the 19th-century Russian writer, who said, 'Liberals want 
freedom, and even a republic, provided it is confined to their own cultivated circles. 
Beyond the limits of their moderate circle they become conservatives. '1221 The second 
is by Anthony Arblaster, a current writer on political thought, who said, 'The ..... 
social-democratic version of liberalism which is suited to capitalism in its periods of 
growth and stability, yields place to a more oldfashioned 19th-century version of the 
creed at motnents of crisis. At these moments~ a robust defence of property, initiative 
and "free enterprise 11 is what capitalis1n requires~ and the old ideology of laissez faire 
is there, in a suitably updated form, to meet this end. ' 1231 Late Weimar Germany was 
certainly an epoch of crisis, and in this period the core liberal values which continued 
to protrude above the receding waters of social and democratic liberalism were 
possessive individualism and negative freedom, both of which conferred upon the 
powerful, the wealthy and the well educated the power to hold on to and exploit their 
positions. Under the cloak of the Vo/ksgemeinschc.!fl (people's racial community) 
aphorism of the interest of the community coming before the interest of the individual, 
liberal individualism for the few flourished in both the Nazi Party itself and in the 
polyocratic Third Reich,!24l while the doctrine of the Fiihrerprinzip, or leadership 
principle, gave those in positions of power licence to dominate and dictate 
unquestionable orders to those beneath the1n. This manifested itself in the endemic 
levels of corruption which prevailed in the NSDAP and infected government, 
administration, business and society at large to an extent probably never seen before 
or since in German history.125 l 
In order to study whether this propensity of the upper middle classes for 
supporting or identifying with the ideas of the Nazis is a valid thesis, it is necessary to 
look beyond the electoral voting patterns. The actual c01nponent parts of the upper 
middle classes need to be identified and analysed. Much work has been done on 
looking at the professions, such as doctors, lawyers, academics, engineers, higher civil 
servants and even psychiatrists.l261 Most of these studies have tended to show that, 
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from the late 1920s, support for the NSDAP flourished within the official 
organisations of these disciplines and that the Nazi Party itself had enough metnbers 
drawn from these professions to create separate specialist groups for most of them 
within the structure of the Party. This is all grist to the mill of this thesis, but as 
Konrad Jarausch points out, the German professions made up only about 2% of the 
German workforce in the Weimar period, 1271 and therefore they and their dependants 
must have nutnbered roughly the same percentage of the population (or perhaps 
somewhat more, given the greater preponderance of non-working wives and other 
female family members in professional households than in those of lower 
socio-economic classes). Working on the basis of the upper 1niddle class constituting 
about 7-1 0°/o of all Germans, 128 1 this begs the questions of who the rest of this social 
class were and whether they were such keen Nazis as engineers and doctors. 
Undoubtedly a good number of these people were independently wealthy, retired or 
else owned medium-sized businesses and may have supplied a further 3-5°/o of the 
total. The remainder are made up of the more senior salaried ernployees working in 
the private sector, the leitende Ange . ..,·tellten or leading white-collar employees. It is 
this latter group who were chosen for the purpose of providing a case study for 
investigating whether another major component within the upper middle classes as a 
whole exhibited the same ideological tendencies as the professions. 
Very little has been written about senior salaried management in the Wei1nar 
era,l291 and even their numbers are a tnatter of conjecture. Most historical works which 
deal with the socio-economic tnakeup of Germany in the 1920s and 1930s tend either 
to group thetn with the etnployer class or else to make no differentiation between 
senior managers and the rest of the white-collar workforce.1301 When 1 began research 
into who these employees were, whether they had developed a sense of identity and 
what sort of social and economic organisations they might have joined or created to 
safeguard their particular interests, a frequent response of academics with whmn I 
corresponded within the field of Weimar history was to suggest that no such sense of 
c01nmon self-awareness existed, and that senior managetnent was most likely to have 
found representation within the employers, associations.l311 Few seemed to entertain 
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these metnbers. A limited number of published photographs within the pages of Der 
leitende Angestellte in the summer and autumn of 1933 show that the leadership of 
the organisation very quickly donned Nazi uniforms after the Machtiibernahme, while 
a dozen or so leading lights were revealed as long-standing Party metnbers. In 
addition, the editorials of the magazine began lauding the NSDAP and pouring praise 
upon Hitler in March 1933. Within weeks, the periodical was littered with articles 
written by overt Nazis extolling the wisdom of National Socialist economics and 
politics. 
Of course, one has to be sceptical when dealing with post-Machliihernahn1e 
publications. For a start it would have been suicidal not only to have criticised the 
regitne, but even to have attempted to ignore it. One could argue that the only way to 
survive as an organisation in the Third Reich was to appear to embrace National 
Socialistn. However, tnany organisations which attempted this to a greater or lesser 
extent soon went under, most notably the trades unions, political pa1iies and even 
church organisations. Only a few employer associations managed to survive beyond 
1934, and that was due to bribery and a willing acceptance of the political aims and 
economic demands of the Nazi Ieadership. 133 l Equally Gleichschaltung (co-ordination) 
could be achieved by packing the leadership of organisations with NSDAP members 
and forcibly nazifying them. This occurred from the smallest sporting clubs to the 
largest professional organisations across Germany in just a few tnonths in 1933.1341 
However, although VELA did indeed see something of a change in leadership in May 
193 3, very few of the old guard were actually removed, while only a handful of new 
NSDAP outsiders were brought in to join the existing, reshuffled board of directors 
and executive comtnittee tnembers. This suggests that many of the retained (and 
sometimes promoted) leadership were seen as sufficiently ideologically sound to 
retain overseership of such an important organisation of strategically placed managers 
within the German econotny. 
The post-Machtiibernahme atticles in Der leitende Angestellte are therefore 
useful in themselves for showing the degree and nature of VELA members' support 
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for National Socialistn, but what makes them even more revealing is seeing how the 
ideas being propounded after March 1933 are in many cases continuations, 
elaborations or radicalisations of ideas that were being discussed in the journal's 
pages before that date. One of the most itnportant themes seems to have been that of 
the !eitende Angestellten as a unique socio-economic group within German society. 
Over the course of the 1920s and on into the 1930s, the notion that senior 
tnanagement held a special position bridging the divide between workers and the 
owners of the means of production came to be propounded, accepted and garnished 
by editorial writers and contributors to Der leitende Angestellte. It took less than a 
decade for the realisation of the strategically powerful position they held at that 
particular stag·e of capitalist econ01nic and industrial development to develop into the 
self-flattering claim that it was the special spiritual/creative/intellectual nature of their 
work which set thetn apart from other groups or other men. Concurrent with this 
process went the genesis of a belief that their critical position between capital and 
labour endowed thetn with a greater understanding of what was in the national 
interest and somehow made them a group which was more likely to act in a 
disinterested way for the greater national good than greedy capitalists or selfish 
sectarian workers - a noble and selfless technocratic nationalism. 
The adjective they used to describe the apparently sublime character of their 
executive work was geistig, a word which does not translate easily into English. 
While it carries the sense of intellectual or 'of the tnind', it is strongly infused with the 
notion of spiritually-imbued thinking. In much right-vving thought and writing of the 
period in question, the word geistig, often in conjunction with the term Kultur 
(culture), was specifical1y used to contrast with the concept of intellektuell 
(intellectual) thought which was held to be a product of flaccid, foreign-inspired, 
unspiritual and, indeed, unpatriotic ideology. psJ The concept was also associated with 
materialism, and this gave rise to problems for those working \:vithin the very 
materialistic world of tnodern German business: how could they reconcile business, 
industry and indeed the current mode of capitalist production with the essentially 
11 
Romantic and often Arcadian irrationalism (or at least anti-rationalism) which 
informed geistig nationalism? 
Jeffrey Herf has shown how engineers in Gennany in the late 19th and early 
20th century wrestled with the problem of reconciling Technik und Kultur, or 
technology and culture, eventually settling upon technology's creativity factor as its 
spiritual credentials. l36l He described the ideological fruits of this project, which led so 
many engineers to become enthusiastic participants in, and supporters of, the Nazi 
Third Reich, as Reactionary Modernism.P71 This conceptualisation informs part of the 
interpretational framework used in this study to investigate the world-views, 
ideological beliefs and political inclinations of the upper-management members of 
VELA. Many of VELA's members were in fact qualified engineers themselves, but 
chose to join an organisation which united a level of seniority across many professions 
and businesses rather than one which represented only engineers and included the 
lowliest shopfloor draughtsman. Thus it would seem likely that this overlap in 
personnel, areas of expertise and location in the modern economic sector would have: 
led to sin1ilar thinking and similar resolutions bet\veen engineers and upper 
management whether members of VELA, members of other management 
representative associations or unorganised individuals. 
Much more work needs to be done on the role of senior managers in the Third 
Reich to co1nplete the picture of their complicity in the phenomenon of German 
National Socialism. It is clear that senior management in the giant chemical company 
IG Farben were eo-opted to work on, administer and run the Four-Year Plan and did 
so with great enthusiasm. PKI It is also a generally accepted fact that the great majority 
of German big businesses co-operated with, and benefited from, the Nazi regime,P91 
but little research has been carried out to differentiate between the involvement of the 
owners of big business and the involve1nent of their salaried managers in collaborating 
with the Nazi regime or adopting National Socialist beliefs and aims. The case study 
in this thesis covers only a 15-year titnespan between December 1918 and December 
1933 and so the focus in this work is upon the development of an ideology 
' 
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compatible with National Socialism within a maJor component of German upper 
mangement. 
The lower-middle-class or 'Centrist' theory is one that has been around from 
the 1930s and was for a very long time almost universally accepted within liberal and 
Marxist interpretations of the Third ·Reich, and more especially within their analyses 
of the rise and the support for the NSDAP in the years up to 193 3.1401 I intend to show 
that this is not only a mistaken analysis, but also one based upon prejudiced views of 
the lower tniddle classes, often referred to as the petite bourgeoisie whose very 
nomenclature has taken on a pejorative sense of s1nall-mindedness and bigotry. While 
not denying that many among the lower middle classes were indeed narrow-tninded, 
self-itnportant, anti-detnocratic bigots, I would contend that the upper middle classes 
actua11y developed and made respectable much of that way of thinking, and effectively 
encouraged those below them to i1nitate and adopt si1nilar attitudes. Those who 
despise the petite bourgeoisie often castigate them for their slavish and poorly 
executed attempts to mimic their social and economic betters. If this analysis holds as 
true for the lower tniddle classes in the 1920s and 1930s as it apparently does for such 
cotntnentators in all the rest of the modern era~ then the conclusion must surely be 
that the lower middle classes were only aspirant Nazis, while the upper 1niddle classes 
were the real thing! Despite the whimsicality of that line of reasoning, the thesis of 
this piece of work is just that - the upper middle classes were one of the main agents 
of the rise and coming to power of the NSDA.P, as well as helping to provide it with 
an ideology that was more coherent, more 'rational' and more modern than most 
people would like to think of such a barbaric movement. 141 1 
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Chapter 1 
The Great Escape of the 
Upper Middle Class in the Historiography 
ofWeimar and Nazi Germany 
In the years immediately following the Second World War, many Western 
historians tended to see Nazism as a specific manifestation of an inherent German 
disease which had caused this troublesome people to engage in aggressive warfare 
over the centuries, and which had culminated in responsibility for the outbreak of two 
world wars within 25 years of each otherY I By contrast, conservative West German 
historians portrayed Nazism as an aberration, as an alien growth on an othervvise 
sound national development.121 After the sterile 1950s, and 1960s, 
Cold-War-influenced attempts to explain N'ational Socialism as pa1t of a totalitarian 
phenomenon and as generically sitnilar to cmnmunism - certainly as comparable to 
Stalinist communistn13l - there emerged a widely accepted analysis vvhich said that 
Nazism was the direct consequence of Germany's late and unique development as an 
industrialised and urbanising society. This is generally referred to as the .S'onderweg or 
special-path thesis which held that, because Germany's economic modernisation 
process was qualitatively different from that experienced by Britain, France and the 
United States, it underwent a deficient political modernisation process resulting in an 
enduring Jack of liberalistn and detnocracy. The arch-doyen of this thesis was 
Hans-Ulrich Wehler, and it was central to most modern Marxist historical analyses. In 
this analysis the idea of the 'missing bourgeois revolution' was important and became 
an explanatory tool for both Marxist and many liberal historians. In essence this 
concept argued that, because the German bourgeoisie failed to achieve political power 
in the 1848 upheavals, and because Germany was united by conservative and 
aristocratic forces under Bismarck, the old elites continued to guide Germany's 
political destiny and deny the develop1nent of modern den1ocratic structures which 
had occurred in other industrialised countries. When this political arrangement 
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became untenable in the context of the Weimar Republic and repeated econo1nic 
crises, the forces of anti-democratic extremism exploited Gennany's democratic 
deficiency to destroy the fragile parliamentary republic.141 
The internal logic of this thesis suggests that if the bourgeoisie had managed to 
wrest political power away from the traditional elites of aristocracy, Junkers, 1nilitary 
officers and high-ranking civil servants, then the course of German history would 
have followed a less aggressive as well as more democratic course. A more 
convincing interpretation, however, suggests that the upper levels of the bourgeoisie 
settled for a post-1848 compromise~ they opted for economic and social gains, which 
consolidatied their privileged status and position in German society, in exchange for 
the old elites continuing to occupy the major national otftces of state in the political 
sphere, and continuing to enjoy the most prestigious social status of all _!SI Neither the 
liberal nor the conservative bourgeoisie favoured a universal franchiseY;l it was 
Bismarck who introduced manhood suffrage purely for the purposes of political 
advantage to himself and his class.17l 
It might fu1ther be argued that the coming to power of National Socialism \vas a 
sort of late bourgeois revolution, or, to put it much more accurately, and using a term 
more suitable to early 20th-century Germany, an upper-middle-class revolution. By 
the Weimar years, the top levels of what had been the 19th-century bourgeoisie, the 
owners of big business, had long been part of the ruling classes or uppennost elite. [RJ 
It was, at least in part, against this political and economic establishment that the 
German upper n1iddle classes, consisting principally of the professions, the owners of 
medium-sized businesses and the salaried senior managers in larger businesses, were 
in revolt. When the state could no longer organise the political unity of the do1ninant 
classes, as happened in Weimar Germany, and as beca1ne particularly apparent in the 
crisis of the Depression years, the upper middle classes staged their revolution 
through the means of the Nazi Party, aided by a widespread \oss of faith in the 
legitimacy of the political system across all classes.191 Their active role in this ~coup' 
consisted of their electoral support for the National Socialists, widespread 
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membership of the Party, a disproportionate influence and participation in the upper 
ranks of the NSDAP, and a large role in the formulation of Nazi ideology. While the 
aristocratic elite around President Hindenburg played a key role in Hitler's 
appointment as Chancellor, the possibility of such a situation arising only came about 
as a result of the strength of the NSDAP, a strength owing much to 
upper-middle-class support and organisation. 
After the Nazis came to power, even larger numbers of the upper middle class 
embraced the Party and the new regime, collaborating willingly in all its policies, 
including the 'euthanasia' and sterilisation programmes, the ostracisation, persecution 
and eventual extennination of the Jews, the diabolical tnedical experiments in the 
concentration camps, the perversion of the rule of law, and the widespread use of 
slave labour in the German wartime economy.IIOI In essence it was the result of an 
upper-middle-class revolution rather than the Jack of a bourgeois one which 
contributed to the emergence of the Third Reich~ and this revolution was a blatantly 
undemocratic affair, one of whose aims, under a cloak of pious national interest, was 
to enhance the povver and status of the upper 1niddle classes. For a long time this 
educated and we11-to-do sector of German society escaped blame for the rise and 
cotning to power of the Nazis, as well as for its roles in the Third Reich. Many 
historical, political and sociological accounts portrayed them as continuing to support 
alternative nationalist and right-wing parties right up to 193 3, only becoming 
reluctant converts thereafter. 11 1J Instead the lower 1niddle classes or petite bourgeoisie 
were held responsible for providing the NSDAP with its largest support. 1121 Indeed the 
very essence of National Socialism has sometimes been described as a farrago of 
petit-bourgeois prejudices, with Hitler exemplifying the archetypal narrow-minded 
parvenu from the lower middle classes. 
In between the theories of totalitarianism and Sondenveg, there was a brief 
discussion and promulgation of the idea that National Socialism created a social 
revolution in Gennany, that social mobility and social equality increased in the Third 
Reich, and that it was during this era that the power of the traditional old elites - the 
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Junkers, aristocracy and military families - was finally broken. All this paved the way 
for the Wirtscha.ft..\·wunder, or economic tniracle, of the postwar period. This view 
effectively sees National Socialism as a 'tnodernising force', and was put forward 
most notably by Ralf Dahrendorf and David Schoenbaum in the mid-1960s. They 
argued that the social revolution was really the unintended outcome of National 
Socialist policies. Dahrendorf claitned that the Nazis completed the social revolution 
which had been lost in Imperial Germany and held up by the contradictions of Weimar 
- but this was in spite of, and not because of, their intentions. The ·Nazi aim was in 
fact to return to the values of the past, but in order to ho1d on to and consolidate 
power, and in order to carry out imperial conquest as part of their project, they were 
forced to adopt modern means. In particular this meant building up the industrial and 
hence capitalist sector of the nation.ll 31 Schoenbaum described this as a double 
revolution: a revolution of ends which was ideological and directed against bourgeois 
and industrial society, and a revolution of means which was bourgeois and industrial 
and necessaty in order to fight a modern war. What in fact prevailed \vas the 
modernisation process. 1141 
This thesis was much criticised subsequently as euphemising or tending to 
exonerate Nazisxn - it could not possibly be regarded as modernising because this 
itnplied that it was progressive and that it moved Germany forward on to a tnore 
advanced (and, by i1nplication, civilised) phase of its developrnent.1 151 Marxist 
historians in particular condemned this interpretation as apologist, as a bourgeois 
pseudo-doctrine of industrial society and as blatantly anti-Marxist. Perhaps because 
few historians wished to be seen as providing any sort of mitigation for the evils of 
the Nazi regime, the link between National Socialism and modernisation was not 
pursued again until the late 1980s, when modernisation and modernity thetnselves 
were critiqued, and no longer autmnatically accepted as positive nonns or a given 
good.1 161 Perhaps, too, the dominance of the Sonderweg theory in Nazi historiography 
played its part, because the 1970s were largely dominated by Marxist theories -
whether being propounded by their advocates or refuted by their opponents. 
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Both the 1960s' theories of modernisation and the Sonderweg theory portrayed 
the National Socialist phenomeneon as counter-revolutionary in intent and essentially 
backward-looking. Both theories upheld the idea of the 'missing bourgeois 
revolution' which argued that, because of the peculiarity of Germany's fast and late 
industrialisation, there was not a proper adaptation of political culture to the new 
socio-economic developments. A 'proper adaptation' here refers to the model 
pursued by other Western industrialised nations - Belgium, France, Scandinavia and, 
above all, Great Britain and the United States. The structural arguments concerning 
the developmental experiences were put forward by Barrington Moore in The Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, where he saw a relationship between 
'developmental trajectories' and the social composition of the modernising coalition 
(i.e. the governing elite). In Gennany's case the developmental experience was 
uneven or partial, and the governing coalition was dominated by pre-industrial 
survivors, namely the aristocracy and landowners, at the expense of the historically 
progressive bourgeoisie.ll 7l 
The ,_)1onderweg theory has, in its turn, been challenged since around 1979. The 
principal counter-thesis has been expounded by David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley. 
They have firstly argued that the 51onderweg theory is merely a turning on its head of 
an older G·erman nationalist concept of the uniqueness of German historical 
development (arising from the special qualities of her culture and national character, 
an idea which, in the second half of the 19th century, became increasingly associated 
with theories of racial difference). This view, which etnerged at the start of the 19th 
century and endured until 1945, interpreted German history and its 'peculiarity' as a 
positive good. Then, with the apparent culmination of this special historical 
development resulting in the barbarity and shame of the Third Reich, the positive 
interpretation of German uniqueness lost favour and credibility among historians of al1 
political colours.IIRJ It was nearly twenty years before the Sonderweg exponents 
revived this concept, but this time in order to criticise the development of German 
history and society. Now Gennany was seen to be, not the pace-setter of progress, 
but a nation out of step with a perceived nonn of modern industrialised development. 
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Its 'special path' was a negative, aggressive and non-democratic course arising from 
the failure of the 19th-century bourgeoisie to create a healthy and vigorous liberalism 
and from allowing thetnselves to become subordinated to the old, indeed feudal, elites 
of aristocracy, large landowners and the military.' 19 1 
The Sonderweg theory was greatly helped, and probably in part inspired, by the 
appearance of Fritz Fischer1s Griff nach der Weltmacht in 1961. Fischer had argued 
that Imperial Germany was seeking war in Europe from 1912 as part of a policy of 
social imperialism embarked upon by the unaccountable old elites clustered around 
the Kaiser and monopolising the higher levels of government, administration, 
dipl01nacy and the military.1201 This thesis could be used to support the 5'ondel-v.'eg 
theory that it was the lack of a 19th-century bourgeois revolution which allowed 
Germany to remain in thrall to the traditional elites and their ancien-regime values 
and beliefs. Thus the bourgeoisie were feudalised through their subservience to the 
old order and did not pursue genuine parliatnentary governn1ent. Indeed Ralf 
Dahrendorf went so far as to say that in Imperial Germany people were more tied to 
their social position than elsewhere and that this prevented their full participation 
throughout society~ this, he said, caused Germans to 'resist modernity and liberalisin' 
and thus created a particular backwardness in German politics and political 
structures.121 1 M. Rainer Lepsius reinforced this analysis by arguing that Imperial 
Germany experienced an inadequate integration of competing and mutually exclusive 
political and social subcultures which led to the endurance of cntcial eletnents of a 
pre-industrial social order.122l These could be used to explain not only the culpability 
of Germany in bringing on the First World War, but also the coming to power of the 
Nazis, within one deeper and wider structural theory of German historical 
deve1opment.1231 
Arno Mayer expanded upon this interpretation in his 1981 book, The Persistence 
of the Old Regime, by positing the theory of a modern Thirty Years' War, a 
continuity of German history which saw the 1914-18 and 1939-45 conflicts as one 
single war with a 21-year gap in the middle. He claimed that Germany's aims were 
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virtually the sa1ne in both conflicts, and that the drive to i1nperialist expansion arose 
out of the enduring and anachronistic influence of the old pre-industrial elites who 
delayed, assi1nilated and subdued modern capitalist development throughout Europe, 
but especially in the central and eastern areas of the continent. May er argued that the 
German bourgeoisie lacked a sense of class-consciousness and had only a partial and 
lukewarm commitment to liberalism. He said that, while the bourgeoisie shared 
economic interests, they had only limited social and political cohesion. The tuling 
feudal elites succeeded in forcing industrial capitalism to fit itself into existing social, 
class and ideologkal structures and, he argued, thereby largely made it serve their 
purposes. Newcomers to the elite circles were carefully acculturated through 
aristocratic-dominated schools and by demonstrations of willing fealty. The 
bourgeoisie showed 'a rage for co-aptation and ennoblement', they tnarried into the 
nobility, bought landed estates, adopted aristocratic lifestyles and the particular 
arrogance of aristocratic behaviour, educated their sons in elite schools, brought their 
daughters up to be genteel 'ladies' and solicited honours, decorations and patents of 
nobility. Thus, he argued, in courting membership of the aristocracy, the bourgeoisie 
impaired their own class formation and accepted a prolonged subordinate place in 
society. [241 
It is upon these ideas of the 'enfeudalising of the bourgeoisie', their subordination 
to the old elites and their lack of influence upon cultural, social, political and 
ideological currents in 19th- and early 20th-century Germany, that Blackbourn and 
E1ey principally focused their criticism of the 5·onderweg theory.1251 Mayer and 
Wehler, along with Jtirgen Kocka and Heinrich August Winkler amongst others, had 
claimed that, in post-1848 Prussia and post-1871 l1nperial Germany, the bourgeoisie 
had not played a political role commensurate with their economic strength or 
comparable with that of the bourgeoisie in Britain, the United States and France. Each 
of these countries had undergone a bourgeois revolution, in 1688, 1776 and 1789 
respectively, which paved the way for that class to stake a strong claim in the political 
arena. This led to the development of liberal polities which, in turn, produced a 
well-grounded acceptance of democratic institutions and democratic cultures. In these 
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states democracy weathered war and crisis much better than in Germany where a lack 
of liberalism and/or a lack of bourgeois political involvement did not allow democracy 
to take root in either institutions or beliefs. Effectively the revolts of 1848 were seen 
as Gennany's attempt to enact a bourgeois revolution. When this failed, her 
developtnent went off the rails of 'normal' historical progression and produced an 
aberrational society whose tensions and contradictions led it down the paths of 
imperialism, war and Fascism. 
Blackbourn and Eley argued, however, that the bourgeoisie were not as supine or 
as ineffectual as the Sonde1weg proponents have clai1ned. They saw liberal capitalist 
values and institutions increasingly permeating the German lands throughout the 19th 
century. A codified and standardised set of laws began to come into operation in the 
new German Reich from 1871, in particular in the fields of commercial law, finance, 
property rights, labour law, policing and civil law. All these were essential for the 
operations and prosperity of the largest sector of the bourgeoisie - the 
Besitzbiirgertun1 or bourgeois property owners. They required a superior authority, 
the state, to hold the ring of uniform legal codes within which liberal capitalism could 
operate. 1261 A universal company law, a unified currency, abolition of internal tolls and 
tariffs, and tnechanisms for ensuring and enforcing contracts were of greater concern 
to the bourgeoisie than universal suffrage or even bourgeois personal representation 
in the governing circles around the Kaiser and Chancellor. 
Thus it can be argued that the bourgeois view of the state was for it to be an 
enabling authority which enforced the law, and, just like the judiciary who were the 
executors of that function, there was no overwhelming case for it to be democratically 
controlled. The state, of course, does much more than just ensure that the law is 
enforced - it also makes the law, involves itself in economics and creates foreign 
policy. In these realms, to varying degrees, the bourgeoisie sought, not personal 
representation, but influence. The commercial and, above all, the industrial 
bourgeoisie were very effective here in organising their own business pressure groups 
to shape government legislation, in particular on econotnic policy and labour law. The 
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'Iron and Rye' alliance was the most obvious exatnple of bourgeois capitalist muscle, 
even if the subsequent protectionist measures adopted at its behest were contrary to 
pure liberal ideals.l271 However 'liberal' and 'bourgeois' are not synonymous terms; 
the first is political, the second is social. Many of the Gennan bourgeoisie were 
political conservatives, while many liberals, including eventually the National Liberal 
Party, were supporters of protective external tariffs and hostile to anything except a 
limited democracy where the lower classes could not translate their numbers into 
political power. (281 
Blackbourn and Eley argue that the pre-industrial traditional elite groups did not 
achieve or hold on to prin1acy in the German social, or even political, culture in the 
half century up to 1914. They see bourgeois values such as taste, fashion, concepts of 
the law, social order, tnorality, noti0ns of private property and social obligation in the 
ascendancy from about 1860.'291 One tnight also add an acceptance of largely 
laissezfaire entrepreneur capitalism: most of the landowning Junkers were practising 
large-scale market agriculture by the turn of the century, while many noble families 
diversified their landowning wealth into business and industry, at the very least 
through shareholding. Thus, argue Blackbourn and Eley, the bourgeoisie were 
co-equal partners with the old elites in determining Germany's path of development 
because so many of their values had taken root among the ancien rrdgilne and were 
tnotivating factors in the governing cliques' policy-making decisionsY'loJ 
This bourgeois social 'semi-hegemony' did not, however, necessarily require a 
high degree of constitutional liberalism: nor did it require a high level of 
class-consciousness. Nevertheless, it can be argued that there was a coincidence of 
liberal and bourgeois values and beliefs. The explanation for this lies in a 
re-examination of the nature of 19th-century liberalism, both in Germany and in the 
rest of Europe. Eley has argued that 19th-century 1iberalisn1 was more a type of social 
morality and philosophical outlook than a political programme. It was based on the 
central idea of the sovereign individual and took much from the philosophical 
tradition of Bacon, 1-Iobbes and Locke. This emphasised the notion of 'possessive 
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individualism', i.e. that property ownership or wealth showed moral worth and 
bestowed political, social and economic rights or privileges. Universal democracy 
here was seen as the rule of the (unworthy) mob, a view which even the archetypal 
liberal, John Stuart Mill, endorsed through his advocacy of a plural-voting system 
giving multiple votes to men of property or education13 '1 Additionally this 
19th-century liberalism was strongly attached to nationalism, since the creation of the 
nation state was held to be a prerequisite for progress. Without the nation there could 
be no citizen. 
Blackbourn and Eley's final criticism of the Sonderweg theory is based on 
questioning whether there is such a thing as a normative model for the development 
of an industrialised and urbanised society.l321 The assumed model, explicitly defined 
by, among others, Barrington Moore, I-Ians-Ulrich Wehler and Jurgen Kocka as the 
19th- and early 20th-century Anglo-Saxon and north-western European nations, is 
open to many criticisms. Firstly, if the ,Sonderweg is so special, why did fascist, 
authoritarian and would-be totalitarian regimes spring up all over Europe in the 1920s 
and 1930s? By the late 1930s liberal democracies were in a distinct minority across 
the continent. The Sonderweg interpretation seems to suggest that other 
industrialising capitalist nations did not have the latent possibility of Nazistn within 
the1n. This of course opens up the debate about whether Nazism was a variant of a 
generic political system, namely, fascismP31 but whether it was or not, by 1 93 8 the 
regimes of Italy, Hungary, Po1tugal, Poland and Austria were certainly a long political 
ride away from liberal de1nocracy. Why should Germany be compared only with a set 
of nations which fit one particular theory and model of development? Germany is a 
central European country, not a western one, and thus comparison would be more 
appropriate with all the nations of Europe, but perhaps especially with Austria and 
Jtaly. 1341 In this latter comparison German social, economic and political development 
does not look quite so unique or special. 
Secondly, it can be argued that each of the "normative' states had as tnany 
differences as si1niJarities during their periods of industrialisation. Britain's course to 
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industrialisation was purely laissez faire, while that of Belgium involved much more 
state participation. While France and the United States had universal male suffrage for 
most of the second half of the 19th century, Britain did not. Only the United States 
fought a huge civil war as its industrialisation reached take-off; only the United States 
had a tnajor racial problem within its borders (unless of course one sees the troubles 
in Ireland as an ethnic conflict). Where is the equivalent of the British aristocracy and 
its still leading role in parliamentary politics in France, the Netherlands or the United 
States? While Britain and France (with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine and Savoy) 
had been geographically well defined since the 18th centmy, the United States was 
still expanding in North America as late as 1912. Finally, although Britain and the 
United States (except for the period .1860-65) had settled political institutions, 
aJlowing govermnents to change peacefu11y, France underwent at least seven major 
political upheavals involving varying degrees of violence to remove existing regimes 
between 178 9 and 1940. 
Thirdly, there are many sitnilarities between German development and that of the 
putative model 'normative' states. Indeed, Germany at the time was often seen as a 
model herself for modern development. 135J However elitist Imperial Gennan society 
may have been, the British class system matched it all the way in social stratification 
and upper class disdain for the lower orders. All the major nations in question 
dragged their heels over extending democracy, none more so than Britain which still 
had an essentially propertied franchise at the end of the 19th century,l36l and was the 
only industrialised nation with a completely unelected upper house consisting entirely 
of a body of hereditary nobility. With the SPD ('-~1ozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands· or Social Democratic Party) Reichstag vote reaching nearly 35% in 
1912, it was widely expected that Germany would undergo constitutional and 
democratic reform to prevent social unrest emerging. 1371 Connected to that was 
another development where Germany appeared to lead the way - the growth of 
socialist parties and a socialist subculture. The SPD was by far and away the largest 
parliamentary socialist party in the world by the turn of the century, while in the 
United States there was no equivalent left-wing working-class political representation. 
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Trade-union law and membership were at least as advanced in Germany as in any of 
the cotnparable countries by 1914.1381 Germany had as free a press as France or 
Britain, and from 1890 the organisation of political parties was as unhindered as in the 
United States or any other Western state. German civic life was also flourishing 
through a burgeoning network of Vereine (clubs) largely organised and dominated by 
the bourgeoisie.1391 
Eley goes on to argue that, beginning in the 1890s, German political liberalism was 
undergoing a reinvigoration by adopting a synthesis of imperialism and social reform 
involving greater state intervention, social welfare and national solidarity. AJthough 
these ideas began on the left among the Progressive Liberals, by the time of the 
Bi.ilow Block of 1907-09 they had spread into the National Liberals. Thus, not only 
were the socialists in a strong position by 1914, but so too were the liberals, to the 
extent that Eley believes that a liberal regrouping was on the cards by the eve of the 
First World War. These developments in German liberalism bear a strong resemblance 
to the emergence of British New Liberalis1n, and much of the British focus on 
'·National Efficiency' in the Edwardian era arose out of interest in the equivalent 
German exatnple. Eley argues that British liberals actually viewed the Kaiserre;ch as a 
model for many aspects of modernisation~ thus it is difficult ·to see the German 
political systetn as intrinsically backward by cotnparison with the British syste1n or 
British political culture. f40J One could add that, while Germany had a distribution of 
Reichstag seats greatly weighted against the urban working-class masses, and an even 
tnore undemocratic three-tier voting syste1n in the Prussian Landtag and in other 
Lander,r41 1 it had little resembling the political corruption of the pre-1914 United 
States, the electoral gerrymandering and voter exclusion of the American South, or 
the vote-rigging machines of the big cities of the USA such as New York where the 
name Tammany Hall became synonymous with large-scale ballot fraud. 
Fourthly, is the Sonderweg theory, and its reliance upon the companson of 
German developments with a supposedly normative model, not a thoroughly 
teleological interpretation? Does it not lend itself to the notion of 'the end of history'? 
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It can easily be interpreted as history written from the point of view of the victors of 
not one, but two, world wars. In one sense these are France, Britain and the United 
States, but in another it can be seen as looking back from the point of view of the 
ideological victors - liberal democracy, possessive individualism and capitalism. 
Everything, says the theory, was inevitably leading up to present day socio-economic 
conditions and political structures; all deviance was historically inappropriate and led 
to conflict which resolved that anomaly in favour of the strongest central shoot of 
bourgeois/liberal democratic industrial development. I-Iowever, not only are most of 
the Sonderweg theorists German (and hence 'losers' in the first sense), but many are 
also Marxists or influenced by Marxist analysis, and thus unlikely to want to be 
associated with Francis Fukayama•s right-wing capitalist triumphal ism. 1421 Yet the two 
:tre compatible. On a simplistic level Marxism is characterised by a belief that 
capitalist or bourgeois hegemony is a necessary stage in the dialectical process which 
ultimately leads to socialism. Put a different way, Marxists claim that their 
interpretation of history is not a linear one, yet the juxtaposition of a putatively 
normative model of industrial development against the ,._)'onderweg is an essentiallY 
structuralist, and indeed determinist, tnodel where the bourgeoisie is an unarguable 
and given agent of progress. 143l Where the bourgeoisie is thwarted, history takes its 
revenge. 
But were the bourgeoisie so thwarted, repressed or dominated in 1 mperial 
Germany? Studies throughout the 1980s and 1990s have tended to support the 
assertion of Blackbourn and Eley that the bourgeoisie was more politically and 
socially active in the Kaiserreich than was previously believed to be the case. The 
works of Thomas Nipperdey, Rudy Koshar and Celia Applegate, among others, lend 
weight to this view by showing how vibrant bourgeois associational life was across 
Germany, and how influential these Vereine were in shaping attitudes and va]ues.144l 
Other studies demonstrate that tnuch local political power was wielded by bourgeois 
notables; in particular, most German cities remained controlled throughout the 
Imperial era by the bourgeois liberal parties.1451 .Patriotic groups such as the 
Pan-German League and the Navy League were gung-ho nationalists and jingoists 
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who urged on the govermnent to greater imperialist and expansionist undertakings 
than even the I<aiser was prepared to countenance - and these associations were 
stacked full of the bourgeoisie. 1461 
It is also scarcely debatable that the most powerful of all the bourgeoisie, the 
bankers and industrial magnates such as Krupp van Bohlen, exercised power and 
influence on the government, and even to an extent upon the court, because of their 
vast wealth, their control of vital sectors of the modern economy and their networks 
of relationships and patronage. The proble1n, of course, is in deciding where the haut.e 
bourgeoisie ends and the nobility begins. If a man was a massively wealthy and 
powerful commoner on a Monday, but was elevated to Baron on a Tuesday by 
cotnmand of the Kaiser, his wealth and power remained the same yet somehow his 
social position is deemed to have changed; he is now an aristocrat instead of a 
bourgeois~ he is now part of the 'old elite' of presumed traditional, indeed nee-feudal, 
values. But of course, Krupp's beliefs and cast of tnind did not change overnight. I-Ie 
was still a social and political conservative and elitist as well as an economic liberal (at 
least in the domestic realm) the day after he \vas ennobled. Bourgeois, or indeed 
liberal, econotnic views came to be embraced by the traditional nobility of Germany as 
the 19th century progressed, while the bulk of the bourgeoisie always aspired to the 
social cachet of a title. Few German bourgeois eschewed the opportunity of adding 
'von' to their names out of any sense of class-consciousness.1471 The plain fact is that 
aristocratic and bourgeois values, and even aspects of culture - from the acceptance 
of market capitalism to the fashion for beards, fi·om arrogant elitist snobbery to a rage 
for uniforms, from anti-Se1nitism to villa-dwelling - were increasingly convergent. 
Each influenced the other as the haute bourgeoisie grew richer and more powerful, 
while the upper middle class of professionals, managers and the owners of 
medium-sized businesses tailgated them and aspired, in the main, not to alter or 
abolish Germany's hierarchical system, but to join the ranks of the elite. 
Is there not an argument for saying that if the bourgeoisie were in fact co-equal 
partners with the traditional elites in the development of German society and politics, 
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as Blackbourn and Eley have argued, then they tnust have been one of the particular 
forces in Germany driving the country on to vvorld war and National Socialism? And 
if that is the case, then it is possible to argue that either the bourgeoisie/upper middle 
class, or liberal values or the very nature of industrialising capitalistn harboured the 
latent possibility of Nazism, fascism or some other extreme authoritarianism within 
them. This once more brings into question the very idea of modernisation as a 
progressive force. 
A further implication of the Sonderweg and related theories is that they see 
Nazism, its appeal and its followers as products of a perceived threat posed by 
industrial capitalism. Although it is the aristocratic and landed classes who, as 
pre-tnodern elements, are deemed to have created the peculiar path of German history 
and a1lowed the conditions for anti-democratic extremists to achieve political power, 
it is a different pre-modern element which is held to have provided the mass support 
for the rise of the Nazis. This was the old Mittelstand (1niddle estate/class) of peasant 
farmers, craft workers, stnall businesstnen and shopkeepers. In the Imperial era thes~ 
people had looked to the Kaiser as a bulwark and champion of the small independent 
1nan.f481 I-Iowever, even before 1 9 "18, they had already become insecure, not least 
because of the rise of the SPD. After the abolition of the monarchy, this social class 
became doubly anxious and politically disoriented, unable to find effective 
representation in the bourgeois parties of Weimar, and implacably hostile to the left. 
This caused them, as 'losers' in the modernisation process of industrial capitalisJn,149l 
to turn to the NSDAP for reasons which were essentially backward-looking and 
anti-capitalist. The old Mittelstand is then (arbitrarily) expanded by the addition of 
lower-level white-collar workers in both the public and private sectors to become the 
petite bourgeoisie which is deemed to have comprised Hitler1s core supporters prior 
to and after 193 3. rsoJ The objections to this eliding of distinct elements of the lower 
middle class are discussed below. 
The idea that Nazism was a petit-bourgeois phen01nenon goes back a long way. It 
was first put forward in the 1930s by Theodor Geiger who coined the phrase 'Panik 
32 
iln Mittelstand' ('panic in the middle class') to describe the fear of the petite 
bourgeoisie of being crushed between the millstones of big business and organised 
1abour.l51J This fear supposedly drove· the lower middle class into the arms of the 
Nazis, the party most vociferously promising to restore some mythical status quo ante 
of a golden age of the middle class. This thesis was se1ninally formulated in the works 
of the sociologist William Kornhauser, and in the better known work of Seymour 
Martin Lips et, Political Man. rs2J However Geiger, Kornhauser and Lip set all 
supported their theories with very little empirical research, while Lipset used the 
membership lists of the NSDAP to support his assertion that this was a 
lower-middle-class party attracting a lower-middle-class electorate. Yet pa11y 
tnetnbership and party electorate are typically two somewhat different constituencies. 
The theoretical exegesis of this lower-middle-class analysis or 'Centrist Theory' in 
liberal historiography has been to see transformations created by advanced capitalism, 
urbanisation and industrialisation threatening the interests of the petite bourgeoisie: 
smal1 businesses folding, peasant farmers fearful of the growing power of city-based 
political parties, and the civil service and private-sector white-collar workers alarmed 
by the prospect of proletarianisation. Strongly attached to their social status, these 
groups turned away from the ineffectual bourgeois parties to the movement promising 
to act decisively and vigorously to protect them against both the <Bolshevik menace' 
and rapacious big-business capitalism - the Nazi Party.rs3J ·Marxist theory has also 
consistently accepted the lower-middle-class thesis, seeing this sector as providing a 
deluded tnass base for the Nazis while the movement was controlled and paid for by 
the ha~te bourgeoisie. While recent research has undennined the control element of 
this theory~ even those Marxist revisionists who have discarded the idea that 
industrialists and other leading capitalist elements financed the Nazis and manipulated 
them politically, have not jettisoned the lower-tniddle-class thesis. 1541 Indeed, the 
adoption of the Bonapartist theory by some revisionist Marxists has, if anything, 
added weight to the argument, since the generally accepted view of the accession to 
power of Napoleon Ill portrays the peasant and small-business classes of 1850s, 
France as his bedrock support. 1551 
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It is tempting to infer that both liberal and Marxist historiography and 
interpretation have uncritically accepted the flimsy empirical basis of the Centrist 
Theory for ideologicalJy or morally didactic reasons. Marxist thought has had a vested 
interest in seeing the working class as the repository of anti-fascism and the hope for 
a socialist future~ liberal historians have been reluctant to face up to the frightening 
and disorienting idea of the whole width of modern society being the Nazi 
constituency - especiaHy perhaps the educated upper middle class which most of these 
historians inhabit. 
Among the many cotntnentators and historians who have supported the 
lower-tniddle-class theory are Hennann Rauschning, Lothar Kettenacker and Michael 
Kater.[56l These three can be singled out for one thing they have in com1non. Each of 
them not only sees social class support for the Nazis as being rooted in the lower 
middle class, but also specifically relates Nazi ideology to petit-bourgeois prejudices 
and mentalities. 
The significance of the work of Hermann Rauschning lies in the fact that he was 
writing his interpretation of the Nazi phenomenon fi·om first-hand experience. l-Ie had 
been born into tninor landed nobility in West Prussia and, when the dust settled on the 
Versailles Treaty, it transpired that his family estate now lay within the borders of 
newly-resurrected Poland. Rauschning gravitated towards the revisionist Nazi Party 
which he joined, quite late, in 1932. He quickly becatne a confidant of Hitler and was 
appointed President of the Danzig Senate, falling foul of older Inembers of the 
Free-State NSDAP who perceived him as an opportunist bandwagon-jumper. Within 
two years he had become disillusioned with, and alarmed at, the nature of Nazism 
which he perceived as un-Christian,l51l and not at all representative of the right-wing 
conservatism in which he himself believed. Fleeing to Switzerland, then Britain and 
finally the United States, he wrote an impassioned but fairly scholarly (or at least 
· 11 I) ·t· of tlle Nazi regime entitled Die Revolution des Nihilismus (The mte ectua en tque 
Revolution ofNihilistn) which was published in 1938. This work was translated the 
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following year into English under the inaccurate but catchy title Ciermany's 
Revolution of Destruction, and went on to become a best-seller. rssJ More importantly, 
Rauschning's critique became a basis for much of the historiographical treatment of 
National Socialism and the Third Reich over the next half century.1591 I-Iis central 
thesis, lost in the revised title, was that Nazism was essentially a doctrineless doctrine, 
an amorphous ideology whose only constant was the pursuit of power; it was devoid 
of principles and hence intrinsically atnoral. Out of this conviction arose his 
condemnation of National Socialism as (nihilism, ..... the total rejection of any sort of 
doctrine, [which] must develop of necessity by its own logic into an absolute 
despotism'. [GOJ 
Although Rauschning had a genuine moral repugnance of the Nazis, he was 
nevertheless an extreme right-wing politician\ an admirer of Edgar J ung and a member 
of the Herrenkluh, a Berlin gentlemen's club for the aristocratic elite among whose 
leading lights was Franz von Papen. 161 1 This meant that, although he came to despise 
the Nazi methods, he nonetheless agreed with most of their political aims up until the 
1niddle 1930s.'62J I1nportantly, however, his falling out with the Party, ofwhich he was 
a senior metnber, owed much to the perpetual rivalry and back-stabbing which 
characterised the NSDAP leadership in the Third Reich. Perhaps nothing shocked him 
more dratnatically than the Rohm Purge of June 1 934, under cover of which Edgar 
Jung was murdered and Franz von Papen narrowly avoided the same fate.l 631 
Rauschning, like Jung, who wrote Rule (~f the It!feriors,l64 l was an anti-democratic 
radical and cultural elitist who was greatly influenced by the works of Nietzsche and 
Pareto. [os) He despised the lower orders (but in a generally paternalistic, if 
supercilious, fashion owing to his deeply-held Christian and conservative beliefs), and, 
in perhaps typically upper-class style\ this scorn was pat1icularly reserved for the 
lower middle class. While he bestowed faint praise upon the working class as 
bulwarks of moderation and (misguided) integrity, his intense dislike of shopkeepers, 
c1erks and small businessmen is palpable within the pages of Germany's Revolution of 
Destruction. What is particularly significant about his analysis is that he equates Nazi 
Party membership with the lower middle class, and National Socialist 1nentality with 
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the outlook of that apparently benighted class. This is quite openly stated throughout 
the book, as for example: 
The class of the population frOJn which the great bulk of the first elite 
sprang [was] the small shopkeeper class, which is also the c1ass from 
which the bulk of the faithful came. 1661 
Is National Socialism the "Salvation Arrny of German patriotism", as a 
cynical critic maintained? There is something in the idea. The 
movement has made the small traders and lower middle class its 
backbone, instead of the Storm Troopers. And the whole machinery of 
the party is built up out of lower middle-class elements. 1671 
These statements by Rauschning are mere assertions of the sociological make-up 
of the Nazi Pa11y and are even more impressionistic than the above-mentioned works 
of Geiger and Lipset. However, this ex-Nazi's opinions and interpretations carried a 
good deal of persuasive influence in contemporary and subsequent conceptualisations 
of the NSDAP. This was presumably due to the fact that he was one of the few 
people who had talked at length with Hitler,168 J had been in a position of power and 
inside knowledge within the Party and, especially importantly in the J 940s, had come 
over to the other side to denounce the enemy eloquently and in high moral tones, yet 
without renouncing his innate Germanness and tragic patriotism. He thus seemed to 
embody both empirical experience and chastened self-examination, two qualities 
which might appear to be part of an elixir of truth and dispassionate analysis. 
It seems clear, however, that Rauschning's analysis came laden with much 
ideological, psychological and cultural baggage. Rauschning \Vas an upper-class, 
elitist nationalist who needed to find an explanation for the terrible path down which 
his country had travelled. While he condemned the unscrupulous and opportunist 
course taken by German conservatism since the First World War, he characterised the 
likes of Hugenberg and the DNVP as being not genuine conservatives but unspiritual 
reactionaries.1691 Thus authoritarian right-wing politics were neither ultimately nor 
inherently to blame. Furthermore, his belief in a hierarchical, in egalitarian but paternal 
Christian society led him on to consider that the cause must lie in some challenge to 
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the 'proper order'. l-Ie might have looked to the working class and the threat of 
Marxist revolution, but he had . a strange and erratic view of that class. This was 
undoubtedly influenced by Romanticism, but whereas normally it is the peasantry 
which is idealised in such a world-view, for Rauschning it was the respectable 
working class. This is a position rather similar to the urban Romanticism of that most 
extreme of volkisch writers, Ernst Junger.1701 Rauschning differentiated this social 
grouping from the proletariat, but he nowhere made it clear who this dangerous class 
might be or how it differed from the working class. !?ll Instead he chose to vilify the 
uppity parvenu lower middle class, whom he had identified as making up the bulk and 
brain of the NSDAP. His prejudice against this whole atnorphous class is evident in 
the unsupported pejorative statements he made about its mentality and tnorality: 
It used to be regarded as a sign of lower middle-dass conventionalism 
to carry moral principles into political life. I think the time has come 
for correcting this view. It is precisely the lower middleclass element in 
National Socialism that has thrown over all moral inhibitions as 
conventional and contemptible. (nJ 
This preference for violence as the typical revolutionary method is not 
inconsistent with the crafty and vety successful appeal of National 
Socialism to lower middle-class self-righteousness,l13l 
[I]t wili surprise nobody that the National Socialist revolutionary elite 
are entirely without moral inhibitions, and that individually they reveal 
so strange a mixture of extreme nihilism with an unashamed adoption 
of the ways of the half-educated lower 1niddle class. P4J 
The magic of leadership is magic primarily for such types as these. 
They reveal not only the "fury of partisanship" but the enviousness and 
lust for domination of the lower middle class. psJ 
The [National Socialist] philosophy is beginning to reveal. its 
insincerity. It is losing its propaganda value as a means of suggestto~. 
It is becoming an actual stumbling block for the followers. It ts 
revealing, in such persons as the Jew-baiter Julius Streicher, the lower 
middle-class character of its originsY61 
Someone who appears to have been influenced not only by Rauschning's 
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interpretation of National Socialism as a nihilistic doctrine, but also by his opinion of 
Gennan lower-middle-class values and characteristics is Lothar Kettenacker. In his 
essay 'Hitler1s Impact on the Lower Middle Class' he stated this quite clearly: 
It is the purpose of this chapter to show that [Hitler] was more 
specifically the mouthpiece of the German lower 1niddle class, the 
unterer Mittelstand in sociological terms, or more to the point, the 
Kleinbiirgertum (petit-bourgeoisie).1771 
[It] can safely be said that on the whole Hitler's message was most 
favourably received by the half-educated, yet self-righteous lower 
middle class, such as artisans, shopkeepers, low grade e1nployees and 
civil servants. [?&J 
Hitler's immense popularity can be explained by the representative 
character of his mentality~ he was and remained the most outspoken 
petit bourgeois of his time. 1791 
This 'representative character' is then defined in the following paragraph as 
repressed philistinism, anti-intellectualism, misogyny and common taste which were 
'widely shared by the half-educated classes in Germany'. rsoJ A wealth of assumptions, 
prejudices and finger-pointing is contained in this par1icularly illuminating paragraph. 
It suggests most strongly not only that the petite bourgeoisie were ardent Nazi 
supporters, but that lower-middle-class ideology or world-views were ahnost 
synonymous with National Socialism, or even that the lower middle class was 
responsible for Nazis1n. Secondly, the citing of 'common taste' in such a pejorative 
manner reeks of snobbishness. Misogyny is undoubtedly a moral failing, while 
anti-inteiJectualism is equally a prejudicial viewpoint~ but philistinism and being half--
educated? These are insults not analysis. Thirdly, why cite the lower middle class as 
the repository of such characteristics? Extreme male chauvinism, if not downright 
misogyny, was in evidence in all classes in Weimar Germany. How many leaders of 
industry or university professors were women in the 1920s or 1930s? Why did the 
. c. I fi ?181J 
Social Democratic Party and the trade umons not tavour equa pay or women. 
'Philistinism' was not the sole preserve of the uneducated or 'half-educated'; 
condemnation and demonisation of modern art, of Cubism and Expressionism, of 
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atonal mustc and jazz preoccupied the wealthy and educated far more than 
self-employed craftsmen, sales .~Jerks, butchers or peasant farmers. As for 
anti-intellectualistn, Jeffrey Herf has shown that this became a world-view widespread 
among many Gennans who had undergone higher education - engineers, chemists and 
even university professors who, in all seriousness, strove to 'think with the blood' in 
the Third Reich.1821 
Even more indicative of a cultural1y elitist or downright arrogant view of the 
lower tniddle class comes from Michael Kater. In his book The Nazi Party he declares 
that 'industriousness or love of hard work' and (anti-intellectuality, ideological 
dogmatistn, xenophobia, bureaucratic formalism, and authoritarian traditionalistn' 
were characteristics of, and specific to, the petite bourgeoisie. fR3l T-T e continued: 
These inclinations and their extensions constitute a catalogue of values 
that may be said, on the one hand, to have been gennane to the 
German lower middle class and, on the other, to have possessed a 
special potential for breeding fascist proclivities.' 841 
It seetns to me, however, that hard work and industriousness are not specifically 
German lower-middle-class characteristics but (and even this is debatable) simply 
German qualities. From landless labourers and coalminers to shopkeepers and 
accountants, from management to moguls, the ethos of long hours and diligent toil 
has been a much lampooned feature of Germans as a whole. While it has been greatly 
exaggerated for effect by both Germanophobes and Germanophiles (and indeed by 
Gennans thetnselves!), such national stereotypes usually contain at least a modicum 
of truth. Rarely has it ever been suggested that this characteristic is class-specific.1851 
As for the accusation of dogmatism, this could as easily be levelled at the KPD 
(Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands), or Communist Party, with its predo1ninantly 
working-class membership and electorate, or the anti-Weimar, conservative and 
monarchist DNVP with its overwhelmingly haut-bourgeoifl\ aristocratic and landed 
leadership and its disproportionate number of well-off followers. 'Xenophobia, 
bureaucratic formalism and authoritarian traditionalism' surely permeated the upper 
middle class and upper class at least as much as the lower tniddle cl~ss. Authors of 
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authoritarian and jingoistic works, such as Oswald Spengler, Edgar Jung, Ernst 
JOnger, Karl Haushofer, Hans Grimm and Arthur MoeJler van den Bruck, who helped 
to sustain and popularise anti-democratic, arch-nationalist prejudices, were most 
certainly not lower middle class. They in fact possessed yet another prejudice - a 
scornful despising of the petite bourgeoisie as either vulgar aspirants, ill-educated 
philistines or a mediocre herd. 
Kater thus singles out a whole vast and variegated class from all the rest and 
dan1ns it as morally and intellectually lacking. But it gets worse! He also claims that 
the lower middle class, being suspicious of formal knowledge, tended to replace 
'rational categories by emotional and even magical values' .rsoJ He then goes on to 
describe RudolfHess and Fritz Sauckel as examples of such believers, despite the fact 
that Hess caJne from a distinctly upper-middle-class family who owned a substantial 
exporting business, that he was an officer in the Great War, and that he attended 
Munich University.f&?J Sauckel, ironically, was in fact the only member of the 
Reichsleitung, or leadership of the Third Rejch, of 3 7 men who was of working-class 
origin, his tnother having been a seamstress, his father a posttnan and he himself a 
merchant seaman and construction worker. [&KJ Kat er continues over the next few 
paragraphs to portray the lower middle class as sad speci1nens who preferred 
character to critical faculty, trustfulness over inquiry: 
[A] basically atnbivalent attitude on the part of the German petit 
bourgeois toward matters of the mind and their sociological 
derivatives, such as higher education and artistic creativity, has always 
been one of the quintessential characteristics of lower-middle-class 
mentality, thus compounding its complexity. The capacity to begin a 
chain of thought without developing it to some definite conclusion 
distinguished the German Kleinbiirger (petit bourgeois) both frotn the 
worker, who refused to think at all, and from the Bildungshiirger (1nan 
of culture), who thought sequentially.1891 · 
What astounding intellectual and class snobbery is displayed in such statements. It 
presents the unedifYing spectacle of an upper-middle-class professor looking down his 
nose at a stubbornly stupid working class and a lower tniddle class of universally 
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jumped-up half-educated cretins. This impression is bolstered by a later piece of 
analysis where Kater · clai1ns that the Third Reich spoils system arose from the 
lower-middle-class mentality of 'materialistically minded shopkeepers, white col1ar 
workers, or even lower civil servants, who gradually entrenched themselves j0 
positions of power,[and] found it harder to resist temptations to enrich themselves 
than had members of the o]d elite, who were either too high-minded or too wealthy to 
succumb' _f901 
But why should lower-middle-class Germans be more matedalistic and possess 
less moral fibre than the owners of Krupps or AEG? Were the villa-dwelling upper 
management of IG Farben reaiJy not interested in their 15,000 marks per annum 
incomel91 J or the possibility of enhanced power? Was the upper-Iniddle-class llennann 
Goering not an avaricious man?1921 What were the social origins and background of 
I-Ians Frank, the personal plunderer of Poland?1931 Why 1night a shipping clerk be more 
materialistic than a sheet-metal worker? The claiin that the educated and wealthy 
might be more high-minded than the less schooled and less prosperous petite 
bourgeoisie is sitnply an unfounded statement of prejudice, if not one of jaundiced 
wishful thinking on the part of the author. 
Kater sees the above-tnentioned narrow-minded ethos running through all levels 
of the Nazi Party, an assertion which has Jnuch truth to it~ but the provenance of this 
ethos is much tnore problematic than his class-specific conclusion would have us 
believe: 
Although it would be incorrect to clai1n that the entire Nazi 
functionary corps was staffed by "typically frustrated 
lower-middle-class individuals" or by "marginal petty bourgeois", there 
is no doubt that the representatives of that class were in the absolute 
majority. Hence the leadership corps wa~ stam~~d by the val~~ syst~m 
of the German lower-middle-class, and tts poht1cal and ad~mistrattve 
actions can be viewed as the product of lower-middle-class 
mentality. 1941 
The value system predominating at the lower leadership levels of the 
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Nazi Party, the system that spread to the higher levels and worked 
even beyond the party to put its stamp on Gennan society, was that of 
the lower middle class. For in spite of the relatively strong 
representation of the social elite (accompanied by a correspondingly 
weak representation of the working cJass), the lower middle class was 
consistently in the absolute majority in all but the very highest 
functionary bodies. This state of affairs, or rather mentality, was made 
possible by the political changes instituted after January 1 933, which 
sanctioned the rule of the "plebeians", as Lerner termed the mass of 
Nazi Jeaders. As a consequence, despite the heavy numerical 
represe~tation of the Gennan elite at the top of the NSDAP leadership, 
the sociocultural value system to which the elite would normaJJy have 
subscribed would have been completely overshadowed by the value 
system of the lower middle class, as had been the case before 1933.1951 
Kater is firstly arguing that, because the lower middle class was in a majority in 
the Nazi Party, and because a whole range of prejudices of the sort listed above 
penneated the Nazi Party, then the lower middle class must have been an inherently 
prejudiced social group as a \V hole. This is a classic case of a syllogism, but not only 
in the sense that it has two premises and a conclusion, but in the other sense of a 
sy11ogism - specious argUJnent or sophistry. 
Secondly, Kater is argumg that because the lower middle class constituted a 
majority at every level of the NSDAP, except the very top leadership, its values must 
therefore have dominated and indeed shaped the ethos, and hence ideology, of the 
Nazi Party. They 'completely overshadowed' the 'normal' socio-cultural value system 
of the elite. If this argument were true, then the pr~judices and mentalities which he 
accurately indicates as being representative of the Party, must have arisen out of this 
class. But how often do sheer numbers or even absolute majorities determine the 
locus of opinion forming in any hierarchical society or organisation? The movers and 
shakers of Tsarist Russia were certainly not the peasantry who made up 85% of the 
population, while the working-class employees who constituted at least 90% of 
United Steel's personnel had very little say in the direction of policy or the corporate 
ethos of that German company. 
In modern, non-communist, industrialised, urban societies for the last century, the 
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upper middle class, in conjunction with the small upper class and haute bourgeoisie 
(referred to by Kater as the 'elite'), have been recognised by scholars of all sorts of 
disciplines as powerful opinion-formers. Indeed it has been recognised that their 
opinions probably make most impact upon that ·layer of the population immediately 
below thetn - the lower middle class. Writers like Rauschning, Kettenacker and Kater, 
who appear to look down on the petite bourgeoisie, have often characterised (and 
derided) its members as aping the behaviour of the cultured and educated upper 
middle class. Why, therefore, in the case ofNational Socialis1n, are they for once seen 
as the pace-setters of politics, morality, taste and prejudice? The usual analysis, and 
the argument from historical observation, is that ideas and opinions tend to flow 
downwards, or that more powerful social groups, almost invariably in a nutnerical 
minority, influence lesser groups far more than they in turn are influenced by the 
latter. This is supported by David Blackbourn in The Gennan Bourgeoisie where he 
talks about the separation of the Mittelstand in the later 19th century into bourgeoisie 
and petite bourgeoisie and about the craving of the latter to become like their social 
betters: 
[The] more substantial and secure petty-bourgeois households became 
a classic case of bourgeois social influence - the master craftsman or 
draper aspiring to the piano in the drawing room, played upon 
occasionally by a non-working daughter. This relationship found a 
parallel in the milieu of clubs and local associations: if bourgeois 
notables - tniddling and senior officials, grammar-school teachers, 
doctors, lawyers, or merchants - took leading roles, it was commonly 
the case that a publican, pharmacist, or reputable tradesman would fill 
the post of secretary.1961 
That the Nazi party had a large and disproportionate lo'vver-middle-class 
membership is not in doubt. Kater shows admirably in his study that this was the case; 
indeed, he shows that the lower middle class constituted an absolute 1najority in the 
NSDAP throughout the Weimar and Third Reich years at every level except the very 
top. Figure l shows the proportions of the social classes which tnade up the various 
levels of the Nazi Party over the years between 1929 and 1942. Kater's own statistics 
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Lower I Lower Middle I Elite I 
German Population by Social I I 
-· 
Class I 933 (Kater) 54.6 i 42.7 2.8 --· 
NSDAP Joiners 1930-32 35.9 ~ 54.9 9.2 
NSDAP Joiners 1933 30.7 57.1 12.2 
NSDAP Joiners 1934-36 33.3 57.0 9.7 
NSDAP Joiners 1938 33.2 57.8 9.0 -
NSDAP Members 1942 
I 
22.8 66.8 10.5 -- -
I 
Kreisleiter 1941 11.3 70.4 I 18.3 
~oc_~peputies 1933 24.8 
~~<-~1-----
16.1 
~-~ichstag Deputies ] 933 12.3 36.0 ••- -·--u .. _ 
j 
···-·-·····-· 
Gauleiter 1929 7.7 51.3 ! 41.0 - -
· :H-___ §- _ !H ---Gauleiter 1930 7.9 Gauleiter 1931 1 "1.6 
! 
-
Gauleiter 1933 14.3 - -
Gauleiter 1941 16.3 51.2 32.6 





Agency Heads 1941 3.7 46.6 49.7 
--r---------
Reichsleitung 1933-451 I [Kater' s field of 24] 0.0 __ j_ 29.2 70.8 -- -------···-~ 
···---------
German Population by Social r 
c41-q Class 1933 {this study) c49 c7-10 
Reichsleitung 
[My field of 3 7] 1933-45 2.7 21.6 : 75.7 
Figure 1. Percentages of social classes at various levels in the NSDAP.f97J 
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have been used to compile this composite table, and his social-class paradig1ns 
have been followed, despite the fact that he employs a very low estimate of the size of 
the upper middle class (2.44% of the whole German population), and combines it 
with a category he caBs 'entrepreneurs' (0.34%), to produce a social group he titles 
the 'elite' which makes up only 2.78% ofthe population.1981 
From the table it can be seen that, while the lower middle class are the largest 
single group at all levels except Agency I-Ieads in 1941 and the 1933-45 
Reichsleitung, nevertheless the upper middle class (or Kater's elite) are 
overrepresented from the bottom of the NSDAP to the top. The only period of time 
which allows a snapshot comparison of this overrepresentation at different levels of 
the Party is 1941-42. Here it can be seen that 10.5°/o of the general membership of the 
NSDAP is from Kater's elite, a 270% overrepresentation when compared to the Reich 
population figure of 2. 78%. Although the latter figure is from 1933, it seems unlikely 
that the social profile of Germany changed much in eight or nine years, since the Nazi 
revolution was not about changing social structures, but about altering consciousness 
and political direction. At Kreisleiter or district level the upper middle class 
constituted 18.3% of the office holders, a 560% overrepresentation~ at C/auleiter or 
district level it constituted 32.6%, a I ,070% overrepresentation; at the level of Reich 
agency head it made up 49. 7%, a 1,690% overrepresentation~ and at Kater's 
Reichsleitung level it formed 70.8%, a 2,450% overrepresentation.1991 
Of particular interest is the social make-up of the Reichsleitung. This group can 
be identified absolutely, while biographical details are in great supply for most of its 
individual members. Social stratification can therefore be based upon the entire field 
and not just upon a presumed representative sample, thus making accuracy of 
categorisation that much more reliable. In such a hierarchical and anti-democratic 
system as National Socialistn, where power and opinion most definitely had a strong 
tendency to flow downwards, examination of the topmost elite would seem to be of 
particular importance when deciding which 'class ethos' dominated, or rather from 
which class the ethos-makers largely came. It cannot of course be assutned, just 
45 
f';jliiJ/Nll.~~:.tltlilllii!UIIIr~~-;a..~i>~llf~~II!HI:V/J&'~rll61~~ •• .. ,J · ~.W~TmWP..IfOI'I.tNrA'~~.t/1~ 
u g 
~ Reichsleiter Social Background Class Newnann K•~er ~ 
~ {j ~~Al~n~m;;,an~--~1v1~a~x~----~~~e=rc~h~a~n7t~~b~m~i~n~es~·s-s~ch~D-o~1-w-a~d~u-m-e--~L~M~C~---x------x~~ 
~Axmann Artur Law student LMC " 
~ Backe I-Ierbert Farmer~ lecturer; universit de ee UMC ~ ~ 
Best Werner Lawyer; university degree & PhD UMC ~ 
l
j Bormann Martin Inspector of farmlands LMC x x ~ 
Bouhler Philipp WWl lieutenant; university degree UMC x x ~I 
Buch Waiter WWI major UMC x x ~ 
lDam! Walther A8J:onomist; universi~ degree UMC x x ~ 
1~Dietrich Otto Political scientist; university degree :~ 
~ &~ n 
~Epp Franz von Retired general ~~ ~ ~ ~ 
~Fiehler Karl Lower civil servant LMC x x g 
~Frank Hans Lawyer; university degree UMC x x 3 
~Prick Wilhehn Hi her civil servant; univ. de ree UMC x x ~ 
~tFriesler Ro]and Lawyer~ university degree UMC x ~1 
~Funk Walther Journalist, editor; university degree UMC x ]~ 
f{Goebbels Joseph Literature critic; university degree & ~ 
~J~· PhD UMC X X :~ 
t) !I 
lr. Goering .Hennann Retired captain UMC x x ~~; 
k1 Grim m Willy Lower civil sevant LMC x x ,;; 
F I 
~ I-Iess Rudolf University assistant; un.1v. degree UMC x :J 
t1Heydrich Reinhard Naval officer UMC x ~ 
t~ Hierl Konstantin Retired colonel lJMC x x !'· 
~Himmler Heinrich Agronomist; university degree UMC x x i 
~!Hitler Adolf ·unetn lo ed, WWl infant man LMC fi 
~~ 
~I-Htlmlein Adolf Retired tnajor UMC x x :1 
~ Latnmers Hans Judge, higher civil servant; ~ 
un1vers1 de ee UMC rJ. 
1
Ley Robert Chemist; university degree & PhD UMC x x ~ 
LLutze Viktor WWl officer(from ranks), merchant LMC x x ~ 
~~,R~i=b~b~en-t-ro-p---Jo~a~c~h~im __ v_o_n __ B--us_i_n-es_s_m_an~------~~--------~-~~~C~---x------x---f.~ 
~ Rohtn Ernst Retired captain UMC x M 
~ Rosenberg Alfred Architect; university degree UMC x x :i 
~Rust Bemhard WW 1 lieutenant; head teacher; ~ 
~~----------------~un~iv~e~rs~i~cy~d~e~~~e~e~~----~------~~=C~--~x~------;J 
I~ Sauckel Fritz Merchant seaman. factory worker WC :~ 
Schirach C 
~ 
Baldur von University student UM x ~ 
Thierack Otto Lawyer, public prosecutor; Wliversity r,1 
UMC ~ ~ degree & PhD ~ 
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because the upper middle class dominated the leadership of the Nazi Party, and 
because the NSDAP leaders embodied all the prejudices of National Socialistn, that 
the German upper middle class was therefore all of that cast of mind. That would be a 
syllogism similar to Kater's conclusion about the lower middle class. Nevertheless, 
with the great overrepresentation of the upper middle class throughout the Party 
rising to massive levels at the very top, the likelihood or probability of this 
observation having some truth to it is far greater than Kater's hypothesis. 
My own estimate of the size of the German upper tniddle class, based in large 
measure upon Richard Hamilton's schema in Who Voted For Hitler, puts the 
proportion in the general population at somewhere between 7% and 1 Oo/o 
' 
considerably larger than Kater's 2.78%. 110 CJ However, in ·Figure 2, which shows the 
social background of the Reich leadership in the years 1933 to 1945, only one 
member of Kater's Reichsleitung whom he designated as lower tniddle class, Philipp 
Bouhler, is elevated to my much larger definition of the upper 1niddle class. Two of 
Kater's elite, Franz Ritter van Epp and Baldur van Schirach, were in fact minor 
aristocrats, but l have left thetn in the category of upper middle class because their 
fan1ilies were not large landovvners, nor 1nassively wealthy, nor had they a history of 
pre-1919 court or governmental inf1uence.1 1021 Artur Axmann, Schirach's successor as 
the leader of the Hitler Youth, is the one uncertainty in the table in Figure 2. There is 
a lin1ited atnount of biographical information on him frotn the age of 15 when he first 
began organising for the NSDAP in 1928, but his only employment up until 1945 was 
in the Party, and there appears to be little on his social background prior to this. 
Robert Wistrich says he studied law, which would suggest that, as a university 
student, he came from an upper-middle-class family. 11031 On the other hand, Gerhard 
Rempel refers to him as a c proletarian' but without citing where that infonnation 
came from.l 1041 For that reason I have compromised on his social classification and 
designated him lower middle class in order not to bias the figures I am using to 
question the validity of the petit-bourgeois thesis. 
What is perhaps the 1nost debatable factor in this analysis is deciding who actually 
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made up the Reichsleitung. Kater took his list from one compiled officially at some 
unspecified time during the Third Reich, which named 20 individuals. T~ this he 
added Ernst Rohm, Joachim van Ribbentrop, Rudolf Hess and I-l.ermann Goering. 
These 24 mel), said Kater, were the most powerful Nazi figures who 'constituted 
Hitler's camarilla, [and] were formally sanctioned in the new system of party and 
state, either by being appointed to a cabinet post_. ..... or by holding ministerial rank in 
a state government' _nos] In I 944, Franz Neumann~ in his book Behen1oth, also 
compiled a list of 39 individuals whom he reckoned made up the Nazi hierarchy of 
that year.f 106l Most of Kater's na1nes appear in that compilation. My own 
Reichsleitung list cornprises all of Kater's slate plus 13 others, of whom Neumann 
includes seven. Out of my 37 individuals, Neumann concurs with 28 of thetn. 
Strangely neither he nor Kater include AdolfHitler. Hitler and five others, included in 
Figure 2, do not appear on either Neumann's or Kater's lists~ these five are Werner 
Best, Hans Lammers, Fritz Sauckel, Albert Speer and Otto Thierack. In this revised 
and enlarged Reichsleilung compilation, the proportion of the top leadership 
emerging from the upper middle class rises from 7.1 ~1> to 76%~ but this is more than 
co1npensated for by the tripling in size of the de1narcation of that class employed in 
this thesis. Now, instead of being 2,450% overrepresented, the upper tniddle class 
merely enjoys an advantage of I ,000%. Lower-middle-class representation at 
Reichsleitung level has, however, declined from Kater's 68% to 50% of its 
proportion in the German population as a whole. 
All in all the lower middle class has served for a long time as a scapegoat for the 
rise of Nazism and even for the contents of its evil ideology. Scorned by orthodox 
Marxists as the deluded running dogs of capitalistn, its members have also been 
pilloried by liberal, conservative and even more modern Marxist historians for their 
alleged lack of education, intelligence or morality. As was suggested previously, there 
are cultural and political reasons for this attitude which precede historical 
interpretation and indeed cJoud it. However, it is not the intention of this study to 
exculpate the lower middle class from its· complicity in the Nazi phenomenon. It 
seems clear from practica11y all research that the lower middle cJass was indeed tnore 
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likely to vote for the NSDAP and more likely to join the Party than the working 
class.r 1071 I-fowever~ as the work of Thomas ChiJders has shown, it is i1nportant to 
differentiate between the different sections of the petite bourgeoisie. While it is true 
th.at the old Mittelstand (middle class or middle estate) of shopkeepers~ craftsmen, 
small businessmen and peasant farmers were indeed core and long-term supporters of 
the Nazis, this is not so true of lower-level civil servants and public e1nployees. It is 
even less true of white-collar workers in the private sector, many of whom were first 
generation clerical workers whose home, family and social milieu were working class 
- an enviromnent likely to influence their political view more than the workplace or 
their sociologically designated class position.1 1081 
The research section of this study looks further up the social sca]e than the 'petite 
bourgeoisie'. It takes a defined group of senior salaried managers and examines their 
world-view and politics. It investigates how close their ideology and prejudices were 
to National Socialism, and how their self-interest, fuelled by an exaggerated sense of 
their own special geistig nature, allowed them to embrace Nazism very easily~ quickly 
and thoroughly. 
The first aim of the chapters which follow is to show how several strands of 
liberal thought are actually very compatible with ·National Socialist ideology, and how 
liberalistn and elitism have often been close bedfellows. liistorica11y, liberalism has 
been associated with the Weimar upper tniddle classes, so this is an i1nportant issue 
which deserves close attention. Drawing upon the support of work done by other 
historians writing on the German professions in the 1920s and 193 Os, on the 
contemporary networks of Vereine and on Wei1nar electoral politics, the second aim 
is to show that the upper middle class as a whole was more enthusiastic about, and 
more electorally supportive of, the NSDAP than the German population as a whole 
and, in addition, probably more pro-Nazi than the scapegoated lower 1niddle class. 
The third aim is to show that the appeal of Nazism for the upper tniddle class in 
general, and VELA in particular, was not the NSDAP's backward-looking Arcadian 
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wmg of Blut und Boden (blood and soil), but its perceived modernity. Senior 
managers in the private sector were firmly wedded to the industrial society of the 20th 
century. Their very livelihoods depended upon its continuance. The fourth aim of this 
study has already been embarked upon in this historiographical chapter. Far from 
Jower-tniddle-class thinking and values permeating the Nazi Party, it was suggested 
that the influence of the respectable, educated upper middle classes had a much 
greater effect upon the ethos, ideology and shaping of the NS.DAP. With the upper 
middle c1asses so enormously overrepresented in the Party, and even more dominant 
in its leadership echelons, they must surely have been able to influence opinion and 
belief disproportionately. Looking beyond the Nazi Party, the extent of the spread of 
National Socialis1n within the economic Berufe and the social Vereine of 
upper-middle-class Weimar Germany is explored to see when, how widely and how 
deeply National Socialist ideas penetrated these upper-middle-class organisations. 
Most important of all for this fourth ai1n, the research into VELA' s belief system 
investigates not only the timing and extent of the development of National Socialist 
thought among senior business managers, but also whether these ideas were imported 
into the organisation or generated from within. 
(I] For example, see: Edmond Venneil, Germany's Three Reichs, London, J944; A.J.P. 
Taylor, The Course of German History, London, 1 945; Wiiiiam Montgomery McGovem, 
From Luther to Hitler. The History of Nazi-Fascist Philosophy, London, 1946: William L. 
Shircr, The Rise and Fall ofthe Third Reich, London/New York, 1960. 
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Chapter 2 
Ideology and its Political Location: 
National Socialism and Liberalism 
Before considering the aspects ofNazi ideology which had affinities to liberalism, 
the electoral support for the NSDAP and the 'modernity' of National Socialis1n, it is 
instructive to look more closely at what actually constituted Nazi ideology itself. 
Much of Gennan National Socialism throughout its brief quarter century of existence 
was defined in tenns of what it opposed. The list is very long. Nazism was 
anti-Semitic, anti-Slav, anti-cOinmunist, anti-socialist, anti-liberal, anti-trade union, 
anti-parliamentarian, anti-democratic, anti-Weimar Republic, anti-Versailles Treaty, 
anti-League of Nations; anti-capitalist, anti-individualist, anti-intellectual, 
anti-cosmopolitan and anti-Christian.1 11 It was hostile to freemasons, homosexuai.~, 
Gypsies, Jehovah's Witnesses, black people, pacifists, the mentally ill and the 
physically handicapped.l21 In power it repressed abstract painting, atonal music, jazz, 
saxophone playing, tnuted trumpets, long hair in men and jitterbug dancing. PI Alnong 
the freedoms which the Nazis swiftly repressed after March 193 3 were freedom of 
speech, fi·eedotn of expression in print, itnage or recording, freedom of assembly, 
freedotn of association and freed01n to strike or withdraw labour in an employment 
dispute. By the middle of the 1930s, all of the political progress and tnany of the legal 
rights which had been slowly built up in the 19th and early 20th centuries had been 
swept away. 
But not only that~ even the very concepts of equality before the law, a single 
unified legal system and impartiality of due process were severely undermined. The 
SS and the Gestapo had their own separate honour-courts shielding them from the 
law of the land, while the increasing use of 'preventive custody' to incarcerate people 
without trial and for an indefinite length of time in concentration camps, meant that 
anyone deemed undesirable to the regitne could be deprived of their civil and legal 
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rights at the whim of high or middle-ranking Nazi functionaries. At a deeper level, 
National Socialism harboured a hostility towards the judicial system itself, towards 
what was viewed as an inflexible bureaucratic structure which potentially impeded the 
execution of political and ideological policies and might indeed be construed as an 
alternative focus of 1oyalty or source of power. The F1'.ihrer, after all, was held to 
e1nbody the supreme authority of the state and people~ and by extension the Party, 
and especially its leadership, should not be hampered by inconvenient rules of 
procedure, evidence or sentencing in the pursuit of its all-important mission m 
Germany .14J 
A list of beliefs, practices and peoples which a political movement opposes does 
not, however, constitute an ideology. On its own it simply seems to suggest a 
pathological disorder, a hostility to the \Vorld which goes beyond mere xenophobia or 
intolerance and verges on paranoid misanthropy. But clearly any analysis which 
suggests that 14 million people could vote for a patty or ideology of mental 
derangement is less than believable. We have to see .what world-view could produce a 
set of beliefs which in turn gave rise to such a hate list, and how such an apparently 
negative philosophy could attract widespread support. This thesis focuses principally 
upon one particular socio-economic group, the upper middle classes, which, 
overwhelmingly, cotnprised people who were well educated. It seems likely that 
many, if not most, of this group would have possessed analytical and reflective 
mentalities, and thus their attraction to, or agreement with, National Socialisin, while 
it may. have had an emotional or visceral component, almost certainly involved an 
intellectual process, whether proactive or reactive. In such a case, the nature of Nazi 
ideology, where it came fr01n and who generated it, are of great significance in 
understanding the relationship between the NSDAP and the upper tniddle classes of 
early 20th-century Germany. This in turn helps to shed light upon the questions of 
whether Nazism was forward-looking or backward-looking, 'progressive' or 
'reactionary', modern or atavistic. 
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Attention must be drawn to the fact that National Socialism was not a static 
ideology. It did not emerge fully fledged with the formation of the party in "1920~ nor 
did it fix its ideas in tablets of stone with the publication of the so-called 'unalterable' 
Party Programtne of 1920Y1 By 1928, Article 17, which was an attack on private 
property and capitalisrn, had been renounced. Until then the Nazi Party had aimed 
primarily at winning mass support among the working classes and in the cities. With 
the failure of that strategy evident in the poor results of the 1928 Reichstag elections, 
the Party changed not only the focus of its electioneering and propaganda to 
concentrate on the middle classes, provincial towns and rural areas, but also changed 
the emphasis of its ideology to appeal to the existing world-views and tangible 
interests of this new constituency and the NSDAP's expanded membership.161 
Just as significant is the watershed of 1933, the difference between the expressed 
ideology ofNational Socialism seeking to attract electoral suppo1t prior to this date, 
and the ideology of National Socialism after it had secured power. This is particularly 
significant for chapters 4-9 of this thesis which examine the congruity of VELA's and 
the Nazi Party's thought up to 1933. After the A1achtiibernahme greater emphasis 
accrued to NSDAP ideological tenets such as anti-Semitism, which was not employed 
as a principal plank of Nazi electioneering but gradually intensified from the unofficial 
boycott of 1.933) through the Nuremberg Laws, the pogrom of Ctystal Night in 1938, 
the ghettoisation of the Jews _once the wa:r had started and the eventual 
itnplementation of the Final Solution resulting in mass extermination. [?J Prior to the 
spring of 1933, VELA's periodical, Der leitende Angestellte, displayed no discernible 
anti-Jewish senti1nents. 
The advent of war also had a major catalytic eifect on the evolution of Nazi 
ideologyYq Its principal effect was to accelerate all the changes which had been 
occurring in the nature of National Socialism since 1933 and to revitalise the 
radicalism of the movement which had appeared to suffer a setback in June 1934 in 
the 'Night ofthe Long Knives' liquidation ofthe SA leadership. The central agency in 
this orgy of murder was the SS whose loyalty to I-fitler's and I-Iimtnler's leadership 
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was unquestioning and whose influence grew steadily thereafter. In the war years the 
role and influence of the SS mushroomed and it was this sinister organisation which 
now both generated and was entrusted with the most radical ideological projects of 
the regime. This was a very different radicalis·m from the more levelling anti-bourgeois 
SA turmoil of the years up to mid-1934. This was an elitist, systematic radicalism 
whose fields of operation were largely the racial purification policies and the 
Lebensraun1 expansionist aims of the Third Reich.19J 
Very few people, very few indeed, had voted in 1932 or 1933 for a repressive 
police state, the mass murder of Jews and a European-wide war, yet within less than a 
decade that was what National Socialism had led to. None of these phenomena was 
an accidental byproduct of war, the unfortunate result of the exigencies of conflict or 
the temporary requirement of national security~ the ideological groundwork for their 
conception and implementation was laid in the 1920s and 1930s and they were all 
consistent with the core aims of Nazi ideology, even if the final form of the security 
apparatus, the solution to the so-caiJed 'Jewish Question', the timing of the war and 
the alignment of its protagonists were not yet envisaged in 1933. 
Neverthe]ess, it IS arguable that, while Nazi ideology did undergo changes 
between 1920 and 1945, it is still possible to recognise a consistent central 
Weltanschauung or world-view. flOJ It was etnbraced by the entire Party leadership 
despite disagreements over policy, it was the credo of many zealous Party members, 
and it was most definitely the definer of the distinctive tnentality of the SS, the 
vanguard of Nazism and a model for the projected Thousand Year Reich. Central to 
National Socialist ideology was, firstly, the Sociai-Darwinist philosophy of the 
survival of the fittest among races and individuals. Secondly, the notion of the 
Fiihrerprinzip, or leadership principle, entailing a strict hierarchical structure and 
demanding total obedience to superiors. Thirdly, the Volk.\gen7einschafl, or people's 
ethnic community, a view of a racia11y-exclusive organic society of unequals which 
nevertheless was somehow to be classless and harmonious, or at least class position 
was to be regarded as irrelevant; 'equality of blood' or 'equality of race' rather than 
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economic equality was both an ideal and a putative key to creating social harmony. 
Fourthly, this Volk\genteinschc(ft had to be constantly protected against both racial 
impurity and the attetnpts of other racial groups to displace, destroy, debilitate or 
dmninate the intrinsically-superior German race, a task which would never end, which 
required periodic war and which called for Germans to have a larger living space at 
the expense of one of the perceived lowest racial groups in the great cosmic order -
Germany's eastern Slavic neighbours. Fifthly, and closely related to racial purity, was 
racial fitness and health~ this amounted to an intolerance of the mentally ill, the 
physically disabled, the senile and anyone who was deemed to be an unproductive 
burden on the Volksgemeinschajt. Along with homosexuals, Jehovah's Witnesses, 
Gypsies and Jews, all these categories were deemed undesirable and dispensable, 
candidates for sterilisation, 'euthanasia' and the gas chambers.1' 11 
Ahnost all ofNazi ideology is contained within these five related tenets. In fact, if 
one were to attempt to distil ·National Socialism down fur1her, the idea of stn1ggle and 
survival of the fittest would appear to be the central kernel of its world-view.'' 21 This 
concept manifested itself in National Socialist ideology in the racial sphere in a 
hierarchy which placed Jews at the vety bottom, a race which was alternately totally 
worthless and useless and at other times so dangerous, clever and devious that it was 
a rival for world dOJnination.1 131 Just above them were black people, who were often 
described as not wholly human. Next were Asians, yet this was complicated by several 
factors: by a lingering German romantic view of China where the Second Reich had 
established successful colonial enclaves, by the alliance with Japan, and by the 
assertion of Aryan supremacy, since the tenets of the Aryan doctrine put the origins of 
this spurious racial descent in northern India. Next in the pyramid, either just above 
or, especially during the years of war with Russia, on a par with Asians \V ere the Slavs 
who were deemed incapable of creating culture or nation states (although how 
Bulgaria and Russia came into existence thus remained a problem). The next major 
bloc consisted of European Latin and Romance peoples - Spaniards, Portuguese, 
Romanians, Italians, French - with the Greeks thrown in too, since they had at one 
time made a major contribution to civilisation. These people were deemed \vorthy of 
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existence and their cultures had value, but they were not as vital as the Germanic 
races and their days of dominance (the Roman Empire, the Spanish Empire and the 
Napoleonic era) had passed. 
As we reach the apex of the Nazi racial pyramid there are further complicatjons -
for instance the place of the Anglo-Saxon (and Celtic) British. While 1-Iitler sought 
throughout the middle 1930s to secure an alliance or understanding with Britain, her 
people were seen as very nearly the racial equals of Germans, but once the two were 
at war the British were demoted a level. The second complication is the position of 
the Germanic and 'Nordic races (i.e. the Dutch, Flemings, N01wegians and Danes) 
vis-a-vis the so-called proper Germans who included not only the Austrians, but also 
German-speaking c01nmunities in Romania, the Critnea, the Baltic states and northern 
Italy - the Volksdeutsche or 'ethnic Germans'. When many tall blond Norwegians 
looked more like the Aryan ideal than Hitler, Himmler and Goebbels, this posed a 
rather thorny ethnographic problem. P-"1 
Besides the racial hierarchy, however, Nazi ideology also signitlcantly saw 
differences in value and intrinsic worth between individuals, and this applied to the 
'master-race' Germans as well. I-Iitler hiJnself was quite clear about this, as he stated 
unequivocally in the second volume of Mein Kc.unpf 
[T]he ultimate consequence of recognising the importance of blood - that 
is, of the racial foundation in general - is the transferance of this 
estimation to the individual person. In general, I must evaluate peoples 
differently on the basis of the race they belong to, and the same applies to 
the individual men within a national community. The realisation that 
peoples are not equal transfers itself to the individual man within a 
national community, in the sense that men's minds cannot be equal, since 
here, too, the blood components, though equal in their broad outlines, are, 
in particular cases, subject to thousands of the finest differentiations. [ISJ 
Thus the elite at the top of the strict hierarchies which made up the Third Reich 
viewed themselves as superior men.P 61 What justified this attitude was the si1nple fact 
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that they were there at the top, that in the survival of the f1ttest doctrine they 1nust be 
the strongest and, in turn, the best.l 111 
This world-view of differential human wo1th both created and was the result of an 
attitude of mind which, not to put too fine a point on it, was one of despising the 
masses, even the Ohermensch, or 'superior-man', German masses. It is closely related 
to that school of thought known as cultural elitism which existed in the last quarter of 
the 19th century and early 20th century. The best known German advocates of this 
philosophical outlook were Heinrich von Treitschke, Jakob Burckhardt, Friedrieh 
Nietzsche and Stefan George. They believed that it was impossible to elevate the 
tnasses, that only a smaJJ 1ninority of men could create or even appreciate 'higher' 
culture, and that the elites should be shielded from popular pressures or else 
civilisation would crumble. They also believed that, on account of the insatiability of 
human desires, there would always be a requirement for an elite to live off others' 
labours. 11 x1 
In the words of von Treitschke, an influential Wilhe!Jnine historian and National 
Liberal Reichstag member ( 1871-88), 'Millions must till the soil and forge and plane, 
that a few thousand can research, paint and rule. '1191 This same bourgeois liberal also 
coined the aphorism, 'no higher culture without servants', and went on to clain1 that, 
'hard, dirty labour' was necessary to sustain 'the achieved state of civilised morals' _12°1 
In his classic and influential essay of 187 4, Sozialismus und seine GDnner ('Socialism 
and its Patrons'),f21 1 von Treitschke argued that social reform was a futile undertaking 
because the essential nature of any social order was itnmutably hierarchical: 'class 
domination - or more accurately, the class order - is as necessary a part of society as 
the contrast between rulers and ruled is a natural part of the state'l 22 1. This line of 
reasoning led him to contend that even attempting to provide education for the 
masses was self-defeating~ it simply generated popular discontent because tnost 
people lacked the necessary spiritual depths to appreciate and benefit fi·om learning.123 l 
During the 1860s von Treitschke had been in favour of scrapping the Prussian 
three-tier voting system and replacing it with an equal democratic franchise, but by 
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the time he had written that seminal work which formed the basis of his political and 
ideological world-view for the next 22 influential years of his life, he was describing 
universal suffrage as 'organised indisdpline, the recognised hegemony of the 
irrational, the superiority of soldiers over their officers, of apprentices over their 
masters, of workers over employers' .1241 V on Treitschke's central argument in 
Sozialismus und seine Gtjnner was that the bourgeoisie did not constitute a new 
social basis from which a movement for a more egalitarian society would flow, but 
was instead an elite which had to be shielded frotn an inevitably inferior majority. In 
other words, cultural elitistn and a strand of liberal thinking (the significance of which 
will be further explored below), were both claiming that a small minority were 
exc1usively endowed with genius, greatness, spirituality and leadership, and only that 
specially-endowed 1ninority could understand and appreciate what was best for 
society. This view was to resurface practical1y intact in the evolving world-view of 
VELA's members in the 1920s and early 1930s. 
One factor which differentiated these right-wing views from more traditional 
conservative elitism was a belief in a more open elite - a belief that genius, vvhile it 
tnight be heritable, was just as likely to emerge spontaneously at any level of society 
and should be encouraged and rewarded. This in effect was also one of the factors 
which was to differentiate the Nazi Party frotn the DNVP, the principal conservative 
nationalist party of Wei1nar Germany. The DNVP, especially after Alfred Hugenberg 
became leader in 1928, sought to conserve the power and class system as it existed, 
or indeed as· it had existed in Imperial timesP51 Conservative leaders wanted to retain 
the old elites (i.e. themselves) at the top, and thus they were essentially supporting a 
closed elite with only very liinited social mobility. They were in fact resistant to what 
we might call a meritocracy, steeped as they were in a status-conscious and indeed 
snobbish tradition. The Nazis, on the other hand, were ideological believers in an 
'open-yet-authoritarian elite', a term to which 1 shall return shortly. 
The concept of the survival (and, indeed, pr·ospering) of the fittest applying to 
individuals as well as to races, seems at first glance to contradict two of the N"azi 
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Party's most popular axioms - 'the cotnmon good before personal advancemenf and 
'the co1nmon interest before individual interest' .1261 It also seems to contradict another 
Nazi maxi1n which said that the individual was nothing, the community or the race 
was everything. Nazism's hostility to liberalism, and in its early years its hostility to 
capitalism, was based on an apparent rejection of egoistic individualism which was 
held to be inimical to the interests of the nation. Thus it is possible to view Nazi 
ideology as actually and objectively embodying a belief that the will of the strongest 
and the wishes of the most powerful should prevail, while at the same time 
propounding a social philosophy for public consumption which stressed selflessness 
and the creation of a mutually beneficial people's comtnunity. 
It seems clear that this is exactly what Hermann Goering, for example, believed. 
An undoubtedly co1nmitted Nazi, he nevertheless viewed the people~s community, the 
Volksgen1einscha.ft, where there was supposed to be equal respect for manual 
labourers and govermnent ministers, as largely a means towards the end of 
1naintaining in power the Nazi Party and its ReichsleiLung, in order that he and they 
could achieve ends of their own choosing_, always, of course, presenting them as 
directed towards the national interest. He utilised the National Socialist emphasis 
upon national over selfish interests to justifY the extension of state control over the 
econotny in the setting-up of the Four Year Plan, which greatly enlarged his fiefdom 
in the constellation of little empires which made up the very inegalitarian 
Volksgemeinscha.ft of the Third Reich. Even the plundering of the artworks and 
treasures of occupied Europe for his own personal collections was p01trayed as 
protecting Europe's cultural heritage.I271 Goering was indeed a dyed-in-the-wool ·Nazi, 
but he was also self-indulgent, vain and power-hungry, making none of the sacrifices 
he demanded of those beneath his station. 
Equally, technocrats of power such as Heydrich, Bormann, Speer and Goebbels 
certainly saw ideology as a method of social control and not as an expression of sotne 
great metaphysical truth. At the opposite end of the Nazi spectrum were the true 
believers - Hitler, Himmler, J-Iess and Rosenberg.1281 I would contend that they 
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simultaneously believed that the will of the strongest should prevail and yet also 
sincerely believed in the Volksgen1einscha.ft where individual self-interest was 
subordinated to the greater good. This could be construed as a schizophrenic state of 
mind, and it has long been a temptation among many comtnentators on Nazi Germany 
to explain away this disturbingly and incomprehensibly barbaric regime as the product 
of individual madness or badness. It is also possible, however, to see a sort of 
wishful-thinking religiosity at work, whereby it is believed that the will of the 
powerful, by cos1nic decree, always strives to work for the greater racial and national 
good rather than for self-aggrandisement. Certainly both Hitnmler and :Hitler believed 
that they inherently embodied the true will of the people by virtue of divine 
providence. [291 
There is also a further possibility which does not preclude the pragmatic or the 
metaphysical interpretation of ·National Socialism, and may in fact illuminate further 
the common ground between the different wings of the ideology: in such an elitist 
world-view as Nazis1n it would be easy to believe that there was one law for the 
chosen few and another for the less able masses. This would be quite compatible with 
the Nietzschean strain of (ibermensch thinking which ran through Nazism. It is also 
the most persuasive interpretation of Nazi ideology. Despite its talk of 
Volksgenwin~.;,·chqft, National Socialism was above all an elitist political phenomenon, 
'an elitist politics for a mass age' yoJ It emphasised the need for total obedience, 
couched often in tnore romantic and noble-sounding tenns such as loyalty, duty and 
honour, and in every sphere of life it sought to create an undemocratic system of 
leaders and followers. To take just one example: when the trade unions were forcibly 
abolished in 1933, the German Labour Front was set up in their place ostensibly 
creating an organisation containing both workers and management \vorking together. 
Yet the truth of the one-sided bias in favour of management and owners was 
expressed not just in the repressive record of labour relations throughout the Third 
Reich, but in the very titles given to the two factions - plant-leaders and 
plant-followers.Pll National Socialist ideology, as embodied in the beliefs of those 
who counted the most- the government leadership, the Party hierarchy, the Gauleiter 
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and the SS 1 :~2 J - envisaged a new aristocracy dominating and ruling Germany. And this 
elitist world-view was inspired by the belief that different people have different 
worth. 
Of particular importance for the subject matter of this study was a new emphasis, 
beginning from around 1928, upon Leistung, or achieve1nent, which helped lead to a 
swift abandomnent of the anti-capitalist strain of Nazi thought. Indeed~ as the 
rearmament drive really got underway from 1936 and the Four Year Plan, big 
business and industry became a necessity for delivering the weapons of war, 
relegating the peasant-idyll notions of those such as Walther Darn~. the Reich 
Agricultural Leader, Food Minister and head of the organisation of German farmers, 
to the background. '331 However, although the need to itnprove productivity and output 
in the arms build-up, in the drive for military victory in the war and in the obsession 
with racial measures, allowed Leistung to become both an ideological driving force 
and a justification for barbarity, it is worth remembering that the foundations were 
laid in the late 1920s with the electoral needs of the Party. J oseph Goebbels, Gregor 
Strasser and Adolf Hitler, among others, did much to reassure the business classes, 
generally in speeches and addresses to closed meetings of their representatives, that 
the Nazis were not a threat to their existence or their property ownership_l341 This was 
emphasised by stressing National Socialist belief in the vi11ues of achievement and 
success, two characteristics which underpin both capitalism and liberalism. Leistung 
was a principle which exalted efficiency and effectiveness and implied that the ends 
justified the means. It was lauded as a 'German' virtue, and therefore those who 
displayed this ability could claim to be tnore purely German (or Aryan or Nordic 
depending on one's particular view of race). Success in achievement benefited the 
nation, and so n1thless pursuit of that goal was to be applauded.l351 This view 
dovetailed neatly with the strong nationalist strain which ran through the ideologies of 
the right-wing bourgeois parties ofWeimar Germany as well as through the NSDAP. 
It also meshed well with the anti-democratic proclivities of many supporters of 
the DNVP and the DVP, right-wing conservative and liberal parties respectively,l361 
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and with the views of large numbers of the upper middle class in general. These 
opinions grew out of the belief that educated and successful men knew better than the 
Inasses of the population what was good for them and for Germany. Thus democracy 
was seen as an impediment to the greater good. Through parliamentary democracy 
the common people in their ignorance were more likely to harm German interests than 
advance them. Among those now wishing to stake a clai1n to be part of this privileged 
elite which should alone wield power were the upper middle classes. The haute 
hourgeoi~\·ie had long since joined these exclusive ranks previously monopolised by 
the aristocratic and landed elites - beginning in the 1860s and being well consolidated 
by the turn of the century.l371 Now professionals, educated men and those who 
managed the companies of capitalist owners sought to share in that power politically, 
econotnically and socially. Where once owner-managers and family finns had been 
dominant in the Gennan economy, by the I 920s and 1930s many companies had 
become so large, !JSJ cotnmerce had become so complex and technology so advanced, 
that large numbers of specialist managers were now required. This 'new class' of 
adtninistrators was by now a sine qua non for tunr.1ing industry, finance and tradeY9' 
In addition, by the I 920s, they had recognised this indispensability and saw their 
function as on a par with professional bodies such as doctors, professors and lawyers. 
Beginning with engineers and chemists, the professionalisation project had spread by 
the 1920s to almost all other areas of upper and upper middle management - plant 
managers, department managers, personnel directors, auditors and so forth. Out of 
this phenomenon emerged VELA, the organisation for senior salaried management. 
In chapters 4-9 of this thesis it is demonstrated that these selllor managers 
perceived their efforts and skills to be essential for producing profits and wealth for 
their employers and, believing themselves to be undervalued, aspired to an enhanced 
status, income and power which they felt were due for such achievements. Their 
justification for rewards in excess of what they already received was based not on 
birth or tradition, but on Leistung - on achievement and performance. To the 
successful should go the spoils - effectively a form of 1neritocracy, a concept well in 
keeping with the Zeitgeist of 'advanced' 20th-century capitalism. A1nong the rights 
68 
which went with success was the right of managetnent to manage without 
interference. In theory and rhetoric this meant without interference from the owners, 
but in practice it mostly meant opposition to any attempts by organised labour to have 
a say in the running of firms. 
But over and above this hostility to economic democracy went an aversion to 
political democracy -the position not only of the DNVP and DVP,1401 but also of the 
NSDAP. Upper-middle-class distrust of democracy dated back to I1nperial times and 
beyond, indeed to the abortive revolutions of 1848 when the bourgeoisie realised that 
it was more afraid of its radical working-class and lower-order allies than of the 
ancien regime, the latter being more frustrating than threatening to its interests. 
Democracy was viewed by the bourgeoisie/upper middle class for the next 70 years 
with great suspicion. A.lthough this subsided somewhat in the 1920s, especially in the 
so-cal1ed golden years of 1924-28, it mushroomed once more with the Great 
Depression, growing stronger as the bourgeois political parties of Weimar Germany 
showed themselves incapable of harnessing democracy in the interests of the wishes 
and perceptions of Germany's higher social classes. As democracy failed to deliver for 
thetn, so their tentative acceptance, or perhaps more accurately their tolerance, of it 
withered.H'l Their embracing of Leistung and meritocracy interacted vvith this 
anti-de1nocratic world-view to produce what amounted to a belief in an 
'open-yet-authoritarian elite,. 
The term 'open-yet-authoritarian elite' originated with Waiter Struve in his book 
£lites Against Democracy.r·nJ He saw it as a guiding characteristic of late 19th- and 
early 20th-century German bourgeois political thought; that is to say that it was the 
world-view not only of the Besitzhiirgertun1 of \veal thy capitalists and merchants, but 
also of the Bildungshiirgertum of the educated and professional upper middle classes, 
i.e. aiJ the bourgeoisie who were not part of the petite bourgeoisie. What the term 
meant was a belief that an elite is both essential and inevitable and that this special 
group/class should be the one to formulate crucial decisions about society, politics 
and the economy. Accompanying this was the assertion that elites are the ulti1nate 
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agents of historical change. Where this differed from contemporary conservative 
thought was in its belief that society's elite should be drawn from a wide spectrum to 
ensure that the best were selected, and not restricted to one class or sector, nor simply 
reliant upon birth or genealogy. 
In this ideological world-view politics were seen as largely a question of who the 
few who were to lead should be - effectively a revolving of elites. This implied that 
what this bourgeois thought was advocating was not democracy of decision-making, 
but democracy of personnel selection - with the bourgeoisie as a partner with the old 
elites of aristocracy and land in forming the limited constituency for political office. Of 
course it also (at least theoretically) allowed specially gifted members of the lower 
orders to rise into the ranks of the elite. However, since higher education was 
perceived as a virtual necessity for entry into the political elite, this effectively 
disqualified the poor, the working class and most of the petite bourgeoisie who could 
not afford the high cost of a university education which had to be borne privately. 
Wealth too could open the doors to entry, but despite the great expansion in the 
number of industrial concerns, commercial firms and trading companies in 19th- and 
early 20th-century Germany, most of the new founders and owners actually emerged 
from the the old nobility and gentry, or were the second or third generation of 
professional fa1nilies, or were the younger sons of existing business owners. Few 
working-class or lower-middle-class people became wealthy company owners even in 
the expansive boo1n years of 1850 to 1873 or between 1890 and 1914.'431 
Until the early 1920s, this 'bourgeois' belief, as Struve called it, was in fact far 
more the preserve of liberal, and hence predominantly upper-middle-class, thought 
than it was of conservative, and hence predominantly, but not exclusively, upper-class 
thought. Alongside the cultural elitists mentioned earlier, he demonstrated that among 
those most closely connected with the belief in, and development of, the 
ideology/philosophy of an open-yet-authoritarian elite, were many of the leading lights 
of the Progressive Liberal Party and others associated in the popular rnind with 
political and social reform, men such as Hugo Preuss, Max and Alfred Weber, 
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Theodor Barth and Friedrich Naumann. In 1891 I-Iugo Preuss, the principal architect 
of the Weimar Constitution, said, "Always and everywhere the few command and the 
many obey."l441 This was not a condemnation nor a call to challenge such an elitist and 
undemocratic state of affairs. The aim was in fact to prevent social revolution, to 
thwart the rise of the Social Democrats and indeed to blunt the perceived threat of full 
political democracy itself by changing the con1position of the nation 1S political 
leaders. This e1nerging theory developed the notion that elites should be responsive 
but not responsible to the German population. 
Struve saw this new 'liberal elitism', developing in the J 890s and early 20th 
century, arising as a result of tensions in the dominant social coalition of wealthy 
noblemen and urban commercial and industrial capitalists. Among the contentious 
issues involved were free trade, commercial law, foreign policy, naval building and the 
treatment of the trade union movement. The principal strain arose from the 
disproportionate influence of Pn1ssian Junkers who were the main proponents of a 
high protective agricultural tariff. This was oppposed by many industrial interest~, 
especially among the newer chemical, electrical and engineering industries, and by 
most of the large banks.r45 l It appeared that a compromise had been reached at the 
turn of the century whereby, in exchange for a substantial progrmnme of naval 
building and an expanded policy of overseas imperialism, agricultural import duties 
were maintained.r46l Struve argued, however, that a significant strand of bourgeois 
opinion diverged from this apparent consensus1471. Among those holding and 
expressing such views were the German liberal elitists, prominent among whom were 
men often perceived as on the left, or even the 'democratic', wing of German 
liberalism. 
According to Struve, the liberal elitists were distinguished by their aggressive 
insistence upon 'the formation of a new political elite which would actively recruit 
members from all strata of society', a rejection of calls for popular control, and a 
critique of the political leadership of the Empire, portraying it as weak, vacillating and 
dominated by 'egocentric agrarians', nobles and 'feudalised bourgeois'. [481 Although 
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the analysis within this thesis does not subscribe to the 
enfeudalising-of-the-bourgeoisie theory, this does not mean that the liberal elitists of 
the ti1ne did not see it that way, even if they were not using that much later 
terminology to express this view. Suitably updated by replacing the ruling institutions 
of the Kaiserreich with those of the Weimar Republic, their critique bears some 
remarkable resemblances to a large part of that world-view which developed within 
VELA between cl930 and 1933 (see chapters 8 & 9). Perhaps even more indicative 
of a link between, and a continuity with, this kind of liberal-elitist thinking and the 
ideology fashioned by VELA in the Wemar years, is the assertion made by Struve and 
others that, from the 1890s, 'liberal elitists ..... wanted to install political leaders 
appropriate to a bourgeois industrial society'. r491 
An example of a pr01ninent individual who embodied such beliefs was Friedrich 
Naumann (1860-1919), who has been routinely and universally seen as a left liberal of 
the Kaiserreich, although he was not a tnember of either of the major Wilhelmine 
liberal parties. His first political experience was gained through working with Adolf 
Stacker's Chris·tlichsoziale Bewegung, or Christian Social Party. The main goal of the 
Christian Social Party was to provide a politically conservative alternative or rival to 
the SPD for working class support. Espousing a policy of social reform and 
state-sponsored welfare, its deeply anti-setnitic leader was, remarkably, also a member 
of the executive cotnmittee of the Gennan Conservative Party. 1501 Eventually rejecting 
the pro-Junker and pro-large-scale farming politics of the Christian Socials, Naumann 
went on in 1896 to become a founding member and leader of a separate (but not very 
electorally successful) party, the National-sozialer Verein, or National Social 
Association. In many respects this party was also a vehicle for opposing the SPD and 
egalitarian socialism, aiming to win over the moderates and right-w1ng elements 
among the Social Democratic leadership and among the skilled workers and better-off 
working cJass. When it became clear by 1903 that the National Socials were getting 
nowhere as a political force, Naumann dissolved the party and led most of its 
members into the stnall ·Freisinnige Vereinigung (Free-Thought Association) which, 
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in 1910, entered into union with other 'left-liberar parties to form the Fortschrillliche 
Volk..szJartei, or Progressive People's Party.15'1 
During his sojourn through the various liberal groups, NaUinann was a consistent 
advocate of a large military budget, an enthusiast for Weltpolitik or a global 
imperialist policy,1521 and a believer in large-scale capitalis1n as a modernising and 
progressive force (while admitting that sections of heavy industry were lacking in 
social and political progressiveness), views which were generally shared by the largely 
urban bourgeois tnembership of the Freisinnige Vereinii:,rzJng and the Fortschrittliche 
Volkspartei. He identified most closely with what he, and many subsequent historians~ 
regarded as the most forward-looking industrial sector - the engineering, che1nical and 
electrical industries.r531 These industries in turn were major backers of both the 
Freisinnige Vereinigung and the f(;rtschrittliche Volk.spartei. 1541 It is of interest to 
note that many of VELA's senior managerial members in the 1920s and 1930s were 
drawn from electrical and engineering firms, tnost notably Siemens, AEG, Bosch and 
Zeiss. This perhaps becomes even more significant when considered alongside the fact 
that Naumann was a close friend of both Robert Bosch and Ernst Abbe of the Zeiss 
optical works in Jena.1 55 l 
This close connection with, and positive attitude towards, modern industry and 
cotnmerce did much to shape Naumann's view of what the proper functions and 
characteristics of political leaders should be. Leadership, he said, ought to comprise 
political technicians, acting for the national good, serving as power brokers, mediators 
and manipulators of organised interest groups. Naumann was clear that he expected 
such leaders to emerge from the bourgeoisie, indeed fi·om atnong the business 
community, declaring in 1909 that he keenly anticipated 'a future condition in which 
the industrial upper stratum will, through its organisation and its will to power, take 
into its own hands the governmental apparatus as well as parliamentary leadership'. 
Nevertheless he did not seek to exclude from leadership positions men from other 
social classes, either higher or lower, who displayed talent and who shared his view of 
politics as a business.1561 NaUtnann was very much a forward-looking individual who 
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was at home in the modernity of his age. He was staunchly opposed to what he saw as 
the feudalising and fossilising tendencies of the ancien regime of agrarians and 
Junkers, putting his faith instead in an industrialised and business-oriented model of 
society.157l Yet he was an ardent imperialist, while his committnent to democracy and a 
universal franchise was compr01nised by an inherent lack of faith in the Volk and a 
belief that this unreliability might often have to be overridden by strong-willed, 
independent leaders. This was demonstrated most starkly in his 1904 book, 
Den1okratie und Kaisertum ('Democracy and In1perial Rule'), where he argued that 
political reform should come by converting the emperor to the cause of 
democratisation. !SBJ 
An even 1nore significant and influential individual, \Vho also qualifies as a liberal 
elitist, was the sociologist, Max Weber (I 864-1920). He was a severe critic of the 
weakness and illiberality of the Second Reich and served upon the c01nmittee which 
was entrusted with the drafting of the Weimar constitution. Because of his association 
with ideas of parliamentary democracy and his acceptance of the political institutions 
of contemporary Western powers as models with relevance for Germany, and because 
of his close associations with the Progressive Liberals and the DDP, and because he 
was seen as one of the founding fathers of the Weimar Republic, Weber's image as a 
democratic liberal became widespread, his reputation reaching new heights in West 
Germany in the 1950s and 1960s where he was viewed as a forerunner and 'glorious 
ancestor', of the newly established democratic Federal Republic.1591 
I-Iowever_, as early as 1958, sotne historians and social scientists started to 
comment upon the dichotomy between this perception and interpretation of Weber's 
works, and the political reality of his consistent advocacy of German nationalism and 
imperialism. A new analysis began to emerge arguing that his support for a 
parliamentary democratic order was a pragtnatic one, taken in order to serve the 
power of the German national state.1601 Weber himself tnade it clear that he regarded 
the nation state as constituting one of the highest of ideals, as possessing an existence 
of its own, and as an ultimate or primary value.16' 1 As a historical necessity and as the 
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source of civilisation, well-being, progress, culture and even meaning~ the individual 
should therefore act through and for his national state. Consequently, he was solidly 
behind the German war effort from 1914 until late 1918, declaring in a speech in 
October 1916 that Germany had a 'responsibility and duty to history' to assert its 
national power. l621 When the Second Empire collapsed, he justified the creation of a 
republic by saying that, "We must favour that [original italics] form of state which 
makes possible the union of the largest possible number of Germans in one unit. "1631 
At first glance, therefore, Weber's views on political structures could appear to 
have been guided by choosing whatever means were necessary and available for 
reaching an overriding end or goal. While there is some truth in this assertion, it is far 
from explaining how he arrived at his pa11icular political positions at different 
moments in time. There was a greater intellectual and ideological basis and coherence 
to his thinking than mere one-dimensional pragmatism. Reflected in his sociological 
theories and works, Weber believed that social conflict was ineradicable and 
inevitable, but also desirable and beneficial. Informed by his absorption of many of the 
ideas of Social Darwinism in the 1890s, IG.:!J he claimed that, out of this productive 
struggle, there inevitably emerged a high-status group which becmne the bearer of 
culture, which set the moral and social standards of society, and which gave stability 
to that society. (CISJ 
Si1nilarly, the exercise of political control always devolved into the hands of a few 
men, regardless of the form of the state. 'Everywhere, whether within or outside 
democracies, politics is made by the few' ,1661 he said in a phrase remarkably similar to 
that uttered by Hugo Preuss. This belief in the efficacy of elites also carried the 
necessary corollary that the mass of humankind was incapable of the achievements of 
those specially-endowed elites. Couching this sentiment in less stark and brutal 
language than did that other liberal elitist, Heinrich von Treitschke, Weber was 
certainly displaying less arrogance and less scorn for perceived lesser men, but, 
nevertheless, he was still singing from the same ideological hymn-sheet when he 
wrote: 'The ((mass" as such (no matter which social strata comprise it) thinks only as 
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far as tomorrow'~l67 1 and, on another occasion, referring to the inability of the ordinary 
man to understand politics, and therefore the futility of seeking the popular will 
through full participatory democracy: 'It is as if one were to speak of a will of shoe 
consUJners which should determine the technology of shoemaking! Of course the shoe 
consumers know where the shoe pinches, but they never know how it can be 
improved' .1681 
In this politico-social analysis, Weber above all (and perhaps above all other 
liberal elitists) concerned himself with the concept of leadership and with the qualities 
which were required to fulfil such a function. He considered Bildung an especially 
important factor and this, coupled with a belief that only men of' independent means' 
could devote enough of their energies to a fuiJtime political career, and that men of 
means were less likely to be greedy than those whose income was less certain, led him 
always to believe that such leaders would and should emerge very largely from the 
bourgeoisie, despite certain admitted shortcomings he ascribed to this class.'691 The 
desirability of a leadership demonstrating such attributes, modified to include 
well-paid senior salaried managers and the other components of the Weimar upper 
middle class, formed a powetful theme running through the writings in [)er leitende 
Angestel/te during the Weimar years. So too did the spiritual and psychological 
qualities needed of such leaders, and this was a subject upon which Weber wrote a 
great deal and for which he is remembered today. 
Weber's exegesis ot~ and approval for, the concept of the 'charismatic leader' 
arose from his early belief in aristocratic individualis1n, which \Vas informed both by 
liberal ontology and by Nietzsche's idea of the value-setting personality who sets up 
new goals for mankind and prevents it sliding into the mediocrity of a leaderless herd 
of 'equals' .1701 Later, when his doubts about the competence of the J unkers' class to 
rule Germany effectively had hardened into opposition to much of the ancien regime 
(including Wilhelm II), his concept of the charismatic leader developed into a mode) 
of the man of personality, wisdom and drive who should act entirely according to his 
own judgement, and not be bound by any notion of mandate or the 'expressed or 
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preswned ..... will of the electorate' .1711 This 1nan could theoretically be drawn from 
any social class.~ but was Inost likely to Cinerge frmn the bourgeoisie, despite the fact 
that Weber believed that the German bourgeoisie was sti11 politically i.tnmature (a 
forerunner of the theory of the ~missing bourgeois revolution'?). The working class~ 
he believed~ was even n1ore politically naive and not to be trusted, vvhile his severest 
scorn \Vas reserved for the lower tniddle class~ dec]aring in J 904 that ~the greatest 
danger to our political life in Germany js that we fal1 under the rule of philistines, the 
petty bourgeoisie'~ this philistinism he described as 'lack of developed instincts for 
national power, the li1nitation of political endeavours to 1naterial goods or even the 
interests of one's own generation, and the lack of any consciousness of the 1neasure 
of one's responsibilty vis-a-vis our heirs' .1721 This refrain bears certain simiJarities to 
the viev.;s on the petite bourgeoisie of Hennann Rauschning and others exatnined in 
the previous chapter. 
w·eber defined charistna. as 'the specifically "creative~' power in history' ,f?31 
placing e1nphasis upon inherent, unacquirable personality characteristics and spiritual 
endoWinent. Weber could thus speak of the 'born leader' whose attraction and 
support were based on the fact that '1nen do not obey hin1 by virtue of tradition or 
statute, but because they believe in hin1. The devotion of his followers i.s oriented 
toward his person and its qualities' .1741 In his vision of a better pol itica] structure than 
that offered by the Second Reich, such charis1natic leaders would elicit support fr01n 
the masses by using p1ebiscitary techniques, while a parlimnent, elected by a full 
den1.ocratic franchise, would largely act as a tneans to re1nove, in an orderly fashion, 
.leaders who failed to Jive up to these transcendental qualities or who theatened to 
beco1ne despots. 1751 The franchise, jn Weber's opinion, would not and should not 
pass po1itical control into the hands of the masses, but should merely serve as a way 
to involve n1ost people in certain stages of the selection of political leaders, and as a 
1neans of delivering an educational experience for the average German. 1761 
As late as autumn.. 1918~ Weber had little inkling of the potential for social . ' 
revolution in Gern1any and was only briefly alarmed at the prospect of the SPD 
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proving to be a genuinely revolutionary or socialist threat. Once the Weimar Republic 
was in place, he once more became sanguine about the likelihood of popular political 
control. In part this was due to his belief that political organisation of the masses 
would alleviate direct popular pressures, and in part because of his optitnism about 
that clause in the constitution which he had helped to fratne, providing the President 
of the Republic with far-reaching powers and making his office subject to popular 
rather than parliamentary e1ectionF71 This was the office which Weber hoped would 
be filled by one great charismatic leader, who would then ensure that further 
charismatic individuals found their way into the elite governing the German nation.f781 
Wolfgang Mosnmsen argued that Weber was simply naive about the dangers of 
detnagoguery and despotism arising in such a political model, his main concern being 
a desire to prevent suffocating bureaucratisation by setting up men of heroic, 
visionary character in leadership positions to give the nation purpose, directions and 
goa1s.1791 Yet Weber stated quite unequivocally that he considered demagoguery to be 
important among the talents required of a political leader. [f:OJ Furthermore, he wanted 
to see political parties largely organised as followings for charistnatic leaders.unJ Their 
subsequent election would be more than just a casting of a ballot~ it would be a 
'profession of "belief' in the call to leadership of the person vvho claims this 
acclatnation' .1R21 He even went as far as to say that, in the model of charismatic 
leadership, there was a need for complete subserviance and 'blind obedience' from 
followers.IR31 Commands from superiors should not be questioned, but obeyed 
unhesitatingly, for to do anything else was to cease to believe in the charisma. Thus, 
while the great leader continued to be successful, his followers should, and almost 
certainly would, obey him unreservedly. 1841 Fitting this into his model of how he 
believed the newly created Weimar Republic should operate~ he wrote: 'The much 
discussed dictatorship of the masses necessitates a "dictator" - an elected [my italics] 
individual possessing the confidence of the masses and to whom the masses 
subordinate themselves as long as he retains their confidence' _rssJ Weber is quite 
obviously describing a constitutional dictator in this scenario~ and perhaps it is too 
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obvious to need to draw attention to the fact that Adolf Hitler came to power as just 
that. 
Many cotnmentators on Weber seem to feel the need to echo the words of 
Wolfgang Momtnsen, 'According to all that we know about hi1n, he would have been 
a passionate foe of fascism' .1861 Yet, naive or otherwise, the fact is that the thinking 
and theorising of this archetypal liberal, this supposed man of the democratic left, was 
part of the development of the ideology of liberal elitism; and who can say whether 
this defensive democrat, had he lived beyond 1920, would not have theorised his way 
back out of support for Weimar democracy by, say, 1930, when he realised that it was 
not performing as he had hoped in either operation or effectiveness? 
During the Second Reich, the liberal elitists' enduring political opposition to the 
old conservative agrarian ruling classes could rely upon a measure of popular backing 
down through many of the lesser classes. They were, in addition, fulso1ne enthusiasts 
for the populist causes of imperialis1n, a great .navy and an expanded German 
empire.1871 Ljberal elitists before World War I were also pro-monarchist, a view born 
out of genuine conviction and again a populist position, which garnered them a 
measure of electoral support beyond the narrow class origins of their political 
leadership. ISllJ I-Iowever, after 1918 this latter view was much more associated with the 
conservative DNVP.189l After World War I liberal elitism (and indeed liberalism in 
general) became, at best, lukewarm towards monarchism for the simple and 
ideologically consistent reason that the Hohenzollerns had failed Germany by leading 
her to defeat. They were no longer worthy to be automatic leaders of the elite - their 
achievement level had sunk too low for that. Although the liberal DVP was 
pro-republican, it soon became hostile to the Weimar systetn, despite the efforts of 
Gustav Stresemann to work within its political framework. 1901 In part this was because 
of the Republic's association with the Versailles settlement, but also because 
Weimar's democratic political institutions allowed the left not only to have a greater 
voice and influence, but actually to achieve office and introduce measures such as 
works' councils, the 40-hour week, social welfare reform and pro-trade union 
79 
1egislation.191 1 Opposed to egalitarianism on ideologically fundamental grounds, not 
the least of which were the 1nodern principles of meritocracy and Leistung, many 
liberals became even more anti-democratic than before the Great War, especially from 
around 1929 and the crisis of the Depression. 
One must not, however, think that 19th-century conservatives \Vere totally 
impervious to this powerful strain of meritocratic or social-mobility liberal thought. 
Some conservatives believed that some measure of movement into (if not out of) the 
aristocracy was needed to blunt the rise of democratic aspirations and prevent the 
spectre of popular control. 1921 It was in the interests of the aristocracy to admit new 
blood to the elite pool - both metaphorically and biologically. The new sciences of 
biology and eugenics and the pseudo-science of Social Darwinism could be used to 
support the traditional view that superiority was an inherited characteristic confined to 
an already demarcated group, namely the nobility itself. But these sciences could also 
be employed to argue that genius or superiority might appear in any class by genetic 
quirk, regression or transmutation. 1931 Secondly, even if it were inherited, could one be 
sure that all of Germany's best genetic stock had been coralled in the limited pool of 
aristocracy? I-Iow could you be sure that substantial quantities of good genes (or 
blood) had not been overlooked in the unscientific past? 1t was this view which tended 
to gain the upper hand as can be seen in many examples from the Imperial period. 
During this era large nutnbers of the haute bourgeoi..'\'ie who had bec01ne successful 
and very rich capitalist owners of manufacturing, banking and commerce were 
elevated to the nobility. The reserve officer system was opened up to the bourgeoisie 
and becatne a highly sought-after symbol of enhanced status - not a conferring of 
nobility, but nevertheless an elevation carrying the hope that this would be a stepping 
stone on the way to eventual family ennoblement. This might even take a generation 
or two to achieve, but it certainly offered the chance of some sort of upward social 
mobility for the upper middle classes.1941 Finally, if such a conservative, nationalist, 
viilkisch writer as Paul de Lagarde could propose opening up the nobility by ad1nitting 
new members on the basis of merit,'95 1 then it is plain to see that liberal elitist ideology 
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was becoming very strong, if not yet hegemonic, among all the upper levels of 
pre-1914 German society. 
Most later 19th-century German liberals were not advocates of the destruction of 
the nobility. 1961 This was not just because of the unspoken pact which divided 
economic power and high political office between, respectively, the bourgeoisie and 
the old elites, but far more because so many of the bourgeoisie aspired to nobility. 
Much conservative and liberal bourgeois thinking held that economic power should 
indeed result in political power, but that this should also ideally be accompanied by 
the conferring of titles. The great bulk of liberal thinking did not advocate social 
revolution in the sense of the abolition of classes, status or inequalities of wealth. 
They did not even particularly entertain the idea that the bourgeoisie, or even the 
haute bourgeoisie, should become the political ruling class. What they were seeking 
was largely social mobility and the hope that they could rise as far as their talents and 
v.;ealth could take them, moving unhindered up through the classes until they too 
became ennobled. Nor did they seek to abolish privilege - far from it. They aspired 
instead to increase their already substantial econon1ic, educational, and indeed local 
and Ldnder (provincial) political advantages, through oiling the mechanisms of social 
advancetnent which were being jammed by traditional conservative old-elite vested 
interests.l97l This later 19th-century liberal view was essentially not all that different in 
the 1920s and early 1930s, except that the concept of formal aristocracy and 
ennoblement had disappeared. 
De Lagarde actually qualified his criteria for entry into the nobility by saying that 
this reward should be given to those whose achievement was of service to the state.
1981 
Attitudes towards the state are very important in understanding the developtnent of 
German liberal thought from the middle of the 19th century. The accommodation of 
liberals to the Second Reich was in large measure achieved by the genesis of positive 
attitudes towards the administrative state. After the shock of 1848, when liberal 
republican calls for representative government helped to inspire the lower social 
classes to come out on to the streets, the bourgeoisie's attitude to universal 
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detnocracy became much more constrained. Eventually finding themselves in the 
greatest part on the opposite side of the barricades from the lower orders, they settled 
for a comprotnise which effectively left national or state high politics to the old elites 
in return for greater control in the economic sphere. 1991 But they also moved into 
another important realm - the state bureaucracy. Thereafter the bureaucracy was 
viewed by them as essential, no longer the arm of a hostile political order, but as a 
mechanism for maintaining order and holding the ring in an increasingly laissez-:faire 
liberal capitalist economy. Indeed by the end of the 19th century, most of the 
bourgeoisie, and probably most of the liberals among them, had come to see the state 
bureaucracy as more important and effective than a quarrelling Reichstag and as more 
strongly identified with the genera] (German) good than were politicians 
themselves.r 1001 This hostility to professional politicians, and especially to elected 
representative government, would of course be a characteristic of parties of the right 
in the Weimar era- the DNVP, the DVP and, above all, the NSDAP. 
However, there are several differences between the ideology of 
pre-First-World-War liberals of the right and post-First-World-War liberals of the 
right. Whereas in the Wilhelmine era the state bureaucracy was regarded with great 
respect and honour, in the 1920s it became somewhat tarnished because of its 
involvement in the functioning of the Wei1nar system.11° 11 In addition, whereas before 
1914 the state bureaucracy constituted, within limits, a German variety of the carriere 
ouverte aux talents, even if only open to the educated or wealthy, after the Great War 
upper-middle-class social mobility and status enhancement were seen to be achievable 
in other socio-economic arenas. One such field was business, in the realm of 
management. The sheer numbers involved in upper management had, by the end of 
the first third of the 20th century, greatly exceeded those of the Wilhelmine era.! 102l 
This in turn created greater insecurity in the 1920s and 1930s Gust as it did atnong 
professionals) as recurring econOinic crises threatened unemployment and an 
undermining of their economic position and hence social status. Politics now took on 
a greater significance in the thinking of this sector of society, as it did generally across 
all classes and occupations in the highly politicised atmosphere ofWeimar Gern1any. 
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The perceived threats to their employment security, high salaries and prospects of 
advancement led many of Germany's senior business managemers to a political 
viewpoint which blamed the Versailles Treaty, reparations and the Weimar system 
itself for their plight and for the dire conditions prevailing in the Fatherland. Their 
growing antipathy towards the Republic developed in large pa11 out of their 
anti~socialism and a total rejection of econOinic democracy (in the form of trade 
unions and works' councils), and eventually reverted to a hostility towards political 
democracy which they saw as being responsible for the creation and endurance of the 
flawed Weimar system. De1nocracy and socialism were regarded as iniquitous 
egalitarian levellers of society which threatened not only management's differential 
reward system and its right to manage without lower-level interference, but also 
threatened Germany's national status and power and prevented her from once more 
reswning her rightful position as one of Europe's great powers. A potent blend of 
self-interest and nationalism coloured the politics of Germany's business-management 
sector, and see1ns likely to have inclined many of its members towards the 
anti-Weimar, pro-business DVP during the 1920s. 11031 
However, the DVP was deficient in two very important respects. Firstly, it lacked 
popular suppoti. Of all Weimar Germany's major political pa1iies, it was the DVP 
whose support was least spread down through the social classes. It found little 
sympathy among the working classes because of its pro-business nature, and little 
among the peasantry because of its perceived urban bias. Unlike the DNVP, which 
could attract support even among the poorest quar1ers of Berlin's working-class 
districts, such as Kreuzberg and Wedding, because of its specifically Prussian and 
Protestant dimension,ll 04 J the DVP was too class-specific a party ever to be able to 
attract mass support. From an alJ-time high of 10% of the Reichstag vote in 1924, it 
was downhill all the way to 1932, especially after the death of its most effective 
luminary and leader, Gustav Stresemann, in 1929. Secondly, while supportive of 
business, the DVP inclined somewhat more towards the interests of the owners rather 
than towards the concerns of their salaried managers.posJ 
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On both these accounts the NSDAP offered better prospects of effective political 
influence, at least from September 1930 when its popular support mushroomed in the 
Reichstag elections. Whether individuals or parties approved of democracy or not, 
that was the framework within which political power had to be sought in Weimar 
Germany, especiaJJy after the failure of all the coups and putsches up to 1923. In this 
respect we are talking about support for the NSDAP as an example of Realpolitik or 
tactical choice, and many former DVP voters may have gone over to the Nazis 
between 1930 and 1932 for that reason or because of the bandwagon effect of their 
seemingly unstoppable momentum.f 1061 Equally, the fact that neither the DVP nor the 
DNVP ever formally repudiated their 1918 declarations of support for parliamentary 
democracy,l1°71 whereas the NSDAP was totally unequivocal about its views of the 
constitution (indeed had attempted to overthrow the Weimar system by force in 
1923), may have persuaded those who actively opposed democracy and felt an 
increasingly urgent need to sweep away the Republic's existing political structure to 
vote for the Nazi Party. 
I-Iowever, there may also have been a deeper and perhaps more ideological 
element in the reasoning of Germany's salaried managers. The NSDAP may have 
actua11y appeared more attractive and more attuned to their world-view because of a 
perception that it was more committed to the idea of 'democracy of personnel 
selection', or the opening up of possibilities for capable non-elite-class members (or 
the 'little man') to rise to the top.posJ In other words, the Nazis were projecting a 
more effective image of pr01noting meritocracy. The NSDAP continuously levelled 
accusations against the conservatives and liberals claiming that they opposed an open 
elite. While this was actually false, even among conservatives after 1918, these 
accusations tended to stick. This may well have been helped by the fact that few 
leading Nazis, or indeed few of the Party at any level, were drawn from the old 
political elites. [I09J And right at the apex of the NSDAP was a Jjving exa1nple of a man 
who had made it all the way to the top through his own abilities and force of 
personality- Adolfl-Iitler himself, born into a distinctly lower-middle-class family11101 . 
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Within the Nazi ideological armoury were two elements which particularly 
appealed to Germany's upper middle class as a whole. These were the 
Volksgemeinschajt and the Fuhre1prinzip. Volksgemeinschaji propaganda may have 
talked about a classless society, but the Nazis never intended that there should be a 
levelling social revolution, although they may have allowed such an interpretation to 
go uncorrected where it attracted the support of working-class or peasant adherents 
who swarmed into the anti-bourgeois SA. National Socialism always advocated a 
revolution of consciousness over a revolution of social structure - an acceptance of 
the social and economic status quo, but with an altered political machinery, different 
political goals and an accompanying ideological crusade.' 111 1 However, the 
Volksgemeinschqft doctrine did advocate two major alterations to the social fabric. 
The first was racial exclusivity. The second was the prospect of greater social mobility 
along with the promise of creating open elites which offered reward for talent and 
effort' 1'2l - the Volksgenteinschajl was also to be a Leislungsgemeinschqft (community 
of achievement). '113 1 This latter notion was actually a very modern one, essentially a 
form of meritocracy, which appealed to those who stood to benefit from such a 
quintessentially liberal capitalist concept - the upper middle classes in general, and the 
business and commercial upper middle classes in particular.il' 41 
The second eletnent was the F'iihrerprinzip, or leadership principle, which 
strengthened the notions of leadership and management and elevated them on to a 
plane of enhanced moral virtue. Advocated by Hitler in Mein Kcunpf and adopted as 
the organising principle of the NSDAP,I 1151 it declared that leadership was what 
created order, efficiency and power in both the political and economic realms, and at 
both local/branch and national levels. Leaders should emerge through their 
achievements and ability~ and, by demonstrating effectiveness, they thereby also 
demonstrated superiority. (ltGJ Thus those below them should not interfere with their 
functions lest they impede the effectiveness of that leadership. In such a belief systetn, 
democracy was a recipe for the rule of the mediocre. That those below leadership 
level should have little or no power to hinder the decision-making process, i1nplied 
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that there should be a system of hierarchical or diflerential rights throughout society 
and economy.1 1171 
What we are really witnessing in the ideology of the Fiihretprinzip is a doctrine 
of power. Akin to the philosophy of Divine Right, it replaced heavenly sanction with 
the utilitarian sanction of Leistung. Leadership was to be guaranteed by effectiveness; 
but effectiveness itself was to be defined by the holders of that leadership. Thus what 
was in the nation's interest was to be decided, not by the nation, but by those who 
could attain and hold on to power. Since democracy in the late 1 920s and early 
1930s was not delivering what large sections of the upper tniddle classes held to be in 
their own and Germany's interests, then an ideology which declared that those who 
led or managed should wield more authoritarian power was obviously an attractive 
proposition to them. It could even be construed as selfless, because such a philosophy 
claitned to be concerned with the nation's best interests or the greater good, and 
because enhanced power demanded greater effort and increased responsibilities. In 
addition of course, by the early 1930s, the Nazi Party had a huge reservoir of popular 
support down through all the classes, which suggested that the task of eliciting all that 
obedience, which would be required for such a utopian 1nanagement-friendly society, 
could be achieved much more readily by the NSDAP than by any of the ineffectual 
and poorly supported bourgeois parties. 
The itnplicit and, indeed, often explicit Nazi advocacy of differential rights may in 
fact be the crucial distinction between the ideology of the DVP and the NSDAP, 
between liberalism in every one of its forms (even including economic liberalism) and 
National Socialism. Differential rights had been one of the most important targets of 
liberal hostility from the time of the French Revolution and perhaps even earlier. They 
were a characteristic of feudal and ancien-regime societies which the liberal 
bourgeoisie had apparently opposed absolutely. However, on closer inspection, one 
can only say with any degree of certainty that liberalism has consistently advocated 
equal legal rights~ it has rarely, if ever, advocated economic democracy, and its 
alignment with political democracy is only a later, mostly 20th-century, bolted-on 
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addition creating the very different variant of liberal democracy. That particular 
development was a delicate bloom in much of Europe till 1945 or even later, and in 
many places its first flushes died fairly quickly - e.g. in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, 
Hungary, Austria and, of course, Germany in 1933. 
It is important not to regard the history of German liberalism as simply one of 
decline~ weakness or pusillanimity arising from deviation from a 'proper' or normative 
development, of the British., French or United States' type.l 1181 Equally, because the 
nature of society is always changing, and with it values and aspirations, German 
liberalistn cannot be properly understood if one interprets every change as deviation 
fr01n its original goals at the beginning of the 19th century,P 191 or if one judges it 
against most present-day liberal beliefs and values. What liberalism meant to Germans 
changed with every new epoch. [1201 To see it is as a chronicle of failure is tantamount 
to accepting the theory of the 'missing bourgeois revolution'. While German 
liberalism's democratic and egalitarian component was a weak shoot of the whole 
n1ove1nent (at least after 1848), its right-wing elitist shoot, placing an emphasis upon 
possessive individualistn and aggressive nationalism, became the main stem. This 
might lay it open to moral criticism or unfavourable comparison with other western 
models of liberalistn, but this is not the same as calling it a failure. In its own terms it 
succeeded by contributing to the creation of a society which, in large measure, 
fulfilled its criteria of what a liberal nation-state should be. 
There were 1nany different sorts of liberalistns across Europe (and North 
America), espousing varying shades of rights' theories and constitutional ideals, 
placing different emphases upon representative government and the franchise, 
attracting asso11ed social classes, and being adopted as a means towards a whole 
range of other goals, such as national unification, anti-feudalism, anti-clericalism, 
commercial freedotns and fi·ee trade. While German liberalism was, by and large, a 
bourgeois phenon1enon in the 19th century, in Britain it had much more of a 
cross-class appeal because it attracted religious dissenters of all classes, because it 
appealed to the peripheries, provincial towns and the 'Celtic fringe' as a 
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counterweight to the dominance of London and the south-east, and because it had a 
powerful wing of aristocratic Whigs in the ranks of its leaderhip1 121 1 In Russia, by 
contrast, 19th-century liberalism was the credo of a very small group, centred almost 
wholly upon members of the educated nobility and the bureaucracy,' 1221 yet so 
disparate in outlook that the only certain factors which united its adherents were 
opposition to the government and a rejection of state authority.1 1231 
It is also the case that there were many different variants of liberalism within 
Germany, both in place and time. Liberals in the countryside had different priorities 
from their urban cousins. Liberals in the north-east were less critical of the post-1870 
Hohenzollern monarchy than those in Baden who resented the pro-Prussian bias of 
the Reich constitution. Liberals in the Rhineland were far more vexed by political 
Catholicism than were those in overvvhelmingly Protestant Schles\vig-Holstein or 
MeckJenberg. Liberals in Bremen and Hamburg saw Free Trade as a much more 
central political goal than did those in Augsburg.1 1241 
Despite these regional differences, it is possible to survey the history of Gennan 
liberalism by concentrating upon its most pred01ninant and most widely shared beliefs 
and values. This aiJows an analysis of how liberalism changed over time, and how the 
more intolerant and anti-detnocratic latency within liberalism as a whole emerged so 
strongly in Germany. It should not be forgotten, however, that Germany was not 
alone in producing 'illiberal' liberals. I-Ierbert Spencer's zealous pro1notion in Britain 
of the doctrine of Social Darwinism led hi1n to declare that the suiferings of the 
incapable, the weak and the imprudent were deserved and were the inevitable price of 
progress for the species; not all suffering ought to be prevented since some of it was 
·curative'. p:s1 
The roots of German liberalistn lay in the Enlightenment, whose forward-looking 
optimism underlay a basic defining characteristic of liberalism in general - a belief in 
progress. Whether that faith was sustained into the 20th century is explored below. 
The Enlightenment also inspired that most basic component of liberal ontology, the 
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individual, and hence the primacy of the individual over the group. Some historians 
have argued that this belief faltered and faded in the two or three decades before 191 4 
as liberals adopted the ideology of the imperial regime." 261 It is true that the growingly 
strident nationalism of all but the most left wing of liberals obliged them to place the 
nation before the rights of the individual, seeing this as a necessary bastion against 
rival imperialist nations. Indeed, some believed that the nation was a source of 
autonomous values, a political end in itself and a source of cohesion and unification 
for German society. However, this did not amount to a renouncing of earlier liberal 
values, since a basic belief of liberals from the early 19th century onwards was that 
without the nation, or nation-state, there could be no citizen. This was one of the 
rationales behind liberalism's solid support for the idea of German unification. 
Another was the belief that the liberty of the Gennan people at home was inextricably 
bound to the fi·eedotn of the German Volk to exist as a nation. 'The struggles for 
nationhood and for political reform seemed [to liberals] to be against the same 
enemies and for the same goals. '[ 1271 
As 'enlightened' men, liberals saw themselves as the true representatives of the 
Volk~ a notion not far removed from Rousseau's idea of the General Will, with the 
same implication that not everyone was aware of what that will was, and that 
majoritarian democratic decision-making was not necessarily, nor even customarily, 
the correct way to elucidate it. This reluctance to embrace a full political franchise 
also arose out of liberalism's conception of <civil' society, and for the tnuch of the 
19th century, German liberalism, which was very largely a bourgeois movetnent, was 
a political expression of a particular idea of the citizen. In the first half of the century, 
this was marked by opposition to absolutism, aristocracy, corporatism, guild 
privileges, mercantilism and religious discrimination, while seeking equality before the 
law, constitutionalism and, theoretically, political equality. Although these were very 
radical aspirations at the ti1ne, the tnovement 1nostly eschewed revolutionary means to 
achieve them, relying instead on education and the passage of time, with, of course, 
the notable and aberrational exception of the abortive events of 1848.
11281 
Thus, while 
liberals demanded immediate legal equality, they were prepared to allow other 
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inequalities to persist. Their concept of the citizen was not only an exclusively male 
one in the early 19th century,1 1291 ~ut, in order to acquire the political rights accruing 
to a Burger, liberal thinking effectively demanded that a man also be a bourgeois, that 
is to say he must either own property or be in possession of Bildung, or education.fl 30l 
The vote had to be earned: it was not to be construed as an automatic right. In most 
German states and cities, where liberal political strength and control remained in the 
ascendancy right through the Second Reich, the full franchise was not granted until 
1918 when it could not be avoided. 1131 1 
Although these fundamental attitudes towards the nation and political democracy 
show a continuity stretching forward· to at least 1 918, there were some factors which 
distinguished most pre-1 848 German liberals from the majority of those who came 
after. While the earlier liberals wished to transform the old corporatist and absolutist 
societies, they had no desire to replace them with what they saw emerging in Britain. 
They did not support laissez-faire economics, nor did they like the idea of large-scale 
industrialised capitalism. Reflecting the socio-economic conditions of Germany in the 
first half of the 19th century, the liberal bourgeoisie, consisting largely of 
professionals and members of the administrative or judicial bureaucracy, advocated 
and envisaged a society of small, Mittelstand businesses where government regulation 
would prevent large-scale capital accumulation and avoid the extremes of riches and 
poverty. This would in time give rise not to a bourgeois society of class distinctions, 
but rather to a 'classless' bourgeois society where as many men as possible could be 
independent and self-supporting.l 1321 Confirmed in their suspicion of political 
democracy and their distrust of the lower orders by the revolutionary events of 1848, 
they could not. however, sustain their vision of, and belief in, a society of small-scale 
producers or of those businesses uniting in co-operatives to defend their independence 
against overmighty capitalist concerns. The concept of the classless bourgeois society 
was developed in a pre-industrial age and it quickly became redundant as the 
irresistible forces of industrialisation and consequent socio-economic change swept 
across Germany in the middle of the century.11331 
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With the emergence of an industrialised society, the social structures of Germany 
altered, creating an expanded working class and a larger bourgeoisie. This in turn 
changed the composition of the liberal movement. Whereas in 1848 the membership 
of the Frankfurt Parliament reflected the dominance of lawyers and other 
professionals in both the bourgeoisie itself and among liberals, in the years following, 
liberalism attracted many more men from within industry and commerce.l 1341 At the 
same time, the already limited cross-class social base of Jiberalism eroded further, 
especially fro1n 1870 and the founding of the united Reich, when models of class 
struggle influenced political thinking in Germany more than in most other European 
nations.ll 351 Workers abandoned the liberal parties for the emerging SPDII 36l, not just 
because of the latter's class-struggle analysis of society, but also because the liberal 
movement itself was becoming increasingly bourgeois, class distinctive and accepting 
of inequalities as a pennanent, unavoidable and even beneficial aspect of society. 
The changing social composition of liberalism in a fast-evolving and modernising 
society led to transformations in its social visions. A signincant strand of liben1l 
thinking, observed above in the views of I-leinr1ch von Treitschke, began to view 
poverty as the result of personal moral failure. In this way the individualis1n of 
liberalism not only endured, but was reinforced, connecting it not just to its earliest 
ideas of the paramountcy of individual decision-making, but to even older Christian, 
and predominantly Protestant, notions of individual responsibility. In 1905 Max 
Weber, that archetypal liberal, would assert that the rise of capitalism (and hence of 
the bourgeoisie) was wedded to the concept of the Protestant ethic, demonstrating 
that the pillar of individualism was still central to the intellectual and ideological 
underpinnings of liberal thinkers. [1371 Social reform remained on the agenda, but it was 
taking on more and more of a role of safeguarding privileged bourgeois society 
against lower-class resentment and socialist revolution, rather than being an integral 
part of progressive refonn designed to produce greater equality and universal rights. 
One of the most i1nportant changes, therefore, in the canon of German liberal 
thinking in the second half of the 19th century was the acceptance ot~ and adaptation 
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to, an industrialised and capitalist society by the 1870s. AJmost as important were 
altered liberal attitudes towards the state. The emergence of a united Germany meant 
that central authority was now much more powerful than previously. Liberal hostility 
to the state dissipated greatly from 1848 with, firstly, the realisation that such an 
institution was essential as a barrier to social disorder emanating from the lower 
classes~ secondly, that only the state could organise and enforce the body of laws 
(such as the Criminal Code and the Commercial Code published in the 1870s) 
necessary for running an increasingly complex commercial economy and society; and, 
thirdly, that the state had become the physical manifestation of the nation in an age of 
growingly strident nationalism and belief in the merits of imperialism, two causes with 
which most liberals strongly identified. 11381 The elitism which was always latent in 
Enlightenment-inspired liberalism grew more pronounced and dominant as the second 
half of the century progressed, now Inanifesting itself in a context of wholehearted 
and largely chauvinist nationalism, identification with a capitalist socio-economic 
system, an acceptance of class society, and support not only for the state as an 
abstract concept, but also as as a presently-existing political reality. In other words 
liberalis1n had largely become a right-wing and essentially politically-conservative 
phenomenon. 
These were the major changes in liberal thinking in Germany over the course of 
the. 19th century, but it has to be borne in mind that the different wings of the 
movement placed differing emphases upon the various component pans of liberalistn 
and chose to support sometimes diametrically opposed policies for what were often 
the same end goals. For exa~nple, the left-wing Progressive Liberals opposed 
Bismarck's anti-socialist laws, while the right-wing National Liberals supported them. 
However, the same National Liberals backed his social welfare legislation, while the 
Progressives rejected it on the grounds that it legitimised conservative political 
control of Germany's authoritarian state. Both parties, nevertheless, were clear about 
the perceived need to take measures to prevent the SPD from achieving a monopoly 
of working-class support and a political effectiveness. !1391 
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There was, in addition, a smaiJ but genuinely democratic and more egalitarian 
strand of liberalism which endured fi·om the time of Johann Herder right through to 
the end of the Wei1nar Republic. This was to be found on the left wing of the 
Progressive Liberals during the Second Reich, championing an extended franchise 
(including equal voting rights for women), advocating greater social welfare 
provision, proposing equal rights for e1nployers and employees, and developing the 
ideas of positive as opposed to negative freedoms. It was the dogged survival of this 
somewhat beleaguered minority faction which made it possible for Social Democrats 
and liberals to work together in 19 I 8-19, creating the co-operation which was 
necessary for the Weimar Republic to be founded. 11401 This emergence to a position of 
prominence and influence of a form of social and democratic liberalism, which 
overlapped ideologically with revisionist Social Democracy, did not, however, last 
vety long. As early as 1920 support for the party most closely associated with its 
beliefs, the DDP, was draining away, while the right-wing liberal party, the DVP, was 
already rejecting the democracy of the Republic. 114 'l By 1930 the DDP had transmuted 
into the StaatL\jXtrtei (State Party) and it too was abandoning its attachment to 
parliamentary democracy as it formed an alliance with the right-wing, nationalist 
Jungdeutscher Orden (Order ofYoung Gennans).ll 42 J 
It has been argued by Dieter Langewiesche and Larry E. Jones that liberalism's 
Enlightenment-inspired belief in the inevitability of progress broke down almost 
completely when Germany was defeated in the First World War. This was 
compounded by the fact that the Imperial regitne also collapsed and thatl although 
liberals were critical of many aspects of the Second Rei eh, they nevertheless regarded 
it as the high point of German history and as largely their own creation. Liberalis1n, it 
is fUJther argued, became so discredited that the Weimar successor parties did not 
include the word 'liberal' in their names, while public disillusion was apparent in the 
nosediving electoral performances of these parties between 1920 and 193 3. The final 
nail in the coffin of belief in inevitable progress, or even the merits of progress, was 
delivered by the Great Inflation of 1923 which deprived the traditionally liberal-voting 
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middle class of the rnaterial wherewithal to live a 'bourgeois' or 'middle-class' life.fl 431 
It is certainly true that optimism was in short supply among many Germans in the 
first half-decade of the Weimar Republic, and then once more when economic 
depression began to set in from late 1928.1 1441 Yet, surely, it was possible to continue 
to believe in the merits of 'progress' and at least sotne elements of modernity while 
sti11 feeling negatively about present conditions. A 'modern' future was not 
necessarily or inevitably a terrible place; the prevailing trajectory of the Weimar 
Republic might have seemed to be leading towards threatening prospects in the eyes 
of many, largely upper-Iniddle-class, liberal elitists in the 1920s and early 1930s, but it 
could simultaneously be believed that steering a different political and cultural course 
could actually usher in a better, yet still modern, age. Weimar Germany was marked 
by diversity, innovation and experimentation in a socio-cultural realm that was highly 
politicised. The ideological road to the Third Reich was not, as suggested by Fritz 
Stern's The Politics (~f Cultural De.spair or George Mosse' s The Crisis r~f (Jennan 
Ideology, a predetermined one paved solely by anti-modern 'conservative 
revolutionaries' such as Julius Langbehn, Paul de Lagarde, Arthur Moeller van den 
Bruck or Edgar Jung.P 451 Chapter 3 of this thesis looks at the culture and politics of 
business and management in the 1920s and considers how 'modern, and 
f01ward-looking this sector was. It will be argued that what attracted many people, 
particularly among the upper middle classes, and specifically among senior managers, 
to National Socialistn were its forward-looking and modern aspects rather than its 
backward-looking manifestations. This suggests that a belief in progress, however 
much shaken by events, among a social group traditionally identified with liberal 
thinking - the upper middle classes - was not absent in the Weimar era~ even in times 
of crisis.l'.u)J 
It is uncontestable that support for the liberal parties nearly vanished over the 
course of the Republic.~' 47J That does not, however, necessarily mean that liberalism 
itself simply disappeared because difficult conditions made people less opti1nistic or 
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because fewer people voted for liberal parties (which, it was noted, were not actually 
called 'liberal'). It has been argued earlier in this thesis\ along the lines outlined by 
Blackbourn and Eley, that liberalism in the later 19th century was more apparent as 
both philosophy and action in the wider German social structures than as merely a 
reflection of the fortunes of the Second Reich Liberal parties. It has also been 
suggested that over time liberalism underwent changes which made each new era's 
belief system sotnewhat different from that which went before. Sitnilarly, liberalism in 
the Weimar Republic did not just live on in the DDP and the DVP, but was developed 
and altered, in the context of the conditions of the 1920s, within the various social 
and socio-economic milieux of the times - in organisations such as VELA, in the 
professional associations and in the large network of upper-middle-class Vereine, aiJ 
of which are looked at in closer detail in chapters 6-9 of this thesis. 
The particular tendency of liberalism which this thesis pursues is that of liberal 
elitism, where notions of leadership, achievement, inegalitarianism and the differential 
spiritual worth of individuals were among the guiding concepts. This in turn led tnany 
adherents of this way of thinking down the political path to National Socialism. Thus 
the argUtnent emerges that there was no real intermediate ideological stage between 
liberalism ( orl at the very least, liberal elitism) and Nazism (the political stepping 
stones of the splinter parties notwithstanding), and that neither was the antithesis of 
the other. This particular intellectual development within German liberalism was one 
of the feeder streams of National Socialist thinking, although it has to be recognised 
that the two ideologies were not synonymous, since Nazism also drew upon other 
derivative sources such as racism, anti-Semitism, Social Darwinism, the v(j/kisch 
tradition and radical conservatism. 
This is the point at which this thesis diverges from the interpretation of Waiter 
Struve. He saw the development of liberal elitistn within Germany coming to an end in 
the early 1920s, probably around 1922 with the death ofWalther Rathenau, one of the 
four liberal elitists he explored in depth. He argued that, '[h]owever well suited to 
counterrevolutionary imperialist needs, the concept of an open-yet-authoritarian elite 
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could not be pursued further within the framework of liberalism ..... After vVorld War 1 
the concept of an open-yet-authoritarian elite was articulated mainly on the Right'. f148l 
l-Ie then went on to discuss the contributions to later Wei1nar politico-social theories 
of elitism of men such as Oswald Spengler, Edgar Jung, Hans Zehrer and Ernst 
Ji.inger, coralling them off in a section entitled 'Conservatives in Search of Elites'. 
This makes it seem that 'right-wing' is to be associated with 'conservative', yet it is 
plain that, with a sma11 exception on the left wing of the pre-war Progressive Liberals 
and of the postwar DDP, German liberalism had long been a right-wing political 
doctrine. How could it be regarded as anything else when almost all of the liberal 
elitists whom Struve examined and mentioned in his account were either Progressives 
or members of the DDP, or at the very least closely associated with those parties? In 
the 1920s the liberal DVP stood to the right of the DDP: indeed, Edgar Jung was a 
member of the former party in the 1920s, standing as a candidate on its slate in both 
1924 Reichstag elections.ll 49 ' To say that liberal elite-theory development abruptly 
ended in the 1920s and somehow became solely a conservative ideological issue is too 
schematic, not to mention unlikely. To say that it became a 'right-wing' politico-soci;JI 
theory is confusing and redundant - elitism is inherently right wing; indeed, it is almost 
a definition of the essence of the very term 'right wing'. 
Struve's justification for his conceptualisation of the earlier elite theorists as 
liberals, and the later as conservatives (whom he interchangeably refers to as 'the 
Right'), rested upon two perceived differences. Firstly, he saw liberal elitists as less 
concerned with the need for one great leader at the pinnacle of their chosen elite, 
while conservative elitists inclined more towards the deus ex n1achina (an ideological 
position which displays obvious affinities with Nazi exaltation of the Fuhrer). 
Although he admitted that both movements were smnewhat '1nuddled' about the role 
of great men, the fact is that one of his principal liberal elitists, Max Weber, developed 
the theory of charismatic leadership and presented it in a largely approving light. This 
suggests that, rather than it being an issue which differentiated liberal elitists fr01n 
conservative elitists, there was an ongoing debate among elite theorists in general 
about the merits of having one suprerne leader - whether as a true vvielder of power 
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and possessor of superior moral and intellectual qualities, or as a figurehead whose 
massive presence would obscure the reality of a wider ruling elite.~' 50 1 
Secondly, he saw liberal elitism pitching its appeal to free professionals, salaried 
employees and stnall manufacturers in consumer-oriented industries and the upper 
levels of the working class, while 'the elitists of the postwar Right, although seeking 
to attract part of the working class, anticipated mass support primarily from the 
middle class, including the old Jniddle class' .1 1511 Significantly, the former constituency, 
minus the working-class eleJnent, comprises the very social groupings whom I have 
identified and defined as the upper middle classes in Weimar Germany and whose 
ideological beliefs (at least among the salaried employees and professionals) are 
analysed in this thesis. It is grist to the mill to have liberal elitism so closely associated 
with my target group, even though Struve mysteriously cut off any further 
development in its thinking and influence in the early 1 920s. My contention is that 
liberal elitism lived on in this very socio-economic milieu, changing and becoming 
ever more undemocratic and self-importantly authoritarian as it absorbed other 
influences (incJuding the thinking of conservative elitists and volkisch writers \vhose 
works were regularly and favourably reviewed in Der !eitende Angeste!lte, as 
demonstrated in chapters 7-9 of this work). Struve,s analysis of the subsequent 
development of elitist theory suggested that this conservative version, with its 'mining 
of a vein of elitist ideas that went back several decades' and its subscribing to the 
'idealisation of preindustrial institutions', gave it a role as a more immediate source of 
National Socialist elitis1n.' 1521 This demonstrates that he still attached credence to the 
idea that Nazism,s belief system was disproportionately influenced by the lower 
middle class and its values. This view is often associated with the theory of the 
'missing bourgeois revolution', a historiographical concept which Struve also 
accepted and used to structure his interpretation.1 153l 
Despite his clear exposition of the major influence of bourgeois liberal thinking in 
setting the ideological and intelJectual framework of Germany until the early years of 
the Weimar Republic, Struve chose to terminate that influence in the early 1920s. To 
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do otherwise 1night have suggested that the bourgeoisie and its associated liberal ideas 
were stronger and more influential than the overarching theory of the missing 
bourgeois revolution would al1ow, and that it was modern influences as much as) or 
more than, feudal and conservative forces which allowed the NSDAP to come to 
power. Struve pushed hard at the door of liberal involvement in the genesis of 
National Socialist ideology~ at one point he said that 'liberal political thought was far 
along the road to scrapping nineteenth-centwy liberalism before the ·Nazi party was 
founded in 1919' _[ 1541 However, in the prevailing historiographical Zeitgeist of J973, 
with the widespread currency of the missing-bourgeois-revolution theory influencing 
interpretational models, he felt it necessary to stop short and allow feudal-remnant 
theories to interpose something (beyond racism and anti-Semitism) between liberalism 
and National Socialistn. That factor proved to be a variety of conservative thought, 
albeit linked backward in time to the common ancestor of cultural elitism, and 
something amorphous called 'the Right'. 
At another point Struve said that 'the Nazi Party was composed largely of men 
from social strata that had once supported liberalism\ and the party's electoral gains 
before 193 3 occurred partly at the expense of the liberal parties' _1 1551 However, he 
irn1nediately went on to qualify this by noting that, although many of the upper strata 
of the middle classes 1nay have gone over to National Socialism fi·om 1930, the lower 
middle classes disproportionately filled the ranks of the NSDAP and 'predominated in 
the early Nazi Party' .1 1561 A footnote to this passage declared that "a good discussion' 
on the social composition of In embers and supporters of the Party was to be found in 
Michael Kat er's 'Zur .S'oziographie der friihen NSDAP ', 1' 571 the forerunner to, and 
basis at: Kater's later work, The Nazi Party, which was critiqued in chapter 1. Just as 
Kater drew a strangely contrary overall conclusion about upper-middle-class influence 
within the NSDAP fi·om his excellent research, so Struve demonstrated clearly 
liberaljsm's contribution to Nazi thinking, and then shied away from allowing it a 
direct or immediate link to National Socialist ideology in his wider interpretation. 
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[ 1] Strictly speaking, Nazism espoused a concept of 'positive Christianity' as stated in Article 
24 of the 25-Point progrrunme of 1920 (Jeremy Noakes & Geoffrey Pridham (eds.), Nazism 
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Modernity and the Culture of 
Business in the Weimar Republic 
One group which appears wholeheartedly to have embraced the idea of social 
mobility, the principle of Leistung and the doctrine of the F11hrerprinzip, was upper 
and upper tniddle management in the private sector, the research subject matter of this 
thesis. This senior-tnanagement level consisted of plant managers, division managers, 
department managers, company lawyers, salaried engineers, sala1ied quantity 
surveyors and other directly-employed professionals, production co-ordinators, sales 
chiefs, publicity heads, personnel directors, chief accountants, auditors, and many 
others. Ill On the basis of largely accepted statistical data showing that between 1925 
and 1933 there were approximately 3,500,000 white-collar workers in Germany12l, 
and using an estimate employed by one of the Weimar managerial associations which 
reckoned that 1 0% of these salaried employees fell into the category of !eitende 
Angestel!ten,l31 this produces a figure of c3 50,000 senior managers.141 That this is 
probably a fairly conservative estimate can be shown by the fact that, in 1933, the 
Reichsbund Deutscher A ngestelltenberujsverbande (Rei eh Association of German 
Professional Salaried Employees' Federations) had 48,000 members,rsJ VELA had 
31,000,161 and the Bund angestellten Akaden1iker technisch- und 
natunvissenschafilicher Ben~fe (Association of Salaried Technical and Natural 
Science Academics) had approximately I 0, 000 members. PI These three organisations 
alone encompassed 89,000 executive employees, which atnounted to 25% of the 
projected 350,000 total (and there were many others within more general white-collar 
unions and associations, non-affiliated local and regional groupings and, importantly, 
specialised professional organisations). For a group who, as a whole, were more than 
a little resistant to colJective practices, this seetns a very high proportion when 
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considered against the fact that only c33% of aJI manual workers were organised into 
trade unions during the s~me ti1ne frame. IRJ 
Founded in 1919, and although organised under trade-union legislation, VELA 
was in fact an emerging professional organisation which hoped to elevate the status of 
its members to that of Ben{(- like doctors or lawyers, or perhaps more accurately Jike 
engineers and chemists who also worked in the world of industry and whose. 
membership now overlapped with the managerial or senior-salaried-employee .. 
organisations. It had taken engineers, chemists and architects a long time to achieve 
the bourgeois respectability of more traditional non-industrial professions, but their 
example showed clearly that prejudice against those who held high positions in 
tnanufacturing, trade and c01nmerce was slowly being overcome.191 VELA was open 
only to salaried employees and not to the owners of enterprises or members of boards 
of directors. Both VELA and sociologists of the time went to great lengths to identify 
this layer of senior tnanagement and show it to be a distinct social group (or perhaps 
even a social dass). Members of this group were referred to as employees with the 
power and responsibilities of employers. Their self-perceived status was further 
butt(essed by the high salaries paid to thern_[InJ 
The political sympathies of the VELA leadership and membership in the 1920s 
were solidly right-wing and nationalist, which probably helped to incline them 
towards the DVP, generally referred to as the party of business.1 1ll The DVP \Vas 
essentially a free-market economically liberal party nm by 'notables' in the fashion of 
the pre-war Gennan liberal parties.r 12J This was different from the DDP, the Deutsche 
Demokratische Partei or De1nocratic Party, a soci:1lly liberal party which~ while 
etnbracing the principles of a capitalist economic systen1, espoused much more of a 
programme of social justice, welfare and democracy and sought (not very 
successfully) a wider mass electorate. The DDP was, along with the SPD, the most 
enthusiastic advocate of the Weitnar system, its leading lights having written most of 
the constitution in 1 919. Both liberal parties were very much of the 20th century and 
far tnore forward-looking and accepting of modern society than the conservative 
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DNVP.1 131 For this reason it is possible that, in the earliest days of the Weiinar 
Republic, VELA members may als? have voted for the DDP,'' 4 ' but this party's vote 
\vas already in free-fall as early as 1920. The Democratic Party very quickly catne to 
be identified with the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty and the burden of 
reparations,l 15 ' two issues about which VELA had strong and hostile views. Many of 
the organisation's members would also have supported the DNVP for its 
conservatis1n and right-wing politics, especially those for whom Protestantistn and 
Prussianism were still part of their value system. Equal1y, some Catholics would have 
opted for the Centre Party, the Zenlrum, or its south-German counterpart, the BVP, 
the Bayerische Volk~partei or Bavarian People's Party.fHil 
In the crisis years of 1929 to 1933 party allegiances became much more fluid, 
nowhere tnore evidently than among supporters of the two liberal parties.' 17' ln 1928 
the DVP and the DDP between them attracted 13.5% of the total Reichstag vote~ by 
March 1933 this figure had been reduced to 1. 9%. An electoral support of 4,200,000 
in 1928 plumtneted to a mere 760,000 in only tive years. Undoubtedly son1e of the 
82% of supporters who deserted the liberal pa11ies went over to the SPD ( especialJy 
DDP voters), and some to the Centre Party. However, the SPD experienced a loss of 
nearly a third of its percentage of the total vote in this same period and the Centre 
Party barely held on to its 1928 share, so the numbers who moved in this direction 
were probably small. Some too tnay have now voted DNVP, but again this party's 
vote declined by 40o/o over these five years. A number may have gone over to the 
welter of small and splinter parties, such as the Wirtschqft.S7Jartei (Econ01nic Party) or 
the Konservative Volk~partei (Conservative People's Party), who picked up 14% of 
the entire Reichstag vote in 1928 and held on to it in 1930. But these parties also 
failed to increase their percentage of the vote, and by July 1932 it had collapsed to 
3o1o~ by 1933 it was an insignificant 1%. Most of this splinter-party vote tnust surely 
have gone to the reJnaining non-communist party of the Weimar era- the NSDAP. So 
too must a very substantia] portion ofthe liberal vote, including that proportion which 
may have used the small and splinter parties as a stepping stone to the Nazis. 
Whatever arithmetic or models are used to describe and differentiate the voter 
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movements of the years 1928-1933, the overwhelming mathematical probability 
points to very large numbers of previous liberal voters ending up casting their votes 
for the NSDAP.ItBJ 
Since DVP voters were hardly likely to switch to the KPD, and almost as unlikely 
to vote SPD, and since VELA members were tnore inclined towards the 
business-oriented DVP, it does not seem too fanciful a thesis to suggest that, by 1932 
or 1933, many VELA members had become Nazi voters. This is of course impossible 
to prove, but it is just one piece of informed induction whose probability of accuracy 
is higher than any other single scenario conjured up to explain the voting behaviour of 
liberal voters in general, DVP voters in particular, and VELA members in 
consequence. 
How then could such an elitist and undemocratic movement, which saw the 
masses as basically incapable of self-government, attract the support of 3 7% of the 
electorate in July 1932 in an election which was undoubtedly untainted by corruption 
or coercion at the polling stations? Why did Germany go down an extreme right-wing 
path in apparent response to the crisis events of the 1920s and early 1930s? In 
Sweden and France, and arguably too in the United. States, the response to the 
Depression was a political swing to the left. This brings us back to the issue of 
electoral support for the Nazi Party. 
Research beginning in the 1980s has indicated that the electoral support for the 
Nazis was spread far more widely across class divisions than was previously asse1ied. 
It has been shown, for instance, that somewhere between 29%) and 39°/o of the total 
Nazi vote in the crucial election of July 1932 ca1ne fi·om working-class or blue-collar 
voters.11 91 And while it is still undisputed that the old middle class of small businesses, 
shopkeepers, artisans and peasant farmers \vere core Nazi supporters, l20l the issue of 
the new middle class of white-collar workers and lower civil servants is far more 
contentious. Certainly in the case of private-sector clerical workers, it seems much 
more likely that many of these were Social Democrat voters rather than Nazi 
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supporters. Large numbers of this growing sector were from families where this was 
the first generation which did not engage in manual labour and who continued to live 
in working-class districtsPll This was probably especially true of young female 
workers such as shop assistants. 
This leaves us then with the upper middle classes, a greatly underresearched 
sector and one whose very definition is the least precise in almost all the literature on 
Nazi electoral support. By the upper middle classes I am not referring to the very 
wealthiest half per cent or so of the population who owned large proportions of the 
means of production, such as Krupp or Thyssen, nor to the largest landed-estate 
owners or the surviving aristocracy. I am talking instead about the next 7-1 O%f22l of 
the population by wealth - or by education, which would later supply them with a 
cotnfortable lifestyle (i.e. university graduates in the main). What is being referred to 
here are the owners of medium-sized businesses, such as small-scale engineering 
firms, department stores, wholesale businesses, theatres, cinemas, haulage firms, 
timber suppliers and so on; plus the senior managers of these and larger concerns such 
as the steel companies, chemical firms, coal mines, insurance companies and banks; 
and in addition to those are included lawyers, judges, doctors, professors, architects, 
engineers, chemists, psychologists, veterinarians, top and middle-ranking civil 
servants, landlords with several properties, well-off investors, military officers, 
newspaper editors, owners of local newspapers, impresarios and the more successful 
actors, singers and rnusicians. 
The upper n1iddle classes are one of the principal focuses of Richard I-Iamilton in 
his book, Who Voted For Hitler?. There he examined in depth the voting patterns of 
14 major cities throughout Weimar Germany, studying most closely the important 
election of July 1932. He found that it was in the best neighbourhoods of every one of 
these cities, except possibly Frankfurt, that the Nazis secured their largest proportion 
of the vote. In July 1932, the upper-middle-class districts consistently gave votes of 
up to 50% above the city-wide averages of the NSDAP. Moreover, by a process of 
assigning most of the Jewish, Catholic and small working-class vote of these 
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neighbourhoods to parties other than the Nazis, he demonstrated that, in a great 
number of these areas, probably 60°/o of the Protestant upper middle classes were 
voting National Socialist in that election.123 J If this trend were repeated throughout the 
smaller communities of Germany, where general support for the Nazis was 
substantially higher than in the cities, then at least 12-17% of the total National 
Socialist vote must have come from this privileged, educated and wealthy sector of 
the population, who made up only 7-10% of the total. This so-called responsible and 
decent sector ofthe population which, until recently, was seen as reluctant to embrace 
Nazism, was in fact one of its most enthusiastic supporters by 1932. 
Much of this economic- and status-conscious group seems to have embraced 
National Socialism for its anti-communism and its opposition to the gains of the left, 
trade unionistn and detnocracy itself.124 l Red revolution and social disorder had been 
the great bogey-1nen ofthese classes since 1918, and the Weimar Republic's electoral 
and party structures, operating within a system of propot1ional representation, had 
failed to allow them to unite politically in order to maintain their conception of social 
cohesion, or to dominate the state politically.1251 Throughout the 1920s the 
cotnmercial and industrial upper middle class, as well a.s the owners of the concerns in 
which they worked, railed against the 'trade-union state', or the Sozialstaat, while 
among many professional groups, in particular doctors and lawyers, a sense of 
'deprofessionalisation' arose, largely out of overcrowding.126J This also tended to be 
blamed upon the existence of the Republic, even though there had been evidence of, 
and anxiety about, it before 1914, if in less drastic form. Thus, effectively, the very 
democracy of Weimar was perceived as a threat not only to their own interests, but 
also to capitalist economic relations, to property and to social status. This was despite 
the fact that not only did the Weimar Constitution and the legislation of every 
governn1ent from 1919 onwards not attempt to undermine property or capitalism or 
the concept of social and econo1nic elites, but the much maligned Social Democratic 
Party, which participated in only one coalition government after 1923, was a fairly 
conservative and only mildly reformist party.r271 However, as political opinion 
poJarised in the context of worsening economic conditions, the attraction of the 
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National Socialists as a party commanding mass support, which could be harnessed 
to take exceptional authoritarian measures, grew among the dominant classes as the 
apparent effectiveness ofthe existing bourgeois parties faded_I2RJ 
This was not the only attraction of the Nazis - they were rabidly militarist, 
nationalist and violently opposed to acceptance of the Versailles Treaty~ they were 
anti-Semitic and, despite rhetoric to the contrary directed at other, lo\ver classes, it 
was obvious that they were not opposed to social and economic inequality. Very 
importantly too, they were believers in strong top-down authoritarian personalised 
rule. All these attitudes were common coinage among the majority of Germany's 
comfortable, wealthy and well-educated classes, so the transition to voting Nazi in the 
years 193 0-3 2 was not a particularly radical step for most of them, liberals as much as 
conservatives. The most difficult aspect for most people of the upper middle classes 
who voted National Socialist, was probably acceptance of the relatively plebeian 
nature of a large number of the Party's members. 
Perhaps one of the least emphasised reasons for upper-middle-class support for 
the NSDAP was that theirs was a relatively modern class, emerging out of 
industrialisation, urbanisation and increased commercial activity, while the Nazis were 
essentially also a modern phenomenon - a modern party with a modern 
Weltanschauung or world-view. While it ts incontestable that the Nazis were 
politically backward-looking in their hostility to democracy and representative 
government, it does not follow that they must therefore have been anti-modern, as 
some historians have argued.f291 Despite the Blut-und-Boden rhetoric which adheres to 
the image of the NSDAP to this day, this was a peripheral strand of Nazi thinking 
which was used selectively to appeal to a rather small and discrete audience - largely 
the old Millel\·tand of small businesses, shopkeepers, handicraft workers and peasant 
farmers.f 3oJ This was the principal sector of German society which felt threatened by 
the rise of modernity - by urbanisation, technology, big business, capitalism and the 
unionisation of workers. In the J 920s and early 1930s it was still possible for political 
parties to say one thing to peasant farmers in Schleswig-Holstein and the complete 
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opposite to civil servants in I-Iamburg just 40 tniles away, let alone in more distant 
Berlin, and not be found out. The Nazis were particularly adept exponents of this kind 
of politicking in an age where communications were still partial, where the radio had 
not quite been developed as a national mediwn, and where there were no nationwide 
newspapers, no national dailies, to expose these contradictions. Ne\vspapers were not 
only regional ( eg the Frankfurter Zeilung or the Berliner Tageblatt), but tended to 
report on affairs and events which involved or interested their own specific 
readerships~ and these readerships were as much divided by class and occupation as 
they were by geography.f3'l 
The Nazi image and message which reached the predominantly urban upper 
tniddle class was not about projects for depopulating the degenerate cities and 
creating medieval peasant estates, nor was it an anti-industrial or even an 
anti-big-business one. Instead, political solutions to economic problems were 
propounded. The Nazis promised recovery through direct action - through the 
dismantling of a perceived restrictive democracy, through the promotion of experti~e 
over entrenched interests, and through decisive individual leadership over collectivist 
pressures. It was not so much the specific economic policies of the Nazis which 
appealed predominantly to the educated and possessing classes of later Weitnar 
Germany, but rather their political-ideological vision. [321 
National Socialism (and in particular, Hitler) was clear about the fact that it 
regarded economics as the hand maiden of politics. 1331 Avrahatn Barkai has analysed a 
rare surviving copy of a draft manifesto, written in 1931 but never published, entitled 
Wirtsclu~(l.spolitische Grundanschauungen und Ziele der N.S'DAP (Basic Economic 
Principles of the NSDAP). This talked about the rights of private property, the 
incentive advantages of capitalist profits and the need for healthy competition, yet at 
the same time it described private ownership as merely a 'right to use'- 11S7{ji·llctun7- a 
Romantic, and indeed medieval, concept. It stated that property ultimately belonged 
to the Volk as a whole and that the state was the body which should supervise this 
use. The implication of this, as the tnanifesto itself said, was that 'the econotny of the 
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people is therefore subject to the art of statesmanshjp' Y4J This was a portent of the 
state direction of the economy· which would cmne to pass in the Third Reich, so 
perhaps it is little wonder that this docmnent remained unpublished at that time~ for 
business, it would have been at best a two-edged sword, offering security of property 
but also a future economic dirigism of constTaints, regulations and intervention to 
which tnost business owners were stil1 hostile in 1931. 
Of even greater sigttificance is what the manifesto failed to address - the three 
million unemployed. In fact, the NSDAP proffered few economic ideas, original or 
otherwise, and did little to attempt to put forward specific solutions to the econotnic 
crisis before the late spring of 1932. There was sotne talk of settlement plans in the 
east, the building of suburban housing for the unemployed, a reduction of wmnen ~s 
work, the outlawing of Doppelverdienere ('double earners' or the holding of two 
jobs), the introduction of obligatory labour service, and a woolly notion of enforcing 
price cuts which, said Otto Wagener, head of the NSDAP's Wirtschaft.spolitische 
Abteilung (Department for Economic Policy), 'could reduce the number of 
unetnployed by half or even two thirds within a couple of months'. '351 However, in 
the main, the Nazis preferred to blame the 'systetn' and make sweeping but vague 
claitns along the lines of another of Wagener' s assertions: 'When the errors of the old 
regime are eradicated, when National Socialist thought replaces them, unemployment 
wili disappear and existing demand wil1 activate the econotny. '[361 
Then, in May of 1932, the Nazis unexpectedly published the Wirtschafiliches 
Sofortprogramm der NSJJAP (Immediate Economic Programme of the NSDAP) and 
distributed 600,000 copies as guidelines for its Party speakers, only to renounce it 
and recal1 all copies for destruction in September of the same year after it received a 
sustained hostile reception from the business community. The Sojortprogran1 had 
laid down proposals for the creation of employtnent by means of credit-financed 
public works (including road-building, housing construction and 1najor land drainage 
projects), hinted strongly at ideas of Autarkie (self-sufficiency), and proposed many 
state-in1posed regulations on investment and prices. The replacement for the 
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S(~(ortprogn.rn1 was the Plan for Economic Reconstruction, which not only 
recommended the relaxation of existing price controls and the reduction of taxes on 
investment and high incomes, but was also much less specific about the issue of job 
creation. Barkai has argued that the Sojortprogran1 was a precursor of many of the 
economic policies actually followed in the Third Reich and that it demonstrated that 
the Nazis were not as devoid of economic ideas as has often been claimed.l371 Whether 
that is true or not, the fact remains that the programme was withdrawn within four 
tnonths and replaced by a much less specific statement of intent more in line with 
previous practices of avoiding giving a hostage to fortune by tying themselves to 
specific plans_I3HI This suggests that public perception of the NSDAP and support for 
the Party could scarcely have been based upon an enthusiasm for its economic 
proposals. Indeed, the much-vaunted work-creation schemes with which the Nazis 
are associated, were in fact first drawn up by the Bruning administration and begun 
under the von Schleicher and von Papen governments of I 932.139 1 Furthermore, the 
issues of public works and deficit spending were being widely debated (and 
supporied) within right-wing circles from at least 1931, including the DNVP and t.he 
radical-conservative nationalists around the influential monthly periodical, Die Tat.I-WJ 
Although the upper middle classes sought economic recovery both for patriotic 
reasons and as a tneans to protect or promote their own interests, it was therefore not 
the economic proposals of the Nazis which actually attracted them; but nor yet can it 
be simply or accurately described as a political affinity. The destruction of the trade 
unions and the complete dismantling of political democracy may have been \Velcomed 
by many in 193 3) but these were not actual 'manifesto commitments' of the pre-193 3 
NSDAP; they \Vere latent and undoubtedly possible events, but they were not 
clear-cut proposals. Indeed, few of the post-1933 political actions of Hitler and the 
Nazis were iterated specifically or unambiguously before they came to power. It was 
at least as much the thrust of the Nazis' emphasis upon 'can-do' leadership, their 
meritocratic elitism and their vision of a modern dynamic Gennany which appealed to 
the BildungsbiirRertum as well as to the Besitzbiirgertton141 1 - in other words it was in 
very large measure an ideological sympathy. Germany needed to tnodernise, not 
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regress to some socially ossified quasi-medieval society, if business was to flourish 
and the growing ranks of professionals (including even such traditional professions as 
lawyers, doctors and professors) were to find gainful employment. And of course~ 
aside from some owners of medium-sized firms, almost all the categories of those 
making up the upper middle classes of business, that is to say managers, professional 
specialists, engineers, che1nists and so forth, were attracted by the prospect of 
becotning technicians of power in a modern yet undemocratic state. Managers could 
hope to gain greater unfettered power over their workforces and, because of their 
expertise, perhaps even acquire some of the controls currently held by less talented or 
less knowledgeable owners of the means of production. This was as true for laW';ers 
and accountants in an age of complex business structures, as it was for chetnists and 
engineers in an age of technological diversity and competitive research. 
National Socialism's positive attitudes towards the modern world of industry and 
technology~ its connecting of creativity to a perceived German Gei.\·t and the racial 
fi·amework within which this ideological construction was contained are examined in 
detail in chapter 5. On w·hat might be called a surface or immediate level of attraction 
for 'forward-looking' people, were the modern appearance and practices of the 
NSDAP. Hitler was the first Gennan politician to use aeroplanes to fly him around the 
country to rallies and meetings, while his love of fast cars was just one more example 
of the modern chic dimension which was embraced and displayed by many of the 
Party's leadership.1421 Hermann Goering was a frequenter of fashionable events and a 
flaunter of the modern trappings of wealth, as weli as tnoving in rnore traditional high 
society.1431 Joseph Goebbels, above all~ was a thoroughly modern man both in his 
tastes and lifestyle and in his deployment of up-to-date techniques of propaganda. He 
was a cosmopolitan city-lover who not only adored the cinema and the culture which 
surrounded it, but employed the film industry to good effect once the Nazis came to 
power. He also utilised the radio for the benefit of the Party after 1933, realising 
faster than most the tremendous potential of this modern medium for attracting the 
attention and tnoulding the opinions of large numbers of people. 1441 He encouraged 
wider ownership of radios in the Third Reich by expanding the production of cheap 
121 
sets at a time when most consumer goods' production was being curtailed in the 
interests of Autarky and while resources were being diverted into savings and 
investment as part of the rearmament drive. 1451 Goebbels' techniques of information 
gathering and dissemination in the fonn of propaganda~ both in the Rei eh Propaganda 
Ministry and in the years before the NSDAP came to power~ were on a par with the 
techniques employed by Madison Avenue executives to sell vacuum cleaners and cars 
rather than political ideas. 
The NSDAP was also years ahead of all its rival political parties in organisation 
and financing. In large rneasure through the efforts of Franz Xaver Schwarz, its 
treasurer, the Nazi Party became self-financing and solvent, never running short of 
tnoney for campaigning, administration or paying its employees until November 1932, 
when the costs of mounting two Reichstag election campaigns, the presidential ballots 
and innumerable Lander and local government contests, all within nine months, 
emptied its coffers. Apart from that occasion, this generally very favourable financial 
situation allowed the NSDAP to avoid bec01ning reliant upon major donations fi·om 
any sectional interest in business, industry or agriculture. l461 Thus it was able to 
portray itself as unbeholden to the interests of capital or wealth or organised labour, 
and this gave credibility to its clai1n to be concerned only \Vith the national interest, a 
'Jnovement' above the fi·ay of interest politics and sectarian par1y squabbling.1471 This 
class-free and patriotic image was attractive to many~ not least the business upper 
tniddle classes who aspired both to escape trade-union and democratic restrictions 
and to break through the stili extant glass ceiling of haut bourgeois and aristocratic 
economic and political power. 
The means of achieving financial solvency within the ·NSDAP were in themselves 
very tnodern and efficient. Unlike other parties, the Nazis never had a backlog of 
unpaid membership dues, not even in the depth of the Depression: for whatever 
reason, nearly all NSDAP members paid up on time. Such efficiency, of course, 
would draw approval from those for whom efficiency and smoothness of operation 
vvere a way of life, e.g. business managers. So too would the way in which the 
122 
NSDAP organisers could elicit so much labour and time from Party members and 
their families to organise rallies, marches, leafleting, poster campaigns and heckling 
groups. They could stage their campaigns much more cheaply than any of the other 
right-wing or bourgeois parties. 1481 Indeed these campaigns were much more high 
profile, public and stitnulating than the staid, unflamboyant and often private meetings 
of these older parties. 1491 
Still more remarkable was the fact that, although the Nazi rallies were popular, 
in1passioned and often exciting events, the general public had to pay to get into thetr1 -
even during election campaigns when the NSDAP was seeking their votes. This was 
not a wholly new depm1ure~ the Social Democrats sometimes charged a ten-pfennig 
entrance fee, although more often than not their rallies were free. The Nazis, 
however, were not in the business of collecting nominal charges - they demanded ten 
times as much as the SPD did: one mark to get in if there was a guest speaker, and 
two tnarks if that guest speaker was Adolf Hitler. Although it is difficult to compare 
then with now, a sum of two marks was equivalent to at least 5% of a skilled 
worker's weekly wage- about £15-20 in today's money. In many ways it seems as if 
it tnust have been a huge gamble to charge such high sums for a product they 
desperately wanted people to satnple and endorse. In another way it is a mark of 
modern 1narketing technique to assess that, if you want something to appear 
desirable, you must set its cost at a high level in order to make it appear valuable. But 
even then the Nazis were not finished. They would make collections within the hall or 
venue; and in the context of these gatherings, which were part political rally, part 
carnival and part religious revival meeting, it was very difficult to ignore the 
collection buckets being pushed under your nose when enthusiastic, bright-eyed 
zealots in the same row were ostentatiously shoving quantities of money into them. 
For those who contributed beyond a certain level there would be loud acclaim and the 
accruing of much kudos to that individual. Such was the efficiency with which the 
Nazis could raise money, that it has been esti1nated that they raised three million 
marks in one month as early as 1930. This was equivalent to the total spent by the 
SPD on their entire 1930 Reichstag election campaign.r501 
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In other ways too, the money-raising abilities of the Nazi Party were very 20th 
century in their nature. The SA were expected to provide their own brown shirts, and 
the Party took the opportunity to set up its own supplier in order to retain the profits 
of such an enterprise. These garments were available at many outlets, and could even 
be acquired by mail order. Obviously there was an attraction in buying your brown 
shirt from the institution you supported. This bears a close similarity to the 1990s' 
phenomenon of football fans buying their replica kits from the club store! A deal was 
also struck with the Sturm cigarette company whereby its coupons could be 
exchanged for SA gear, such as daggers, belts and badges. The Party in return 
received a percentage on sales and a further cut for endorsing the product to its 
1nembers. This actually led to a 'cigarette war' at the streetside kiosks betv;een Nazis 
attempting to strongarm them into stocking l)'tunn cigarettes, while the Stahlhelm 
veterans' organisation was pushing its own favoured brand, Os~front. This episode 
somewhat resembled the Coca Cola!Pepsi marketing wars with a strong element of 
Mafioso technique thrown in. The SA were fwiher expected, indeed obliged, to take 
out insurance against injury incurred in street fighting~ and such insurance policies 
were to be taken out with the Party itself, which made the NSDAP a tidy sum. The 
Nazis also had several other profitable enterprises, most notably their publishing 
concerns, of which the Jnost profitable was Eher Verlag which printed and distributed 
Mein Kampf When a one-volume edition was published in 1930, sales took off and 
profits poured in - both to the Party and to Hitler personally. The Fiihrer thereupon 
took up residence in the most expensive suite in Berlin's most prestigious hotel, the 
Kaiser he~(, for the next three years. [sJ I This was certainly not the action of a 
hair-shir1ed ascetic or bucolic party leader. 
Allied to the organisational efficiency and the modernity of the NSDAP was the 
perceived dynamism of the Party in the years up to 1933. This included the incessant 
street activities, the putnped-up rallies~ the marching columns, the profusion of flags 
and uniforms, and the diverse Nazi organisations which catered for youth, wo1nen, 
sportsmen, car enthusiasts, shooters, and a plethora of occupational and professional 
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groups. The Nazi Party appeared more vigorous, more enthusiastically proselytising, 
and certainly a lot younger than any other party except the KPD. 1 t generated interest 
and excitement, but it a] so displayed a willing acceptance of modern technology and a 
leadership organisation which appeared to get things done. What an appealing image 
this must have presented to those sections of society who perceived themselves as 
undervalued and underempowered 1nodern men deserving of greater rewards and 
greater power.l521 
The NSDAP, of course, also presented itself as the protector of order and social 
discipline, as a party which would prevent social chaos or social revolution, and 
indeed, from 1928, as the upholder of the rights of property. It successfully portrayed 
itself as a bulwark against Bolshevism and the threat of socialist expropriation, 
characterising its own thuggery as either a reaction to communist violence or else as 
pre-emptive and preventative. This i1nage of restoring order, despite the reality of 
their perpetrating and starting most of the disturbances, was encouraged not only by 
the Nazis themselves, but also reported by many bourgeois or right-wing newspaper. 
Thus the respectability and attraction of the Party was greatly enhanced, ironically and 
paradoxically, by highlighting and publicising their very street brawling.r53 1 
How the dynatnism, modernity, authoritarianism and ideological elitism of the 
NSDAP came to be embraced by many of Weimar Germany's senior business 
managers is pursued over the following six chapters of this study, but before 
examining this phenomenon, it is instructive to look at the wider German business 
culture and politics of those years and the econo1nic framework of the tin1es. 
Germany had been profoundly affected by the Great War, not just in terms of the 
destruction of men and resources, nor simply because of the traumatic psychological 
and social-psychological impact of defeat. The relationship of state to society was 
substantially altered, nowhere more so than in the practices of, and attitudes to, state 
intervention, planning and brokerage in the econ01nic realin. During the war various 
ministries, such as munitions and food, had developed into economic-planning 
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agenc1es which strictly regulated labour supply and movement and controlled the 
allocation of raw materials. Although the wartime controls were dismantled after 
1918, Germany, like much of the rest of the industrialised world, did not revert to the 
level of market freedom which existed before 1914. The Weimar lnterparty 
Comtnittee and the Ministry of Labour, among others, accrued increased political 
tasks and responsibilties, and by the mid-1920s the state was collecting and spending 
twice the share of national income which it had been taxing and administering before 
the war. Despite this increased role for the state, fewer decisions were actually being 
made by the Reichstag, or even by the many coalition governments of the period.'541 
However, it did not follow that an enlarged state bureaucracy therefore held the 
reins of power. Economic (and indeed political) management became, in large 
measure, a matter of arbitration and brokerage undertaken within and between the 
forces of capital and labour. Power in the Inarketplace was increasingly correlating 
with political influence, and as economic bargaining became too imporiant to be left 
to the free market, state agencies were set up to become legal mediators. Since the 
most high-proftle clashes were between the trade unions and business owners, this 
inevitably politicised the situation. f-Iowever, as the expectations ot~ and reliance 
upon, political solutions and state action increased, simultaneously the· ability of 
politicians to take decisive action declined as they became progressively more reactive 
rather than proactive, and as the stormy econOJnic conditions of the WeiJnar years 
overwheltned even their ability to comprehend what economic forces were at work. 
Yet however tnuch business might criticise the actions, or Jack of theJn, of 
successive governments, there was a general acceptance that there was a necessary 
role for the state to play in the management of the economy and in regulating labour 
relations. There was little debate about the economic and social merits of pure 
laisez-faire economics,r551 although this was a straw-man. whom the Nazis in particular 
set up on many occasions only to knock down in a tirade against what they tenned 
selfish, individualistic, unpatriotic liberalism. Instead, the issues which concerned 
German business revolved around interest-group politics,l561 which meant gaining 
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influence with, access to, and even membership of, state policy-making bodies. This 
could mean achieving selection as a candidate for one of the business-friendly 
bourgeois parties and being elected to the Reichstag, or it could mean membership of 
the many appointed committees on economic management~ or a place on an 
arbitration panel or one of the many other quangos of the day. Quickly too, the issue 
of the nature of the state and whether parliamentary democracy was the best political 
structure for the nation became an issue for the largely very right-wing German 
business world, both for the owners and their senior managers. 
This anti-detnocratic tendency arose primarily as a reaction not just against the 
participation of the SPD in several governtnents, but also against the perceived 
ovennighty power of labour, in particular that of the trade unions. from the 
beginning, Weimar Germany had a near-permanent record of conflict between 
business and labour, although there are also some seemingly remarkable examples of 
consensus and co-operation, such as the great wave of passive resistance and strikes 
which followed the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 and which was suppotied 
by both capital and labour. More relevant to the this study than the surge of 
patriotism which fuelled the Ruhr events, was the Zenlralarheil.~gen7einschqji (ZAG), 
or Central Community of Work, established by the Stinnes-Legien Agreement of 
November 191 8 between employers and the SPD-affiliated unions. German industrial 
relations were reordered by this arrangement based on mutual recognition, 
renunciation of company or 'yellow' unions, collective bargaining, the eight-hour day, 
and institutionalised joint consultation on issues of economic and social policy.l571 
Essentially this was an attempt by these large corporatist blocks to bypass political 
government and secure a structural agreement with a socio-economic policy attached, 
which the yet-to-be-elected Reichstag was expected to approve as afait accompli and 
then enforce by legislation. Thus, even before the Weimar Constitution had been put 
in place, there were moves to circumvent parliament's authority and role. Significantly 
too, it was claimed that the interests of the two parties to this agreement were 
synonymous with the interests of the entire nation, while denying any legitimation of 
that agreement to the population as a whole beyond their own ranks_IS!iJ 
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The ZAG endured only until late 1923, partly as a result of defections from 
component parts of each block. Many employers, especially among the newer light 
industries, refused to be dictated to by the larger heavy-industry companies, while 
rank-and-file socialist trade unionists felt that their leadership had sold out and 
prevented the full socialisation or nationalisation of big business. The final nails in the 
coffin were the acceleration of inflation, the unilateral repudiation of the eight-hour 
day by heavy industry in the autumn of 1923, and an insistence by the body of 
etnployers as a whole that wages be reduced and social expenditure curbed -
measures which the government duly accepted and enforced.r591 
Thus, although the ZAG appeared to be a co-operative undertaking when it was 
first set up, it proved to be merely a marriage of convenience arising from the 
uncertain crisis period of November 1918 and was never remotely a consensual 
agreement.160l Culpability for the break-up lies overwhelmingly with the employers and 
business,l61 l whose intransigence and aggression were marked not just by the events of 
1923, but also in 1928 when they initiated the lock-out of 250,000 iron and steel 
workers in the Ruhr in an attempt to challenge the still-existing binding arbitration 
systen1, collective bargaining and the authority of the state itself, at this point in time 
governed by the Grand Coalition of the SPD, DDP, Centre Party and the DVP~ and 
headed by the Social Democrat, Hermann MUller. As a result of this business hostility, 
the practice of collective bargaining grew ever more dependent on state arbitration 
and enforcement which was not only hated by both sides, but also served to further 
kindle political polarisation. Added to this simtnering brew was the fact that, despite 
their distrust of successive govermnents, the trade unions, and especially their leaders, 
came to depend upon the state for protection against the employers. This had the 
effect of creating on the other side of the fence a perception that the state and the 
unions were in collusion, and fanned the fires of a growing hostility to the Weitnar 
system and its democratic constitution.'621 
If the employers and business were gratified by the abolition of the eight-hour day 
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and the imposition of lower wages in I 923/24, and by the degeneration of the Works 
Councils into talking-shops, their anxieties were quickly reignited by the evolution of 
the Wirtscha.fisdemoh·atie (economic-democracy) programme within the SPD and 
their affiliated trades unions from about 1925. [GJJ This programme can be plausibly 
interpreted as a Social Democratic reconciliation with capitalism or as a recognition 
that the ambitious revolutionary hopes and demands of earlier years were 
unobtainable. What was being sought now was an extension of legal rights m 
economic matters rather than full socialisation or nationalisation of the means of 
production. The SPD and the trade unions wanted an institutionalisation of their voice 
not just at shopfloor level (Works Councils), but also at the macro-level of 
tnanagement of the economy.1641 This highly democratic aspiration was worked out in 
the aftennath of the actions of employers in 1923/24 with the aim of preventing such 
aggressive and arbitrary acts happening again. It was not so much the social and 
economic losses which concerned the SPD and the unions, who could reluctantly 
accept their (temporary) necessity within the framework of their belief in the eflicacies 
of economic rationalisation, but the draconian and unilateral nature of the way they 
were carried out. [fiSJ 
Despite the moderation of the position of organised labour and the SPD, and 
despite apparent evidence that they had almost completely eschewed Marxist 
revolutionary aitns, 1661 the employers were not mollified. Instead the 
Wirtschaftsdenu>kratie ideas threw them into a near-panic, intensified their hostility to 
the trade unions, increased their onslaught upon collective bargaining and Weimar's 
social legislation, and strengthened the influence of the more reactionary ele1nents 
within big business and industry. 1671 There were increasing calls for 'Freiheit der 
lndustrie' (freedom of industry), which was not an invocation of laissez-:faire 
free-market principles in the highly cartelised and protectionist context of the Weimar 
years, but a straightforward demand that business be given more power, by legislation 
where necessary, to roll back trade-union rights and allow employers to resurrect 
their pre-war (indeed 19th-century) Herr-im-Haus (master-of-the-house) position of 
dominance over an unorganised and impotent workforce. This also implied a 
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challenge to the state, which preserved labour's rights and persisted with a welfare 
system which business held to be too expensive. In the ideological realm, the effect of 
the alannist reaction to the idea of Wirtschajtsdemokralie was to promote an 
exploration of alternative views of comtnunity, beginning with the idea of the 
WerksgemeinschC{{t (community of the company/firm) and devoping into notions of 
the Volksgenwinschaft.l 681 A very similar ideological development and trajectory 
began to emerge in VELA as early as 1924 and is explored over the course of 
chapters 6-9 of this thesis. 
As early as 1925, voices emanating from heavy industry had been heard calling 
for tuJe by presidential decree to override the Reichstag,l 691 and this began to swell 
into a chorus from big business as the Great Depression really started to bite in 
Germany. Hostility to the trade unions was still at the forefront of employers' and 
managers' concerns, despite the fact that during this crisis, unlike the civil disorder 
that had marked the early I 920s, there were few strikes or demonstrations by either 
the unemployed or the unions; the workers feared too much for the loss of jobs "to 
down tools, while the left was split and paralysed by the acrimonious animosity 
between the SPD and the KPD which had emerged around 1929 with the latter's 
adoption of the Stalinist analysis of Social Democrats as 'Social Fascists' yoJ 
1-lowever, the reluctance of successive governments either to fully rein in the trade 
unions by rescinding legal rights or to cut back welfare provisions during the long 
crisis, led to increasing calls for authoritarian government, calls which envisaged a 
codified dictation of industria) relations being laid down by the state and business, 
rather than by the perceived prevailing block of state and organised labour. The 
Weimar system itself, long despised by business interests despite their constant 
manoeuvrings for position and advantage within its institutions, more and more 
became the focal point of political opposition. As mentioned above, the ideological 
social framework which emerged to replace it was one which attempted to deny the 
concept of class struggle by conjuring up the image of a Volk~genwinsc/u.~ft, 
something which the Nazis claimed to have created when they introduced the 
repressive National Labour Code of January 30th, 1934, which did indeed order 
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labour relations just as business had been demanding. 1711 Interestingly, VELA members 
played a significant role in drawing up that piece of Nazi legislation (see chapter ·I 0). 
It is transparently obvious from this discussion that, in the realm of labour 
relations, much of German business was profoundly illiberal and repressive, and, frorn 
our present vantage-point, hugely reactionary in its political views. However, from 
the perspective of the Weimar era, with democracies dwindling in number across 
Europe and the stark exatnple of the Soviet Union, it was not at all evident that 
political democracy was by any means the way of the future. Equally, labour relations, 
labour Jaw and social-welfare provisions were under attack everywhere in the 
capitalist world by the time the Depression gained a grip. It is possibly worth 
considering the fact that Prohibition became part of the United States' constitution at 
exactly the satne time as the Weimar constitution was approved. Both institutions also 
died in the same year as each other. After many years of widespread contempt and 
disregard for the legitimacy of this part of their constitution, Alnericans abolished it, 
recognising it as a mistake and a retrogessive move. Why deny a similar logic to the 
motivations of Germany's business community who also rode roughshod over what 
they despised in the Weimar system and also sought constitutional change, albeit of a 
much more fundamental nature? 
If the question of attitudes among German business towards politics and labour 
relations is subject to debate over whether it was forward-looking, the sa1ne cannot be 
said for attitudes towards business organisation. When Frederick Taylor' s book, The 
Principles C!f Scient{fic Management,' 12' was published in Germany in 1918, it went 
on to sell 30,000 copies over the next four years.173J The ideas of 'Taylorism', or 
scientific management, had already spread to Germany and influenced many 
industrialists before the Great War. Taylor's basic thesis was that the accurate and 
objective measurement of work performance would lead to the establishment of a just 
and acceptable wage rate and provide the key to improved productivity and industrial 
harmony. This was to be achieved by timing basic work actions, developing detailed 
instruction cards for employees, creating factory planning departments, screening out 
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unsuitable job applicants by psychological testing, and imposing wage scales based on 
piece-work. Good workers would thereby share in the prosperity generated by 
expanded output, while inefficient workers' wages would fall below subsistence levels 
and force them to quit.l74l 
Hailed as the application of disinterested and logical science to the world of 
economic production, which would usher in a utopian change fro1n power over men 
to the adtninistration of things, Taylorism, in Germany as elsewhere, was applied 
almost exclusively to questions of labour efficiency. The purportedly impartial 
pronouncements of science almost invariably supported entrepreneurial and 
managerial proposals, while the framework of reference, built on the premises of 
optimising output and piece-work reward, ignored the reality of collective bargaining 
and the wellbeing of employees. [?sl As Germany moved into a period of relative 
economic stability fi·otn around 1924, Taylorism began to be questioned and criticised 
as both dehumanising and too narrow a concept of business operation. A1nong the 
critics was the industrial engineer, Gustav Frenz, who published a critique of 
Taylorism clain1ing that incentive payments and psychological selection processes 
were unsuited to the nature of German workers. Additiona11y, since only happy 
workers were productive workers, and since overspecialisation and deskilling were 
destructive of Arbeitsjreude Gob satisfaction), good and effective management would 
be procured by businesses which encouraged the promotion of fulfilling \Vork for the 
greatest number of employees, not just for a select few at the top. [?ol 
Another critic was the econmnist, Friedrich von Gottl-Ottlilienfeld, who argued 
that a narrow focus upon technical improvements, centred upon squeezing ever tnore 
efficiency out of workers, was becoming counter-productive and myopic. As well as 
turning factories into soulless prisons and inflaming industrial relations. it did not 
address the much wider issues of economic and technological rationalisation which 
were essential for the future well-being and competitiveness of German industry. [771 
Gott1 instead chose to sing the praises of Henry Ford and his 'rationalisation' 
methods. [?SJ These included the use of moving assembly-lines, standardisation and the 
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enlargetnent of a mass nutrket through low prices and high wages.P9l 
1-Jowever, just as important to Gottl as the organisation of production, was Ford, s 
management style and business ideology. fle saw Ford workers as imbued with a 
spirit of work which transformed the rigours of labour into joy in the achievement of a 
common task with which they identified strongly. Inspired by firm and effective 
leadership, they felt that they were a valued part of a large and worthwhile project and 
thus readily accepted managerial authority. According to Gottl, by replacing the profit 
motive with an ethic of service, .Henry Ford had developed an admirable systetn of 
labour relations, grounded in the leader-follower principle, which should be adopted 
and adapted for German conditions. He went on to argue that a benign dictatorship of 
technical reason, imposed from above by managers, would release a spirit of joyful 
activism which was the foundation stone of genuine community, both in the firm and 
in the nation at large. (IWJ This interest in creating a cotnmon goal and sense of 
community among the workforce which would not only improve the poor 
industrial-relations record of Weimar industry, but might also dissolve class conflict 
and forge a sense of working for the good of the entire German Volk, was to be found 
in many other pamphlets and books of the time.ISll These same publications also 
stressed the desirability of ensuring upward mobility and advancement for capable 
etnployees.' 82J 
For senior managers within Gennan business it is not difficult to see why they 
might find some of the ideas emerging from a German interpretation of F'ordisnnts 
very appealing. As well as encouraging social and economic upward mobility and 
bolstering the concepts of Leistung and meritocracy, it was advocating increased 
managerial power - a 'dictatorship of technical reason' .11131 One can also perceive more 
than a suggestion of the Nazi Ftlhrerprinzip and the Vo!ksgeJneinschc!fl liberated from 
class struggle in this emerging thinking. 
For entrepreneurs as a whole, the attraction of Fordisn1us lay in its 
administrative, productive, marketing and organisational reordering of business 
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concerns based upon ideas of rationalisation. For big business owners a fi.1rther 
consequence of the 'rationalisation movement' was an increased preoccupation with 
amalgamation and cartelisation, surpassing even the pre-war trend to concentration in 
German industry.184 1 Charles Maier has argued that Fordism 'best served the 
bourgeois-conservative, often Malthusian ends of European business and industry in 
the later 1920s'. He saw a general fear among businessmen that the market would be 
flooded with goods from factories which were presently operating at less-than-full 
capacity, and this led to their increased interest in the theories and practices of 
rationalisation. The emphasis of this rationalisation fell upon cutting factor costs, in 
particular that of labour, and upon absorbing smaller concerns into larger ones. Maier 
argued that, behind the images of assembly-line efficiency, the prospect of abundance 
through scientific procedures applied to production, and the promises of the social 
benefits which big-business capitalism could deliver, lay the 'zero-sum' reality of a 
redistributive project which simply increased the wealth and control of established 
interests. 1851 
Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis explore the widening split between the perceived 
interests of managers and owners and the development of a critique of capitalism, or 
more accurately of contemporary capitalists, which emerged within VELA in the later 
1920s. This sits well with Maier' s portrayal of the way big-business owners came to 
interpret the doctrines of rationalisation - as a justification for industrial 
concentration and playing safe. Salaried business managers, on the other hand, took 
rationalisation to mean technological innovation, organisational change, and enhanced 
managerial responsibility and autonomy, as wi11 be shown later.1s61 Additionally, as one 
would expect, this emerging and rising socio-economic group displayed more 
fondness for a risk-taking culture than the conservatively-oriented established sector 
which it was challenging. Maier also argued that rationalisation of the sort favoured 
by big-business owners was at its height between 1924 and 1928 when the bourgeois 
parties ruled in coalition without the SPD,I871 and this too ties in well with VELA's 
political critique of these parties and the Weimar system itself, which emerged on the 
heels of its economic criticisms. 
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Attitudes in the Weimar years to state intervention, planning and laissez-faire 
owed much to German tradition and practice. The Cameralism of the 17th and 18th 
century led almost seamlessly into 19th- and 20th-century economic theories, 
displaying a common authoritarian concept of the state.lllRJ Even before German 
unification, the public and government sectors were larger and more influential, and 
the direct influence of the state more palpable, than in most other European 
countries. 1891 After 1870, the Imperial state not only embarked upon a series of 
protectionist measures for both agriculture and industry, but also nationalised the 
railways, set up economic activities at both Reich and municipal levels, supervised and 
encouraged cartelisation, and began to intervene actively in mining and industry. 1901 
Accotnpanying the economic developments of Germany from the beginning of the 
19th century, there grew up a body of supportive, and sometimes guiding, intellectual 
vvork which contained certain common threads. These were, firstly, the assertion that 
the main purpose of all economic activity was to support the power of the state and 
the Volk, and that the satisfaction of individual desires was seconda1y; secondly, it 
was the right and duty of the state to intervene in the economy and, where it was in 
the interest of the common good, to place restrictions on free enterprise~ and thirdly, a 
favouring of ideas of economic self-sufficiency, usually with a bias towards the 
importance of agriculture. Among those who contributed to this canon were J oh ann 
Fichte ( 1762-1814 ), Ad am Mulier ( 1779- I 829), Friedrich List ( 1789-1846), Wilhelm 
Roscher (1817-94), AJbert Schaffie, Adolf Wagner ( 1835-1917), Gustav Schmoller 
(1838-1917) and Georg Friedrich Knapp (1882-1926).19 '' 
These ideas in turn influenced thinkers of the postwar period, both among 
liberals, such as Walther Rathenau and Wichard von Moellendort: and on the 
conservative right, such as Werner Sombart and Othmar Spann. AJl of these men's 
beliefs and attitudes were also much affected by the Great War and the accompanying 
economic planning which had proved effective enough to keep Germany supplied in 
the face of enemies whose combined economic power was far larger than that of the 
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Reich and her allies. 
Rathenau, heir to the giant AEG electrical conglo1nerate, and MoeJJendorf, a 
Prussian aristocrat, engineer and executive within AEG, were in charge of the 
allocation of raw materials in the War Materials section of the War Minstry and 
played a large role in the organisation of Reich-wide production between 1914 and 
1918. When the war ended, they both sought to apply their experience of a 
Planwirtschajt (planned economy) to the moulding of the Weimar economy.l921 
Although the ideas of a planned economy were largely associated with the left, and 
although Rathenau and Moellendorf described their proposals as 'socialist', both were 
using the term in the sense of 'community of the Volk' where there would be class 
co1laboration in the public interest. Both also saw their visions of a Pfanwirtschqft as 
an alternative to Marxistn.1931 
Rathenau became Minister of Reconstruction in 1921, and then Foreign Minister 
m 1922, shortly before he was assassinated. by right-wing youths for his 
'collaboration' in accepting the Reparations settlement. His version of a planned 
economy was for the extension and systemisation of cartelisation, \Vhere private 
enterprise would continue but would be guided into serving the national interest 
through the transformation of these cartels into public bodies and ,St(ftunge 
(foundations).'941 The economic system would be centralised, rationalised and guided 
by state planning formulated by a Volkstaat (people's state) government. The 
Volkstaat itself was to be an admixture of the democratic and the autocratic, where 
social mobility would abound and where an authoritarian elite, elected/selected on the 
basis of merit and ability, would wield dictatorial powers.195 l 
Moellendorf, who transferred to the Weimar Ministry of Economics after the 
war, pursued a more technocratic vision of Plarnvirtschqft, whose guiding principle of 
competence was inspired by his admiration for Taylorism.!96J His variant of Taylorism 
was an extremely authoritarian one, functioning, as he saw it, as a 'tnilitaristn of 
production' where workers would be educated out of their prevailing tendency to see 
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conflicts between management and labour as inevitable.1971 Additionally, MoeJiendorf 
viewed state intervention and initiative as essential for the effective working of a 
modern economy, proposing state-organised planning and supervisory bodies for 
every branch of production at both local level and through industry-wide councils.l9RJ 
One thing which Rathenau's and Moellendorfs ideas on Planwirtschqft (and, indeed, 
ideas emanating from within the SPD) had in common was an emphasis upon 
tnaximising production for the benefit and power of the German nation. 1991 
AJthough Rathenau's and Moellendorfs ideas were not actually put into practice 
m the Wei1nar years, they contributed in the 1920s to the exploration and 
development of the themes of planning and the role of the state, complemented by 
cotnJnentators and theorists on the radical conservative-nationalist right. AJnong the 
latter was Othmar Spann, an Austrian economist and sociologist, whose propagation 
of the notion of a corporatist state won him widespread interest not only among 
peasant farmers, artisans and small businessmen, but right on up the socio-economic 
scale to include the likes of the industrialist, Fritz Thyssen, and across classes through 
the historic association of German Catholics and the Centre Party with corporatist 
ideas.rtoor His ideas also attracted attention and interest very early in the 1920s among 
1nany of the NSDAP's leaders and followers, in particular Feder, Wagener, 
Rosenberg and Hitler himseJf.1 101 1 
Spann)s concept of the corporate state was, in many respects, a quasi-medieval 
one, whose pritnary aim was not the maxi1nalist production of Rathenau and 
Moellendorf, but a harmonious preservation of social equilibriwn, stability and 
security. Spann rejected parliamentary democracy in favour of an authoritarian, 
hierarchical society where social organisation was to be based upon professional 
bodies of employers and employees within each trade or industrial sector. These 
bodies would take care of conflicting interests in industrial relations, competition, 
prices and the market, and would conduct their economic affairs with a large degree 
of autonomy. The state itself was also to be constructed as a Stand (estate), \-vhich 




superior economic body, the corporations were to manage the economy in order to 
free the state from its economic and social roles and obligations. In this way the state 
would be released from the constraints of conflicting economic interests and could 
concentrate upon the purely political realm where it would have absolute authority _ 
effectively making it a 'political Stand'.1 1021 It is easy to see why the Nazis would find 
the concept of a 'political Stand' with absolute political power an attractive idea. 
However, the autonotny granted to each corporation and the economic power vested 
in their collectivity was a much more problematic notion, and soon after the Nazis 
came to power, they publicly distanced themselves from Spann.f 103l 
Although the old Mittel..,·tand of Germany was the socio-economic group which 
displayed the most enthusiasm for Spann' s ideas of the corporate state, the 
heavy-industry sector of big business also showed an interest which endured into the 
Third Reich. This can be viewed as these firms seeking suppoti from the old lower 
middle classes while diverting the latter's gaze away from the threats posed by big 
business to s1nall business. Equally plausible, and probably more significant, is the 
interpretation which sees large-scale industry accepting a corporate structure as a 
suitable framework for the preservation of its autonomy and as a way to promote its 
monopolistic interests. The formation of self-policing economic associations could 
promote co-operation between giant concerns and thereby increase their leverage on 
government. 11041 
The economist, Werner S9mbart, was an even more enthusiastic supporter among 
the radical conservative-nationalist right for the principle of state intervention in the 
economy \Vhich he began to favour as early as 1903. 11051 I-Ie rejected Spann's 
corporatist state, saying that it gave too much say to the individual corporations 'in 
the moulding of the will of the state. The future state, by contrast, 1nust always be 
authoritarian' _1 1061 Corporations, if they were to exist at all, should merely be the 
agents of political government; the state should decide the structural format and 
should reserve to itself the power to fix prices, wages and the distribution of 
resources. Sombart also proposed the nationalisation of large banks, raw-material 
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industries, the whole transport sytem of the nation, and al1 firms producing military 
supplies."07l By 1932, he was advocating centralised planning for all sectors of the 
German economy - a fully-fledged Planwirtschaft. Sombart was not alone in his 
enthusiastn for centralised planning, his ideas being eagerly taken up and propounded 
by Die Tat and its followers.1 108l 
Despite their advocacy of greatly enhanced government intervention in economic 
matters and their use of terms such as state socialism or Prussian socialism, Spann, 
Sotnbart, Die Tat and all the radical conservative groups of the right believed in 
private ownership of the means of production and the incentive of personal profit. 
Their vision was of an authoritarian state restricting the freedom of business owners 
to set prices and wages, but not abolishing the capitalist mode of ownership. S01nbart 
expressed it thus, '[P]rivate and communal property will co-exist. .... although private 
property will be subject to constraints. Wherever it involves the means of 
production..... that property is a .fief '11091 Although the theories of Rathenau, 
Moellendorf and Spann all contributed to ideas which were fermenting within the 
NSDAP, the model favoured by Sombart bore the most resemblances to the 
politico-economic structures which would eventually emerge in the Third Reich. As 
the later chapters of this thesis will show, it was also closest to the concepts which 
eventually etnerged atnong senior managers within VELA in the early 193 Os. 
A final component of Weimar business culture which has not received a lot of 
attention in historical or sociological accounts of the period, is the locus of 
company-policy formation in relation to managers and owners. l 1101 This issue was to 
raise its head again and again in the pages of Der leitende Angestellle, VELA' s 
in-house periodical, increasingly so as the years passed. and the evolution of a body of 
political-ideological thinking on the subject among VELA's senior managers is 
explored over the following chapters. One of the few works to have addressed this 
relationship was The Rationalisation Movement in Gern1an Industry, published by 
Robert Brady in 1933. This contemporary account described power passing from the 
owners to the management in the Weimar years as a direct result of the effects of 
139 
rationalisation. This was attributable to the new methods of production which 
required greater, and often more specific, managerial skills, thereby elevating the 
status of the expert and the specialist. Brady saw rationalisation promoting the 
inculcation of professional attitudes, attaching greater importance to individual and 
group responsibilities, and fostering 'the formation of policies according to plans 
rather than as dictated by personal interest or individual caprice'. !111 I 
Of equal significance was Brady's argument that the growth of vertical and 
horizontal expansion and ahnagamation, which had led to larger and larger 
corporations coming into being, had lessened the control of the owners. The very 
form of these concerns had produced a special kind of corporate legal form among 
Germany's larger finns. Diffusion of O\vnership had divided property ownership into 
numerous small parcels carrying limited rights, and the owners of these small blocks 
played very little part in the determination of company policy, interesting themselves 
largely in the size of dividends and the prospect of speculative profits on the stock 
exchange. Shareholders interests had thus become sho11-term, while the concerns of 
management ·were long-term. Such large-scale concerns required greater amounts of 
investment capital, ever larger numbers of shareholders, and, in order to make all this 
function, more effective concentration of managerial authority. Alongside this growth 
of managerial responsibility for planning, financial discretion and production design, 
Brady saw a professionalisation project at work among senior salaried employees 
which i1nbued them with a a new ethos or We!Lanschauung. He described this as the 
entrepreneurial drive giving way to 'motives of workmanlike skill, security, and desire 
for orderly change' .11 121 Brady, however, did not have the benefit of hindsight, nor did 
he give much weight or concern to the political situation in Germany in his largely 
economic analysis. As the foiiowing chapters wiii demonstrate, the Wellanschauung 
which actually developed among the senior mangers within VELA between 1918 and 
1933 was far more complex, more ideological, more politicised by the events and 
crises of the Weimar years, and ultimately more ambitious than the sober, moderate 
ethos described by Brady. 
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Chapter 4 
The For1nation and Self-Conception of v·ELAIIJ 
Just one month after the end of the First World War, on December 22nd, 1918 in 
Berlin, VELA (Vereinigung der leitenden Angestellten in Handel und Jndustrie), or 
the Organisation of Leading Salaried Employees in Trade and Industry, was founded 
and recorded as a registered society (eingetragener Verein). This arose as a direct 
result of the huge strikes which had taken place in Berlin in November 1918 when 
trade-union pjckets barred the entrance of management employees to their offices. In 
response, the leading figures of top management in the firms concerned called a 
protest meeting to resist attempts to force them to be party to the aims of the 
white-collar unions. By forming their own organisation, using trade-union la\vs and 
regulations, individual managers could no longer be accused of being strike-breakers 
because now, by insisting on going into work, they were merely following the 
directions of their own union, VELA, which was opposed to the strikes. 121 
In May 1919, VELA held its first general meeting, where its constitution was 
agreed upon and adopted. It declared itself an employees' association set up to look 
after the social and econ01nic interests of its metnbers. It aimed to do this by 
influencing public opinion and government legislation, by deepening and widening 
understanding of the connections between social and economic factors, by working 
with other associations, by mediating in disputes, by providing legal advice and 1egal 
protection, by setting up an employtnent bureau, and by providing economic 
assistance to its members through contributory welfare schemes such as provision for 
widows and widowers, unemployment payments and a burial fund. !JJ Metnbership of 
VELA was open to both male and female salaried employees working in trade or 
industry,!"! although the organisation always had an overwhehningly male 
composition. Not a single woman was ever installed m a top executive position 
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throughout its fifteen years of existence, a situation that was typical of occupational 
and professional organisations of the time throughout the wor1d .. To become a 
member one had to be engaged in work of a managerial or high-ranking nature, or 
else be an independent provider of services of a 'higher sort' (A1{[gahen hi:jherer Art), 
in other words a professional consultant such as an auditor, an accountant or a 
company lawyer.rsJ 
The setting up of VELA was in many ways the result of a reaction by upper 
tnanagement to the changes affecting German white-collar workers which had 
occurred in, or had at least been accelerated by, the Great War. As working 
conditions and pay deteriorated over these four years, white-collar workers as a 
whole began to reassess their social position and, more importantly, to reconsider 
their approach to economic and political matters. More and more they realised that 
there was much to be gained by seeing the manual trade unions not as class enemies, 
but as allies in the struggle with business owners. No longer were the traditional 
deferentia) professional organisations ~S'tandesorganisationen) sufficient to protect 
the interests of salaried employees. As their numbers increased both absolutely and as 
a proportion of the total workforce, white-collar workers' chances of promotion, their 
hopes of one day beco1ning independent, and their closeness and daily contact with 
their employers all declined. 16l As Emil Lederer had predicted before the war, the 
white-coJJar workforce was becoming proletarianised~ they were, in the main, just so 
many hired hands working for distant employers with different and often antagonistic 
interests. !11 Now, not only were the trade unions increasingly seen as allies in the 
struggle of labour, whether by hand or by brain, but their very structure, organisation 
and tactics were considered more appropriate in an industrialised advanced capitalist 
economy. 
White-collar associations began to change their structures as the Great War 
dragged on and on, and this process was further stimulated by the revolution of 1918. 
Thereafter wage negotiations were institutionalised by a LavJ of Wage Contracts, 
trade-union Jaw was revised to give the unions more statutory rights, and preparations 
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were made to institute Works' Councils whose composition would consist solely of 
wage-earning workers and employers, with no provision for separate representation 
of salaried or white-co11ar employees. Helter-skelter revision of white-collar 
associations ensued with umbrella organisations for different skills or professions, 
different econotnic sectors and different levels of seniority and remuneration springing 
up. These in turn found it necessary to enter into alliances, cartels and amalgamations 
with tnanual trade unions. 181 
For the leading salaried workers, in other words for management, all this 
portended a bleak outlook. Their fellow white-collar workers were consorting with 
the dangerous working class and their socialist ideas. What would become of 
hierarchy and wage differentials? Would management's right to manage be infringed? 
But not only that~ in this time of economic and political unrest the large associations 
and umbrella organisations were representing and pursuing the interests of the greater 
number of their members. In such large organisations upper and upper middle 
tnanagement, who numbered about one tenth of the total white-collar workforce, 
would be swamped and marginalised.191 Economic levelling (and hence loss of social 
status as well as managerial power) was a distinct possibility, even if two out of the 
three umbrella white-collar organisations were actually in favour of a capitalist 
socio-economic system (see later in this chapter). 
The combination of salaried position and managerial rights and responsibilities 
gave rise to a self-~erception among VELA's membership that they were a distinctly 
different socio-economic group from both employers/entrepreneurs and wage earners 
(Lohnarheiter) whether manual or white collar. This view was not, however, unique 
to VELA~ it was shared by managers who were not members of the organisation or 
who had joined other paraiJel interest or professional groups. One such organisation 
was BUDACI, Bund der angestellter Chen1iker und lngenieure, or the Association of 
Salaried Chemists and Engineers, which, by 1922, had enrolled approximately 10,000 
members and had changed its name to Bund angestellter Akaden1iker technisch-
naturwissenschaftlicher Ben!fe, or the Association of Salaried Technical and 
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Natural-Science Professions.1 10l 
The convergence of vtews atnong upper and upper-middle management 
concerning their distinctly differentiated socio-economic or sociological position is 
contained in the definitions of leitende Ange.<:tellten put forward at the time by two of 
the largest associations which represented managerial interests. VELA's definition 
runs as foiiows: 
Leitende Angestellten sind so/che Arbeitnehmer, die im Dienste eines 
Wirtschaftsbetriehes gegen Entgelt eine Stelle einnehmen, in der sie 
unter per.5.-t)n/icher Verantwortung .fiir eigene Arheit oder fiir die 
Arbeit au~~fiihrend tlitiger Arbeitnehnler a1{[ Grund gedanklicher 
Bejahigung und ben~flicher Aushildung eine .fiihrende, leitende, 
pn~fende, entwerfende, in der llauplsache von eigeneJn ~ .... ntsch/uss 
und selhstandigen llrteil abhiingende Tiitigkeit ausiiben, ohne at~f 
Grund des Anstellungsverhdllni.\·ses ein Besitzrecht oder ein ahnliches 
Ve7./tit,'1tngsrechl iiber die Produktionsmittel oder iiber den Gewinn 
der anstellenden (Jnternehmung zu haben.1 11 1 
Leading salaried employees are those employees who, for 
remuneration, take up a position in the service of an economic concern 
and who have personal responsibility for their own work or for the 
work of non-executive employees on the basis of their intellectual 
capabilities and professional education~ they carry out leading 
manageria] activities of a supervisal)' and decision-making nature, for 
the most part acting on their own initiative and using independent 
judgement; yet on account of the relationship of employment, they 
have no right of ownership nor si1nilar right of disposal over the 1neans 
of production nor over the profits of the employing company. 
The definition of leitende Angestelllen, as put forward in 1921 by B UDACI, the 
Association of Salaried Chemists and Engineers, was as follows: 
Leitende Angeste/lten sind Arbeitnehmer, welche entweder als 
gesetzliche Vertreter eines l!nternehmens dessen Leitung verkti1pern, 
oder sonst an der Leitung eines Unternehmens mit heschliessender 
5,'tinune beteiligt sind, oder als Leiter selhstlindiger Abteilung eines 
flnternehn1ens (wie Tochtergesellschitften, r.,ilialen) oder in anderer 
Dienststellung derarl Arbeitgeherste/lung einnefunen, da.~·s sie, von 
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Ausnahn7efc:t/len abgesehen, ilher Au.nvahl der zu heschi!ftigenden 
Arbeitnehmer, Art der Arheilsbedin~:r;ungen und Entlohnungshbhe 
nach eigenem E'rmessen zu entscheiden oder mitzuentscheiden hahen, 
also in einer Person sowohl Arheitnehn1er wie Arbeitgeber sind. 112J 
Leading salaried employees are employees who occupy employer 
positions either as legal representatives of a concern who are embodied 
with leadership or else given a decisive voice in the leadership of a 
business, or as managers of independent departments within a business 
(such as a subsidiary company or a branch), or who occupy another 
position of e1nployment to the extent that, apart from exceptional 
cases, they have the power to decide or decide jointly, using their own 
discretion, upon the selection of employees, the sorts of working 
conditions and the level of wages~ this individual is, therefore, at the 
same time both employee and employer. 
These attempts by business management to define themselves in order to lay 
claim to occupying a special position in the economy and in society were also taken 
up by sociologists in the Wei1nar years1131. This lent credence to the concept of the 
leitende Angestellten as a small but vel)' important stratum of society which was 
neither worker nor employer. Drawing on the works of legal experts, sociological 
commentators and the published works of VELA and BUDACI luminaries, Car! 
Totschek produced a thesis in 1932 on the development of the leilende Angestelllen 
as a recognisably discrete group. In this disset1ation, entitled Der Begr?ff des 
leitenden Angestellten, or 'The Concept of the Leading Salaried Employee', Totschek 
came up with his own definition of who this group of people were. Essentially sin1ilar 
to that of VELA and BUDACI, it contained in its very first line perhaps the n1ost 
succinct description of the nature of leitende Angeste!lten: 
Leitende Angeste/lten sintl Arheitneluner 1nit 
Arbeitgeberfunktionen, dh. solche Arheitnehn1er, die die Befugnis 
hahen, entweder ilber die Entlohnung oder ilber die Ent!assung iln 
wesentlichen aller Arbeitnehmer des Betriebes oder einer 
Betriebsabteilung selhstandig zu hestintmen oder entscheidend 
rnitzuhestimmen1 141 
Leading salaried employees are etnployees with e1nployer 
functions, that is to say, those employees who have the authority to 
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decide or to have a decisive say either over the wages or over the 
dismissal of essentially all employees of the concern or of a department 
within the firm. 
In its earliest days VELA took great pains to portray itself as an organisation 
which was basically trade unionist in nature and practice. Such was its concern to 
project this image that it went to the extent of commissioning a well-known figure in 
the trade-union movement, district court advisor (Landesgerichtsrat) Kulemann, who 
had written a book on the development of professional associations, to produce a 
report on the 'trade-union character of the organisation'. Kulemann' s findings were 
published at length in VELA's bi-monthly journal, Der !eilende Angestellte ('The 
Leading Salaried Employee'), in April 1920. He came to the conclusion that VELA 
was indeed a trade union, or at least an organisation with the requisite characteristics 
to be viewed as such, for three reasons. Firstly, there was the position of its members 
in the economic life of the nation (i.e. they were employees and not employers). 
Secondly, VELA refused to accept the right of employers to fix unilaterally 
employees' wages or salary levels. Thirdly, VELA had adopted acceptance of the use 
of the strike as a legitimate method of conducting a dispute.r 151 This latter assertion 
was made despite the fact that VELA was at most lukewarm on this issue, seeing the 
withdrawa] of labour as a very last resort when an employer had been utterly 
unreasonable and when every possible avenue of reconciliation and negotiation had 
been explored to the full no matter how long it took, and despite the fact that VELA 
members had already refused to join in strikes over the previous 18 months and had in 
fact continued working during massive walkouts by almost the entire workforces in 
disputes in Berlin's metalworking and electrical industries.r 161 
There \Vere several reasons behind this apparent wish to be seen as a trade union, 
despite the fact that VELA was undoubtedly aspiring to be a professional organisation 
si1nilar to those which already existed for doctors and lawyers. The most obvious was 
the prevailing political climate of 1919-20 Weimar Gennany. During these years (at 
least until the June election of 1920) the government and the composition of the 
Reichstag, as \Veil as of the Lander parliaments (Landtage ), were dominated by the 
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SPD, the liberal parties and the Centre Pat1y. It was a time of left-liberal and social 
detnocratic dominance augtnented by the power and influence of the trade-union 
movement.1 171 In order to try to achieve representation for its members at the highest 
levels of political and economic decision making, VELA had to be seen as part of the 
'progressive' forces of Weimar society and not be regarded as bedfellows of the 
(temporarily) discredited employers' camp. ln particular, VELA was seeking to 
establish institutional representation for leading salaried employees on the proposed 
Works' Councils (Betriebsrdte) as a third force sitting alongside and between 
employers and employees. While this met with little opposition from employers' 
groups, it was regarded with hostility by many within the trade-union movement, 
particularly in the white-collar unions. 
The nature of the ongoing dispute between VELA and other white-collar 
organisations was twofold. lt was firstly over 1nembership, and secondly over political 
direction. VELA had rivals for the recruitment of managerial personnel from several 
other associations, among which was AfA, A llgemeiner freier Angestelltenverbiinde, 
or the General Asociation of Free White-Collar Federations. This umbrella 
organisation was on the left of the white-collar trade-union movement and included 
the ZdA, Zentralverband der Angestelllen, or Central Federation of White-Collar 
Workers, which was affiliated to the SPD.P 81 AtA. was flatly opposed to 
institutionalising divisions between white-co11ar and blue-collar workers, and had the 
long term aim of replacing the capitalist system by a socialist one. It believed in the 
necessity of class struggle and full socialisation of the means of production on the 
basis of the proposals and programme of the USPD (llnahhtingige 
Sozia/Jemokratische Parlei Deutschlands), or the Independent Socialist Party, drawn 
up by Emil Lederer and Rudolf Hilferding. Since the USPD was to the left of the 
SPD, and included many among its rank and file who had sympathies and affinities 
with the KPD, or Communist Party, this was indeed a radical stance. As part of the 
strategy of working towards these goals, AfA had entered into a cartel agreement 
with the huge manual workers' umbrella organisation of trade unions of the left, the 
ADGB, A/lgenwiner deulscher Gewerkschc!ftsbund, or the General Association of 
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German Trade Unions, which was associated with the SPD.' 191 
In addition to the ZdA, AfA also counted among its affiliated umons Butab, 
Bund der technischen Angeste/lten und Bean1ten, or the Association of Salaried 
Technicians and Officials, who were direct rivals for a sizeable proportion of VELA' s 
membership. Butab' s members were salaried employees who were technical as 
opposed to cotnmercial managers, in the main engineers, designers, architects and 
industrial technicians. Butab arose out of the amalgamation of Butib, Bund der 
technisch-industriellen Bean1ten, or the Association of Technical-Industrial Otlicials, 
and the DTV, Deutscher Techniker Verband, or the German Federation of 
Technicians. Butib was n1uch the stronger of Butab's two component patis and its 
very committed pro-trade-union stance prevailed in the politics, policies and positions 
of this rival organisation.'20J In addition Butab exerted a strong and disproportionate 
influence within AfA, which led the umbrella organisation to adopt a position of 
political hostility towards VELA, perceiving it as being very close to the employers' 
associations and unreconstructedly pro-capitalist.l2ll In the latter observation they 
were undoubtedly accurate, because VELA was indeed wedded institutionally and 
ideologicaiJy to the prevailing socio-economic system as well as being intensely 
anti-socialist. Affinity with the employers' associations was somewhat less certain, 
since one ofVELA's aims was to create an independent niche or social layer (.S'chichl) 
for themselves as a third force between employers and all other employees, while the 
employers themselves, although not at all averse to having upper and upper n1iddle 
management as allies, still regarded themselves as a class apart from all those who 
worked for them and never made any provision for even the most senior managers to 
join their organisations. 
AfA, however, was only one of three groupmgs of white-collar associations 
which vied with VELA for members. r221 To its political right was the GdA, 
Gewerkschc!ftshund der Angeste/llen, or the Association of White-Collar Trade 
Unions, which was founded in 1920.1231 It was characterised as a liberal camp and saw 
white-collar workers as a different social ·group from manual labourers. While 
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supporting a market economy and free enterprise, it condemned the excesses of 
capitalism and sought social reform by peaceful means. It rejected revolutionary 
socialis1n and state-itnposed socialism, seeing both as manifestations of divisive class 
conflict. It called for the creation of a community of labour between employers and 
employees (die Bildung von Arbeit~genwinschaften zwischen Arbeitgehern und 
Arbeitnehmern) m the interests of the national economy. The GdA entered into 
combination with the blue-collar Verband der deutschen Gewerkvereine (the 
Federation of German Union Organisations), also known as the Hirsch-Dunker 
Association, to form the Gewerkschaftsring deuischer Arheiter-, Angestellten- und 
Bean1tenverhande (Gwr) or the Trade-Union Group of German Federations of 
Workers, Salaried Employees and Officials, a liberal-national organisation_l2·~1 
Further to the right was Gedag, Gesan1tverhand der Angestelltengewerkschaften, 
or the General Association of White-Collar Trade Unions, which \vas characterised as 
a Christian-national grouping. Its principal component union \Vas the DfiV, 
Deutsch-nationaler Handlungshilfen-Verhand, or German National Trading 
Assistants' Federation, while its main recruitment rival to VELA was BUDACI, the 
Association of Salaried Chemists and Engineers. llSI Gedag, too, formed a coalition 
with like-minded manual unions, in this case the Christian trade unions, the 
Gesamtverband der Christlichen Gewerkschajten J)eutschland~· or General 
Federation of Christian Trade Unions of Germany, to form the DGB~ Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftshund, or German Association of Trade UnionsY61 
In party political terms Gedag was always most closely associated with the 
conservative DNVP and the right-wing liberal DVP, 1271 and espoused an anti-socialist, 
anti-feminist and anti-Semitic line. It advocated the rigid separation of white-collar 
and manual trade unions, seeing the need to represent what it perceived as the 
distinctly different interests of white-collar workers which were at odds with those of 
the socially inferior working class.12NI In theory it adhered to the ideals of a society of 
estates (.~·tandische Idea/e), a pre-industrial social conception which divided society 






class system of interwar Germany meant that Gedag in fact believed in an atnalga1n of 
these two conceptualisations. It was happy for salaried employees of aJJ grades 
working within one industrial or commercial sector to join the same union, but it did 
not extend this standisch ideal to manual workers. They had to be confined to their 
own blue-collar unions. 1291 
Gedag advocated special privileges in Jaw for ·white-collar employees over 
manual workers and claimed that greater social prestige adhered to their members' 
type of work. This supercilious and hierarchical attitude was not mitigated by the 
claims of both component parts of the DGB to being Christian. Whereas the 
overwhelming bulk of manual labourers who were members of Christian unions were 
Catholics, the majority of white-collar workers who were in Christian unions affiliated 
to Gedag (or in Gedag unions with Christian wings) were Protestants.'30l In the DHV 
in particular there was a strong strand of Lutheran fi.mdamentalism which espoused a 
theology of nationalism resembling, in many ways, the hostile anti-CathoJjc ideology 
of the Kulturkcunpf (cultural/religious struggle) of Bismarck's day. It was for this 
reason that the far-right DHV could claim in 1933, after the coming to power of the 
Nazis, that it had never really been 'Christian-social', but rather 'national-social' -
ingratiating perhaps, but also possessed of much truthY 11 Thus, on account of both 
class and religion, the DGB was always a rather fragile coalition. 
As will become clear over the following chapters, VELA had certain ideological 
similarities with the GdA and Gedag in that it, too, suppot1ed the capitalist economic 
system, rejected class struggle and saw the white-collar sector as separate from the 
manual labour force. Like Gedag it believed its members to be a cut above blue-collar 
workers both socially and intellectually (which should of course be recognised by 
superior econ01nic remuneration), but, unlike Gedag, VELA believed that the 
managerial position of its exclusive tnembership set it, in turn, above the mass of 
rank-and-file white-collar workers who made up Gedag as well as the GdA and AfA. 
Additionally, VELA was not an advocate of a stiindisch society divided horizontally 
by economic sector, but rather a firm advocate of vertical division. It was organised to 
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include upper and upper-middle manage1nent in every field of trade, industry and 
finance, seeing this as a natural socio-economic divisionP21 It believed that its 
members shared the same interests, outlooks and goals regardless of whether they 
worked in banking, coal mining, engineering or distribution, and that their function 
and position in the national economy was a special and crucial one. This required that 
they cotnbine in an exclusive organisation to pursue aims which were not just about 
their own economic interests, but were also vital for the national interest. This belief 
in their disinterested function (or perhaps this rationalisation for claims on privilege, 
power, status and wealth) would become more pronounced among the utterances of 
VELA spokestnen and writers over the course of the l 920s and l 930s. 
To i1Justrate the nature ofVELA and its self-perception, it is worth looking at the 
definition of the organisation and the concept of leitende Angestellte given by Dr Leo 
Milffelmann, its business manager and editor of Der leitende Angestellte. He wrote 
this as part of an article giving an overview of the current organisational structure of 
white-co1lar associations and trade unions in Germany in 1920. 
Als besondere .S'pitzenorganisation fiir die Schicht der leitenden 
Ange.s'lellten ist die '{Vereinigung der leitenden Angestellten in 
Handel und lndustrie" zu nennen. Die 0 Vereinigung'' ist die 
Einheitsorganisation der gedanklich scha.ffenden, d.h. der leitenden 
Angestellten. Die Fachgruppen der Vereinigung bilden die 
Ben~fsorganisationen der leitenden Angestellten. Die I{Vereinigung" 
selber ist die Zusammenjassung dieser Ben{(sorganisationetJ in der 
Einheitsorganisation. 
Die Notwendigkeit der Schaj(ung einer besonderen Organisation fiir 
die leitenden Angestellten ergiht sich aus der .._C:.,'tellung dieser 
leilenden Angestellten im Wirtschaftslehen und ihrer eigenartigen 
Ein.fiigung in den Produktion\prozess zu'ischen Arbeitgebern und den 
anderen Arheitnehmern. Die m it der Zusammenfassung spezialisierter 
Betriehe zu grossen Produktionseinheiten fortschreitende Entwicklung 
zur Riesenunternehmung fiihrt zu einer imn1er weitergreffenden 
Trennung von llnternehmungsverwaltung und Betriehsleitung. Dan1it 
hdngt die lnten.sivierung der Wirt .. <,·chaft in Betriebsorganisation und 
Arheitsmethode in immer ausgedehnterem Masse von der 
Leistungssteigentng und dc.nnit der Wertschc'itzung der gedanklich 
leitenden Angestellten ab. ··'Die leitenden Angestellten, '' so hat die 
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t(Vereinigung ,, in einer Eingahe an das Reichswirtschcrftsn1inisteriun1 
ausg~fiihrt, l(sind durch die in den bisherigen Arheit.sgen?einschqften 
vertrelenen gewerkschaftlichen Verhande der Arheiter und 
Angestellten nichl vertreten, sie stellen viebnehr eine von der Gruppe 
der Arheiter und der Gruppe der Angestellten nach ihrer Tatigkeit 
und ihren Interessen durchaus verschiedene besondere 
Arbeitnehmergruppe dar. Ebenso wie die Angestellten von den 
Arbeitern in der Gegeniiherstellung von Kopfarbeitern zu 
Handarbeitern unterschieden werden, ebenso unterscheiden sich die 
leitenden Angestellten von den Angestellten dadurch, dass letztere 
geistig au5fi.ihrende Arbeit leisten, wahrend die Tatigkeit der ersteren 
eine geistig-schDpferische ist. Dieser (]egensatz zwischen der Gruppe 
der korperlich au5fiihrenden, der geistig ausfiihrenden und der 
geistig-schoP.ferischen Arbeitnehn1er ist denz Beanttenrecht durchaus 
gelaufig. Es werden dart die unteren (ki.Jrperlich au.~fiihrenden), die 
n1ittleren (geistig au.~fiihrenden) und die haheren Becunlen 
unterschieden, die die Grund\'titze und Weisungen ausarbeiten, nach 
denen die mittleren Bean1ten geistige au.~·fiihrende Arheit leislen. [)ass 
dieser [lnterschied von drei durch die Art · ihrer Ti.itigkeit 
verschiedenen Arheitnehn1ergruppen den1 BecTJntenrecht durchaus 
gelt:i1{/ig und selbstverstdndlich ist, wahrend er fiir die auf 
Privatdienstvertrag angestellten Arbeitnehmer noch nicht 
hinreichend anerkannt wird, ist dadurch lelcht erkkirlich, das in den1 
Jahrhunderte alien Bean1tenstaate, der dem Bean1tenrecht besondere 
Vorliehe und P.flege angedeihen liess, diese Begr{ffe seit langem 
entwickelt undfestgelegt worden sind, wahrend sich at.!f dem Gebiete 
des Privatarheitsvertrags die Gruppe und der Begr(ff der leilenden 
Angestellten erst seit verhc.'illni .. s·sn1iissig kurzer Zeit dadurch enlwickelt 
hat, dass in Deutschland an die Ste/le der kleineren die n1iltleren und 
Grossbetriebe getreten sind Die Arheit der leitenden AngeL<;tellten 
wird in den kleinen Betrieben au.s~s·chliesslich vom Arbeitgeher 
geleistet. Er ist diejenige Perstjnfichkeit iln Kleinbetriebe, die die 
Weisungen giht, nach denem die Geschqfte ge,[iihrt werden. Bei der 
Entwicklung der Betriebe in lndustrie und Handel zu Gro~:s·betrieben 
musste der Arbeitgeher diese leitende, geistig-schapjerische Tcitigkeit, 
die er fiir den ganzen Betrieb allein nicht n1ehr leisten konnte, an 
Arbeitnehmer ahgehen, ohne diese aher zu Arbeitgebern werden zu 
lassen. Hierdurch /rat der bisher nur aus Arbeilern und Angestellten 
bestehenden Arbeitnehnterscha.ft die dritte (Jruppe der !eitenden 
A ngestellten hinzu. '' 
Trotz verschieden auflauchender Neigung zur Sonderhiindelei ist es 
der (IVereinigung'' mtiglich gewesen, die gewerkschqftliche Beweg11ng 
der gedanklich fiihrenden und ihrer sozialen Besonderheit bewussten 
Angeste/lten vor den1 selbstzerstorenden Missgeschick der 
Ge"werkschqftsbewegung der ausfiihrend tatigen Arbeitnehmer, ~er 
Zer.\plitterung in politisch, konje.s~s·ione/1 und sonderben!fllch 
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abge.spaltene Gruppen und (Jriippchen, zu hewahren.l331 
The Organisation of Leading Salaried Employees in Trade and 
Industry [VELA] is regarded as the distinctive elite organisation for 
the stratum of leading salaried employees. [VELA] is the organisation 
that brings together the mentally creative, that is to say, leading 
salaried employees. The specialist groups within the organisation 
constitute the professional associations of leading salaried employees. 
VELA itself is the collective body of those professional associations 
within one united organisation. 
The necessity for creating a special organisation for leading salaried 
employees results from the position of the leading salaried employees 
in economic life and their peculiar interposing in the production 
process between employers and the rest of the employees. The 
progressive development of huge enterprises arising from the 
mnalgamation of specialised plants into large unified units of 
production leads to an ever more widespread separation of 
entrepreneurial administration from plant management. Because of 
this, both the intensification of business in the organisation of plants, 
and methods of working, increasingly depend on the improved 
performance of the leading intellectual salaried employees. "The 
leading salaried employees," argued [VELA] in a petition to the Reich 
Ministry of Econmnics, "are not represented by the trade union 
associations representing blue- and white-collar workers fi·om a 
previous community of work~ instead they constitute a far different and 
special employee group from workers or white-collar employees 
because of their occupation and their interests. Just as white-collar 
e1nployees are differentiated from manual labourers by the contrast 
between head and hand work, in the same v-vay leading salaried 
en1ployees are distinguished from white-collar workers because the 
latter carry out intellectual administrative work, while the job of the 
former is intellectually creative. This contrast between the groups of 
employees who carry out designated manual work, designated 
intellectual work and intellectually creative work is completely normal 
in civil service law. There it differentiates between the lower (manual), 
the middle (intellectually administrative) and the higher otlicials, the 
latter of whom work out the principles and directives which govern the 
middle officials' administrative work. That this dividing into three, 
based on the nature of the jobs of their various employee groups, is 
really common and regarded as self-explanatory in civil service law, 
while it is not yet sufficiently recognised in private employment 
contracts for salaried employees, is easily explained: in the century-old 
bureaucratic state, where special favour and care was expended upon 
civil service law, this concept developed slowly and became 




grouping as well as the very concept of leading salaried e1nployees has 
only been developing over a relatively short period of time, in the same 
way that in Germany only recently have middle- and large-scale plants 
replaced small ones. In the small plants the work of leading salaried 
employees is carried out exclusively by the employer. His is the 
personality in the small concern which gives the instructions upon 
which business is carried out. Because of the development of business 
in trade and industry into large-scale concerns, the employer has had to 
leave to an employee this leading intellectual-creative job which he can 
no longer carry out on his own for the whole business, but without 
allowing this employee to become an employer himself. It is because of 
this that the third group, the leading salaried employees, has joined the 
c01nmunity of employees which, until now, consisted only of workers 
and white-collar employees." 
Despite various emerging tendencies towards creating special 
groups, it has been possible to guard the trade-union movement of the 
intellectually-leading salaried employees and their recognisably special 
social features against the self-destructive misfortune of the 
trade-union movement of non-execuitive employees to split into 
political, confessional and professionally-specialised splinter groups. 
From the evidence of the above, here is a group - German senior management -
which has tied itself totally to the idea, and indeed reality, of modern, industrialised, 
commercial society. Its prospects and status are seen to depend almost totally on the 
continuation of the capitalist mode of production and on modern methods of 
large-scale concentrated firms. Only in such an economy can managers hope to wield 
the maximum aJnount of power. Small companies allow owners and entrepreneurs to 
dispense with many of their services, and managers become less pivotal within the 
business process~ fewer powers are delegated to plant management, while the 
'leading' salaried employees become less distinguishable fl·om the rest of the 
white-collar workforce. Equally, anything other than private ownership might let the 
state usurp the power which the free market and the profit motive allow to business 
managers~ nationalised companies and/or a centrally-planned and controlled economy 
mean that many more economic decisions are taken by political agents, such as party 
figures, government ministries and supervisory state officials, a process which tends 
to reduce management to much more of a non-executive specialist role - the upper 
manager becomes a mere administrator. Far better fi·om their point of view is the 
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single profit-orientated owner or the distant hands-off investors and stock-holders 
than the active state with its own agenda and r:ival power-builders in party and 
bureaucracy. 
Management's prospects were therefore perceived by themselves to be linked 
inextricably with capitalism and economic liberalism - but not necessarily with 
political or democratic liberalism. These were forward-looking people in all but a 
political sense (provided of course that political progressivism is accepted as the 
establishtnent and enhancement of democracy). This group, at least as represented by 
VELA in the above speech by Dr Muffelmann, appears to have seen itself as an 
etnerging and increasingly recognisable and recognised high-status group. At the veJy 
least it was aspiring to become a fully-fledged professional organisation like the ones 
for doctors, lawyers and engineers. More probably it was aiming even higher. The 
analogy with the progress of high officials in the Gennan state bureaucracy in the 
previous century is illuminating. The comparison was there not just to illustrate that it 
was only a matter of time before senior management was accepted as a discrete 
group, as a higher-status\ officially recognised, self-governing, professional 
association~ a mirror \Vas also being held up to the eventual leg}tl recognition of high 
officials in the state bureaucracy as being different tram and above the rest of the 
white-collar civil service. This is the key concept which suggests that VELA and its 
managerial me1nbership were aspiring beyond consolidation or professionalisation. 
They were seeking to establish themselves as the third and highest tier of the private 
workforce in Germany, with power and influence in their realm of the economy 
proportionate to that exercised by high offtcials in state service. 
This can be looked at in several ways. Firstly, this concept equipped VELA with 
the makings of an ideology suitable for deploying in a 20th-century corporate society. 
To many at the ti1ne~ as well as subsequent analysts and commentators, Gennany 
appeared to be essential1y divided between two forces - capital and labour - whose 
weights were roughly balanced and whose mutual hostility was entrenched. 1341 Conflict 
was to be avoided by mediation and negotiation supplied by government-supported 
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organisations such as tribunals, arbitration co1nmittees .and, most contentious of all for 
those on the political right, Works' CouncilsY51 If a sector of society could interpose 
itself between these two apparently natural and necessary but antagonistic forces and 
be seen, prosaically, as a bridge between the two, or else, more metaphysically, as 
transcending these two blind antipathetic forces, it could project itself as offering a 
way out of an impasse. It would be a third force, small but powerful, and because it 
was neither worker nor employer, it could claim to be devoid of their narrow 
self-interests which pulled against each other and prevented progress for society or 
the nation as a whole. Of course, it could be argued that, because they embodied the 
characteristics of both (rather than neither) employers and employees, they possessed 
a double dose of self-interest, not to mention self-importance. 
Secondly, even if the corporate society were not to prevail, VELA still sought to 
establish its members very high up in the socio-economic scale of the more 
conventional hierarchical society which is depicted and despised by Marxists, while 
being sought after and sanctified by economic liberals. In this ideal-typical capitalist 
model, society is portrayed as a broad-based pyramid as opposed to a see-saw or a 
tug-of-war. This 'perfect' model rarely actually exists, but some societies approxi1nate 
more closely to it than others. It had 1nore appearance of reality in Imperial Germany 
than it did in the Weimar Republic, and to those of a right-wing persuasion this 
seemed even more clear and stark. The political parties which VELA tneinbers 
typically supported (the DVP, the DNVP and later the NSDAP) all sought to 
re-establish the pyramidal order, but with slightly different emphases on where the 
individual building blocks should go. In the previous century the building block called 
leitende Angestellten scarcely existed, so VELA' s members were not so keen to see a 
simple restoration, a policy or position more closely associated with the DNVP than 
with the DVP or NSDAPY61 Instead they had their eyes fixed upon a very high course 
indeed, sharing a level with the higher state officials just below the canopy of gold 
made up of wealth and political power. To shift analogy from pyrmnid to te1nple, 
VELA' s /eitende Angestellten, like higher state officials, could see themselves 
bec01ning high priests mediating between the rarified realm of power and office and 
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the everyday world of work and service. Endowed with an allegedly innate disinterest 
b.ecause they straddled both realms, they therefore claimed to be inherently inclined to 
act in society's best interests. 
Thirdly, whatever model or view of society prevailed, VELA was looking to the 
future and not to the past as far as socio-economic changes and trends were 
concerned. Various political configurations might deliver favourable outcomes, but 
capitalist economic conditions and relations were a necessity~ indeed it was modern, 
large-scale, industrial, technological, specialised-yet-concentrated, complex capitalistn 
which offered the best prospects for upper management. In such a situation they were 
indispensable for production and commerce, and whoever is economically 
irreplaceable is politically influential. Thus VELA' s members looked to future new 
developments m economic and social relations and certainly not to a 
fondly-remembered or imagined golden past, whether medieval or just ten to twenty 
years earlier. Whichever political party tnost closely espoused that 'progressive' 
econotnic vision was likely to win over the support of a great number of the 
organisation's members. The 'party of business', the DVP, was the most natural home 
for Germany's upper managers, at least in non-Catholic areas, throughout the 1920s. 
However, when this right-wing liberal party went into steep electoral decline from 
1929, and when the NSDAP at around the same time renounced points 11 and 17 of 
their 25-Point Party Progra1nme and affinned their belief in the rights of private 
property and the efficacy of capitalism,137l it was frotn the Nazis that the strongest, 
most attractive message of economic modernity and political reaction catne forth. The 
NSDAP was also a dynamic, united, expanding, well-organised and winning party 
\Vhich stood more chance of getting its hands on some measure of po\ver than the 
ever-dwindling band of fractious, leaderless DVP deputies with their popular electoral 
support down to a derisory 440,000 in the July 1932 Reichstag electionYs1 
It is true that the socially-modernising message was only one among many being 
disseminated by the National Socialists. Walther Darn~ and his fellow Blut-und-Boden 
enthusiasts were simultaneously directing diatribes about the corrupting influences of 
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urbanisation, big-business capitalism and technolof,ry at tractorless peasant farmers in 
Schleswig-l-1olstein, artisan toy-makers in Thuringia, blacksmiths in Franconia, 
forestry workers on the large East Prussian estates close to the Polish border and ) 
assotted cranky inte11ectuals.IJ91 These somewhat isolated and/or insular groups 
tended not to know what the Nazis were saying elsewhere, especially what they were 
saying to more cosmopolitan, worldly or urban audiences in cities like Berlin or 
Dusseldorf. Conversely, if those latter audiences, among whom were senior business 
managers, knew about the anti-modern strands ofNazi proselytising (which is in itself 
a matter of some doubt), then it is unlikely to have particularly troubled them.f4tlJ 
Upper management's view of the world, coloured by a sense of their own importance, 
led them to believe that power Jay in the modern sectors of society - in business, in 
industry, in cities, in central government - and not on its fringes, in rural areas or in 
declining econ01nic sectors. 
In this they were essentially correct despite the rural and provincial support that 
was so important for Nazi electoral successes, and despite the coterie of agrarian 
interests vvhich still exerted considerable influence upon President Hindenburg as late 
as January l93J.l·HJ Once the Nazis were in office, thanks to the different roles played 
by these two distinctive constituencies, it was control of, and willing co-operation 
frOJn, the more modern sectors which allowed them to en1bark upon the use of real 
power to achieve radical aggressive ends. The conservative programme hoped for by 
van Papen, Hugenberg and Oskar von 'Hindenburg did not materialise once the Nazis 
got their hands on political power - nor did the quaint pastoral dreams of Darn~ and 
I-Iess. The reasons for that lay in the absence of any way to remove the Nazi political 
administration and, just as importantly, in the co-operation of the business sector at 
both ownership and managerial levels, which allowed the political power of the 
NSDAP to translate into economic power, which in turn magnified the extent of 
authoritarian control that the Nazis increasingly came to exert over Gennany as the 
years progressed. It was the real powers in the Party, the 'modernisers' such as Hitler, 
Goering, Goebbels, Heydrich, Best, Todt and Speer, along with the technocrats and 
professionals within the SS, the Four-Year-Plan executives drawn largely from 
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industrial and business management, and the functionaries at the higher levels of the 
NSDAP (overwhelmingly occupied by the upper middle classes, as shown in chapter 
1 ), who set Germany on the road to expanding its industrial sector, to encouraging 
even more capitalist concentration through compulsory cartelisation laws, and to 
implementing more efficient production and management techniques and practices 
based on the A.Inerican models pioneered by Frederick Taylor and Henry Ford.1421 
It is certainly feasible that such a self-confident social group as upper 
tnanage1nent, with an ideological underpinning of belief in their own importance and 
indispensability, would be able to recognise that the messages being directed towards 
them were emanating from those strata and sections of the NSDAP which were 1nost 
likely to be the real or major power centres in the Party. Either that, or these 
managers would believe that, whoever won out politically, it was only by moving with 
the streatn of socio-economic modernisation that real actuating power could be 
gained. In other words, modernisation was an inevitability or, at least, to fail to move 
with it meant to stagnate, decline or become marginalised. Alternatively, and perhaps 
surprisingly coming frotn potential Nazis, but not so surprisingly when they are 
considered also as economic liberals, VELA's members may have believed that 
economic factors were what really underlay the course of development of society, and 
that political power is at best a set of reins which still requires that the horse of 
business be a co-operative animal. 
The etnergence, as early as 1 920, of a belief among senior business managers in 
their own importance as a third force between capital and labour was the first of the. 
many threads which were needed to weave VELA and the NSDAP together by 1933. 
Over the next four or five years much of the rest of the fundamental ideological fabric 
which underlay the finished cloth of Nazism was to be displayed and developed in the 
pages of Der leitende Ange .. <.·tellte, VELA's in-house periodical. 
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[ l] Much of the history of VELA contained in the following six chapters is drawn from the 
pages of its bi-monthly periodical, Der leitende Angestellte, renamed Mitteilungsbltitter der 
VELA in 1933. However, at some time after 1955, a short account of the organisation was 
compiled in East Germany for an official publication on 'bourgeois and petit-bourgeois' 
parties and associations in pre" 1945 Gennany, Lexicon zur Parteiengeschichte, Die 
barger/ichen und kleinburgerlichen Parteien und Verbtinde in Deutschland (1 789-1945), 
Band 4. DDR (place and date unknown. Source: Deutsche Angestelllen Gewerk!,:chqfi, 
Bibliothek und Archiv, Hamburg). It described the foundation of VELA, its purposes, its 
membership, its landmark events, its actions at the time of the Nazi takeover of power, and its 
subsequent support of the new regime. As one might expect, the lengthy political analysis of 
VELA contained in this document very much corresponded to the official line of the East 
Gennan Communist Party on the 'bourgeois capitalist classes'. It emphasised the 
organisation's links to 'reactionary' politicians and big business owners, specifically naming, 
Emst von Borsig (referred to in chapter 5 of this thesis), Hermann Messingcr, Car! Kottingen, 
Hjalmar Schacht (chapter 7) and Josef Winschuh. It also insisted that VELA had close links 
with the Stahlhelm (the right-wing veterans' association with tics to the DNVP), and that it 
had an extensive interest in> and contacts with, Italian Fascism. 
Each of these claims has some basis of truth, but they arc greatly overstated. For example, 
a few articles in Der leitende Angestellte carried approving comment on the apparently 
favoured position of upper management in the Italian Fascist state, but the main points of 
contact between VELA and its Italian counterparts were exchange-trips between parties of 
senior managers visiting each others' countries for what seemed to be simply junketing 
holidays! In addition, this thesis hopes to show that~ by the late 1920s, VELA was becoming 
disillusioned with both 'reactionary' politicians and the leadership of big business, one of the 
factors which contributed to its eventual embrace of the NSDAP. The East German document 
is very selective in its use of evidence, presumably in order to fit in with the theory that 
fascism was the tool of the most reactionary elements of capitalism. This required that senior 
mangers, defined as part of the 'capitalist classes,' be seen to have links with these circles. 
Their 'modernity' was, in effect, played down. Nevertheless, despite the ideological bias of the 
analysis, its conclusion that VELA welcomed the coming of the Hitler government is most 
certainly true. Its depiction ofVELA's anti-trade union hostility, its anti-class war rhetoric, its 
growing hankering after authoritarian govenunent, its extolling of the virtues of leadership, 
and its obsession with the idea that senior managers poscssed a special Geistigkeit (roughly, 
intellectual spirituality) are all confirmed in the course of this thesis. Thus~ the document has a 
certain value. However, it has only seemed necessary on a couple of occasions to use this 
rather short precis of VELA's history as a reference. The material it used, as its footnotes 
indicate, was taken ovenvhelmingly from the pages of Der leitende Angestellte. The original 
sources from the periodical are used throughout this thesis. 
[2] Giscla Klcine, Die leitenden Angestellten in der gegenwtirtigen ¥Virts:ha.f£sgese!l!J:chaft, 
~.._S'chrijienreihe der Union der leitenden Angestellten (ULA), Cologne, 19)4, p.l8: Rcmhard 
Giersch, 'Vela, Vereinigung der leitenden Angestellten in Handel und lndustrie e. V (Vela) 
1918-1934' in Lexicon zur Parleiengeschichte, p.201. , . . 
[3] Leo Mtiffelmann, 'Vela, Vereinigung der le~tenden Ange.~·tellten m Ludw1g Heyde~ 
lnternatinnalen Handwtirterbuch des Gewerkscha.ftswesens, Berhn, 1931-32, pp I ~829-1 ,832, 
Der leitende Angestellte (hereafter LA), He.fi 7/8, 1920, p.73. 
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[4] Mi.iffelmann, 'Vela', p.l,830. 
[5] LA, Hefi 7/8, 1920, p.74. 
[6] Kleine, Die leitenden Angeste/lten', pp. 12-16. 
[7] Emil Lederer, Die Privatangestellten in der modernen Wirtschajisentwicklung, 
Tiibingen, 1912, p.5. 
[8] Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundations of Fascism in Germany, 
1919-1933, NC/London, 1983, pp.26-31. 
[9] LA, Hejt I, 1919, p.5. 
fl 0] Carl Totschek, Der Begr(ff des leitenden Angestellten, Leipzig, 1932, p.3~ Charles E. 
McLelland, The German l!.xperience of Projessionalisation, Cambridge, L 991, 189. 
[11] Dr. Hermann Schaefer, LA, Heft15, 1921, p.ll6. 
fl2] Totschek, Begr(ff, p.72. 
[13] KJeinc, Die leitenden Angestellten', pp.20-23; Totschek, Begriff, p.4 & 79-80. 
[ 14] Totschek, Begrijj p. 72. 
[15) LA, Heft 718, 1920, pp.73-78. 
[16] Giersch, 'Vela', p.208. 
[17] Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 'Die deu.tsche Revolution 1918-1920' in Geschichte u.nd 
Gesellscha.ft, 4, 1978, pp.362-391. 
[18] On the hostility between VELA and the ZdA, sec LA, Heji 2, 1919, pp.16-17. 
[ 19] Hru1s Speier, German White-collar Workers and the Rise of !fit/er, New Haven & 
London, 1986 (written in 1933), p.141 ~ Kleine, Die leitenden Angestellten, p. I 6~ LA. He.fi 
2/3,1921, p.lO~LA. Heji 14,1920, pp.l31-132. 
[20] Speicr, German White-collar Workers, pp.18-22 129-130~ I\1cLclland, German 
Experience c?f Professionalisation, p.l86. 
[21] Spcicr, German White-collar Workers. p.l4l:LA, He.fi 2, 1919, pp.l3-14. 
[22J Ji'lrgen Kocka, 'Zur Prohlematik der deutschen Angestellten, 1914-1933' in Hans 
Mommscn, Dietmar Pctzina, & Bernd Weisbrod (cds.), Jndustrielles .S),stem und politische 
Entwicklung in der 1¥eimarer Republik, Di.isscldorf, I 974, 802-8 I J. 
[23] On the animosity between VELA and the GdA: see LA. He.fi 4, 1920, pp.40-4l. 
[24] LA, Heft 14, 1920, p.132~ LA, Heft 2/3, 1921, pp.l 0-12: Speier, German rVhite-col/ar 
Workers, pp. 77-78, 1 J 3 & 141: Kleine, Die leitenden Angestellten, p.l7. 
[25] On the rivalry between VELA and BUDACJ for hearts and minds and members, see: LA. 
H~(t 2, 1919, pp.l4-16: LA, Heji 1, 1920, pp.4-5; LA, Hefi 2, 1920, pp.l4-16. 
[26) LA, Heji 14, 1920, p.132; LA, He.fi 2/3, 1921, pp.l0-11; Speier, German White-collar 
Workers, pp.14J & 152; Kleine, Die leitendenAngestellten, pp.J6-17. 
[27] On the party-political affiliations of Gedag, and particularly on the relationship between 
its most important component union, the DHV, and both the DVP and DNVP, see Lany E. 
Jones, 'The Crisis of White-Collar Interests: Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehiljim-Verhand 
and Deutsche Vo/kspartei in the World Economic Crisis' in Hans Mommsen, Dietmar Petzina 
& Bemd Weisbrod (eds.), lndustrielles System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer 
Republik, Diisseldorf, 1974, pp.8ll-823. 
[28] Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilisation in 
Weimar Germany, New York/Oxford, 1990, p.48. 
[29] Michacl Prinz, "Das Ende der ... \'tandespolitik' in Jurgen Kocka (ed), Angestellte in 
europaischen Vergleich, Gottingen, 1981, pp.33 l-353. 
[30] Speier, German White-collar Workers, p.143. 
(3 I] Speier, German White-collar Workers, p.l49. 
[32] Mliffelmann, 'Vela', p.l ,830. 
[33] LA. Heji 14, 1920, p.l33. 
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Deutschland 1848-1 94R, Opladen, 1969, p.l98~ Kurt Biedenkopf, 'SoziaLpolitik und 
Arbeitsrecht' in Hans Mommsen, Dietmar Petzina & Bemd Weisbrod (eds.), lndustrielles 
System und politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik, Dusseldorf, 1974, 
pp.299-30 1. 
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from Self-Definition to Self-Importance 
The continuing existence of VELA beyond the crisis year of 1918-19 owed as 
much to changes in the very structure and nature of the 1nodern German econotny and 
its business organisation as it did to its members' aspirations and political or 
ideological world-views. Although protnpted into being by the exigencies of political 
and econotnic upheaval, in particular the increasingly socialist demands and actions of 
not only manual workers but also white-collar e1nployees, sociologically speaking the 
time was probably ripe for the emergence of an organisation of senior management. 
While crisis brought VELA into existence, the passing of any threat to the existence 
of the capitalist economy of Germany did not result in the dismantling or decaying of 
the organisation. Indeed the resolving of the situation into one where private 
ownership of the means of production in a competitive market economy was 
sustained, yet at the same ti1ne a strong trade-union movetnent and a substantial 
socialist and redistributive political presence was 1naintained, meant that upper 
management was essentially obliged to organise and take sides in a two-di1nensional 
corporative system which existed in a state of balanced tension. 
Just as importantly, the continued growth of industrialisation led to even more 
vertical and horizontal expansion in the business world, making companies not just 
larger but 1nuch more complexYI Innovations in technology and business practices, as 
well as new patterns of ownership, created enlargement and specialisation in the fields 
of engineering, chemistry, banking, insurance, business administration, accounting, 
personnel selection, sales, and management in general. 121 Some of this growing body 
of senior managerial personnel possessed their own specialised professional 
groupings, but these tended to be technical organisations concerned largely with the 
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nuts and bolts of engineering and quantity surveymg or the theories of internal 
auditing within vertically integrated companies. Political and econ01nic representation 
was either non-existent or else centred in groups so specialised as to be numerically 
weakYl The leitende Angestellten as a whole needed greater clout to protect their 
own interests, and required larger, more secure self-help welfare systems. They also 
tended to gravitate towards each other because of a recognition of the similar position 
which so many different types of upper management actually occupied within this 
particular stage of development of a competitive capitalist socio-economic structure. 141 
Both because of this particular intermediate location and because of their political 
inclinations, senior managers essentially found themselves identifying with the aims 
and goals of the companies for which they worked, one of these being an interest in 
resisting the wage demands of the rest of the workforce. This naturally tended to 
separate them even further from lower-level employees. 
Gisela l(leine argued that it was actually in the period of least crisis in the 
Weitnar Republic, in the so-called 'golden years' of 1925 to 1928~ that the gulf 
between the leitende Anges·tellten and the remainder of the white-collar workforce 
widened tnost. With the ending of Gennany's chronic and debilitating inflation, 
econotnic recovery was accompanied not only by a rationalisation of companies 
through streamlining, amalgamation and cartelisation, but also by the development of 
'an industrial reserve army of white-collar workers' Y1 These lower-level white-collar 
workers increasingly saw that the only way to prevent deterioration in their pay, 
conditions and even status was to unite in trade unions~ work in co-operation with the 
manual unions, and generally take up a stance of defending their interests against the 
opposing interests of their employers, something which white-collar workers would 
have found almost inconceivable a mere ten to fifteen years earlierY'1 This position of 
confrontation with entrepreneurs and the owners of business was anathetna to upper 
management, and provided an element of ideological underpinning to their e1nergence 
as a self-consciously distinct layer or ._\'chicht within society. 
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Howevever, the divide between !eitende Angestellten and the rest of the 
white-collar workforce began long before the 1925~28 period of stability and relative 
prosperity. Indeed it even pre-dated the great crisis year of 1923. The sheer nutnbers 
of upper management had been steadily growing from the late 19th century onwards 
because of the requirements of the modern economy of Germany, and they had 
probably reached the critical mass necessary both for organisation and for its 
prerequisite - awareness of their own colJective existence - in the years prior to 
VELA' s foundation. It was the crisis of 1918, both defeat in war and the overthrow 
of the ancien regin1e, which triggered off a development which had been held up by 
the unusual circumstances of the Great War. 
The question of self-awareness was, of course, closely linked to the question of 
who the leilende Angeste/lten actually were. In the individual departments, plants and 
companies, such people were easily recognisable, but it was tnore problematic to find 
an overall definition (as opposed to a description) which could be used to delineate 
and demarcate this group. [71 This process, described in some detail in the previous 
chapter, was not just an exercise in nmnenclatural creation. To reach a clear definition 
was to take the first and necessary step towards legal recognition of their 
separateness, an event which VELA and BUDACI members hoped would confer 
upon them legal preference of a sort enjoyed by higher state officials. Although no 
such law was. ever enacted in the Weitnar Republic, separateness was very much 
recognised as a de facto reality and was not just a perception or conceit of senior 
managers themselves. As early as 1921, Or Otto Suhr of the AfA-Bund declared that 
there were 145,000 people,18l consisting of directors of limited companies and leading 
managers, who were not entitled to be called Angestellten. By implication they could 
not therefore be members of Angestellten trade unions, at least ce11ainly not of unions 
which were affiliated to AfA. 191 
The question of whether leading salaried employees should therefore be 
categorised as part of the Arbeitgeber-Klasse (employer class) or 
Arheitnehnler-Klasse ( etnployee class), was one over which sociologists, Marxists, 
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the Wei1nar leitende-A ngestellten organisations and their post-1945 successor 
associations argued and debated into the 1960s.11°1 This debate may have had practical 
implications in the 1920s and 1930s, and theoretical implications for Marxist analysis 
for a much longer period, but it is not one which needs to be pursued very far for the 
purposes of this study. Suffice it to say that VELA me1nbers certainly did not see 
the1nselves as 'workers' or ordinary white-co11ar employees, even though, technically 
and legally, they were Arheitnehmer receiving a monthly salary just like any wages 
clerk or typist. Nor did many other workers, blue- or white-collar, see them as 
ordinary employees. The part of the debate which is more relevant for this study is 
whether leitende Angestellten were part of the employers' or bosses' class (a view 
prevalent among socialists, trade unionists and probably the great majority of 
low-level employees), or whether they were a class or Schicht apart (VELA's and 
BUDACI's own view, which was also held by certain sociologists1111). 
An early example of VELA' s determination to set itself apart from employers 
and owners of business came at its Hauptversanunlung, or Annual Genera] Assembly, 
which was held in Berlin in April, 1920. At the prompting of the assembled delegates, 
a hastily-constituted committee produced recommendations for guidelines on \vho 
was eligible to become a member of VELA. Its retnit appears to have been to dea1 
with the top end of 1nembership, as the title of the debate which dealt with the issue 
suggests: 'Abgrenzung des Mitgliederkreise.s nach ob en', which translates as 
'Demarcation of the membership's upper limits'. The article in Der leitende 
Angestellte which reported the discussion stated that the proposals were accepted 
unanimously, and went on to quote the wording used to define the upper delimitation 
of VELA membership: 
Mitglieder der Vereinigung kbnnen leilende Angestellten nicht 
werden, wenn sie dauernd die At{[gaben von Arbeitgehern zu 
el:fiillen hahen und ihre eigenen lnleressen in1 Gegensatz zu den 
Jnteressen der allgemeinen Arbeitnehmerschqfi stehen. Das ist dann 
der Fall, wenn .. s·ie a1{( die Verteilung des gemeinsa1nen 
Arheitsergebnisses einen bestinunenden Eil?flu.s:s· hahen, wie 
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hei .. \]Jielsweise Vorstandsntitg!ieder, stel!vertretende 
Vorstandsmitglieder und Geschiift .. ~fiihrer einer (Jmbl-1. f)as Recht 
der selbstandigen Einstellung und Entlassung von Arheitnehn1ern 
allein schliesst die Mitglieds·chqft nicht aus. 1121 
Leading salaried employees cannot bec01ne metnbers of the 
organisation if they have to carry out the functions of employers on 
a permanent basis and if their own interests stand in opposition to 
the interests of the general workforce. That is the case if they have 
decisive influence on the proportion or distribution of profits, as for 
exatnple metnbers of boards of directors or deputy board members 
or the business tnanagers of limited companies. The right to hire and 
fire employees independently does not of itself exclude membership. 
There are two basic approaches to, or methods of, deciding class location. The 
first is objective class theory which uses quantifiable indicators such as wealth, income 
and position in the production/economic process. The second is subjective class 
theory which deals with qualitative factors such as lifestyles, habits, the personal and 
etnotional, and, above all, self-perception.1 13J Using all the indicators of objective 
theory, this study unequivocally places the leitende Angestel!ten finnly within the 
socio-economic category of upper middle class. However, the same quantitative 
indicators cannot be used to group upper management with the owners of the means 
of production - the Arheitgeber-Klasse. There are two reasons for this. In terms of 
wealth, the owners of businesses varied dramatically. 'vVhile Fritz Thyssen and Alfred 
Hugenberg might be fabulously rich and wield influence at the highest level of politics 
and econotnic policy, owners of smaller finns and businesses, which nevertheless 
employed dozens or scores of workers, could be living tnuch more modest lives not 
very different from the top management within the former's companies. Both these 
tninor capitalists and upper management would fall within the category of upper 
n1iddle class as defined in chapter 3 of this study, while the wealthy big-business 
owners would qualify as part of an upper or elite class. Secondly, and more 
significantly, objective theory may be useful and appropriate for placing 
sub-categories within larger socio-economic classes, but it cannot be utilised to put 
employees within a class of emJ!loyers; even in its own terms, objective theory 
differentiates between the positions of these two groups in the production process. 
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With regard to subjective theory, members of the leitende Angestel!Len who 
joined organisations such as VELA and B UDACI did not primarily, as an ideological 
imperative, regard themselves as upper middle class. They did, to some degree, 
identify with doctors, professors, top level civil servants and others of similar wealth 
and prestige with whom they socialised and interacted in the vast network of Vereine, 
or social organisations, which existed beyond the econ01nic and professional 
representational associations of Weimar Germany, a phenomenon which is discussed 
at greater length in chapter 6 of this study. Moreover, as the above quotation on the 
upper demarcation of VELA membership helps to illustrate, they were even less 
interested in seeking to align themselves with the Arheitgeber-Kiasse. The notion of 
being tniddle class, upper middle class or part of the employer class was not the great 
rallying cty for Gennany' s (organised) senior managers. Theirs was not so much a 
class-consciousness as a deliberate aim to set themselves apart fron1 other 
sociological classifications and to be recognised as a distinct Schicht, defined by their 
occupation in the world of trade and industry and by their elevated, yet still 
intermediate, location between owners and all other employees. As the 1920s 
progressed, this Schicht was expanded to include the independent professions and 
senior state officials in their emerging world-view. One reason for the emphasis upon 
their 'otherness' was the simple matter of creating an identity for themselves as 
organised groups. By doing so they could target and attract further membership to 
their organisations - especially if that identity offered a self-perception of being unique 
and indispensable. It is this issue of uniqueness and a belief in their own 
self-importance which were among the most important factors inclining the 
membership of VELA towards a politics of elitism, and eventually towards support 
for the NSDAP as a party which promised to give greater power to those who 
demonstrated performance and leadership - as embodied in the concepts of Leistung 
and the Fiihre1prinzip. 
There are many examples of VELA members and leaders extolling and 
expanding upon the idea of of being part of a special, and specially-endovved, 5'chicht 
176 
of upper managetnent occupying a pivotal position in German society. An unsigned 
leader article in Der leitenqe Angestellte of June 1921 demanded that the government, 
in considering the composition of economic advisory councils, take into account the 
existence in large snodern firms of a newly-emerged Oherschicht (top layer or upper 
stratum) of senior mangement which now shared with entrepreneurs the functions of 
leadership in the econotnic life of the nation. On the basis of the widespread 
developtnent of upper managers with executive functions, places should be reserved 
on these bodies for the separate representation of the leitende Angestellten. The 
article went on to distinguish between the geistig capabilities of senior managers and 
the merely administrative work of other white-collar workers, to list the educational 
background required of upper management, and to assert their right to receive tnuch 
higher remuneration for the importance of their work and for the special abilities, 
knowledge and experience which that work required. Such special people, the atticle 
continued, should be regarded as a type apart, and it was only right that they should 
come together in their own exclusive socio-economic organisations where their 
growing self-awareness could be fostered. The anonymous writer concluded by 
declaring that political and economic democracy were two completely different 
concepts. Political detnocracy was a matter for the masses, but economic democracy 
was a realm which should be open only to leadership, to those people \Vithin 
businesses who had the relevant technical and organisational skills to take decisions 
which would benefit the: concern and the economy as a whole. 1141 This position on who 
should have a say in economic matters bears more than a passing resemblance to 
19th-century liberal attitudes towards political enfranchisement - it should not be 
restricted to a very stnall traditional elite, but neither should it become a universal 
right. 
In an article in July of 1921, Dr Hermann Schaefer, VELA's new business 
manager, argued that, in order to create a proper new system of law for the country, it 
was necessary to define the leitende Angestellte as a certain social type. It was also a 
necessity, for the sake of the economic community, that leading salaried e1nployees be 
regarded as a special group. He went on to argue that it was in everyone's interest 
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that a self-consciousness of their own un1que identity should emerge among the 
leitende Angestellten, and that they should develop that identity through the means of 
an empowering exclusive organisationoiiSI Already it can be seen that legal and 
econotnic arguments are being aired to justify the growing claim of being a special 
group and to reinforce the demand to be granted privileged status, backed up, of 
course, by the assertion that this would be in the public interest and for the greater 
national good 0 
In the August 1921 edition, Dr Muffelmann, now the secretary of VELA as well 
as editor of Der leitende Angestellte, stated that it was an uncontested fact that 
leading salaried employees were a special group and indeed special people, m an 
article arguing that their salaries should not be subject to the same 
govermnent-imposed restrictions as those affecting other white-collar workersoll 61 In 
the sa1ne edition Dr Schaefer wrote a very long piece on the definition of leitende 
Angestellten and their place in employment law. It was here that VELA's definition, 
cited in chapter 4, was expounded. In the course of this article Schaefer wrote the 
following g) owing testitnonial to the virtue of the type of work and the type of person 
embodied in the leitende Angeste!lte: 
J)ie Ausscheidung der ()berschicht der Arbeilnehmer beruht 01{[ der 
Erkenntnis des wirtscht!ftlichen Sonderwertes, der sozialen 
.Sonderbedeutung, der hesonderen sozialen und wirtschafilichen 
Daseinsbedingungen der geistig selbststiindigen Ben!fs·arbeit. [l 7J 
The setting apart of the upper stratum of employees rests upon the 
recognition of the special economic value, of the special social 
importance, and of the special social and economic living 
requirements of such intellectually independent professional work. 
In the course of this one sentence, Schaefer not only set the leitende 
Angestel/ten apart as a distinct and gifted social grouping, but also claimed that their 
occupation fell within the definition Ben{p.,-arbeit, or profession. Members of 
professions such as doctors, lawyers 
0 
and architects were already defined by law as a 
different and separate socio-economic group, and as such were subject to different 
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economic and tax legislation, as well as benefitting from government employment, 
patronage and the provision of educational establishments. They also frequently 
achieved separate representation on governmental consultative committees.ll 81 
The issue of separate representation for the leitende Angestellten at this juncture 
was very much in the forefront of VELA thinking because, in February of 1921, the 
government had finally introduced a law establishing Works' Councils. Every 
enterprise which had more than twenty employees was now obliged to establish such 
a body, consisting of representatives of workers and employers, which was supposed 
to play a major role in deciding upon the running of each firm.l 191 VELA's overriding 
concern was that the interests of senior managers might well be marginalised by their 
location within the al1-enc01npassing category of employees, where their small 
numbers would be swamped by the retnainder of the workforce.f2°1 Blue- and 
white-collar workers combined outnumbered upper management by approxi1nately 65 
to 1.'21 1 This apprehension turned out to be well justified since the employee side of 
these councils came to be d01ninated by the trade unions~ especially those of the left. 
However, the Works' Councils themselves proved to be toothless in practice because 
of the ambiguity of the wording of the legislation under which they were set up with 
regard to the legal powers they possessed to enforce their will, and also because of 
the reluctance of successive Weimar governments to allow any but entrepreneurs to 
decide upon the direction of econotnic enterprise. This latter inclination became even 
1nore tnarked from 1923 after the SPD ceased to be a partner in government, and the 
Works' Councils became impotent forums for the exchange of class-war rhetoric 
between unions and employers. [221 
Nevertheless, despite the receding of fears about the potential powers ofWorks' 
Councils, VELA and its upper-management membership did not slacken in their quest 
to be regarded as a Schicht apart. In the October J 921 edition of Der leitende 
Angestellle, the leader article enlisted the support of the recently-held Thirty-first 
Conference of Jurists which had declared that, in the matter of employment la\V, 
leading salaried employees should be considered as outwith the regulations covering 
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all other employees.'231 This was music to the ears of believers in the special nature of 
/eitende Angeste/lten, since legal recognition of their claim to being a separate 
socio-economic group was by now a fundamental demand of VELA. Legal definition 
and hence legal differentiation, which had started off as a defensive tactic against the 
perceived threat of the trade-union power of lower-level employees, were already 
becoming the first steps towards a detnand for differential legal rights, even if only as 
yet within the reahn of employtnent law in the autumn of 1921. Perhaps of greater 
long-term significance was the convergence of views between senior business 
management and this section of the legal community. Many VELA members were 
themselves trained in the law and worked, for example, as company lawyers, a greatly 
expanding area within the modern business sector of the 1920s. On May 30th, 1933, 
VELA was to be incorporated into the BNSDJ (Bund Nationalsozialistischer 
Deutscher .Juristen) or the Association of National Socialist German Jurists. This was 
done at the request of the organisation's leadership and with the approval of Hans 
Frank, the BNSDJ's leader, to avoid VELA's upper-management members being 
absorbed into the NSA (Nationalsozialistische Angestelltensch{.!ft), the white-collar 
workers' sector of DAF (Deulsche Arbeit.~fronl), the German Labour Front, which 
enc01npassed all e1nployees down to the ve1y lowest levels (see chapter 9). Thus, 
twelve years into the future, VELA' s members would still be manoeuvring to achieve 
exclusive and elite status, and would indeed seem to have achieved a measure of 
formal success in the early National Socialist state with their official redesignation 
from leitende Angestellten to Wirtsclu~ftsleiter, or economic leaders, and by being 
grouped together with other high-status economic and legal professionals and officials 
within a relatively powerful Nazi Party/state organi·sation headed by an influential 
patron. 
As early as 1922, a leader article in the January edition of Der leitende 
Angestellte claimed that VELA had moved beyond being a mere organisation to 
having become a tnovement (Vela-Bewegung) directed at emphasising the special 
location of leading salaried employees in the economic life of the nation. The article 
stated that employtnent-law ljterature now routinely and without exception recognised 
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the special position and the need for special treatment of leitende Angestellten. The 
next task was to make this acceptance more widespread among the general public, 
atnong the trade unions of lower-level white-collar workers, and in the Reichstag. 
Although VELA was officially non-party political, the article urged members to 
become involved in politics in order to further its aims, and indicated that several 
VELA members already sat on the employee com1nittees of various of the political 
parties. The article concluded by saying that it was a fundamental demand of VELA 
that the salaries of leitende A ngestellten should not be based on a fixed and schematic 
scale of rates, but should depend upon the individual's contribution to the value and 
well-being of the business for which he worked - Leistung should be the criterion for 
measuring reward. 1141 
This the1ne of being separate, special and valuable permeated the debates and 
speeches at VELA' s annual general meeting in March 1922. Delegates and officials 
referred to it at every opporiunity and in discussing matters as diverse as pension 
rights and relationships with other employee organisations. Even the Vereinigung· s 
business report contained the following grandiose assetiions: 
Die Vela hat den Grund gelegl zur Schqffung einer eigenen 
Verhandsideologie ..... [Die] Vela-Bewegung unterslreicht die 
Sonderstellung des Wirtschqft.~filhrers und ziehl eine Trennungslinie 
Zlvischen den Fiihrenden und den Gefiihrten. Die Vela-Bewegung 
hetont, dass ohne die Sonderwertung der Jntellegenz, ohne die 
besondere Anerkennung der geistigen Tatigkeit die Entwicklung 
jedes wi11schaftlichen Le bens behindert ist. 1251 
VELA has laid the foundations for the creation of an associational 
ideology ..... The VELA-movement underlines the special status of the 
economic leaders and draws a dividing line between leaders and the 
led. The VELA-movement emphasises that, unless special credit and 
recognition are given to intelligence and spiritual/intellectual work, 
the development of all economic life is hampered. 
In the ·May edition of 1922, reporting on the Annual General Meeting, the leader 
article claimed that VELA was creating 'a social stratum with special ideas, with a 
special spiritual/intellectual form of employment, and with its own view of 
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spiritual/intellectual development and of economic relations'. In this same aJ1icle, for 
the very first time, the claim that VELA 'is the gathering together of the 
spiritual/intellectual leaders of economiC life (geistigen [;.iihrer des 
Wirtschaftslehens)' was aired in the official house journal of the organisation. The 
article concluded by saying that lack of leadership was the problem of the age~ that 
western society, as well as Germany, was crying out for leadership at a tin1e when 
conditions were unfavourable for it. It was VELA' s task to foster the training and 
emergence of such leaders within its own field of operations, while also encouraging a 
wider development of leadership personalities (Fiihrerpersonlichkeiten) among all the 
spiritual/intellectual professions (Geistesberufe), with the hope that both the free 
professions and the higher state officials might one day come together with VELA to 
create a pinnacle organisation (Spitzenorganisation), a united front (Einheit.~front) of 
geistig achievers and leaders.f261 
As mentioned in chapter 4, some analyses of Weimar Germany have seen it as a 
dichotomous corporatist state where the power of the employer class and that of the 
trade unions d01ninated both economics and politics. This was indeed how VELA 
viewed the situation in the early 1920s. In the leader article of the September/October 
1922 edition of Der leitende Angestellle it was stated: 
Der Ausdruck, dass die (]elverksclu~f/.en oder die 
Arbeitgeberverhande eine Nehenregien1ng ausiiben, ist nichl korrekt. 
Diese Verhc'inde sind die Regierung ..... {D}ie politischen Parteien 
sind frotz ihrer schbnen politischen Programme, trotz ihrer 
·u.·eltanschciulich verbramten Fassaden letzten Endes nur Fonnen in 
denen Arheitgeberverbande und Gewerks·chq(len 1vieden11n ' in 
Erscheinunx treten.1171 
To say that the trade unions or the employers' associations perform 
the function of a supplementary government is not correct. These 
organisations are the govermnent. .... In spite of their fine political 
programmes and their glossy ideological facades, the political parties 
are ultimately just structures in which employers' associations and 
trade unions in turn reveal themselves 
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VELA' s leadership expounded a critique of this corporatist structure, claiming 
not only that both of these antagonistic forces were self-interested, but that the 
German population at large was ill-educated and ill-informed about economic and 
political realities. This was a dangerous situation which allowed the left, in particular 
the SPD and the Free Trade Unions, to dominate Weimar's democratic political 
system and to impose a policy of levelling-down (Nivellierung) upon German society. 
To an organisation of highly-paid senior 1nanagers this was, of course, an 
unacceptable and insidious development. Their proposed solution was not to 
strengthen the independence of the detnocratic political systetn, but rather to get 
themselves recognised and accepted as major players in this behind-the-scenes 
duopoly and turn it into a tripartite system of influence. [281 In order to achieve this, 
VELA had to be as strong and as aiJ-inclusive of management as possible. In the same 
articJe from which the last quotation was cited, the argument was put forward that it 
was the duty, indeed the patriotic duty, of a11 geistig practitioners, whether salaried 
etnployees or independent professionals, to join their relevant occupational 
organisations. Only in this way could they influence the government (given the above 
tnentioned corporatist analysis), and such was their responsibility to do this, that 
anyone who did not fulfil this obligation was committing treason against the 
Fatherland (Ven·at an1 Vaterlande)! 
This was strong moral and social pressure indeed, but interestingly the article 
went on to appeal to the self-interest of leitende Angestelllen - the carrot as well as 
the stick. It pointed out that leading salaried employees were just as affected by the 
current tide of inflation as were the lowest wage earners~ yet many leitende 
Angestel!ten and members of the free professions had said nothing about this, had 
considered it beneath their dignity, and appeared to hold some sort of medieval faith 
that the declining value of the mark would somehow pass thetn by and only affect 
those in more menial employment. VELA' s founders, it said, had foreseen both these 
developments and they were among the principal reasons for the creation in 1919 of 
an organisation which could protect its members' financial interests through bringing 
together in numbers one of the 1nost strategically placed of all socio-economic groups 
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in German business. Only an organisation like VELA could prevent an erosion of the 
value of managerial salaries, fight against the threat of the proletarianisation of 
leitende Angestellten, and also take up the struggle to resist the very real prospect of 
the destruction of spiritual/intellectual work (Vernichtung der gei.,·tigen Arbeit). In 
other words, the fate of leitende Angestellten as a whole was tied unequivocally to 
their ability to organise themselves effectively~ the success or failure of VELA was an 
Existenzfrage, a word which translates appositely as either a 'question of livelihood' 
or a 'question of existence' .1291 
By 1923 the greatest problem facing Germany's senior managers was the one 
which was affecting just about everyone in the country - the Great Inflation. But 
perhaps just as threatening in the short term was the French and Belgian occupation 
of the east bank of the Rhine, including the area of the Ruhr. Many of VELA' s 
members lived and worked in the large concentration of industry and business in the 
cities of the Ruhr and Rhine! and such as Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Essen and Cologne. 
The Cologne archive which holds the collection of l)er /eitende Angestel/te covering 
the years 1919 to 1934, fr01n which the research materials for this study were dravvn, 
contains no copies of Der leitende Angestel/te for the year 1923. This was, however, 
not just the result of the city being occupied by the French from January 1923 until 
the SU1nn1er of 1925. When the national periodical reappears in the archive in January 
1924, the very first article in that edition makes it clear that publication of Der 
leitende Angestellte had been suspended for a whole year because inflation had made 
the subscriptions of VELA metnbers, upon which the organisation and the periodical 
both depended, worthless. [JoJ 
In the meanti1ne a local monthly magazme, Organisator - We . s·tdeutsche 
Zeitschr(ft der leitendenden Angeste/lten (Organiser - West German Periodical of the 
Leading Salaried Employees), appeared in May 1923 and carried on in production 
until January 1925. This was a greatly-shrunken magazine, not just in terms of the 
volume of articles, notices and adverts, but also in its very size and quality. Whereas 
[)er leitende Angeste/lte was always slightly larger than A4 size and printed on high 
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quality paper throughout its 15 years of publication, Organisator appeared in AS 
format and upon cruder paper. Nevertheless, it contained articles by many leading 
lights of VELA, including Dr Hermann Schaefer, the national organisation's business 
manager, and continued for a year after the reappearance of Der leitende Angestellte. 
The pages of Organisator over the two years in question were, of course, much 
taken up with the questions of foreign occupation, rampant inflation and, latterly, the 
effects of the revaluation of the mark. Nevertheless, a substantial amount of space 
was still given over to the issues which had previously been running in Der leitende 
Angestellte, namely Leistung, geLs·tige Arbeit and the concept of leading salaried 
employees as a separate and specially-endowed 5'chicht. 
The very first article in the very first edition of (JJ:ganisator was entitled 
'Perst>nlichkeitsrecht der Geistesarheit', or 'Personality Rights of 
Spiritual/Intellectual Work'. It argued that, in this time of extreme crisis for Germany, 
it was more important than ever that the abilities and personal qualities of thos(~ 
engaged in geistig work should be recognised and given full leash. Only through the 
drive and commitment of that layer of society, which was not affected by either 
desperate self-interest or a fatalistic acceptance of oppression by a (tetnporarily) 
superior and irresistible foreign power, could Germany survive and her economy 
recover. It was therefore in the interests of the whole nation that leitende Angeslellten 
should have their pay differentials restored and increased so that such creative tnen 
did not have to waste their energies on finding ways to satisfy their basic and banal 
everyday material needs. Neither should they be subject to the forces of economic or 
social levelling, standardisation or bureaucracy which had hampered the leaders and 
managers of the economy in the past. Indeed, the Ben!fsschicht, or professional 
stratum as they now termed the collective wider grouping of geistig practitioners, 
should enjoy a social status and personal freedom enshrined in the economic order by 
legislation. Only by this means could the creative willpower (schap[erische 
Willenskraft) unique to this group or class be properly nurtured and utilised. 
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This article demonstrates a new and interesting development in the continuous 
efforts by VELA to justify its members being regarded as special, and therefore 
entitled to extra rewards, increased status, more power and, ultimately, differential 
legal rights. The particular development lies in the use of the concepts of will and 
willpower as positive active agents, as the creative, if irrational, forces in hUinan 
nature. These qualities, it was claimed, were inherent characteristics of those who 
were capable of engaging in geistig activities where creativity and force of personality 
were essential for success and achievement. Originating with Artur Schopenhauer in 
the early 19th century,'311 the theory of the power of the will (or the 'will to power') 
was very influential in the formulation of Nietzsche's idea of the {ibennensch, or 
superman, who can create and impose his own laws.IJ21 It was also a favourite theme 
of National Socialism, and particularly dear to the heart of Adolf ·Hitler.f331 In a 
1nodern Social-Darwinist world the power of personality rather than that of mere 
physical strength was held to be the principal factor determining who became the 
dominant individual in a group. And this could, of course, apply as much to a 
commercial enterprise as to a political organisation. This appears to be the argUinent 
which was being advanced in this article, but in order to attract the support of (and 
perhaps\ indeed, keep the interest of) members who were less attracted to such 
metaphysical notions, it was interwoven with the case for higher remuneration for 
upper salaried management. In the world of business\ wealth most definitely also 
played a role in setting the order of the hierarchy, and thus VELA' s detnand for large 
pecuniary rewards within a supposedly spiritually-inspired and non-materialist 
argument could be conveniently dressed up as merely a tool to enable this essentially 
selfless group to achieve a suitably high position of status and power which would 
allow them more effectively to pursue a course of action that benefited the entire 
nation. It is a moot point whether ideology is created out of economic reality, but it is 
certainly not beyond the bounds of possibility that at least some of those exposed to 
these proto-Nazi, or at least elitist and anti-democratic, ideas adopted such beliefs 
because they buttressed and justified their more visceral material and financial 
atnbitions. The attraction of National Socialism\ especially after its watershed year of 
1928 when it changed its approach to private enterprise and adopted a tnuch more 
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sophisticated propagandist line under the astute guidance of Joseph Goebbels, was 
based as much upon an appeal to self-interest as it was to selfless idealism. Such a 
potent ideological synthesis chimed extremely closely with the attempts of VELA to 
reconcile privilege and power with patriotic altruism. 
The Organisator article concluded by claiming that performance enhancement 
could only be achieved through freedom: 'Leistung gedeiht nur in Freiheit!' or 
'Achievetnent thrives only in freedom!' Although claiming in the last paragraph that 
this freedom included liberation from foreign domination and occupation, the 
overwhelming concentration of the whole piece was focused upon the other two 
fi·eedoms mentioned in the same sentence - freedom from material shortages and 
freedom fr01n legal restrictions. Nor was either of these latter two issues treated as 
universal for the German population, but each was dealt with purely in relation to the 
rights and aspirations of VELA' s own 1nembers and those in si1nilarly geistig 
upper-middle-class occupations and professions. 1341 
The second edition of Organisator contained an article entitled ~sozial 
D{fferenzierung' or 'Social Differentiation'. This argued that human progress was 
only possible through dissi1nilarities between people, which both caused and required 
different lifestyles and varied incomes. The allocation and gradation of wealth 
distribution should be based upon the criterion of personal achievement with some 
individuals receiving far more than others on account of their creativity. This, claimed 
the anonymous writer, was not the advocacy of a progrmnme of social injustice as the 
'levellers' claimed, but was in fact a deep social and cultural necessity. Indeed, he 
concluded, the aspiration towards social differentiation was the vety kernel of the 
Vela-Bewegung. PSJ 
The July edition of 1923 appeared just as the Great Inflation really got into its 
stride and the value of the mark plummeted to 350,000 to the dollar, devaluing faster 
with every passing day.r361 Most of this edition was taken up with lamenting and 
cataloguing the distress and straitened circumstances of the leitende Angestellten, 
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who, the leading article claimed, were worse hit than any other sector of the 
population because their real income had been reduced to a third of its pre-war level. 
It n1ight of course be argued that, with inflation running at I 00°/o every ten days, they 
had got off rather lightly, but the article went on to argue that any degrading of the 
standard of living of upper management was unacceptable both for the individuals and 
for the economic well-being ofthe whole country. Without irony it went on to ask if it 
was not a great monstrosity that highly-educated and skilled top managers from 
well-known firms should have to spend their free time dealing in the markets for 
cigars, antiques and paintings in order to maintain the standard of life to which they 
had previously been accustomed. Achievement and performance of a geistig nature, 
which one expected and required from leilende Angestellten, was only possible if 
those individuals neither had to worry about providing for their families, nor had to 
think about the most 'primitive' questions of existence. The very quality of 
independent geistig work and performance would inevitably decline if leitende 
Angeslel!Len did not enjoy an elevated standard of living and the prospects of a 
successful career. No matter how vast the means of production or how great the size 
of the workforce, these factors were of no value without the independent gei .. '.·tig 
personality of leaders in the workplace. The effects of a levelling-down of society 
would be to destroy the power of personality within the economy by stifling the 
creative atnbitions of its most dynamic members, reducing their work to mechanical 
functions, curtailing their innovative abilities, and embittering and stultifying these 
most valuable of men. [J?J 
These ideas of will, leadership, personality and creativity, which suffused the 
pages of Organisafor throughout 1923, are indicative of the development of VELA' s 
thinking on the role and nature of its members. Whereas between 1919 and 1921 the 
emphasis was upon definition by occupation, by 1923 the leitende Angestellten were 
being identified by their supposed high standards of character and innate geistig 
capabilities which endowed them with special leadership qualities which, it was 
argued, should be fostered in the interests of the whole community. It is very possible 
that this developtnent was due to the atmosphere of crisis and chaos in 1923 which 
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impelled many Germans to look to improved and inspired leadership for salvation. 
Whatever the cause of this phenomenon, it is perhaps of more relevance and 
significance to this study to note that Ian Kershaw has said in his recent biography of 
Hitler that, '[t]he theme of personality and leadership, little emphasised before 1923, 
was a central thread ofl-Iitler's speeches and writings in the mid- and later 1920s' .!381 
Some similarities between the ideas, concepts and vocabulary of both Hitler's 
and VELA's tnembers' writings at this same juncture in time can be seen by reference 
to a passage in the first volume of Me in Kan1pj, written in 1924: 
The movement must promote respect for personality by all means; it 
tnust never forget that in personal wot1h lies the worth of everything 
human~ that every idea and every achievement is the result of one 
tnan 's creative force and that the admiration of greatness constitutes, 
not only a tribute of thanks to the latter, but casts a unifYing bond 
around the grateful. Personality cannot be replaced: especially when it 
etnbodies not the mechanical but the cutural and creative element. !391 
This thetne was picked up again in Volume 2 of Me in Kampf and elaborated 
upon in a manner which is even closer to the \Vording and ideas contained in 
contemporaneous VELA publications. Hitler began by talking about inventors and 
inventions, but then went on to expound on the importance and the virtues of all 
creative thinkers: 
It is not the mass that invents and not the majority that organises or 
thinks, but in all things only and always the individual man, the 
person ..... A human comtnunity appears well organised only if it 
facilitates the labours of these creative forces in the most helpful way 
and applies them in a manner beneficial to all. The tnost valuable thing 
about the invention itself, whether it lie in the 1naterial field or in the 
world of ideas, is primarily the inventor as a personality. Therefore, to 
employ him in a way benefiting the totality is the first and highest task 
in the organisation of a national community. Indeed, the organisation 
itself must be a realisation of this principle. Thus, also, it is redeemed 
from the curse of mechanism and becomes a living thing. It ntust itself 
be an emhodin1ent f?{ the endeavour to place thinking individuals 
above the masses, thus subordinating the latter to the former. 
[original Italics] 
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Consequently, the organisation must not only not prevent the 
emergence of thinking individuals from the mass~ on the contrary, it 
must in the highest degree make this possible and easy by the nature 
of its own being. In this it must proceed from the principle that the 
salvation of tnankind has never lain in the masses, but in its creative 
minds, which must therefore really be regarded as the benefactors of 
the human race. To assure them of the most decisive influence and 
facilitate their work is in the interest of the totality. Assuredly this 
interest is not satisfied, and is not served by the don1ination of the 
unintelligent or incompetent, in any case uninspired masses, but solely 
by the leadership of those to whom Nature has given special gifts for 
this purpose. 1401 
Hitler's reference to inventors is not at all irrelevant to the world and roles of 
upper managen1ent since, amongst other factors, a great proportion of inventors were 
engineers (and chetnists), of whom a sizeable number were members of VELA. Both 
Jeffrey Herf and Kees Gispen have studied the strong connections between the 
engineering profession and the Nazi Party which began to emerge in the late 1 920s.r41 1 
I-Ierf, in particular, has shown how the apparent gulf between the concepts of Geisl 
und Technik (spirituality and technology), which influenced n1uch late l 9th-century 
right-vving Romantic nationalist thought, was bridged by the development~ in the first 
third of the 20th century, of the idea that technology in fact contributed to a 
spiritua]ising of labour. This came about through technology's gradual identification 
with fonn, use-value, creativity, aesthetics and German Cieistigkeit, and through its 
detach1nent from abstraction, foreign intellectualism and the materialism of (largely 
Jewish) finance capitalistn. Previously the means-ends rationality and n1odernity of 
technology had aroused the antipathy of 19th-century German Romanticism, which 
was one of the major ideological streams of right-wing nationalist thinking and which 
was very much rooted in an atavistic, pastoral world-view. However, the experience 
of the First World War and the growing influence of the concepts of the will to 
power, the celebration of the self and the 'authentic experience' in Romantic thought 
led it to embrace technology as the embodiment of will and beauty and as having a 
Geist of its own. 1421 Oswald Spengler, the historicist writer, even went as far as to 
clai1n that modern Western technological innovation was religiously inspired, that it 
was in fact the tnanifestation of an urge to reveal the mysteries of God's universe. 1431 
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Spengler was one of a new generation of postwar viJlkisch writers who did not 
reject the urbanisation, industrialisation and faster pace of modern Jjfe. Included 
among this group were Werner Sombart, Carl Schmitt, and the highly influential Ernst 
Ji.inger who glorified the power and 'authentic experience' of modern mechanised and 
highly-destructive warfare. These powerful voices helped to transform pastoral 
Romanticism into political Romanticism, or what might even be called Romantic 
Modernism with its acceptance of technology as an expression of the joy in creation, 
and where the engineer-artist could bend nature to his will now that Technik had been 
reconciled with Kultur.1441 But even before the Great War, German Romanticism was 
predisposed to accepting inventors as 'teachers of the nation' and as a wellspring of 
hwnan creativity. The heroic cult of the artist-genius was slowly being applied to the 
realm oftechnology, and, although it rarely appeared in the visual art forms employed 
with such enthusiasm by the Italian Futurists,1451 it was a recurring theme in German 
literature where the inventor was portrayed as an embattled genius str11ggling against 
the forces of conformity, standardisation, rationalisation and both capitalist and 
socialist collectivisation.1"61 This idea also carried within it the viJ/kisch notion of 
Germany's special technological genius, which is vit1ual1y indistinguishable from the 
context of Hitler's pro-inventor pronouncements quoted above. These appeared in the 
chapter of Mein Karnpf entitled 'Personality and the Conception of the Vblkisch 
State' where he was comparing the Aryan disposition towards creativity with 1 ewish 
parasitical manipulation. 1471 
Nationalistically-inclined engmeers, who constituted at the very least a 
substantial minority of the whole profession, also did much to effect the fusion of 
technology and culture through their professional organisations, and in particular 
through their writings in those organisations' periodicals from as early as the 1870s. 
The very name of the most widely read of these periodicals, Technik und Kultur, is 
itself indicative of the desire among the profession to claim for themselves a role in 
the nation's 'cultural mission' .1 481 Carl Weihe, who edited Technik und Kultur from 
1921 until 1934, exerted a great influence upon the consciousness of the 
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university-trained engineering elite~ making the writings of cultural critics (including 
the volkisch writers just mentioned) comprehensible to them, utilising the ideas of 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to establish a harmony between technology and Gennan 
philosophy, and instilling in their minds the notion that they had an autonomous and 
costnic 'cutural mission' within Germany. Weihe was also a great believer in the 
power of the will, going so far as to say that human beings were only instruments of 
this external force, which existed most strongly in creative people, in the leaders of 
men and in artists. Perhaps needless to say, Weihe becmne a Nazi and a great ad1nirer 
of Hitler who, he said, was the epitome of one possessed of the power of the will, 
acting and speaking from the heart rather than resorting to 'clever reasoning' .f491 Here 
we see an example of something which, at first sight, appears contradictory and 
unlikely - the irrationalism of the Romantic, the .anti-intellectualism of Nazism and the 
logical professional skills of the engineer being synthesised into an essentially 
consistent world-view, even if based upon some very contentious underlying 
assumptions about creativity, hUJnan nature and the existence of external, and indeed 
Jnetaphysical, forces. 
A final group who influenced the marrying of German technology and German 
nationalist culture by way of the concepts of the will and the power of creativity, was 
the Nazi Party itself While Hitler, Goering, Goebbels and Speer have all been 
tnentioned as leading Nazis who embraced modernity, in the specif-Ic context of 
cementing Technik to Kultur, much was due also to the efforts of Gottfried Fed er and 
Fritz Todt, both of whom were qualified engineers themselves and both of whom 
were personally close to :Hitler at different times. 
Feder laid the foundations for the NSDAP's attitude towards technology and 
industry with his publication in 1919 of Das Man?fesl zur Brechung der 
Zinsknechtschaft des Geldes (The Manifesto on Breaking the Interest Slavery of 
Money).15nl Basing his theory on one of the central tenets of National Socialism - the 
idea of an eternal racial war focused mainly on the struggle between Aryans and Jevvs 
- Feder distinguished 'Jewish finance capital' from 'national capital'. This 
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conveniently allowed for a populist anti-capitalist rhetoric which nevertheless left the 
bulk and structure of existing property relations untouched. In 1923, Feder declared 
that Jews did not engage in productive labour and were the bearers of a parasitic 
Geist, while 'German' big business (such as the firms of Krupp and Thyssen) and its 
possession of large amounts of capital was not at all in conflict with the interest of the 
totality. The fundamental recognition of private property, he said, was 'deeply 
anchored in the clear awareness of the Aryan spirituality' .rsrJ The formulation of a 
racial analysis of property rights and relations also gave an ideological underpinning 
to, and justification for, the NSDAP's public change of tack in 1928 when it 
abandoned the anti-capitalist Article 17 of the Party Programme (see chapter 2). In his 
1933 work, Kampf gegen Hoc~finanz (Struggle against High Finance), Feder 
contributed his most theoretical work to the canons of National Socialism and coined 
one of Nazism's many catchy aphorisms and slogans, 'creative versus parasitic 
capital' (schqffendes gegen raffendes Kapitaf). Here he asserted that creative capital 
was a source of usefulness, employment and technological advance, while parasitic 
capital leeched away national resources for the benefit of international tinanciers?21 
Foreign banks and the Jews were to blame for all of Germany's problems, thus 
denying that class conflict or any notion of a struggle between capital and labour 
could be a cause~ instead, the issue was conceptualised as a nationalist one requiring 
the creation of a Volksgen7ein .. ,·chqft where National Socialism would put service to 
the nation above individual gain. 1531 
Feder was also instrumental in setting up the National Socialist Library, which 
published a series of pamphlets on the Nazi view of economic matters and technology. 
ln 1930, the NSDAP's first official statement on modern technology appeared in one 
of these pamphlets written by yet another engineer, Peter Schwerber. Schwerber 
declared that National Socialism's aim was to emancipate technology from the 
d01nination of money and the 'chains' of Jewish materialism, and that racism was both 
the foundation of, and rational conclusion to, Germany's reconciliation with 
technology. He further clai1ned that technological advance was not only a founding 
principle of the NSDAP, but also in tune with the Geist of the German Volk. 
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Technology, indeed, was an 'independent force' possessed, like National Socialism 
itself, of a 'primal life instinct' which could be utilised against the 'gigantic power of 
money' and 'Jewish materialist restrictions'. As a natural force, technology had a will 
of its own and could be either passionate or demonic. In the hands of Jews and 
financiers its misuse created destruction and misery. However, the 'natural' will of 
technology was to seek the victory of 'spirit over matter' and the Nordic race was 
perfectly suited by its own intrinsica11y geistig nature to be its custodian and 
practitioner.l54 1 This official pamphlet unambiguously declared Nazi support and 
enthusisrn for technology, laying out a case in ideological, philosophical and 
metaphysical tenns. The concepts of wil1, spirit and autonomous external forces, 
stripped of their overt racism and anti-Se1nitis1n, bear many resemblances to the 
world-view which VELA has been shown to have been developing during the early 
\Veimar years and which would be reiterated and enlarged upon during the latter 
phase of the Republic.1551 
Feder's lingering anti-capitalist rhetoric helped to lead to his swift eclipse in 
1933 as an influential figure in the Nazi leadership. However, it is just as likely that his 
decline arose t1·om his lack of a personal or political following in the scheming rivalry 
that characterised the Reichsleitung of the Third Reich.' 56 ' Among those who stepped 
over him on their way up were Robert Ley, leader of the Labour Front, and Fritz Todt 
who was put in charge of the Amt der Technik (Office of Technology) and designated 
by Hitler as his representative for all matters to do with the organisation and 
development of technology. Todt had been a Party member since 1923, but he 
continued to work in engineering for another decade and was therefore very well 
connected to the engineering profession and its cultural traditions, unlike the more 
detached and scholarly Fed er. Although very much in the mould of a technocrat, Todt 
was also an ideological and political evangelist for the NSDAP. Using the Alnt der 
Technik to publish what he called a 'technopolitical journal', Deutsche Technik, this 
glossy periodical constantly sought, over an eight-year period, to convince its 80,000 
engineering readers that National Socialism was compatible with, and the best 
promoter of, modern technology. Less metaphysical than Feder or Schwerber, Todt 
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concentrated upon convincing engineers that it was their technical rationality rather 
than their souls which the Nazi state sought to mobilise in the national interest. He 
did, of course, as a believing National Socialist, emphasise that their skills were 
derived from a particular German Geist and that their technological achievements 
should be conceived of as cultural works of a creatively spiritual nature. While this 
fitted in well with the cultural traditions and claims of engineers developed over the 
previous 50 or more years, and appealed to their nationalistic idealism, Deutsche 
Technik was not averse to pointing out to its readership how the power and 
importance of engineers were growing in the Third Reich with the undertaking of so 
many large-scale construction projects and the demands of a modern rearmament 
programme. (S?J 
Feder and Schwerber were, of course, preaching to a largely NSDAP audience, 
while Todt was projecting his views directly at the engineering profession, so it is 
worth looking at what the inflential Joseph Goebbels had to say on the linked issues of 
technology and CJeistigkeit - in public. Not one prone to metaphysical flights of fan<.:y, 
Goebbels had no time for the notion that technology had a spirit of its own, but 
nevertheless he did believe that there was a special Geist inherent in the German Volk 
and most developed among those who had embraced National Socialism, an approach 
not dissitnilar to that of Todt. At a speech given at the opening of the Berlin 
Automobile Exhibition in March 193 9, he said: 
We live in an age of technology. The accelerating tempo of our 
century affects all areas of life. There are hardly any undertakings 
which can avoid its powerful influence. Thus., surely, there must be a 
danger of modern technology rendering men soulless. However, 
National Socialism has never rejected nor fought against technology. 
Instead, one of its principal tasks has been consciously to approve it 
while providing safeguards through disciplining it and imbuing it with 
soul in order to put it to the use of our people and our culture. In the 
past National Socialist public pronounce1nents have talked of the steely 
romanticism of our century. Today this phrase has becotne wholly 
meaningful and real. We live in an age which is both romantic and 
steely, an age which has, however, not lost profound feeling, but rather 
has uncovered a new romanticism through the effects of tnodern 
inventions and technology. Bourgeois reaction to technology was one 
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of distance and incomprehension, if not complete hostility, and 
modern-day skeptics believed that it constituted the deepest roots of 
European cultural disintegration, but National Socialism has 
understood how to fill the soulless framework of technology with the 
rhythms and fiery impulses of our age. 158 1 
As tnentioned above, many of the senior managers within VELA' s ranks were 
also qualified engineers, but it is equally significant in the context of the second 
quotation from Mein Kampf that, in the years up to 1933, Der leitende Angestellle 
began to feature many articles on the issues of copyright and patent laws and the 
rights of inventors and innovators. 1591 Kees Gispen has shown how the Nazi patent 
laws of 1936 met almost all the demands of salaried engineers for inventions to be 
recognised legally as the intellectual property of the inventor (albeit with an obligation 
to use it for the good of the nation - a right inevitably denied to Jews) and not of the 
company for which he worked. Much of the work needed to promote this 
inventor-friendly measure and have it signed into law by Hitler was done by I-Ians 
Frank, whose name keeps recurring in relation to matters concerning VELA. Similar 
patent-reform bills, supported by the NSDAP, had been introduced into the Reichstag 
in 1929, 1931 and 1932, but had been defeated by various opposing forces.' 601 All this 
detnonstrates clearly a harmony of view between much of the engineering profession 
and National Socialism, at least on the patent issue, on the underlying ideological 
conceptions of the value of geistig work and the rewards due to geistig practitioners, 
and on the (spurious) distinction between Aryan 'Geistigkeit' and Jewish 
'intellectualism'. 
Although most of non-engineering upper management in business and industry 
was not involved in the popular image of invention - new machines, improved 
engines, better mousetraps and so forth - it was, nevertheless, ve1y much engaged in 
organisational innovations, in office and information systems, in production methods, 
sales techniques, advertising-copy creation, and much more. All of these contributed 
as much as improvements to Opel' s engines or the development of new synthetic 
fibres to the growth, efficiency and profitability of German business and industry in 
the Weimar years _ and a good deal of these innovations were etninently patentable. 
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This is conHrmed in another study by Gispen where he showed that the 1920s and 
early 1930s constituted a period in the development of German technology where 
consolidation and the build-up of complex systems following the burst of inventive 
activity from 1880 until the Great War was the norm. The decade-and-a-half 
following the war saw much more concentration on organisational improvements 
within firms engaged in mature technologies than the creation of radica11y new 
inventions. These improvements were based largely upon rationalisation, Fordism, 
Tayloristn, efficency, economies of scale and the construction of enormous 
technological systems. While great strides were made in electrification and public 
transport, little progress was made in the development of automobiles or 
telephones. 16 1J 
Despite these shackles, which Gispen sees as arising ti·om a tradition of German 
bureaucracy and a formalised and over-specialised education system, he nevertheless 
concurs with many commentators in describing the Weimar Republic as displaying a 
'self-conscious culture of technological modernity' .'611 His conclusion is that, from the 
point of view of inventors, engineers and industrial scientists, the Weimar Republic 
was seen as an anti-technological phase in German history where the dominant cu1ture 
stifled the forces of creativity and innovation. Consequently, this sector became 
'caught up in a radical anti-capitalist and anti-establishment critique of Weimar 
society,, [GJJ a phenomenon which si1nilarly developed within VELA and is examined in 
chapters 7 & 8. 
All this evidence and analysis helps to reinforce the argument that semor 
management, and not just the engineers among them, were attracted by the essential 
modernity and positive approach to technology and industry of the NSDAP, and not 
by its overemphasised pastoral Blut-und-Boden wing. The Nazis were seen to be 
enthusiasts for technology, for creativity, for innovators and for geistig leaders, 
reacting against the perceived culture of devaluation of such factors and people. 
However, despite the convergence of views clearly evident as early as 1923, the crisis 
of that year was not the one which would draw engineers and other leitende 
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Angestellten into political support for the NSDAP -that would have to wait until the 
coming of the next crisis, the Great Depression, following four years of economic 
recovery and relative stability. 
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Chapter 6 
1924: VELA and the Wider Upper Middle Class. 
Ideological ·oevelopments in Mid-Decade. 
The period 1924 to 1928 is often referred to as the golden age of Weimar, when 
relative economic prosperity went hand-in-hand with relative political stability.fll The 
electoral fortunes of the extreme political left and right were at a low ebb, especially 
as a result of the December 1924 Reichstag election, and they both made little or no 
headway at the 1928 poll. The bourgeois parties, the DDP, the DVP and the DNVP, 
in coalition with the Centre Party, formed the mainstay ofWeimar governments at this 
time. Yet, despite surface appearances, this was not a period of consolidation of the 
n1iddle classes into these established parties, nor was it a time of political quietude. 
The decline and disintegration of the bourgeois parties was already in train, a process 
that is continned by the results of the 1928 Reichstag election, where the DDP l.ost 
nearly half a million votes, the DVP 400,000 and the DNVP almost two million over 
their 1924 perfonnances.121 However, this tableau of party-political decay was not 
synonymous with political apathy. 131 Political interest~ awareness and organisation 
among the middle classes were in fact on the increase - they were just not occurring in 
the ambit of the established bourgeois parties.141 
In the case of the leitende Angestellten, the disillusionment with these established 
parties arose in large part out of their resentment at the lack of representation they 
had within all three parties, and with their frustration at being unable to achieve what 
they considered a commensurate presence in the econotnic policy-making bodies of 
the nation or their advisory committees. This they blamed on the over-tnighty power 
of the employers who still carried considerable political influence in the perceived 
dualistic corporate capitalist structure of the Weimar Republic. The friction between 
managers and entrepreneurs was tnirrored in the bourgeois parties themselves. Apart 
froJn the fact that the DDP was too politicaJly and socially left-liberal for tnost senior 
managers' taste and that the DNVP was heavily dominated by its agrarian wing, both 
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the DNVP and the DVP represented the interests of business owners much more than 
they did those of salaried ernployees.151 The only difference in the . business 
representation between these latter two parties was not vertical, but horizontal~ the 
DNVP (frotn about 1924) provided a political home for slightly more of traditional 
heavy industry, while the DVP tended to attract larger numbers from the tnodern 
sectors of light engineering, electrical firms and the chemical industry.161 No VELA 
members were included among the leadership or the Reichstag candidates of either of 
these parties. Neither party offered the /eitende Angestellten sufficient recognition of 
the importance of their strategic position between capital and labour or 
acknowledgement of the special Geist which they believed that they possessed. 
With the reappearance of Der leilende Angestellte in January 1924, VELA's 
in-house publication continued seamlessly to pursue many of the issues which had 
appeared regularly over the previous year in Organisator and in its own pages up 
until the end of 1922. Reflecting upon the events of 1923, Dr. Ml.Hielmann, VELA's 
business manager and. publisher of the periodical, claimed that geistig life and its 
movetnents had been particularly hard-hit by the crises of the previous year. He said 
that the power of the organisations representing the bearers of the spiritual/intellectual 
1novement had either shrunk or been destroyed~ most of them had 'fallen by the 
wayside' (sind auf der Strecke gehliehen). The consequence of this had been to create 
a totally egoistic struggle by each individual without concern for the well-being of the 
whole. The only solution to this undesirable situation, and the only practicable defence 
against such egotistical tendencies, was to build back up the strength of these 
organisations. In this way a sense of community feeling and loyalty towards the state 
could be restored, both of which were necessary in order to protect the German 
nation (presumably against foreign dotnination, internal disintegration and moral 
weakness). Muffehnann gave no named examples of any geistig or hen{f/ich 
organisation going to the wall, but he did assert that, despite all the debilitating 
hardships of the previous year, VELA had in fact grown in strength over that 
period. 171 
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This theme of an ongoing attack being perpetrated upon geistig work and geistig 
workers was continued in the second edition, where the assault was more clearly 
defined as an attempt to reduce the special position of leitende Angestellten through 
the use of the labour laws, as a refusal to recognise the special stratwn of society 
(Schicht) which geistig workers occupied, and as an attempt to drag economic leaders 
down into the ranks of ordinary employees. The oft-repeated analysis, that this attack 
on the position of upper management was being manifested in attempts to force their 
pay into line with that of (merely) administrative employees, was trotted out. To 
prevent this happening, VELA must use all means available to have the leitende 
Angestellten recognised in law as both a professional organisation and as a special 
socio-econ01nic group. This would greatly help in raising their remuneration and in 
resisting the levelling tendencies and power of the 'mass organisations' -by which the 
writer, of course, meant the trade unions, the SPD and the fast-growing KPD. 
What is of greater interest and signi·ficance in this particular article is one of the 
first-sighted uses of the term Wirtschqfi~fiihrer, or economic leaders, to describ\~ 
VELA members. This appellation was only one short linguistic step away from the 
title Wirtschq(ts/eiter under which VELA gained membership in May, 1933 ofi-Ians 
Frank's BNSDJ, the Association ofNational Socialist German Jurists. In introducing 
this term, the article went on to stress how important it was to have upper 
n1anagement's and VELA's significance for the entire economic life of Gennany 
widely recognised, a process which would be aided if VELA took it upon itself to 
educate its tnembers in political econotny. It was the duty of VELA., as the 
organisation of Wirtschaftsfiihrer, to help to establish its members not only as leaders 
in individual firms and businesses, but also as participants in the direction, leadership 
and policy-making of the German econ01ny as a whole - an essentially political task. 
The a11icle argued that the selection of leaders was a universal problem for all areas of 
society and a symptom of the nation's current weakness. What vvas most lacking in 
German politics and economics was the participation and collaboration of the 
private-enterprise sector's leading managerial personalities m national 
policy-formulation. One of the greatest steps towards addressing this dearth of 
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effective leadership would be achieved by the formation of a group of national 
economic leaders, drawn largely frotn within the leitende Angeste!lten, who, at the 
moment, were almost totally unrepresented in the upper ranks of political parties or 
within the economic committees advising the govermnent. It should be considered 
the 'holy duty' (heilige Pflicht) of all leitende Angestellten to pursue actively the 
interests and well-being of the nation state, a task which would be most effectively 
achieved through their organising body, namely VELA. To strengthen the organising 
body was to reinforce cmntnunity awareness and the 'sense of state' (.)'taat.sgefuhl), 
and out of this would be created the participating citizen (der Jnitteitige 
Staatsbiirger). rsJ 
The concept of the 'active' and 'passive' citizen was one of the guiding ideas of 
the French Revolution and became a central pillar of European liberalism in the 19th 
century. It was intrinsically opposed to the idea of universal democracy on the basis 
that, although all men were created equal, participation in the political life of the 
nation was to be restricted to those who possessed propet1y and/or education. ~ 9 1 
VELA' s 1924 analysis was therefore, in a sense, a reversion to that 19th-century 
liberal belief before liberalism reluctantly (especially in Germany) endorsed political 
democracy. Yet VELA was not actually calling for the abolition of Weimar's 
universal franchise~ but instead was proposing a form of 'political-economic 
citizenship' whereby a small elite of experts (or, to use the organisation's own 
ideological jargon, a narrow Schicht of speciaJly geislig men) would take charge of 
the economic policy of the nation. Rather than advocating the complete snuffing out 
of political democracy, which was a belief as yet neither widely spread in the German 
nation nor developed within VELA's Weltanschauung, this analysis was nevertheless 
seeking to circumvent the political systetn of Weimar Germany by superimposing 
upon it a coterie of economic decision-makers chosen, not by public election or even 
by political representatives, but by and from that group itself on the basis of 
socio-economic position, specialised knowledge and presumed character and 
personality advantages. ln some respects this advocacy of the rule of the ablel the 
capable and the expert was simply a technocratic and meritocratic updating of the 
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much older elitist belief that only the gentle-born were entitled, or had the inherent 
capability, to rule. This development in VELA's thought is a particularly compelling 
example of how Jeffrey Herfs concept of Reactionary Modernism applies as fittingly 
to the very tnodern sector of senior management in business and industry as it does to 
his chosen example of Germany's late 19th- and early 20th-century engineers. 
The last mentioned article in Der leitende Angestellte concluded by arguing that 
the aim of setting up an institution of Wirtschatsfiihrer to supervise and direct the 
national economy could only be achieved by political means, and that upper 
management should get actively involved in politics and become members of various 
of the existing Weimar parties. Adoption of this political tactic to serve an emerging 
ideological elitism was stated quite unequivocally: 
Erziehung der leitenden Angestellten zu politischer Arbeit, Versuch 
einer A uslese von Wirtschaji.~fiihrern unter den lei tend en 
Angestellten, das ist die eine der neuen A·~{fgaben der Vela.' 10 1 
Educating the leading salaried employees tor political work in the 
attempt to bring about the selection of economic leaders from among 
the leading salaried etnployees - that is the most crucial of the new 
tasks of VELA. 
While this article ended by reiterating that VELA was completely politically 
neutral, the leader article in the May 1924 edition of Der leitende Angestellte 
nevertheless made recommendations to its readers regarding voting in the 
forthcotning Reichstag election. It urged members to support only those candidates 
whose parties stood up for the value and promotion of geisLig work and guaranteed 
the stratum of leitende Angestel/ten its proper place in the economic organistn of 
Germany. A list of recommended parties which were deetned to fulfil this demand 
then followed. This list is significant, not so much for those which were otnitted (the 
SPD and the KPD), as for the inclusion, alongside the DDP, the DVP, the DNVP and 
the Centre Party, of the Deutschvolkische FreiheiL\parlei (DVFP), or the Gennan 
Racial Freedom Party.1 11J This ]atter party was the north-German equivalent, or 'sister 
organisation' ,' 121 of the Bavarian-based NSDAP. Because the NSDAP had been 
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banned as a political party following the Munich Putsch of Noven1ber J 923, its 
members worked closely with, and sometimes within, the DVFP to put up candidates 
and win support for the ViJ/kisch Social Block, under whose imprimatur both parties 
contested the May 1924 election, and which won 9% of the national voteJ 13 ' It 
appears that the overt anti-Semitism of, and indeed its very centrality to, the volkisch 
philosophy of the DVFP was in no way a barrier to the recommendation to VELA' s 
members to vote for this extretne right-wing racist political party. 
The previous month's edition of the periodical showed further evidence of a 
certain affinity with the NSDAP' s thinking and, indeed, a direct, if somewhat tenuous, 
link to the Party itself. The substance of the article in question is of some interest in 
that it displayed the supercilious attitude of the writer towards those deemed of lower 
socio-economic status, and at the same time suggested a fear of these lower orders 
and their politics. Briefly_, it argued that German society, and in particular its 
economy~ needed a proper and genuine ArbeiL~gemeinschajt, or community of labour, 
in order not only to thrive, but actually to survive in a hostile world. The 
Zentra/arbeitsgemeinschqft of commercial and industrial employers and einployees, 
which had come into existence in November 1918, had slowly died and was being 
usurped by the emergence of more and more organisations of employees such as 
construction workers, shoemakers, the AfA -Bund and the Gewerkschqftsbund der 
Angestellten. These people and their representative bodies, it said, were largely 
associated with socialism and notions of class sttuggle. The concept of a true 
Arbeit.~gen7einschaft was to be welcomed because it was only through trustful 
co-operation between people of different abilities and status that Germany could be 
restored to its proper place in the world economy and that class conflict could be 
prevented.f 141 It. could be argued that this Arbeit.sgemeinschc!fi of harmonious 
inequality and a beneficient class structure was only one linguistic and anti-Semitic 
small step away from the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft described in chapter 2 ofthis study. 
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1t might also seem reasonable, at first glance, to suggest that the Italian Fascist 
concept of corporativism was at work in VELA's thinking, an idea which had a wide 
influence in the 1920s, not just in European countries like Primo de Rivera's Spain, 
but also in South America. However, Italian corporativism had one fundamentally 
very different basic assumption from VELA's socio-economic thinking. Whereas the 
Italian Fascist model envisaged a horizontal division of society into sectors comprising 
banking, manufacturing, transport, intellectual and cultural occupations, the merchant 
marine and so forth,l 151 VELA's visionaries always spoke of a society divided 
vertically, with those of a similar level of seniority (and hence similar Geistigkeit) 
uniting in organisations which would then come together as one Schicht.1' 6l While 
there were occasional references to Italy and to the position of leitende Angestel/ten 
under Mussolini's regime, especially in the 1930s,' 171 and while there were occasional 
reports from the Soviet Union, Argentina and France (and even some rather positive 
articles about Henry Ford1' 81), these were altogether so few and far between in the 
pages of ])er leitende Angestellte that one is tempted to infer that the periodical and 
VELA' s members were somewhat insular, and that they thought largely in terms of 
German traditions and practices. 
The shorter and more direct link to the NSDAP in the last-mentioned article was 
contained in the employment of a lengthy quotation from a newspaper feature written 
in praise ofthe concept of an Arheitsgen1einscha.ft by Ernst van Borsig. 1191 Borsig was 
a Berlin locomotive and machine manufacturer (and also a Weimar privy councillor 
and former chairman of the ZAG) who was among the very small number of 
prmninent big businessmen to support and provide funding for I-Iitler and the Nazi 
Party before 193 3. poJ There was a further connection to Borsig in that the first 
chairman of the board of directors of VELA, from 1918 until I 921, was 
Oheringenieur Dr. Arnold,' 21 J who worked in Borsig's Berlin firm, while a second 
management employee, Herr Fischer from the Breslau plant, also became a VELA 
board member in I 921.1221 
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Borsig was also quoted approvingly in the June edition attacking the socialist 
agenda of much of the trade-union movement and the self-serving nature of its 
institutionalised leadership. The uneducated masses, he claimed, were oppressing the 
professional classes and there was an urgent need to free the German economy from 
interference in areas where trade-union patiicipation was inappropriate to a capitalist 
econotny. Fiowever, it is instructive to note that the author of the article, Dr. 
Muffelinann, went on to summarise and criticise a different piece written by Borsig in 
which the latter condemned the entire trade-union movement and virtually declared 
war upon its very existence. Muffelma~n took issue with this sweeping hostility on 
two grounds. The first was that ·vELA and some other professional organisations 
were legally trade unions - and were most definitely not supporters of socialism. 
Secondly, such a stark position simply invited the outbreak of class warfare. If a true 
Arbeit.~geJneinschaft were to be constructed for the nation's benefit, then one could 
not afford to alienate such a huge swathe of the population as the trade-union 
tnembership of Germany. Indeed, since a community of labour would require 
organisations and structures to make it function smoothly and harmoniously, the ideal 
vehicle would therefore be a refonned version of the existing trade unions - limited of 
course to everyday practical matters at work and no longer in the business of 
formulating econotnic policy or business strategies.' 23 J One could draw the conclusion 
that Mi.iffelmann's thinking in this respect was not very far removed from that of 
certain figures who were later to become powerful figures in the NSDAP, such as 
Gregor Strasser and Robert Ley.'241 But one could equally draw a different conclusion 
from concentrating upon his disagreen1ent with Borsig, given that, in May 1933, Dr. 
Ml.iffehnann was one of the few members of the VELA leadership who was replaced. 
In his case he was 'retired' from the executive board of directors and from his 
position as business manager of the head offices in Berlin. He also lost his job as 
editor of Der /eifende Angestellle in the otherwise very mild Gleichschaltung which 
was visited upon VELA in the immediate aftennath of the Nazi Machtiibernahme in 
the spring of 1933.1251 Gregor Strasser, of course, was to lose tnore than his job over 
his ideological and political differences with Hitler. 
209 
The October 1924 edition of J)er leitende Angestellte reported upon a 
conference, held in Bern and Interlaken in Switzerland in September of that year, to 
which VELA sent representatives. This was the First International Middle-Class 
Congress, out of which came the setting up of the International Middle-Class Union 
with Dr. Muffelmann of VELA being elected as one of the two German 
representatives 'of the spiritual/intellectual professions' (der geistigen Ben{/e). The 
article was effusive about the proceedings of this conference, probably because it 
confirmed and supported many of VELA' s ideas about the separateness of geistig 
workers, offered yet another way of defining just who the leitende Angestellten were, 
and added some high-sounding metaphysical aphorisms to the shrine of VELA' s 
vanity about its members' special spirituality and their powers of personality. 
The article said that, for the first ti1ne ever, it was clearly established that the 
geistig 1niddle classes were not part of the old Mitte/stand of craftsmen, smaJI 
businesses and farmers, but belonged to the Schicht of the so-called 'new 
Mittelstancf. This stratum of geistig workers consisted of members of the fh~e 
professions, high state officials and leading salaried employees in trade and industry. 
The reason for classifying these groups together as part of a larger 
sociologically-recognisable Schichl lay in the fact that they shared three significant 
characteristic features. Each did not rely upon capital as the basis for making their 
living, but rather upon the employment of their own skills and abilities through 
entering into employment or professional contracts; each had undergone special 
education or training_~ and each had a special location in the work process. The first 
factor separated the new Mittelstand from the old Mittelstand and placed the former 
within the ranks of the 'workforce'(Arbeiterschqft). However, the new Millel..\·tand 
was in turn sharply differentiated from the remainder of the workforce by the other 
two defining characteristics of this geistige Schichl. Each of its three constituent parts 
had undergone education or training (A usbildung) of an exceptional and advanced 
nature before they had attained their high and responsible positions. As a result of 
mastering this intellectual develop1nent, which not everyone was capable of doing, 
they now occupied those special positions in the production or econotnic processes 
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which were qualitatively different fi·om the tasks carried out by the less exalted and 
non-executive members of the Arheiterschafl. The work of ordinary e1nployees, both 
white- and blue-collar, was merely mechanical, whereas the jobs carried out by al1 
those categories within the new Mittelstand were of a creative, executive and geistig 
nature. 1261 
Implicit also within this article was an attempt to differentiate this discrete group 
from the wider btirgerlich, or bourgeois, class which included entrepreneurs and the 
owners of large-scale capital. Although practically all middle-class and right-wing 
politics in Weimar Germany upheld the idea of a capitalist society, nevertheless they 
simultaneously contained significant strands of hostility towards plutocrats, 1noguls 
and the power of large capital in general. 1271 This phenomenon became more marked 
the further right one went on the political spectrum, the most pronounced invective 
emerging from the vblkisch movements, among which the term 'bourgeois' was 
employed as an insult and condemnation. 
Although the article did not express it ovet11y, it hinted that there was a fourth 
detlning characteristic of the geistige .Schicht, which was based upon the possession 
of inherent character features among its members. 1t claimed that the work of leilende 
Angestellten, high state officials and free professionals both required and expressed 
individual personality. This type of work was not just a means of producing goods or 
services, but was a source of honour, inner satisfaction and pride. Thus it could only 
be undertaken and successfully acc01nplished by people with the appropriate 
personality who were capable of taking full personal responsibility. An emotional and 
spiritual (see/isch) attitude towards work was a prerequisite for the occupations of 
feitende Angestellte, high state official or free professional, and this necessary 
personal characteristic therefore defined the social type which constituted the new 
Mittelstand. Put simply, it was arguing that individual possession of Geistigkeit was a 
necessary prerequisite for being capable of undertaking Geistesarbeit. 
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How gratifying it must have been for VELA's members to read of a gathering of 
other professions and other nationalities agreeing that the leitende A ngestellten were 
part of a very select group indeed. Not only were they skilled~ intelligent and 
indispensable~ but they were also touched by the spirit of creativity and possessed of a 
rare strength of character. This had to be the case because, otherwise, they could 
never have risen to their present levels of authority and achievement, since the filters 
of Ausbildung and the personality requirements of the very jobs themselves would 
have seen to it that less geistig aspirants would not have made it so high. One can 
easily see dose parallels with the Sociai-Darwinist idea of the survival and prospering 
of the fittest and with the rationale of the Filhrerprinzip in the logic which is here 
being used to justify 'vhat is effectively a doctrine of elitism. There can be little doubt 
that the analysis, reported so approvingly in the pages of Der /eitende Angeste/lte, 
was stating that geistig workers were intrinsically, inherently and by their very 
definition 'superior tnen'. And that which made them inherently a cut above others 
was possession of the powers of creativity, will and personality. It went without 
saying, of course, that these special spiritual gifts would be used selflessly in the 
interests of the previously-lauded Arheitsgen1einschqft of harmonious class divisions 
based on innate abilities and character rather than birth or wealth. This self-flattering 
and idealised Arheitsgemeinschc_~fi. vision of a renewed and revitalised German society 
was really' not very far removed from the idealised ideological vision of the NSDAP. 
Although very much in an embryonic stage of development, the assertion that 
some people were spiritually and intellectually above and beyond the rest, and should 
therefore enjoy differential rights, contained within it sotne of the raw material needed 
for the construction of a biological-political ideology based on the ideas of inherent 
individual superiority which, as was shown in chapter 2, was one of the fundamental 
underpinnings of the National Socialist Weltanschauung. VELA's emerging thinking 
also seems, by 1924, to have been espousing several other of the philosophical or 
metaphysical underpinnings of Nazism, such as a belief in the existence of 
autonomous external forces which have the power to influence human actions (usually 
tnanifesting themselves in individuals as the power of the will), the power of 
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personality and the power of creativity. VELA was in fact embracing Social 
Darwinism and the concept of the Fiihre1prinzip with all its latent hostility to 
democracy and equal rights~ and it had clearly shown itself to be explicitly nationalist 
and anti-socialist. What this Weltanschauung mainly lacked were the racist 
dimensions - the notions of racial purity, racial hygiene and racial superiority - which 
would later turn Arbeit5.gemeinschaft into Volk~gemeinschaft. It also, however, 
lacked very much popular appeal beyond those who stood to benefit fro1n being 
defined as within the sacred pantheon of geistig occupations. Its view of the trade 
unions transforming themselves into willing partners in the leitende-Angeste!lten 
vision of a community of labour was very much a case of wishful thinking. All of 
these aspirations would remain merely distant a~nbitions until this emerging ideology 
could attach itself to a viable political movement with a somewhat more inclusive 
appeal, a wider constituency and a more emotive populist programme than VELA' s 
narrow agenda. 
One particularly important point which this early coincidence of much Nazi and 
leitende-Angeste!lten thought helps to illustrate is that this section of Germany's 
upper tniddle class, in a similar fashion to doctors, lawyers and engineers, did not go 
over suddenly to National Socialism in 1933 Y11 1 Neither were they reluctant converts 
nor tnen dragooned into confonnity or collaboration by the intimidation of forced 
Gleichschaltung. The emerging Weltanschauung of VELA had already, by 1924, 
adopted and developed many of the concepts which made up the underlying 
ideological structures of National Socialist thought. The transition to etnbracing the 
beliefs and politics of the NSDAP would not have been a dramatic or value-shaking 
Damascene conversion for many leitende Angestellten who had already absorbed and 
accepted similar views which were being expressed in their own organisation's 
journal. From the evidence cited above, it seems plausible, and indeed likely, that the 
comparable ideas and beliefs of these two organisations developed quite separately 
and independently yet almost contemporaneously. It could, however, also be the case 
that Nazi ideas were influencing the development of leitende Angestellten thought, 
although, up until 1924, the pages of Der leitende Angestellte contained no n1ention 
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of the NSDAP or any of its known members or supporters beyond Borsig. 
Furthermore, given the as yet small size of the NSDAP and its electoral support, is it 
not just as likely that the far larger upper tniddle classes~ who, as research has shown, 
were demonstrating such thinking in areas beyond that of senior management, might 
also have been helping to shape the views of the Nazi Party? This analysis is pursued 
further in the later pa1t of this chapter. 
The December 1924 edition of Der leitende Angestellte carried a very small and 
cursory piece on the forthcoming Reichstag election, the second of that year. It stated 
that it was a patriotic duty to vote, but this time it made no party recommendations at 
all. Members were simply urged to take part in the campaign in order to draw 
people's attention to the social and cultural importance of the creative geistig 
economic classes. It also called on the political parties to dispense with the syste1n of 
choosing candidates on the basis of interest representation~ instead they should be 
selected according to the criterion of geistig superiority if outstanding personalities 
were to fill the positions of leadershipY91 This was /)er /eitende Angestellte's on!y 
reference to the election and, since voting took place on the 7th of December, the 
chances are that many members only read it after the event. It certainly would not 
have been possible to carry out any of the exhortations it made tovvards its readers, 
and it \Vas decidedly far too late to influence the parties' candidate selections. 
It could be argued that this was a sign that the great early 1920s' crisis of 
Weitnar Gennany was receding, and that, therefore, political action was now seen as 
less urgent or vital. The election results tend to support this analysis because the 
pat1ies of the extreme right lost more than half of their May 1924 support, while the 
KPD vote declined by a third. The so-called middle-class or bourgeois parties all 
made small gains and, although the SPD made even larger ones, for the next 
three-and-a-half years the Social Democrats chose to remain aloof fi·om government. 
It was left to shifting alliances of the Centre Party, the DNVP, the DDP and the DVP 
to form shaky~ fractious and~ more often than not, minority cabinets until May 
1928.1301 That Germany did not experience serious political crisis during these years is 
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due in part to the powetful and effective statesmanship of Gustav Stresemann,l3'
1 
but 
even more so to the relative economic stability of these years before an agricultural 
crisis and the Wall Street Crash subjected the Weimar Republic to a real test of its 
durability. 
A further sign that Germany might be entering a more quiescent political and 
economic period could also be detected in another aspect of the last issue of Der 
leitende Angeslel!te of 1924. While the article on the imminent election was· very 
brief, at least six times as much space was devoted to a feature extolling the virtues 
and benefits of 'Holiday Rest-I-Iomes for geistig Workers' as the piece was entitled 
(Erholung .. \·heime fiir geistige Arheiter). This was accompanied and interspersed with 
photographs of large, well-appointed and expensive-looking examples of these 
hoteJ-cum-spa-cum-tiJneshare establishments. Such a layout was an unexpected 
development for the normally austere pages of Der leitende Angestel/te, which had 
rarely appeared as anything but unbroken oceans of small-sized Gothic script since 
1919. The article was contributed by a guest writer, J-Ierr von Kleinau, director 0f 
Devo> or the Deutsche Volk..verholungsheime, e.G1nbH (German People's Holiday 
Rest-Homes Ltd.). The tone and the contents of this piece demonstrated that either 
I-Ierr von Kleinau was a most remarkably astute and well-informed salesman with a 
sales pitch which was unerringly tuned to the Zeitgeist of recent at1icles in Der 
leitende Angestellte, or that these ideas had a much wider constituency than merely 
that of senior tnanagers. 
The piece described how the setting-up of these exclusive holiday rest-homes in 
the mountains and beside lakes was part of a movement dedicated to supporting the 
creative capacity for work which naturally resided in the German Biirger and which 
was going to prove to be a very necessary asset for Germany in the uncertain years 
ahead. The use of the word Biirger did not actually indicate a democratic sensibility 
towards making this facility available to all citizens, nor the view that all Germans 
were endowed with the same superior qualities. Biirger was here being used in its 
801
newhat 1110re old-fashioned sense ofbourgeois,l
32
1 as the article 1nakes clear when it 
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talks about providing guests with the wherewithal to relax and recharge their batteries 
in situations conducive to their social status. Founded and predominantly used by 
professional people many years before the Great War, the movement had been revived 
and reconstituted as a co-operative three years previously, and once again it was a 
place where professors rubbed shoulders with lawyers, free professionals with high 
state officials. Now it was also being made available to the leitende Angestellten. It 
was a place where the geistig arbeitende Mittelstand as a whole could take that 
annual break which all creative people needed and should be provided with. 
1331 
w·hat a 
gratifying end to the year this must have made for many VELA members who, just a 
few months previously at an international conference, had heard themselves described 
and defined as part of that special Schicht which included free professionals and high 
state officials, and who were now seeing a tangible manifestation of that acceptance in 
an invitation to mingle w1th, and become part of, the established (upper). Mittelstand 
in one of their exclusive social arenas. 
The Erholungshein1hewegung, or holiday rest-home movement, was just one 
example of that vast tapestry of upper-middle-class Vereine which permeated 
Germany throughout the Weimar years and which has been studied by, among others, 
Peter Fritzsche and Rudy Koshar. 1341 Koshar has shown how, from the late 19th 
century onwards, the German bourgeoisie increasingly founded and joined a whole 
range of social organisations encompassing charitable associations, museum clubs, art 
societies, library circles, choral and concert societies, sporting and leisure clubs, 
shooting clubs, and a host of others. 1351 He argued that these were just as important as 
overtly political organisations, such as the parties and nationalist leagues, in creating 
ideological attitudes. Indeed, in the I 920s and early 1930s, participation in these 
voluntary organisations provided the crucible in which political awareness and 
opinion-forming were forged under a cloak of expressed 'apoliticism'. This 
apoliticism was in fact an ideology in itself, one which was hostile to mass parties and 
democracy, and which was nationalist and virulently anti-socialist; it was not so much 
a rejection of politics as a rejection of (existing) political parties. P6J At a ti1ne when the 
established bourgeois pa1ties were proving more and more ineffectual, and in 
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particular after 1924, this nexus of Vereine, with its great overlapping of membership, 
was the arena where political awareness and interest were heightened. 137 1 Koshar 
concluded that the 1920s were in fact a period of ~ntense politicisation of the German 
bourgeoisie. Thus it was not the case that, as a result of a failed 19th-century 
bourgeois revolution, a politically itnmature Gennan upper middle class was naively 
taken in or swamped by the Nazis in the early 1930s - they had already laid the 
groundwork for active acceptance of National Socialist ideology over the previous 
decade-and-a-half. psJ 
Koshar saw a cotnmon set of beliefs etnerging fro1n this network of Vereine, 
based upon a widespread hostility to mass parties which focused primarily upon the 
SPD, the KPD and the Centre Party. These parties, it was believed, created sectional 
conflicts and damaged the moral fibre of communities and the nation. What was 
needed was the creation of a 'non-socialist moral community' .1 391 Koshar argued that 
the notions of community and Volk began increasingly to enter into bourgeois 
ideology during the First World War, partly as a result of the Burgji·ieden (the truce 
between capital and labour), and partly as a development of liberal, nationalist and 
anti-Semitic thought. These concepts helped to promote commitment to the idea of 
the public good, and the Biirgertun7 in turn saw itself as best equipped, tnorally and 
intellectually, to be the representative, upholder and definer of that public good. 1401 He 
saw the period of relative calm and stability in the Wei1nar Republic, from 1924 to 
1929, as the period when political Nazi ideas and influence spread into a wide range 
of bourgeois organisations by means of individuals in those organisations joining the 
NSDAP. This allowed the Nazis to build a base within the social and organisational 
fabric of upper-middle-class society from which they were able to expand dramatically 
between 1930 and 1933 .14 '1 In addition, from 1929, the advent of economic and social 
crisis heightened the 'apoliticism' of bourgeois society which now, paradoxically, 
required organised political representation to make any impact. 1421 Thus a massive 
surge of support from this sector of society flowed towards the NSDAP as the only 
party which had not participated in any Weimar administration and whose advocacy 
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of a cotnmunity of the Volk chimed closely with the supposed apolitical belief in a 
socio-political system which transcended individual interests and class conflict. 
Koshar' s analysis was essentially concerned with showing how the struggle for 
ideological hegemony, moral authority and national leadership was taking place at 
least as much in civil society as it was in the arenas of the state and overt politics. f43 l 
He laid stress upon individuals within these quotidian organisational networks 
becotning 'joiners' of the NSDAP and subsequently spreading Nazi ideas within the 
Vereine, whose 'apoliticism' provided the raw materiaL or else the fertile ground, for 
acceptance of National Socialist ideology and politics. He emphasised that the 
informal diffusion of Nazi thought in this manner was just as important to the NSDAP 
as propaganda, the cult of Hitler or the conspiratorial infiltration of social groups. 
This interpretation is both plausible and persuasive, and his illustration of the 
emergence of ideas about the Volk and community, about the Biirgertunz being best 
placed and best equipped to define and promote the national interest, and about the 
divisiveness of party politics and selfish interest groups, all mirror developments in 
VELA' s thinking shown to have been happening in the pages of Der /eitende 
A ngeste!lte even before 1925. 
Where the interpretation of this study differs fi·om that of Koshar is in asserting 
that the beliefs and ideology which were developing among upper management, and 
indeed within all the organisations he cites, were not just the product of ideas 
itnported back into the Vereine by members who had joined the NSDAP, but were 
also being fashioned independently. The 'apoliticism', which Koshar described as 
perrneating Weinmr bourgeois socia] organisations, very largely came from within and 
did not require direct NSDAP input in order to develop into a widely-shared and 
widely-diffused upper-tniddle-class ideology which was converging with many 
aspects of National Socialist doctrine. To a great degree both Weltanschauungen 
\Vere autonomous yet congruent phenomena. 
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This is not to deny that there must cet1ainly have been some contact between the 
vast spider's web of Vereine across Germany and the Nazi Party of the 1920s, but 
once again it should be emphasised that this was a two-way street. The overwhelming 
majority of Nazi members and leaders (with the exception of some individuals, such as 
Baldur von Schirach who took up a full-time paid job in the Party in his teens), had 
lives, jobs and careers before and beyond the NSDAP, from whence catne many of 
their formative views on the nature of society and politics. It must also be borne in 
tnind that the NSDAP was a very young and recently-formed organisation. It 
therefore seems reasonable to conclude that, for many people, their 'Nazi' beliefs 
predated not only their contact with, and membership of, the Party, but in some cases 
may also have preceded the very existence of the NSDAP. The pre-1933 Party, and 
even more so the NSDAP of the early and middle 1920s, was much more a place 
where those who had already become inclined towards a belief in a viJ!kisch 
non-democratic society could find a political home, than it was a proselytising deu.s ex 
machina revealing a new, enlightening and inspiring Weltanschauung. National 
Socialism was not an external or extraneous force which was visited upon the German 
people, but a derivative ideology (albeit a coherent one) bundling together many ideas 
and tendencies whose roots lay in the late 19th century or even earlier. Koshar argued 
that one should not underestimate the uniqueness and originality of National 
Socialism_,144 l but, powerful, persuasive, choate and deadly logical though it certainly 
was, clain1ing that this ideology was unique or original tends to obscure the 
development of similar strands of thinking outside of the realm of the Party. It was 
not just within the NSDAP that there emerged a world-view which would ultimately 
support and underpin a ruthless, undemocratic, and ultimately barbaric politics. 
Without this underlying world-view having already achieved a wide currency, if not 
quite a hegemony, across large areas of German society, the NSDAP could never 
have achieved the popular support it began to accrue from about 1929 onwards. 
One of the most important areas for these ideas to take root in was that level of 
society from which so much opinion-forming flowed - the upper middle classes. I 
would argue that, although Koshar did not use his well-researched materials to 
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promote this interpretation of autonomous yet congruent and convergent ideological 
development, nevertheless such a thesis is supported by his evidence and 
observations. This emerges not just through his exploration of the concept of 
'apoliticism', but equally significantly by one of his most crucial assertions - that it 
was much more a case of Vereine members joining the NSDAP than of Nazi Pa11y 
metnbers joining these organisations in order to infiltrate and subvert them.'451 This is 
important for the purposes of this study for three reasons. Firstly, Koshar 
detnonstrated clearly that political and social life were not radically separated in 
Weimar Germany as 1nany historians of the two decades preceding the publication of 
his work had claimed (in agreement with Max Weber's assessment of an unpolitical or 
politically imtnature German bourgeoisie1461). Secondly, evidence of an ideology 
siinilar to that being propounded by VELA existing within the much broader and 
larger context of the upper-middle-class Vereine milieu adds corroboration to the 
wider thesis that the upper middle class of Germany was much more deeply complicit, 
and indeed more instrumental, in promoting and shaping the phenomenon of National 
Socialism than was believed until recently. Thirdly, in the absence of any evidence of 
how many VELA members were enrolled in the NSDAP, it is doubly important to 
find support for the argu1nent that joining the NSDAP was much more likely to be a 
last step than a first step in the process of believing in its ideology or adopting its 
underlying world-view. 
Peter Fritzsche also saw an upsurge in bourgeois political activity in the 1920s. 
He argued that this political fervour was not just the result of periodic crises, nor was 
it merely protest politics~ rather it was underpinned by deep and emotional convictions 
about what made for a good and harmonious society. Terms such as Volksstaat, 
Volk.\partei and Vo/ksgemeinschqft were bandied about a great deal at this time, and 
Fritzsche saw this as an expression of a desire for both social inclusion and political 
exclusion - in other words, \vhile the longed-for united national cotnmunity was to 
include the industrial working class, it rejected Marxists as beyond the pale. He 
asserted that this intense political phenomenon, which he refered to as 'populism', 
was quite separate from National Socialism throughout the 1920s despite their many 
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sitnilarities. He further stressed that the vocabulaty of decay, which is commonly used 
to describe the Weimar Republic, could easily and tnisleadingly be elided into a 
description of the political activism of the bourgeoisie. This would give a false 
impression of both the vitality of the bourgeois community and its members' political 
awareness and involvement.l.tJJ 'Political fragmentation was not a reliable register of 
political debility. '1481 Not only was bourgeois social life not incohesive, alienated or 
disintegrating, but the breakthrough by the NSDAP actually required prior populist 
political mobilisation which, to a large extent, was occurring within the nexus of 
social organisations - the Vereine. He firmly rejected that interpretation which saw the 
cotning to power of the Nazis as the outcome of the cumulatjve dissolution of the 
bourgeois communities, an interpretation largely drawn from the observation that the 
principal bourgeois political parties fractured and declined so dramatically during this 
period. 1491 
Fritzsche further argued that Weimar middle-class politics were much more 
purposive and rational, and far less fraught with the anxieties of' pre-modern tendency 
theories' than was once believed.1501 'German populism' and its later adherence to 
National Socialism, at least amongst the great majority of the bourgeoisie, was not an 
insurrection against the modern world, but was a struggle for a political voice. 1511 
Although this popular mobilisation was ultimately profoundly undemocratic and led to 
the destruction of the Republic, it was, nevertheless, also a phenomenon of political 
self-reliance and public activistn resisting traditional deference and patronage, and it 
could therefore be interpreted as part of a democratic upsurge.1 521 Although he did not 
explore why the democratic element of this process of politicisation was perverted 
and finally abandoned, it is implicit in much of his observation and analysis. The 
movement was markedly anti-Marxist and exuded an overheated fear of social 
democracy which gradually Jed it to distrust not just the perceived ineffectiveness of 
party politics, but also the democratic system itself. This system allowed far too much 
influence from the parties of the left whose class-struggle analyses and rhetoric stood 
fundamentally opposed to the popular and populist concepts of Volk~·staat and 
Volk.sgemeinschqft.1531 Fritzsche also asserted that there was a constant tone of tnoral 
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righteousness penneating Weimar bourgeois politicsY41 a tendency which, it has been 
shown, penneated the thinking and self-definition of VELA and its members up to 
1925. The previous chapter of this study illustrated how that kind of thinking very 
quickly developed into self-righteousness, leading to a belief in the geislig and moral 
superiority of leitende Angestellten. This, coupled with a conviction that they knew 
what was in the best interests of the nation, contrived to create the belief that what 
benefited them benefited everybody. In such an analysis, universal democracy catne to 
be seen as an impediment to the greater good. 
The initial acceptance of democracy by large swathes of the upper middle class in 
the first years of the Weimar Republic can be seen as tiying out a weapon in the quest 
to find a 'third way' between socialis1n and capitalism. It certainly proved effective in 
helping the growing upper middle class to wrest much power away from the old elites 
of notables in the area of local politics and even to a degree within the bourgeois 
parties themselves. However, while hostility to socialism verged on the paranoid, 
opposition to capitalism, big-business owners and overpowerful local notables rarely 
rose above the level of resentment. Relatively quickly this lukewarm anti-capitalistn 
was effectively abandoned in favour of defending the socio-economic status quo 
against the exaggerated threats of a levelling from below. Power and influence, 
reward and status, were to be achieved by organising atnongst themselves within their 
economic associations and social Vereine. Fritzsche argued that these arenas \Vere 
much more conducive to 'Biirger integration' than the bourgeois political parties.f55 l 
He also stressed that it was important not to see the dissipation apparent in the 
interest-group political parties as inimical to, or destructive of, bourgeois civic unity. 
The German Blirger had multiple identities as members of many Vereine which not 
only shared memberships, but also jointly organised events such as the various annual 
patriotic festivals. Weimar's bourgeois social and economic groups were not 
self-contained exclusive organisations seeking either to benef1t at the expense of each 
other or to secede from wider social or civic life. They were co-operative with one 
another and shared basic dispositions about the virtues of public activistn and 
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involvement in political mobilisation, and about the compatibility of these activities 
with their own sectional interest-representation.1561 
It was actually within the Vereine that the practices of democracy were at their 
most secure. Almost all of the Vereine, whether social or economic, had written 
constitutions, annual conferences and one-member/one-vote electoral and assembly 
resolutions' systems. In the overtly political realm of the nation, however, their 
1nembers' con11nitment to universal detnocracy was far less certain. It is a moot point 
whether the significant number ofupper-tniddle-class voters who deserted the Weimar 
liberal and/or bourgeois parties to go over to the Nazis in the Reichstag elections of 
September 1930 and July 1932, did so in spite of, or because of, the NSDAP's 
hostility to political democracy. The suggestion in chapter 2 of this study that the 
'can-do' leadership appeal of the NSDAP prevailed in the minds and calculations of 
the Biirgerfllln over the possibility that the Nazi Par1y might abolish universal 
democracy once it came to power, supports the idea, in the light of the vibrant activity 
and internal democratic workings of the Vereine, that the upper middle classes of 
Weimar Germany might have been happiest with the 19th-century liberal ideal of a 
limited political fi·anchise. 
Various other conclusions reached by Fritzsche support the contention of this 
study that an ideological substructure, which was compatible with many, if not tnost, 
of the doctrinal foundations of the NSDAP, had already developed by 1924 within 
VELA and probably within a very large proportion of the entire upper tniddle dass. 
Since Fritzsche was dealing with the Blirgertun1 as a whole, his evidence and analysis 
is most useful tbr corroborating the larger extrapolated theory. He argued that, 
despite the growing proliferation of divisions of interests and of subsequent 
organisations being formed in order to represent them, nevertheless there was a 
popular desire for unity and fraternity. This actually constitutes a good description of 
the apparent aims of VELA, which was set up to promote the interests and welfare of 
a discrete group and yet supported the idea of an Arbeitsgenwinschc~fi. He also 






! propagation of a forward-looking viJlkisch utopian ideal. Finally, he asserted that the 
Nazis did not set the agenda of Biirger political and ideological pursuits, but instead 
encouraged the heightening politicisation of 'burgher dissidence' by participating in 
and suppot1ing their particular concerns, aspirations and demands. [S7l 
Allowing for the differences of terminology and for the subsequent stnall 
variances in the socio-economic compositions of the groups being studied by Koshar, 
Fritzsche and this work, namely the bourgeoisie, the Biirgertum and the upper tniddle 
class, four very distinctive and significant areas of agreement emerge from the 
evidence and exatnples of the first two authors' works to complement that presented 
in this thesis on the developtnent of senior-management thinking contained within the 
pages of Der leitende Angestellte, and to help expand the emerging analysis so that it 
encompasses the wider upper middle classes as a whole. Firstly.. whether tenned 
apoliticistn, populistn or liberal elitism, a highly politicised and increasingly 
undemocratic Weltanschauung was emerging, essentially autonomously, among the 
classes not far below the socio-economic summit ofWeimar Germany. Secondly, this 
Weltanscha11ung was not only motivated by selfish power-seeking, but was infused 
with visions of the Volk, the Volkstaat and the Arbeitsgen1einschaji which \Vere 
anti-socialist, nationalist and paternalist. Thirdly, this world-view was compatible, 
contemporaneous, congruent and convergent with National Socialism. And fourthly, 
this ideological template had already crystallised by as early as 1924, which therefore 
made the transition of the respectable upper middle classes to supporting and 
embracing the NSDAP less dramatic or difficult; indeed, without this early 
politicisation of these classes, the mushrooming of the Nazi Party and its meteoric 
electoral rise could not have begun to happen as the decade came to a close. 
[I] Franz F. Wurm, Wirtschaft und Gesellscha.fi in Deutschland 1848-1948, Opladen, 1969, 
224 
pp. 207-20X~ Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889-/9 36: llubris, London, 199X, pp.257-259. 
121 E. J. Fcuchtwangcr, From Weimar to Hitler. Germany, 1918-33, London, 1993, 
pp.l63-l66, 200-202 & 328 .. 
131 Peter Fritzschc, Rehearsals.fhr Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilisation in Weimar 
Germany, New York/Oxford, 1990, p.l2. 
[4_1 Larry E. Jones, 'TI1e Dissolution of the Bourgeois Party System in the Weimar Republic' 
in Richard Bessel & E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Social Change and Political Development in 
Weimar Germany, London, 1981, pp.276-277 & 279. 
[5] Larry E. Jones, 'The Crisis of White-Collar Interests: Deutschnationaler 
flandlungsgehilfen-Verband and Deutsche Volkspartei in the World Economic Crisis' in 
Hru1s Mommsen, Dictmar Pctzina & Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), Industrielles System und 
politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik, Di.isseldorf, 1974, pp.811-823. 
[6] Lothar Dohn, Po/itik und Interesse. Die Interessenstruktur der Deutschen Volksparlei, 
Meisenheim, 1970, pp. 91-129 & 308-377; Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to !-lit/er, pp.l49 & 
161; Dick Geary, 'The Industrial Elite and the Nazis in the Wcimar Republic· in Peter D. 
Stachura (ed.), The Nazi Machtergre~fung, London, 1983, pp.86-98~ Jones, 'Dissolution', 
p.274. 
[7] LA, Heji I, 1924, p. I. 
['8] LA, 1-l~ji 2, 1924, p.6. 
r9] Dieter Langcwicsche, 'The Nature of German Liberalism' in G01·don Martcl (ed.), Modern 
Germany Reconsidered, London, 1992, pp.l 0 l-1 02; Geoff Eley, 'Liberalism, Europe and the 
Bourgeoisie 1860-1914' in David Black bourn & Richard Evans (eds.), The German 
Bourgeoisie, London, 1991, pp.299-300. 
f I 0] LA . I-1 e.fi 2, I 9 2 4, p. 6. 
Ill] LA. lf~(t 5, 1924, p.30. 
112] Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship, London, 1971, p. 159. 
113J J. Noakes & G. Pridham (eds.), Nazism 1919-/945; Vol./: The Rise to fJower, Exeter, 
1983, pp.36-37~ Feuchtwanger, From Weimar to Hitler, p.l94. 
[141 LA, lf~ji 4, 1924, pp.21-22. 
f 151 Martin Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy, London, 1989, pp.22-25; Denis Mack 
Smith, Mussolini, London, I 983, pp.136-139. 
[16] Such fundamentally different basic assumptions gave rise to radically different models of 
society and economy. The NSDAP conferred a degree of lip-service on the ideas of separate 
estates, or Stande, along the lines of the Italian Fascist model of corporativism of horizontal 
trade and sector divisions, while organisations such as the Farmers' Front were indeed set up. 
However, the creation of the much larger Labour Front amounted to a quite clearly vertical 
division, where little attempt was made to differentiate between, say, manufacturing and 
transport, or shipping and the retail trade. The rea.lity of the Third Reich, underpinned by the 
imposition of the F1'lhre1prinzip as the organising principle of all social, economic and 
political structures, was a society which bore far more resemblance to the hierarchical model 
proposed by VELA 's writers. Because of the underlying ideological emphasi.s upon verti?al 
division as its guiding principle, a.tld despite its polyocratic structure, Its overlappmg 
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Chapter 7 
VELA 1925-1928: Ideological Consolidation 
and Political Rumblings 
· Over the course of the four years between 1925 and the end of 1928, Der 
leitende Ange .. \·tellte continued to explore and develop a set of ideas, beliefs and 
political views which, as has been shown, had already become well established in the 
im1nediately preceding years. These can be summarised and categorised as the pursuit 
of five interrelated themes. The first was the continuing claim on behalf of the leitende 
Angestellten that they possessed a superior, inherent Geistigkeit which infused thern 
with enhanced character, ,personality, strength of will, intelligence and creativity~ these 
qualities further endowed them with a high capacity for performance and 
achieve1nent, or Leistung. The second was the justification, drawn partly fi·om that 
claim, for differential rewards for such outstanding people: they were entitled to such 
remuneration, not only because their work \-Vas inherently more valuable and 
productive, but because fostering and nourishing their skills through greater incentives 
was of benefit to the entire German nation. This nationalistic belief and justification 
was paralleled and complemented by a third concern, the paternal (and utopian) 
concept of the Volk - a desire for an incJusive cornmunity expressed as an 
Arbeitsgenwinscht.rft or as a Volksgenwinschqft. 
The fourth theme was the promotion of the concept that, because of their unique 
and disinterested location in the economic system between capital and labour, leitende 
Angestelllen comprised part of a special Schicht of geistig occupations, which also 
included the free professions and high state officials. These claims to uniqueness and 
superiority were further leading to the assertion that different abilities should confer 
not just differential financial rewards, but also differential rights upon this Schicht, an 
idea which still stopped short of a call to abolish universal political de1nocracy, but 
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which nevertheless was heading slowly in that ultimate direction. This produced the 
fifth theme, which was the rightful position and power which leitende Angeste!llen 
should occupy in German society, and the need for VELA members to become 
knowledgeable of, and active in, politics in order to achieve what amounted to a claim 
t.o a statutory position of high-level influence upon the shaping and direction of 
national economic policy. These five concerns were supplemented and augmented by 
an enduring anti-socialism, a strong sense of nationalism and an increasing 
disilJusionment with the policies, politics and compr01nises of the existing bourgeois 
parties. The ugly head of anti-Semitism was nowhere raised in the pages of .Der 
leitende Angestellte between 1925 and 1928, but neither was it ever condemned, 
criticised or even discussed. 
To avoid overloading this chapter with sumtnaries of the many articles which 
appeared on the above themes over these four years, and which contained a 
tremendous amount of repetitious analysis and commentary, this section largely lists 
the frequency of these themes, only focusing upon their content if it produced a!ly 
new developments, introduced new concepts or showed a direct affinity or connection 
with the NSDAP. The earlier years of this period are more important for their 
ideological content, since it is a basic contention of this thesis that the foundation and 
framework of VELA' s belief system were laid down long before the crisis of the 
Great Depression hit Germany. The later years were of more significance for an 
upsurge in the political thinking of the organisation of senior managers. 
In the 1925 editions of Der leilende Angeste/1/e, which, in May of that year 
began to appear twice monthly, the theme of Geistigkeit and the virtues of 
personality, creativity, will, leadership and Leistung were explored at length in eight 
major articles.lll Two new claims were added to the existing analysis, the first being 
that leitende Angestellten had a greater capacity for, and willingness to, work than 
lesser non-managerial employees because of the potentially perfect dovetailing of their 
innate abilities and the demands of their type of occupation, a process which, in turn, 
created unrivalled energy and achievement. rzJ 
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An even more novel. and significant development was one which reinforced the 
elitist self-perception of VELA members, bolstered their claiJn to preference on the 
grounds of benefiting the entire nation, and deepened their belief in the profound 
qualities of that special Schicht they claimed to occupy. At the 1925 Annual General 
Meeting of VELA, Dr. Schaefer offered the suggestion that the VELA-Bewegung 
should be considered as a cultural movement of the highest order. This, he said, was 
on account of the sitnilarity between artistic (kilnstlerisch) creativity and the 
Geistigkeit of /eitende Angestellten, and also because the cultural levels of any society 
or nation were directly correlated to the strength, performance and vitality of its 
economy, all of which were dependent upon the performance of its senior business 
managers. The all-too-apparent cultural and moral crisis of the Weimar Republic, he 
claimed, had arisen partly as a result of the Versailles Treaty and the Dawes 
Agreement which had depredated the German economy~ but this unhappy situation 
was not just the outcome of external oppression. There was an inherent and persistent 
unproductiveness in the German economy, ste1nming in ve1y large measure from a 
failure to encourage the bloss01ning of the talents of its geislige ;..\'chicht or to harness 
those talents for the benefit of a nation which was bereft of effective leadership in 
every sphere and suffering from a consequent narrowing of its cultural life. 131 This 
article tnarked the start of a process in VELA of identifying leitende Angestellten as 
'culture-bearers' and integrating that self-important belief into its elitist 
Weltanschauung over the next few years. 
At least five substantive articles dealt with the ideological issues of differential 
re\\rards during 1925, aJ'rllough many others discussed the levels of pay and 
condemned the iniquity of imposing fixed pay-scales on such a senior and productive 
sector of the economy. 141 To the clai1n that upper mangement was justified in 
demanding extra incentives in the form of bonuses and higher salary increases than 
could be granted to the rest of the labour force, was now added the argument that the 
efficiency (Leistungsfi'ihigkeit) of leitende Angestellten was such that the benefit to 
the nation would be disproportionate to the costs. Efficiency, it \vas claimed, related 
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directly to how little or how much geistig employees were relieved of having to think 
about their material comforts and financial well-being_ISI An article in the February 
edition tackled the dimension of political philosophy head-on, arguing that the 
concept of equality as a positive good was drawn from misconceived and vague ideas 
of natural rights. The course of human progress, however, had been characterised by 
the leaving behind of the inefficient equality of pritnitive societies for an 
ever-increasing diversification and a productive inequality of economic and social 
functions among individuals and groups. The case for social differentiation and 
evaluation of the individual's worth was still valid, but should ideally be based on 
personal Leistung. This advocacy of inequality , argued the author, had nothing to do 
with individualistic egotism or social injustice, but was a deep and intrinsic social and 
cultural necessity. Indeed, it took courage, in an age of mass organisations and the 
power of capital, for the tninority group of the geisUge Schicht to express these ideas, 
when the cotnbined tendencies of Nivellierung and standardisation were conspiring to 
destroy the ti·eedotn of the independent leadership personality_ltiJ 
Although the thinking expressed in Der /eitende Ange.s·tellte appeared to include 
a1nassing a great deal of ideological fuel for the concept of a meritocratic systetn, 
other principles and interests inevitably intruded to upset the perfection and 
self-containment of such a theoretical construct. In the second July edition, a piece on 
the cultural and social politics of VELA asserted that Germany's trade and industry 
had suffered from a long history of nepotism, and that 1nany of those who currently 
exercised power as the entrepreneurs of large businesses were third-generation 
owners who did not have the drive and talent of their grandfathers. A new influx of 
blood from below, or from outside these closed and privileged circles, was needed to 
reinvigorate both the economy and society. Later, however, in the same article, the 
arb'TUI11ent was made that a refining and improving of leadership qualities could be 
passed on through the generations. If senior management were not to recetve 
adequate retnuneration, then today's leitende Angestel!ten would not be able to 
provide their children with the appropriate standard of living or the education required 
. l d l 'ld t' [71 for this process to happen, and th1s could ea on y to socta egenera 1on. 
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It is scarcely surprising to hear a defence of family rights coming from such a 
socially conservative, or even archetypically bourgeois, group as well-paid, 
well-educated upper managers. Giving your children a headstart in life over the less 
privileged may be considered a normal and commonplace practice, but it is, 
nevertheless, also a form of nepotism which hinders any future infusion of 'ne\:v 
blood'. What this sotnewhat dishonest, or at least contradictory, thinking was actually 
advocating was the replacement of one elite by another, and the subsequent 
entrenchment of the new one. This is a phenomenon which actually began to emerge 
in the NSDAP in the later 1930s atnong the alte Kan1pjer, or old fighting comrades,181 
at'ld which developed into a full-blown reality atnong the higher-ranking metnbers of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the course of that party's much longer 
hold on power. !91 There is also more than a hint of the debate which went on within 
the Nazi Party on whether personality, character and all those strengths and vi1tues 
which went to making up a good National Socialist were only present in a minority of 
Gennan people, or whether education and propaganda could instil them in all Aryans~ 
did we live in a world which was fully biologically deterministic, or was social 
engineering through indoctrination a more realistic perspective?floJ 
The issue of the Volk and a national cornmunity appears to have been aired on 
many occasions at the 1925 Annual General Assembly of VELA, since most 
references to it in the pages of Der leitende Angestellte occurred in the May and June 
editions, which were largely devoted to reporting on the conference. PIJ Indeed, in 
anticipation of that topic being discussed at length, Dr. Mutfelmann wrote an article, 
which appeared about a fortnight before the assembly, in which he quoted from a 
speech given by Dr. Pieper, who was described as the spiritual leader of the Christian 
trade union movement. Dr. Pieper had said that it was i1nportant to recognise that 
Ben{(sarheit was not se]f-seeking, egotistical or exploitative, in the way that purely 
commercial, acquisitive, capitalist activity was, but constituted work of the highest 
service to the Volksgemeinschaft. Dr. Muffelmann. concurred with this view, stressing 
how impo11ant it was for VELA members working in the commercially-competitive 
232 
world to be seen and appreciated as practitioners of that kind of self-less work. I-Ie 
concluded that the spiritualisation of economic life was necessary for creating the 
foundations of a genuine Arheit.\·gemeinschaji. This process, and not the horse-trading 
tactics of Weimar political parties, their leaders and their interest-backers, was in fact 
the only way that a Volksgemeinschaft could ultimately emerge. He urged VELA 
members to make the creation of such a national community a central concern of the 
forthcoming assembly. 1121 . The question of what this as yet vaguely defined, yet 
increasingly etnployed, concept of a Volksgemeinschaji comprised, and how close it 
was to the Nazi vision, was pa1tially addressed during the 1925 Hauptversammlung. 
Two reports on the proceedings referred to the creation of a complete 
Volksgemeinschaft as a 'patriotic task' which went beyond the boundaries of the 
Reich, specifically including unity with Austria as a requirement of this goai.l 131 As yet 
the racial and anti-Setnitic elements, so central to National Socialism's understanding 
of the concept, were absent in VELA, or, at least, absent from its published 
pronouncements. 
Five articles~ dealing with the theme of a special Schicht, and with the coming 
together of leitende Angestellten, free professionals and high state officials \vithin that 
layer, appeared during 1925, and it is clear that these topics were raised frequently at 
the annual conference. 1141 The introduction of the concept of Ben!fw.rrbeit was a useful 
tool for the discussion and promotion of the idea of a new social and sociological 
category~ which, claimed one article, was now widely recognised and referred to in 
books, doctoral theses and legal contracts~ it was even. mentioned in the recent 
Washington Agreement on International Trade. 1151 Several other newly-minted or 
recently-deployed terms were also heard during the annual general assetnbly' s 
proceedings, the most significant of which were references to their Schicht as the new 
Afittelstand, the geistige Mittelstand, the Geistesarbeiterbewegung (intellectual 
workers' movement) and the Einheit.~front der Geistenarheiter (united fl'ont of the 
intellectual workers).1 161 These were tenns which, like Ben!fvarbeit, show that 
discussion of the theme was so well established and mature that it was beginning to 
233 
produce its own widely-comprehended terminology and shorthand references to 
broader concepts. 
The final theme, that of the political and socio-economic roles that leitende 
Angestellten, VELA and the wider geistige Schicht should play in Germany, was as 
frequently discussed as the theme of Geistigkeit, appearing in at least nine articles 
over the course of the year.1 171 This was, however, the least developed of all five 
themes, the thrust of the analyses being more that of criticising and bemoaning current 
political-econotnic conditions than of offering practical programmes, policies or 
political affiliation. There were many assertions about the growing i1nportance of 
leadership in an age of increasing specialisation and amalgamation in the modern 
German economy, of the threats to geistige Arheit posed by standardisation, 
bureaucratisation and Nivellierung, and of the lack of any specific government 
progratnme to protnote the creative sectors of the economy and of society. This last 
complaint, it was argued in one miicle, was partly the outcome of the pariy-political 
interest-trading of coalition government, and partly the result of all the politicJl 
parties being full of representatives of the working classes. This applied not only to 
the SPD and ICPD_, but also to every one of the bourgeois parties. Additionally, the 
latter parties also included representatives of business owners, agricultural interests 
and the commercial middle class among their Reichstag deputies, yet not a single 
1nember of the especially itnportant geistige MitteLc..·tand had been elected or even put 
up as a candidate by any of these so-called middle-class parties at the last national 
election.l 181 There was growing criticism of the current political-economic situation, 
and mounting disillusionment with the. established parties of the Weimar Republic, but 
beyond vague, unformulated demands for increased power and influence for the 
geistige L\'chicht, there was as yet no clear political analysis, far less any specific 
party-political inclination. 
In the 1926 editions of Der leitende Angestellte, the theme of Geistigkeit was as 
popular as ever. It appeared in nine major articles, yet little new was added to 
VELA's vainglorious analysis of its members' innate character and abilities beyond 
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repitition and amplification. 11 ~ 1 One development, however, did emerge - the assertion 
that it was not the job of everyone, or more specifically not the job of the 'masses', to 
create a united society. Nor should they concern themselves with issues such as the 
proper relationship of state and society, since the tasks of conceptualising such 
important questions and acting upon the resultant vision were ones that should be left 
to leaders in all the various parts of German society.1201 The barely-concealed asset1ion 
in that statetnent was that the masses were not in possession of the intellectual, and 
perhaps even the spiritual, capacity required for such thinking and such action. 
The second theme, that of differential rewards, featured in only three analytical 
articles, although the constant refrain that leitende Angeste/lten were undervalued 
appeared almost too often to be counted. The first of these articles took the line that 
the introduction of scientific business management (Taylorism) had led to the cutting 
of production costs and the raising of workers' productivity and output. Since senior 
managers had responsibility for designing and implementing such systems, it was 
essentially their skills and their value-adding activities which created the improved 
efficiency; consequently they should be the ones to reap the rewards.r 21 1 This \.vas part 
of that favourite VELA assertion that capital and labour were of little worth without 
the input of creativity, personality and leadership, and that these qualities increasingly 
lay with upper managetnent. The second article on this theme stressed the view, first 
mentioned in the previous year, that many third- and fourth-generation entrepreneurs 
lacked the dynamism ·of their ancestors and predecessors. They had become 
conservative, timid, resistant to new ideas, and ensnared by the lures of profit and 
materialism. Today's managerial sector, by contrast, had the potential to emulate the 
innovative, forward-looking entrepreneurs who had given such a boost to Germany's 
prosperity and international standing in the second half of the 19th century. If they 
were properly recognised and rewarded, then their talents would blossom The nation 
too, it almost went without saying, would benefit fi-om an incentive system that 
encouraged such creative activity.122l The third a11icle detnanded an end to the 
inclusion of /eilende Angestel!ten in the category of those subject to the govermnent' s 
restrictive incomes policy. Apart from the unwelcome econotnic levelling effect which 
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this caused, the policy was founded upon a fundamentally flawed notion of reward. 
Assessment of income should be based upon the evaluation of personality.1231 
The theme of community and the Volk was the least explored in 1926, although it 
was woven into an important piece written by Dr Zellien, which is examined in detail 
be1ow. 1241 
Four articles dealt with the concept of a special Schicht,l 25 l while the increasingly 
commonplace use of the terms geistige Arheit and geistige Arbeiter suggests that the 
idea of a spiritual/intellectual layer, which was wider than just that of the c01nmunity 
of leitende Angestellten, was an accepted and firmly-established part of VELA 
thinking. But the organisation's members also had cause to believe that this concept 
was more than just an abstract notion. VELA was an affiliated member of two 
broader upper-middle-class associations which held assemblies in Berlin in 1926. The 
first was the Intellectual Salaried Workers of Germany (die angestellten 
Geistesarbeiter Deutsch/and\·), whose conference VELA organised and hosted. This 
assembly issued a proclamation of grievances and demands which !Jer leitende 
Angeste/lte published in full. Among these was the claim that the working class, the 
lower-level white-collar workers and the free trade unions were being granted 
preferential treatment by their representation on bodies such as the Works' Councils 
and government social-law advisory cotnmittees, privileges not extended to senior 
managers. To rectifY this anomalous and unfair situation, a special depa1tment should 
be set up in the Labour Ministry to deal specifically with the concerns of geistig 
emp]oyees. !26' 
Under the title 'Eine Kundgehung fiir deutsche Geisteskultur' ('A Rally for 
German Intellectual Culture'), Der leilende Angeste!lte repo11ed that more than 40 
organisations of the geistig professions, wh~ were part of the .)"chutzkarte/1 deutscher 
Geistesarbeiter (Protective Cartel of German Intellectual Workers), had gathered in 
the Reichstag to discuss the connection between econotnic crisis and the perceived 
crisis of culture gripping Weimar Germany, that sub-theme which had first appeared a 
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year earlier. The importance and status of this gathering was attested to by the 
presence of Chancellor Luther to deliver an address. Among those rubbing shoulders 
with the VELA delegates were architects, engineers, university professors, 
economists, senior state officials, publishers, journalists and editors, authors, artists 
and, perhaps most unexpectedly, representatives of the Deutsche O.ffizierhund 
(Association of German Military Officers)l271 . Many of those addressing the assembly 
spoke about the economic plight of their occupations and of fellow professionals, 
whom they referred to collectively as the Kulturschicht (cultural stratum), and drew 
the conclusion that Weimar's cultural disintegration, as they saw it, was connected to 
their own distress since they were the bearers of German Geistesku/tur, the kernel of 
the nation, as one delegate put it. The repeated emphasis on the reality and 
importance of a geistige Schicht for Germany's restoration to greatness which 
emanated from this conference, demonstrated that VELA was not alone in pursuing 
this thematic concept and aspiration.' 2111 
Five tnonths later in a radio broadcast, Or Otto Everling, chairman of the 
Schutzkarte/1, spoke about the coming together of a Kulturschicht which he 
specifically described as comprising the free professions, senior state officials and 
leitende Angestel/ten, confirming VELA' s own definition and delineation. This 
stratwn had the will to retore the Fatherland, he said, and he was encouraged by the 
growth of its organisations which, a few years previously, could not afford postage 
stamps, yet were now producing periodicals, staging large conferences and employing 
full-tin1e staff. They were becoming organised and militant, and building up 
inter-organisational connections, a sure sign of the vibrancy of a 'new Mittelstand', 1291 
that tenn first employed just two years earlier by Or Muffelmann of VELA. Everling's 
description of the increasingly self-confident activities o( the so-called Kulturschicht 
tends to corroborate the analyses of Koshar and Fritzsche concerning the upsurge of 
political interest, activity and militancy which was taking place within the 
upper-middle-class Vereine in the Inid-1920s (see chapter 6). 
237 
As in l925, the theme of the political and socio-economic roles that leitende 
Angestelllen, VELA and the broader geistige .\'chicht should play in Germany was 
widely discussed in Der leitende Angestellte. Seven a11icles dealt with this issue in 
depth_l3°1 Although no party-political preferences emerged, there was a definite 
firming-up of VELA' s political analysis. This analysis argued that politics were not 
superfluous to econo1nics, and that, indeed, without a strong state, a strong econo1ny 
could not emerge. Social order required the firm hand of the political state, while 
economic decision-making could not be left to a blind-faith belief in the beneficial 
effects of liberal laissez-faire capitalistn. This had merely resulted in the growth of 
anonymous share capitalism, cartels and monopolies, placing more and more 
concentrated power in the hands of fewer big-business owners, who were enslaved 
and driven by the detnands of profit. The German economy was fast becoming the 
plaything of the stock exchange. This was bad for the leitende Angestellten, and bad 
for the nation. lt was ti1ne for a new social order to emerge, time for rational men 
with insight into the true require1nents of a Volksgemein'·;chc!fi in this modern 
industrialised age, to take control of the political direction and governn1ent of 
Germany. A different sort of leadership from the party-political interest-merchants 
representing grasping financiers, stock-exchange speculators and the short-sighted 
greedy proletariat, was essential. Men with specialised technical, technological and 
tnanagerial skills, men devoid of rnaterialisn1 and egotism, men of personality and 
tnorality, men of culture - these were the ideal people for fighting the c01nbined and 
corrosive might of capital and labour. To this end VELA must educate its members to 
political awareness, proselytise its socio-political message, attract new members, and 
encourage all existing ones to become as involved as possible in Vereins/eben (the 
social network of upper-middle-class organisations and clubs). [31 I 
The party affiliations of the VELA writers who contributed to the above 
political-economic analysis are not known, but it would seem highly unlikely that 
many of them \Vould have been members oft he small Nazi Party in 1926.1321 However, 
it is known with certainty that Dr Zellien, writer of an article published in Dece1nber, 
had been a long-standing NSDAP member when he was elevated to the nazified 
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leadership of VELA during the process of G/eichschalt11ng in 1933 (see chapter 9). 
I-Ie may or may not have already joined the Party by 1926, but it is instructive to 
exatnine in some detail the contents of an article written by someone who was, at the 
very least, a budding Nazi, to see how. closely he agreed with the analysis of his 
fellow-VELA contributors. In this lengthy piece, Zellien dealt mostly with 
socio-political issues, but he also touched upon every one of the other four themes 
pursued by VELA, drawing them together into an ideological synthesis which was not 
only extretnely authoritarian, but reeked of self-righteousness, bile, hostility and a 
slightly paranoid sense of being conspired against. 
Entitled 'The Oppression of the Salaried Spiritual/Intellectual Worker in 
Econotnic and Social Politics', the article began by saying that governmental social 
policy should aim to protect and support the spiritual, economic and physical welfare 
of every citizen, and should ensure the participation of the entire Volk in the cultural 
riches and activities of the nation. It should not be designed only for the exclusive 
support of certain social classes,' but should be pa~ of a proper Volksgen1einschq(!. 
The Weimar state was at present weighted in favour of, and dominated by, the 
labouring classes and the non-managerial white-collar workers as a direct 
consequence of the misguided attempt to construct both political and econOinic 
detnocracy. These classes, whose functions and activities were merely that of carrying 
out orders (au.rfiJhrende Tatigkeit), had come to gain a stranglehold on German 
society and economy through their mass organisations, the trade unions. The net 
result of this surfeit of democracy was to hinder effectiveness in every area which it 
permeated - political, econo1nic and social. The sheer power of the mass organisations 
amounted to a parallel government contesting power with the one ostensibly ruling 
from the Reichstag - which, in any case, was full of people with little insight or 
resolute will. Thus post-war social policy had been completely biased and one-sided, 
resulting in a lack of recognition of the special ski11s, as well as of their strategic 
location between capital and labour, of the leitende Angestellten. But more than that, 
this had led to actual oppression of the classes of geistig workers. 
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Weak-willed government also permitted monopolies to exist at the other end of 
the socio-economic spectt1lm among the big businesses of Weimar Germany. 
Consequently, the nation had been carved up by a duopoly of employers and mass 
trade unions who completely dmninated the Reichstag, the political parties and the 
govermnent bureaucracy. However, just when it seemed that Zellien was about to 
etnbark upon a critique of capitalism, or at the very least of the perceived corporatism 
of the Wei1nar Republic, he veered back again to attack his real target, the true object 
of his spleen, the trade unions and the uncultured masses. He argued that the mass 
trade unions were deliberately trying to destroy independent unions and representative 
organisations which did not conform to, or unite with, the large monopolising ones. In 
particular they had targeted VELA by freezing it out of crucial advisory councils and 
excluding separate representation for geistig workers on the Works' Councils. The 
issue which appeared to make Or Zellien most hot under the collar was the practice of 
successive governments of inviting the trade unions into talks on, and issuing joint 
statements upon, issues which were often economic in nature, and therefore the 
natural preserve of VELA's knowledgeable and specialised members. It seemed i:o 
rankle vvith him that manual workers and people who only carried out relatively 
menial tasks, people without Bildung and deficient of culture, should be allowed to 
influence matters about which they clearly knew nothing _ no wonder the nation was 
in such a mess! 1331 
It is quite clear from this vitriolic article that Zeilien was not just opposed to the 
mainstreatn political parties of Weimar, or to their horse-trading political practices, or 
to the institutional role of the trade unions. I-fe was hostile to the entire Weimar 
social, economic and political system, \Vhile his anti-democratic proclivities were 
displayed prominently in his jaundiced attitude towards the 'masses', towards the 
lower economic orders, and, apparently, towards anyone and everyone who was not 
in an executive or professional position. On the surface, this article was making the 
case for greater representation for senior managers, but Zellien's marshalling of the 
virtues of personality, creativity, skill and the sacred totem of leadership was at least 
as much in order to enlist them in a critique of democracy based on the rubbishing of 
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the idea that people of lesser talents and inferior innate character should have the 
same say as obviously superior men. His scorn for 'lesser individuals' was palpable. 
This fits well with the analysis of National Socialist ideology in chapter 2 of this 
study, where one of Nazism's principal tenets was defined as seeing differential 
intrinsic value and worth among individuals and not just among races, a view which 
led to a rejection of equal rights as irrational and destructive of a nation's greatness. 
Over the course of 1927, the same five themes again appeared with roughly the 
same pattern of distribution as in the preceding two years. Geistigkeit was included in 
the subject matter of ten articles1341, differential rewards in six,l35l the Volk and the 
VolkvJeJneinschcrft in three,l361 the special Schicht in nine,l.17l and political and 
socio-economic aspirations and demands in no fewer than fourteen_!381 
The theme of Geistigkeit focused much upon the idea of a culture-bearing 
Schicht, developing that sociological conceit into a metaphysical one, and endowing 
the leitende Angestellten with yet another noble virtue - and yet another reason \vhy 
they were so indispensable to the nation. One ar1icle came up with a catchy slogan 
with which to en1phasise this claim and give it a bit of political spin. It said that, 
because of Germany's current weakened international position, where the old 
principle of der Printal der Aussenpolitik (primacy of foreign policy) was temporarily 
an impracticality, the call to the nation should be der Printal des Geistes (primacy of 
the spirit). Geist, Geistigkeit and Leistung, said another article, were the nation's 
hope for both cultural and economic revival, and for renewed greatnessY91 
The issues of differential rewards and the Volksgenteinsc/u~ft tended to intertwine 
during I 927, with the apparent aim of reconciling the contradictory, or at least 
competing, demands of self-interest and service to the community. Claiming that the 
Great Inflation had hit the geistig sectors much harder than other workers, a de1nand 
for a restoration of wage differentials was put forward, combined with a call for the 
introduction of a Leistung.\prinzip into econmnic and political thinking in order to 
asstgn rewards according to performance and achievement. A proper 
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Vo/k.c.gemeinschqft would look after the interests of every class and sector, not just 
the manual and au.~fiihrend (non-managerial, contrasting with .fi'ihrend) workers who 
were coddled and favoured in the present levelling Weimar system. Financial 
incentives were required to restore morale among the hugely undervalued leitende 
Angeste/lten.l401 Only in this way, argued Dr Zellien in another of his articles, could 
senior tnanagers be infused with the drive to increase their latent efficiency~ the 
wrong-headed reward system and its consequent devaluing of the worth of personality 
and leadership were obviously detrimental to the creative energies and power of 
gei.\·tige Arheit, and thus served to weaken the whole German nation.141 1 
This line of argument tended to undermine the simultaneous claim that the right 
of geistige Arbeiter to exercise increased power, both in their individual occupations 
and at a political-economic level, was based upon utilising that power in the service of 
the nation, a duty which was intrinsically embodied in the very Geist of such 
disinterested and patriotic men. I<~:!J Yet here were VELA writers, including a present or 
soon-to-be Nazi, arguing that leitende Angestellten needed monetary incentives ~n 
order to motivate them to produce that high-performance work which was so 
necessary for the Fatherland. The best that any VELA writer could come up with to 
square this circle was another sloganeering aphorism: 'GemeiJJ:'I·chqjisdienst durch 
Selbsten((altung!' ('Service to the community through self-development! ');'431 in other 
words, it was to be taken as a matter of faith that the individual geist;g leader's 
material enrichment and empowerment would automatically trigger off in him a 
selfless drive to do good for the Volk. 
Little of significance was added to the development of the theme of a special 
Schicht of geistig workers despite the large amount of space devoted to it in 1927. 
The major emphasis was upon furthering the case that senior managers in the 
capitalist business world were part of that status-enhancing category - culture-bearers. 
To the argument that science, technology and organisational skills could raise not only 
econOtnic but also cultural levels, was added much discussion of the notion of 
'material culture' and of engineers and managers as 'functionaries of the spirit' 
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(Funktioniire des Geistes):'44 l and this spirit was defined as specifically German. 1451 
Whereas high capitalism (Hochkapitalisn1us) of the American version was a 
soul-destroying, impersonal machine driven purely by avarice and materialism, there 
was a German Geist, embodied in the leitende Angestellten and the larger Schicht to 
which they belonged, which promoted individuality and personality. It humanised 
work and was infused with a concern for the well-being and strength of the entire 
VoJk.l461 This line of argutnent was very similar to that which engineers had been 
advancing since the turn of the century in order to reconcile Technik und Kultur (see 
chapter 5). 
It is also in keeping with much of the analysis of attitudes to\vards work 
described by Joan Campbell in Joy in Work, G-erman Work. She saw a widespread, 
bourgeois Christian belief: originating in the late 19th century in the writings of 
Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl ( 1823-1897), which claimed that there was a traditional 
German work ethic that valued work for its own sake and for the good of the Volk 
rather than for profit. This idea began with a conservative praising and idealising of 
peasants, aristocrats and middle-class artisans as the embodiment of that Geist, but, 
by the turn of the century, this mantle had been passed on to the German middle-class 
Biirger, and the belief itself had become the property of liberal as well as conservative 
thinkers. Riehl's Lutheranism led him to prize and praise the work ethic of the 
Protestant urban upper middle class, and to espouse a 'mild' anti-Semitism based on 
the religi·ous attitude that Protestants understood God's message better than the 
Jesus-denying Jews and were therefore better people. His cultural nationalism, as vvell 
as his somewhat bigoted religious views, informed his beliefthat the 'German ethos' -
that work itself was blessed and a blessing - was a shield against modern capitalism 
degenerating into profiteering and the ungodly pursuit of mammon in the Fatherland. 
He also claimed that there was a hierarchy of work based on the degree of intellectual 
effort involved, which helped to shape his vision of the ideal society as a harmonious 
. . f 1 1471 orgamc commumty o unequa s. 
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Campbell argued that the main impact ofRiehl's work came after the Great War 
and infused much Weimar thought. 14!i1 It is certainly visible in the thinking which went 
into constructing and justifying the concept of a specially-endowed geistige Schicht. 
She also showed how National Socialisn1 bore many resemblances to R.Jehl's kind of 
thinking, particularly in its advocacy of a Volksgen1einschajt imbued with an altruistic 
work ethos. In 1920, lJitler declared that work was not a curse sent by God, but for 
Germans it was a duty and a rational vocation, to be done in the service of the Volk 
and not the self. One part of the pre-1933 NSDAP, led by Darn~, courted the 
peasantry of Germany by declaring that they were the sector of society which typified 
all that was good about the German work ethic - independence, self-reliance, 
diligence, dutifulness and a feel for the organic interplay of natural forces. 
Si1nultaneously, another, and ultimately far more powerful and central, tendency in 
the NSDAP was at work on the urban, modern parts of German society. Campbell 
sav1 the leading figure in this endeavour being Gregor Strasser, who was espousing a 
rejection of materialistn, placing the value of work higher than the value of property, 
and emphasising the paramount importance of Leistung. This doctrine did a great deal 
to allow the essentials of capitalism to be accommodated within the 'socialism' of 
National Socialism. Campbell showed how this, in turn, reassured the bougeoisie and 
facilitated Strasser's overtures to the owners of big business, which eventually led to 
the latter's qualified support for, or, at the very least, sympathetic tolerance of. the 
NSDAP in the final years of the Weimar Republic.l49l However, Strasser's doctrinal 
points would appear to display an even greater hannony and affinity with the beliefs 
of that other 'capitalist class', senior managers, for whom the downgrading of 
capital-owning power in favour of a Leistungsgemeinschqft had become an 
ideological and political aim. [so] 
Another of Camp bell's conclusions was that modernisation was embraced by 
most ·sectors ofWeimar society, especially in the cities, as a way to restore Germany's 
economic strength and international status. However, no consensus could be reached 
upon how to achieve the increase in productivity and economic rationalisation which 
was needed to improve the quality of life in the nation. It was the NSDAP which 
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benefited most from the consequent political-economic disarray by espousing a largely 
modern attitude towards work, achievement and reward, coupling it with an appeal to 
the traditional German belief that labour in itself was virtuous, and linking it to the 
powerful nationalist message that satisfaction and self-fulfilment were to be found in 
doing work that was for the greater national good and glory. Deutsche Arheit and 
Arbeitsjreude (joy in work) were married together in a modern vision which had a 
wide general appeal 1511 - and which found a particular resonance within the thinking of 
the leitende Angestellten. 
The fifth theme, of the political and socio-economic roles that leitende 
Angeste/lten, VELA and the broader geislige .5/chichl should play in Gennany, took 
up 1nore space than any of the others in 1927. Over the years, VELA writers had 
criticised the apparent political powerlessness of their socio-economic sector in the 
face of organised labour and capital, an issue pursued in the January edition of the 
periodical \Vith a demand tor the creation of a special department for senior 
managerial affairs within the Ministry of Labour. 152l In March it was reported that just 
such a department had been created, and that, in addition, upper management had also 
been granted separate representation within the labour arbitration courtsl53 1. 
·However, these gains appeared to count for little in VELA's political-economic 
critique, because the sense of injustice and fi·ustration did not slacken. Instead, 
indignation was focused upon the lack of separate representation for leitende 
Angestellten in the proposed setting-up of a Reich Economic Advisory Board, which 
I . 1. I rs4J would have statutory consultation powers on governmenta econom1c-po 1cy p ans. 
\Vhen, in December of that year, it was reported that this long-advocated body was 
finally being set up, the article describing this development was apopletic with outrage 
at the fact that, similar to the Works' Councils, leitende Angestellten would be 
considered as part of the larger category of salaried white-collar workers. Not only 
would no recognition be given to their separate existence between capital and labour, 
but they \.Yould be lumped together with lower-level, an~fiihrend employees, 
undifferentiated from clerks and offtce-boys. To rub salt into the wounds, VELA' s 
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arch-enemies, the umbrella trade-union organisations, Afa, Gedag, the GwR and the 
ADGB, were all g1ven statutory consultative rights. Each of these 
Monopolgewerkschc.!ften (monopoly trade unions), it was bitterly stated, were 
affiliated to, and supported by, the big established political parties, who were 
effectively in the pockets oftheseMassengewerkschqften (mass trade unions).f55l 
VELA's intensifying hatred of trade umons, of whatever political hue, was 
increasingly having an impact upon its attitudes towards the political parties of 
WeiJnar, who were seen as bending the knee towards these overmighty, levelling, 
personality-detroying dinosaurs of the Sozialstaat. Only the independent, and usually 
one-issue, small splinter parties, and the still largely electorally-marginal NSDAP, 
appeared to be free of the influence of the 'Massengewerkschqften', because even the 
very right-wing Christian-national Gedag, with its anti-Se1nitic and anti-democratic 
tendencies and its strong links to the DNVP, was defined and condemned as one of 
the Monopolgewerkschqften by VELA. With the politicis~tion of the organisation's 
membership increasing steadily, it would be only a matter of time before this factDr 
began to loom larger in the political thinking of Weimar Germany's leitende 
A ngestellten. 
The degree to which VELA 1nembers were becoming politicised was illustrated 
at their Annual General Assembly held in I-Iamburg in May. Despite two full evenings 
being set aside for the discussion of economic policy, there were repeated criticisms 
from atnongst the delegates that not enough time had been assigned for the discussion 
of this matter nor had there been suflicient debate or clarification of the 
' 
organisation's political demands and political stance. The leadership appeared to be 
taken by surprise when a motion from the floor, calling for the setting-up of a 
permanent VELA economic-policy committee, was carried unanimously. 1561 
Some evidence of the direction of that politicisation is illustrated by a couple of 
examples culled from the pages of Der leilende Angestellte during 1927. On two 
occasions mention was made of the concept of a Volk ohne Rau1n (Race/People 
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without Space), the title of a book by T-Ians Grirnm which had been published in the 
previous year, and which eventually sold half-a-million copies. Grimm was an extreme 
right-wing volkisch nationajjst who popularised the idea of Germany's need for 
Lebensraum, clai1ning that the nation was doomed to breed itself into starvation and 
extinction if it were not allowed to expand territorially. l-Ie argued that the old upper 
classes no longer had the ability or vitality to bring about a thorough reform of 
German conditions, an analysis very similar to the one being applied by VELA to the 
owners of big business. Gri1nm was an unabashed advocate of elitism, imperialism and 
a purified German race, with an intense fear of, and hostility towards, Bolshevism 1n 
pmiicular, and socialism in general. He supported the NSDAP and greeted 
enthusiastically their coming to power. These sentiments were reciprocated by the 
Nazi Par1y and Hitler, who adopted Volk oh ne Raun1 as one of the slogans to promote 
their doctrine of imperialist expansionism.r57l Der leitende Angestelfle agreed that 
Germany's land and resources were too meagre to support its population and did 
indeed need to be augmented, arguing that, in this time of relative international 
weakness, the nation should look to its inner resources and promote the idea of a Volk 
voll Geist (people fu11 of spirit) as a stepping-stone towards that future goal. r.ssJ 
A further example of the nature ofVELA's politicisation came in an ariicle which 
demanded that special preference should be given to the geistige .S'chicht in the 
formulation of social policy. It argued that not elevating such an important sector of 
German society, which comprised the very driving force of economic and cultural 
productiveness, was not only ruinous for the entire Volk, but was also politically 
dangerous. In a remarkably prescient sentence that was as much threat as analysis, the 
writer, Dr Everling, head of the ...\'chutzkarte/1 deutscher (Jei5;fesarbeiter, warned: 
A us Not verzwe[felnde lntellekluelle sind als politische Fanatiker fiir 
den A t((hau einer Volk.sgemeinschqf! besonders geflihrlich. 
In times of distress, despairing intellectuals make especially dangerous 
political fanatics bent upon constructing a people's racial 
cotnmunity. 1591 
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Over the course of 1928, VELA' s increasing attention to political and 
socio-economic matters continued in the pages of Der leitende Angestel/te, where J 7 
articles discussed this theme.1601 Geistigkeil was addressed in nine articJes,i61 1 
differential rewards in five,' 621 the Volk and the Volksgemeinschaji in three,r631 and the 
special geistige Schicht in eleven.164l Although aiJ these themes were discussed as 
frequently and at as great a length as in 1927, this was very much a year of 
consolidation of ideological positions. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say 
that it was a year of repetition, both of the material of earlier editions, and of the exact 
same speeches being repeated word for word in the accounts of national, regional and 
Gau-level gatherings addressed by VELA's leadership. 
On the theme of Geistif.{keit, an emphasis upon leitende Angestellten as 
culture-bearers of the nation was still very much in evidence. Some of the impetus 
towards this (self-)assertion undoubtedly arose from a lingering sense that 'cultured' 
people in the world of the arts, academia and the older professions still looked down 
upon those who worked in the sphere of business and industry. A seeking after 
cutural kudos and social status was therefore very much behind this particular 
elaboration of VELA' s Weltanschauung. A further development was the claim that 
senior managers were more devoted to their work than those who were merely 
au.~fiihrende Arbeiter. For non-managerial employees, work was merely a necessaty 
evil; for leitende Angestellten, it was an end in itself It gave their life meaning, 
purpose and fulfilment - the Arheit.~freude of which loan Campbell spoke.l65 1 Senior 
tnanagers fonned part of the very soul of the companies for which they worked, 
protecting them from both external and internal dangers. Within their firms they were 
mediators between the claims of capital and labour, and synthesizers of their powerful 
but antagonistic productive capacities. Thus, not only did they possess unique skills, 
knowledge and powers of leadership, but they also exerted moral influence upon 
everyone else in their companies, a responsibility which their special Arheits1noral 
(attitude to work) and Perstjnfichkeit equipped them well to deal with. 1661 
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The topic of the powers of personality was flogged relentlessly, with a stuttering 
venture into the thorny area of individualism. At one point [)er leitende Angestellte 
stated that VELA members believed in individualism (Jndividualisnn1s) as a necessary 
part of the freedom which senior managers needed in order to realise their creative 
potential1671, but a few weeks later it was being stressed that the type of PersDnlichkeit 
embodied in leitende Angestellten was not at all the egotistical character of the 
atomised economic liberal who put self-interest before the greater good of the nation. 
The truly geistig personality did not seek personal gain, but achieved 
self-development and self-fulfihnent through service to the Volk. !681 What VELA was 
stutnbling towards, but would never quite grasp, was a philosophy which 
distinguished between individualism (Jndividuafisnnts) and individuality 
(lndividualitiit)~ in the pages of Der leitende Angestelfte, the terms are used 
interchangeably. 
Individualism is an ideological concept which says either that one's best interests 
are served by acting solely for one's own gain, gratification and fulfilment, or that the 
effect of everyone pursuing such a course of action is to promote the greater common 
good - the latter version being the wishful-thinking ideological position of pure 
laissez-.faire economic liberals and right-wing libertarians, forever seeking to justify 
greed and/or power-hunger by constructing a moral case for self-interest. 
Individuality is more of a psychological concept, describing an individual's sense of 
being distinct from other people and of being able to use and develop that uniqueness 
autonomously.r691 The concept of individuality can, however, have ideological 
ixnplications, particularly if it is not differentiated from individualism. If the baby of 
individuality is thrown out with the bathwater of individualism, then something else 
has to be put in its place in order to justify the claims for the power and differential 
rights of individual personalities. In much thinking of this sort (of both the 
authoritarian right and the authoritarian left varieties), that something is a prescribed 
set of values. This \vas exactly what the NSDAP propagated during the Third Reich 
to encourage and enforce loyalty and obedience (see chapter 9). Pa11ly as a result of 
VELA' s inability to distinguish between individualism and individuality, its etnergent 
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ideology had a tendency to build up a complex desiderata of right-wing tenets which 
defined and prescribed the attributes and beliefs which were deemed descriptive of the 
geistig individual. Individuality thus became the pr·oduct of a way of acting and 
believing, rather than being the agent which inspired creative behaviour. 
Almost nothing new was added to the themes of differential rewards and the 
Volksgen1ein .. r..·chajt in 1928, while the factors of a special Schicht and of political and 
socio-economic considerations became so interwoven that it is difficult to consider 
thetn separately. However, what is abundantly clear is that political matters were 
moving closer to centre stage, perhaps an indication that Germany was entering the 
final crisis-phase of the Weimar Republic more than a year before the Great 
·Depression speeded up the process. Already the country was experiencing an 
agricultural crisis,r701 and by the end of the year, unemployment was well in excess of 
two tnillion. PI 1 
With a Reichstag election commg up in May, Der leitende Angestel!te agarn 
urged VELA members to become involved in the political pa11ies in order that a few 
of them might get elected to parliament, or at least be selected to stand as 
candidates.P21 On both counts they achieved absolutely no success. Just as bad from 
their point of view were the election results themselves. The gains of the SPD and 
KPD led them to believe that the radical currents on the left would gain more 
influence. Their despised foes, the Massengewerkschaften, would be closer to the 
centres of power and able to extract even more favourable treatment for au.~fUhrende 
Arheiter at the expense of the geistige 5'chicht, leading to even more economic and 
cultural Nivel!ierung. To add disillusiomnent to disappointment, J)er leitende 
Ange5:tellte noted that the hiirgerlich parties had colluded in creating a situation 
which marked an all-time low point in the spirit of German political life, from which 
the influence of the geistige schqffende Schicht had been even further excluded than 
before. The failure of these parties to choose appropriate candidates from among the 
Ku!turschicht, their cosying-up to mass-organisation and capital-owning pressure 
groups, and the imminent prospect of the Reichstag beco1ning nothing more than a 
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battleground for competing interest-groups, would soon make obvious the political 
and cultural crisis of the state which was already apparent to VELA.P31 
I-1owever, even before the bad news of the election and the subsequent 
appointtnent of an SPD-Ied coalition government had been announced, VELA seemed 
to be anticipating increasing political tensions, and possibly crisis, developing not too 
far ahead, and vvas fishing around for political answers and tactics. An a11icle in April 
said that the leitende Angestellten were helping to create a Volksschicht which would, 
in the future, be courted for its political support. It would naturally be attacked by 
those who believed in class struggle, but it had the pow·er to determine whether the 
security, power and wealth of the possessing classes were to continue, depending 
upon whose side this powerful Schicht aligned itself with.P4 J This was an 
over-extravagant claim, but it does indicate that VELA's politics were developing, 
not just out of fear or reaction, but also from a sense of optimism, self-belief and a 
fonvard-looking mentality. An ele1nent of that, perhaps overblown, self-confidence 
was evident in an earlier atiicle, which declared that the Benifsschicht was so fuli nf 
intelligent, strong-wi11ed, geistig people that it should be a matter of no great 
difficulty for a small number of such intellectually-capable men to infiltrate the 
political parties, spread their beliefs and take over the leadership positions. f7Sl Yet 
another article clai1ned that the current political and econotnic leadership of Germany 
was not as sure and forward-looking as the leadership of yesteryear because, like the 
third generation of business owners, it was made up of men who were pa11 of an older 
world, of an out-of-date Zeitgeist. Modern economic leadership required special skil1s 
and insights~ it demanded knowledge of ne\v technologies, advances in organisational 
procedures, and innovative means of selling products to the consumer; but it also 
required that senior managers possess the ability to delegate while still retaining 
recognition of their full authority throughout their area of responsibility. Leitende 
Angestel/ten had changed and adapted to the altered conditions of the modern world 
over the past ten years, whereas the entrepreuneurial class had not - and neither had 
the 'political class' .1761 
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During the ten-year history of VELA recounted up to this point, Der feitende 
Angestellte had a fondness for quoting and commenting favourably upon the \Vorks of 
recent nationalist and vtJ!kisch literary works~ and 1928 was no exception. On this 
occasion it was Oswald Spengler's Untergang des Abendlande (DecJjne of the West), 
published in 1922.1771 Spengler argued that all civilisations and cultures were subject to 
the process of decay and decline in accordance with a historical predeterminism. The 
spirit of Western civilisation had died, and a soulless expansionist Caesaris1n was 
upon the world. It was better for Western man, at this juncture, to be an engineer 
rather than a poet, a soldier instead of an artist, a politician rather than a 
philosopher.11111 The Nazis, of course, loved this sort of grand; sweeping, historical 
philosophising, with its invocation of cosmic forces controlling destiny, and its 
element of prophecy about the coming of a new era where action was to take 
precedence over reflection. Spengler' s eschatological vision must also have struck 
some resonance among those VELA members \vhose vision of the future had evolved 
into seeing themselves as dynamic, far-sighted, geistig technocrats leading the nation 
into a new age - an age where their particular skills and PersOnlichkeit would be the 
most apt and effective, both in the emerging economic and technological conditions, 
and in the Zeitgeist of this dawning epoch. The writer of the article in question agreed 
with Spengler that Western, and not just German, culture was in a state of crisis. 
Attetnpting to turn back the clock was not the solution~ the hope for the future, at 
least for the Fatherland, lay with the emergence of the geistige .._~'chichl, that product 
of modern socio-economic development, as a po·wer factor in a modern and realistic 
Germany. 1791 
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Chapter 8 
VELA 1929-1932: Political Choice 
The year 1929 began with Germany experiencing a lock-out of 230,000 workers 
in the Ruhr iron and steel industries, a dispute which had been going on for many 
weeks. The agricultural crisis was deepening and causing widespread rural 
bankruptcies, while the number of unemployed was pushing the three-million mark.1
1
1 
Aready serious splits were appearing in the Grand-Coalition government of Hermann 
Muller spanning the SPD, the Centre Pa11y, the DDP and the DVP. As the year 
progressed, the situation in Germany became bleaker and more fraught, sta11ing with 
the publication of the Young Plan in June, which reopened many raw vvounds and 
rekindled the bitter debate on reparations and war guilt. This was now conducted with 
the volwne of nationalist rhetoric emanating from the political right turned way up. 
Around the opposition to the Young Plan there began to emerge shifting and fractious 
alliances of vtj/kisch groups, nationalists, the 5'tahlhelm (right-wing veterans' 
association), the DNVP and the NSDAP, conjunctions which would break up and 
reform over the next three-and-a-half years until the Nazi Party emerged don1inant.l2
1 
On the 3rd of October, 1929, Gustav Stresemann, the leader and vo1ce of 
compromise in the DVP, died. With his passing, his own party and the other 
'bourgeois' parties slid ever further to the right.Pl The NSDAP, meanwhile, was 
doubling and trebling its vote in Uinder and local elections, largely at the expense of 
these bourgeois parties, whose response was to adopt even more illiberal stances.l
4
J As 
if a11 this was not bad enough, on October 24th, the stock market on 'vVall Street 
crashed, sending out shockwaves which were amplified by their intersection with 
Germany's domestic economic crises and her particular reliance upon foreign 
investment capital, especially loan capita1.151 The ensuing economic disintegration was 
accompanied by a plunge into political self-destruction - or, perhaps more accurately, 
the murder (or at least manslaughter) of democracy. This came about in large measure 
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as a result of intrigue and dramatic misjudgements by various right-wing statesmen 
and agrarians around the less-than-democratically-inclined President Hindenburg. fGJ 
The first step on this road was the plot hatched between Hindenburg, the 
leadership of the DNVP and General Kurt von Schleicher of the Defence Ministry to 
unseat Chancellor Muller and install Heinrich Bri.ining in his place to govern by 
decree, a power denied to his Social-Democratic predecessor. As well as effectively 
undermining parliament, a further by-product of this intrigue was the holditig of 
unscheduled elections for the Reichstag in September 1930, a singularly ill-judged 
political move which resulted in the NSDAP receiving a vote eight times as large as it 
had done in 1928. Bri.ining, in turn, was ousted in 1932 by a conspiracy, again 
involving von Schleicher and 1-Iindenburg, but this time also with the support of 
Hitler. This led to the inept and totally unrepresentative 'cabinet of barons' of Franz 
von Papen, more elections, and a doubling of the Nazi vote. There followed furiher 
scherning by von Schleicher and, fina1Jy, counter-scheming by an embittered von 
Papen, whose desire for revenge was so consuming that he was willing to back Hitler, 
for whom he had no liking, for the position of Reich Chancellor - just as popular 
support for the NSDAP appeared to have peaked and begun to ebb in the November 
election.Pl 
This sequence of spectacular misjudgements was carried out largely by a cast( e) 
of men who were extremely authoritarian and anti-democratic, but who were also 
traditional conservatives whose world-view had largely been formed in Imperial times. 
For this reason~ amongst many others, the forward-looking VELA and Der leitende 
A ngestel/te had no love for any of the chancellors or governments ·which followed on 
from the fall of the socialist Muller until the coming of Hitler. This chapter looks at 
the issues which were being discussed within \TELA during this period of intensifYing 
economic and politial crises, from the watershed year of 1929 until the eve of Hitler's 
elevation to the chanceiJorship, just as the final plot and greatest miscalculation of all 
was being set in motion by the soon-to-be-ancien nJgi1ne around Hindenburg. 
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Although the ever-deepening and widening depression tended to focus the 
attention of Der leitende Angestellte writers on to socio-economic and political 
matters in the years 1929 to 1932, the other four themes described in the last chapter 
still permeated the articles appearing in the periodical during this crisis period. The 
issues of personality and leadership were the most pursued within the theme of 
Geistigkeit. It was claimed in one article that leaders had different tnentalities from 
those of the masses; they were innovators motivated by an individual, driving 
life-force to overcome problems by the strength of their characters! - an idea not 
terribly far re1noved frmn the concept of the 'triumph of the will,. An earlier article 
attetnpted to explain the special nature of the schtjpjerische geistige A rheit which was 
the hallinark of such born leaders, but the analysis quickly slipped into a tautological 
fog of assertion, arguing that such creative work was unmeasurable, unclassifiable and 
unlearnable, and that it could only be recognised by the way it made apparent the 
individuality of the leader. [91 Yet another article had a stab at this, clai1ning that the 
position of leitende Angestellte required more character and morality than any other 
in a firm. Senior salaried managers \Vere the social and national conscience of 
everyone else connected with the company, struggling against the egotism, selfishness 
and materialism emanating fi-om the antagonistic forces of capital and labour. They set 
an example to au.~fiihrend workers, and fulfilled the role of making lower-level 
employees feel that they were part of the enterprise, in the way that paternal owners 
of 19th-century firms had done, but which was not now an option for them in this age 
of enormous industrial plants and amalgamated businesses.[JOJ 
The line of reasoning of these somewhat hazy, patronising and wishful-thinking 
analyses contrasted sharply with the argument adopted by Dr Everling of the 
.)'chutzkartell deutscher Geistesarheiter, although all agreed ultimately on the superior 
worth of Geistigkeit. Never one to mince his words, Everling stated bluntly that there 
was a qualitative difference between manual work and brain work: manual labour was 
more extensive in German society, but brain power was more valuable. It was 
self-evident that without the input of creativity and management, capital and labour 
had little value. Without its geistig contributors, no nation, especially not a disarmed 
258 
and robbed one~ could hope to rebuild itself But there was more to it than just an 
economic dimension. Geistige Arheil had a cultural, ethical, social and political 
significance for the nation. Without the fostering of that special creative Schicht, there 
would be no 'cultural goods' for the masses, who, in any case, demanded Geistigkeit 
from leaders in the state, the economy, science and the arts. I' 'l This concurred with 
the writer of the first article who said that in the mass of people there lay a deep 
desire for leadership, but if a nation's leaders were weak or ineffective, as they were 
in Germany at present, then the desire could easily be perverted into hostility against 
the very concepts of leadership and personality by levelling socialists.l' 2l 
The theme of differential rewards, over the four years in question, was pursued at 
great length, but ·largely in a practical and defensive manner. Literally dozens of 
articles argued that the higher salaries of leitende Angestelllen were being unfairly and 
disproportionately targeted for increased income tax, supplementary taxes, crisis 
levies and special, emergency welfare contributions. Additionally, managers had not 
received the same levels of wage increases which manual and clerical \VOrkers had. 
been awarded since 1924, and thus the gap betv-1een the highly-skilled, educated and 
geistig employees of the Kullurschichl and the ungelernt (unskiJled/uneducated) 
remainder was narrowing.1 131 While short-time working for au.~fiihrend workers might 
be a necessary evil in a time of economic crisis) it was wholly unsuitable and 
degrading for leitende Ange .. \·tellten to be treated as hourly-rate workers~ it would 
reduce both performance and motivation.r 141 
One retnarkable line of special pleading was the clai1n that 'quality thinking' and 
geistige Leistung could only be produced under circumstances where managers' 
material needs were satisfied beyond the level of mere survival, where 'cultural 
nourishment' was readily obtainable, and where there was a genuine prospect of 
personal economic success as a spur to action. Active leadership was incompatible 
with soul-destroying proletarianisation, and, since leadership was the most important 
factor of production in any firm, it should be prioritised for protection and 
promotion. ~' 5 1 One wonders if it ever occurred to these still financially-privileged 
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people that everyone, including the merely au.~fiihrend, performs better when they are 
free fi·om financial worries. It is also tempting to remark that this line of reasoning 
suggests, not so much the (ihermenschen of Nietzschean cultural-elitism thinking 
which infonned their geistig self-conceit, but conjures up instead an image of fragiJe 
and demanding hothouse flowers, scarcely suitable for the red-in-tooth-and-claw 
world of Social Darwinis1n, or even the more gentle-sounding concept of a 
meritocracy. 
Nothing new , and indeed very little in total, was said about the idea of a special 
geistige Schicht. Perhaps this was because the concept had become so deeply-rooted 
in VELA's mentality that it was taken for granted that such a stratum of society was a 
reality. It is certainly the case that the phrases geistige Schicht, Kulturschicht and 
neuer Miltelstand were employed frequently in articles. Equally, Dr Everling, 
chairman of the Protective Cartel of German Intellectual Workers, had become an 
honorary member of VELA, while the Schutzkartell itself was an affiliated 
organisation. The very raison d 'et re of the 5,'chutzkarte/l was to promote unity and 
identification among the sectors of professionals, higher state officials, senior 
managers in business and the loosely-defined realm of culture. Or Everling continued 
to contribute articles to Der leitende Angestellte and delivered a speech at each of 
VELA's general asse1nblies in 1929, 1930 and 1932.! 161 
An alternative, or possibly complementary~ interpretation of the lack of 
discussion of the special Schicht might suggest that, having created this conceptual 
union, and having even made it real to the extent of forging social and cultural links to 
other geistig groups, it was now dawning upon many VELA members that even this 
enlarged and supposedly significant group still required a political vehicle for the 
delivery of their vision of a better future. Many of the regular contributors to the 
magazine had developed certain lines of thought within VELA which had provided its 
members with a very welcome ideological and social-psychological underpinning to 
their sense of identity and self-esteem~ they had forn1ulated a cohesive critique of 
contemporary socio-economic conditions, practices and institutions~ and they had also 
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graphically shown how counter-productive the Weimar political system was when 
even the so-cal1ed middle-class parties seemed to be in the pockets of big business and 
the Monopolgewerkschaften. Yet this political analysis had not really developed very 
much since the mid-1920s, while the economic and political conditions of Germany 
had changed dramatically by the early 1930s. VELA had stood stiJI on this important 
matter, clinging rigidly to its declared political neutrality. Indeed, as has already been 
mentioned in the previous chapter, articles in Der leitende Angestellte on speeches by 
VELA' s leadership at regional gatherings often showed that exactly the same contents 
were being reported. Or Muffelmann took to giving very si1nilar speeches at each 
year's general assembly involving recounting the history of VELA and telling the 
same anecdotes about senior managers being taken off in wheelbarrows and dumped 
on rubbish tips in the dark days of socialist revolution in 1918 and 1919. A geistige 
5ychicht was a good idea, but perhaps was only ever going to achieve anything if it 
acquired political direction and political influence. 
On the question of the Volk and the Volk\gemeinschqft, in 1929l VELA's ideas 
were still largely of a conventional bourgeois right-wing nationalist kind, seeing their 
own class, sector or Schicht as part of a sacred German whole vvhen dealings with the 
outside world were at issue, but regarding themselves as quite separate and above the 
lower 1niddle class and working class in domestic matters. The organisation's 
antipathy towards trade unions) which continued unabated through to 1932, along 
with all the trouble they had gone to over a decade to define themselves as superior 
tnen, made the idea of solidarity with lesser, ausfiihrend employees a hard one to 
come to grips with. However, the apparent mismanagement of the economy was 
leading them towards a more pronounced critique of the policies and practices of 
Germany's big-business owners and their representatives in and around government. 
By enlisting the 'national interest' to bolster their analysis of Weimar' s current crisis, 
it was important to have some sort of line on the Volk and on how leitende 
Angestellten were an integral and contributing part of it. Claims of the efficiency, 
productivity and value-adding abilities of senior managers were all very well, but, in 
these highly-politicised and ideologically-charged times, it seemed necessary to send 
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out a message that transcended the merely material. The political and socio-economic 
language of these years was fiiied with references to community, unity and the Volk, 
cOJning from both the left and the right, and VELA could not avoid having to deal in 
these terms. 
As in 1925, when the word Volk\gemeinschajt entered the vocabulary of Der 
leitende Angestellte for the first tiJne, and when Dr Pieper, the spiritual leader of the 
Christian trade-union movement, had been caiJed on in support of VELA's nascent 
vision of a national comtnunity, so too in 1931 was a Christian-social ethos advanced. 
This condemned liberalism as no longer constituting a viable, underlying economic 
doctrine because its materialist world-view was devoid of morality and ethics. It 
treated employees as mere economic units, interchangeable at will, dispensable at a 
whiin. Very few firms still generated a spirituaJ sense of belonging for their workers, 
creating a fatalistn and pessimism across the entire spectrum of German society. But a 
ne\v age was cotning. It was the task of leitende Angeste/!ten to restore an ethical 
dimension into business as this era developed. The ethos of the paternal and 
patriarchal companies of the 19th century needed to be restored, but this time utilising 
modern means. Firms should employ 'social secretaries', 'social engineers' and 
factory nurses in order to make the workforce feel part of the whole concern. There 
should be regular speech-hours by senior management and works' newspapers to 
keep everyone informed and inspired, and to create a purposeful and harmonic 
atmosphere in the company. Germany's problem was a human, not a technological, 
one - as was its solution. Leitende Angestellten must strive selflessly as the spirit and 
heart of each plant and finn, always keeping their eyes fixed on the greater good of 
the German Volk, and this ethic, which was a matter of faith, had to be spread to all 
employees, and, in due course, to the whole nation. 1171 
This Christian-social ethic, however, for all its uplifting proselytising rhetoric, 
was essentially ethereal and hollow, especially in such grim and hostile times as the 
Depression years. It embodied a rather out -of-touch wishful thinking and proposed 
little more than peripheral social tinkering. lt was also rather similar in tone to sotne 
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of the ar1icles about Geistigkeit described above, and just as Everling came back at 
them with a much more hard-nosed analysis, so too did the writer of a later article Dr 
' 
Mausebach, in his vision of a Volksgemeinschaft. He began this article, entitled 
'Planning - Leadership - Order', by summarising approvingly the ideas contained in a 
recent book by Dr E. Wachter, also entitled 'Planung - F"iihrung - Ordnung'. 
Mausebach said that these ideas were to be recommended to, and should be taken 
seriously by, VELA because, although they were political, they stood above and 
beyond parties. Wachter argued that, in the interests of the Volk, there must be a 
concerted effort to devise a future economic system built upon an idealism 
characterised by the leitmotiv, 'Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz' (community benefit before 
self-interest). This phrase \Vas one of the favourite slogans of the NSDAP,I' 81 and it is 
almost inconceivable that Mausebach could have possibly believed that this was not 
party political. Either he was astonishingly ignorant, blindly naive, or else actually 
believed the claim of the Nazis that, despite being a political movement, their politics 
and beliefs transcended normal party-vested interests. 1' 91 
Wachter's book was a critique of the current economic and poljtical leadership in 
Germany, and he argued that, to be a genuine nationalist, one had to put aside al1 
concerns with the self, alJ individualistic an1bitions, and devote one's entire efforts to 
improving the conditions and building up the strength of the German people as a 
vvhole - the Volksgenossen (racial con1rades), yet another linguistic halhnark of the 
NSDAP. Egotism was a vice which was encouraged by the individualism of 
liberalisn1, setting individuals and groups against each other and consequently 
weakening the nation. Only by looking to the Volk as a whole, as a 
mutually-supportive community, could this anti-nationalist egotism be overcome. It 
could not, however, just be wished away by pious sentiments. A new sort of 
leadership was needed, both economic and political, which genuinely etnbodied this 
altruistic spirit. This was to be found in that generation of Gennans who been shaped 
by the KriegL ... :erlebnis der Front (war experience at the Front). This was not only a 
major theme of the extreme right in Weimar Gennany, and of contemporary vtJlkisch 
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writers such as Ernst Ji.inger, but it was also a thinly-veiled attack on the older 
conservative leadership of the bourgeois middle-class parties. 
Wachter went on to argue that what Germany needed for its practical 
revitalisation was a planned economy, run on miltary principles as it had been in the 
Great War,1201 although with less of a role for the trade unions who had changed for 
the worse. Capitalist profits were not the driving force then, so they need not be now. 
This would, of course, require a certain narrowing of economic freedoms, but he did 
not envisage going as far as creating a state economy, since there were no examples 
to show that such a system worked better than a privately-owned one. Mausebach 
commended all of Wachter's ideas to VELA's membership, with only slight 
reservations about the notion of a state-directed economy, since the set-up in the last 
war had produced over-bureaucratisation and a great surge in the growth of carte1sl21 J 
What Mausebach's article demonstrates is threefold. Firstly, it shows that there 
was a degree of debate and disagreement within VELA over the nature of the 
authoritarian politics which the organisation was developing - or at least indicates that 
there was a variance in the speed with which its individual members were heading for 
the extreme nationalist and anti-democratic right. Secondly, VELA' s conservative 
nationalism of 1929 was undergoing challenge and change by 1932. Thirdly, this 
article atnounted to a Nazi socio-economic and political philosophy being offered up 
for approval in the pages of VELA' s official in-house journal. Significantly, too, it 
appeared in the edition of Der leitende Angestellle which was published in early July, 
1932, just a couple of weeks before the crucial Reichstag election where the Nazi 
vote shot up to 37.3%, and to much higher levels in upper-middle-class urban 
areas.[221 In keeping with VELA's avowed strict patty-political neutrality, no 
recommendation on how to vote in the July 1932 election was made anywhere in the 
pages of Der leitende Angeste!lte. Yet, although the NSDAP had not once been 
mentioned by name in Mausebach's article, to anyone \Vith any political awareness 
whatsoever, in the midst of a swell of criticism of von Papen's govermnent and a 
continuing disillusionment with the bourgeois parties being apparently beholden to big 
business, large agrarian interests and the lv!assengewerks·ch{.~ft.en, this exceptionally 
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long 'book review', covering two full pages, was quite obviously a plug for the Nazi 
Party. 
The many articles in Der /eitende Angestellle which talked about the concepts of 
a national community and, increasingly, of a Volksgemeinschaft, shaded very much 
into the political analysis and discussion which was starting to take up more and tnore 
of the periodica1's subject matter as the Depression progressed. In the past, Der 
leitende Angestellte had always been very circumspect in its treatment of politicians of 
the centre and right, almost never aiming criticism at specific par1ies or people. 
However, during the Depression years, this began to change. 
From as early as 1929, it became clear that I-feinrich Briining was held in very 
low esteem by the magazine's writers. He was condemned in his role as finance 
1ninister for continuing a policy of high taxation and social spending, betraying the 
promise he had made the previous year to cut taxes once government fiscal receipts 
had exceeded 1,200 million marks.P31 This criticism grew even louder in 1 930 vvh·~n 
Bri.ining, by now Chancellor, was accused of showing favouritisn1 towards the 
Massengewerkschq(fen's demands. Ffis practice of first assessing what government 
expenditure on social welfare was going to amount to, and then setting taxes in order 
to raise the necessary income, was described as a completely backwards way of 
running a financial system, one that would never be tolerated in a commercial 
enterprise. It amounted to a self-defeating economic policy which did not reflect what 
Germany could afford. It led to oppressive taxation levels resulting in a squeezing of 
national purchasing power, vvhich then led to fur1her factory closures and deeper 
recession. l24 l This hostility to Bruning continued through 193 11251, and reached a peak 
in April 1932, just weeks before he was ousted in favour ofFranz von Papen. He was 
accused of attempting to find a solution to Gennany's econ01nic crisis by looking 
solely to international action and intervention rather than promoting the idea of 
self-help and reconstn1ction from within the nation. Indeed, continued one article, he 
appeared to be presiding over the internal decline of the German economy in order to 
force the hand of her creditors (presutnably meaning the countries to which Gennany 
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still _owed reparations)~ this was a disastrously self-destructive policy, one which was 
even rebounding to the disadvantage of the Reich's foreign policy and international 
status. 1261 One reason for this enduring dislike of Brlining was that, from 1920 until 
1930, he served as business manager for the League of German Trade Unions,f271 
hence VELA's strange belief that he was somehow a champion of labour. 
I-Iowever, the hostility towards Bruning was as little compared to the deep 
antipathy towards van Papen, which culminated in a polemical diatribe against him in 
early November, 1 93 2. He was accused of running a dictatorship on behalf of a feudal 
class, his cabinet of barons being described as 'Manner ohne Volk' (men \Vithout [the] 
people)~ his government, it said, was representative of only a small circle of industrial 
capitalists and large landowners. Far too much aid was being doled out to farming, 
and the largesse shown to the landowning aristocracy in the form of Osthi!fe (Eastern 
Aid) was just like a return to the corrupt practices of the 1880s and 1890s. 
Big-business owners were receiving tax cuts while employees were being burdened 
with ever more e1nergency levies and short working hours. Von Papen knew nothing 
about either brain-work or manual labour, and this showed in the fact that his 
measures were having no effect whatsoever. His policies ·were in fact madness.'281 
One of these 'mad' policies, it \Vas claimed~ was a proposal that Germany should 
embark upon a course of Autarkie, or self-sufficiency. This had already been 
discussed in several earlier issues of Der leitende Angeslellle, and was consistently 
rejected as impractical and counter-productive, on the grounds that Germany was 
short of too many raw materials, that she gained a net benefit fi·om international trade, 
and that the consequences of erecting import barriers would be retaliation from other 
nations and a further flight of capital.1291 Aularkie was to become a central policy plank 
of the NSDAP by 1 936,P0l and it shows that VELA's thinking was not identical to 
that of the Nazis on all points. The thinking of leitende Angestelllen \Vas influenced by 
their high and knowledgeable position in the modern world of business and industry 
where a strong current of pro-international trade, apart frotn within some of the heavy 
industries, held sway in 1932. VELA's views on many economic matters were not so 
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very different from those of Hjalmar Schacht, the once-and-future president of the 
Reichshank, who began to be attracted by the ideas of National Socialism and the 
perceived genius of I1itler around 1930, although he was never a supporter of a policy 
of self-suffiiciency.P 1J Two months before Schacht resigned from the bank in March, 
1930 in protest at the Young Plan, Or Muffelmann went out of his way to praise him 
for his analysis of Germany's current crisis, and declared that he was the man who 
would save the nation at the last moment. Mutfelmann said that he knew this to be 
tn1e because he was a friend of Schacht, had once worked as his assistant, and could 
vouch for hi1n as a practical and non-romantic man. r32 J 
There were, however, many areas where VELA did support, or come round to 
supporting, policies advocated by the NSDAP in the latter years of the Weimar 
Republic_l33l In late 1930, Der leitende Angestellte rep011ed favourably upon a 
proposal to ban foreign seasonal workers from working in German agriculture, and 
declared that VELA had supported this measure for some long while.1341 A few 
months later it was discussing the merits of expelling all non-Germans except tho:'e 
who had been registered as citizens before August l st, I 914_13-'l 1n early 1931, the 
issue of outlawing J)oppelverdiener (double-earners), or people with two jobs.f361 first 
appeared in the periodical. Although at first sceptical about the idea, before the end of 
the year VELA had accepted the principle of banning all public employees from 
holding a second job. By 1932, it was taking seriously a proposal to forbid the wives 
of government officials from taking up paid employment, later extending this to 
discouraging all married women from going out to \Vork. It even gave consideration 
to the call, first put forward by the Wirt.w:haft.sy;artei (Economic Party) and soon 
taken up by the NSDAP, to actively decrease the number ofwomen, both single and 
married, working in the civil service and to replace them with unemployed menY1l 
The issue of compulsory labour service, strongly supported by the Nazis as a 
way to relieve the unemployment problem and as a means of instilling discipline and a 
sense of duty into young Germans,l38l \Vas at first opposed in the pages of Der leitende 
Angestellte when it was broached in October, 1930. A debate on this question was 
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carried out over the next 20 months, by which time VELA had come round to 
supporting the idea. On the way there the discussion had gone down some interesting 
routes. The idea of a voluntary labour service was quickly taken up as a worthwhi]e 
idea, with the suggestion that this might be run by existing voluntary organisations 
who were in a position to be able to provide the necessary factors of education, 
training, physical fitness, strengthening of character and teaching of the virtues of 
service to the Fatherland, ideally along the lines of the milita1y-service year of pre-war 
days. As an example of the sort of group which he had in mind, the writer of one 
particular article suggested the Artaman League. The Artaman League was a 
right-wing viilkisch organisation of young nationalists v.;ho were virulently anti-Slavic 
and devoted to the Blut-und-Boden doctrine. They advocated the forcible removal of 
Polish fanners from the eastern German lands, to be replaced by racially-pure 
Germans, a tributary of the grander theory of LebensraJ/117. Among the league's 
members in the 1920s were Heinrich Himmler, Wait her Darn~ and Rudo1f Hoess, the 
future com1nander of Auschwitz extermination camp. [JYJ It was indeed suggested that 
the unemployed be put to work on the land, but an ~qually serious debate was entered 
into on the merits of compelling unemployed workers to work in factories producing 
goods solely for export at wages set at 70% of the going rate, in order to cut down 
the costs of these outward-bound goods and undercut rival nations. f401 
Unsurprisingly, the question of whether the senior managers of these export 
cotnpanies should consist of conscripted, unemployed leitende Angeste!lten working 
at less than three quarters of their customaty salary, was never raised. 
Just as important as agreement with the NSDAP on specific policies, was a 
growing sense of estrangement from the the perceived ruling class or establishn1ent. 
VELA had long been hostile to the trade-union movement and socialism, and 
regarded its members as inherently superior to manual and non-managerial workers. 
Now, however, criticism of the owners of big business and of their bourgeois and 
aristocratic· political representatives and placemen began to intensify. The tone of this 
outrage was captured in an article in 1930 which reported on an Oberingenieur 
(senior engineer) who had poisoned himself and his entire family in despair at losing 
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his job and having insufficient pension funds. On the very same day, retired Admiral 
Franz was appointed to a position on the board of directors of Rhein~netalJ AG, given 
a large salary and allowed to keep his generous state-guaranteed pension. This man 
knew nothing about engineering and yet he now had the power to decide the policy of 
a major industrial f1rm. This was neither morally right nor in the national interest.f4 '1 
VELA' s analysis, first put forward in the mid- 1 920s, that the interests of 
big-business owners were not necessarily synonymous with those of senior 
management, or perhaps even with business and capitalism itself, was solidifYing and 
bec01ning more radical as Germany's twin economic and political crises worsened. 
The idea that there was a tiredness of the entrepreneurial spirit and an unwillingness 
to take risks in the ossified, comfortable and complacent upper levels of business 
owners and boards of directors was talked about at great Iength.142 J One particular 
development of this idea argued that the bureaucratic mentality, which had been 
rightly criticised as personifying all that had been wrong with the pre-war rigid ethos 
of the state civil service, had infested the ownership layers of business. These were 
now full of bean1tet (appointed-for-life) people who had turned the German economy 
into a mass of car1els and trusts designed for two purposes - profits and the 
permanence of their over-rewarded positions. The destruction of capitalism \vould 
come, not from too many socialists nor insufficient capital, but from a surfeit of weak, 
timid entrepreneurs, too many sinecures and too much bureaucratic method.'43 1 
Another article echoed aiJ these sentiments) declaring that a failure of econOJnic 
leadership had alienated the mass of the workforce and driven it into the arms of 
communism. What was needed were new men, promoted from below, with talent and 
personality. 1441 
A critique of capitalism was, by the time of the Depression, emerging in VELA. 
This essentially amounted to a rejection of laissez-:faire economic liberalism, which 
had come to be blamed for being one of the causes of the present crisis. 1451 Indeed, one 
at1icle placed the origins of Gennany' s current problems in the French Revolution, 
which had spavv'ned detnocratic principles out of which .came the liberal spirit. This 
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selfish creed had led to the development of the present-day system of 
. f ' . fi d ' [-16J 
J-Jochkapitalismus, operating under the seduct1ve banner o economic ree om . 
What this had actually given rise to was corruption, which always seemed to be most 
widespread in states with a democratic foundation and a large-scale finance-capital 
system. Capital interests and banking power were turning the country into one 
mammoth economic concern, with unnerving similarities to the Russian communist 
system. Finance capital and its corollary, finance politics, were paralysing the 
economy and strangling the spirit of enterprise. The present variant of capitalism was 
cOining to an end, and the issues at stake were: what would replace it, and could it be 
achieved without bloodshed?i471 
Here was not only a critique of economic liberalism, but a tying-together of 
capitalism and Bolshevism through the medium of finance capital. This was one of the 
NSDAP's most often trumpeted claims, with the concept 'finance capital' being code 
for 'Jews'. In a fu11her article, one contributor ca11ed for the 'breaking of interest 
slavery' ,r4x1 a phrase coined by the early Nazi ideologue, Gottfried Fed er, and 
enshrined in the NSDAP's 25-point Pat1y Programme of 1920. This concept argued 
that there \Vas a difference between 'productive' and (parasitical' capital, the latter 
being loan capital rented out at usurious rates of interest, which, claimed Feder, cou)d 
always be traced back to the Jews. 1491 lt would be improper to deduce that what we 
are seeing here was an example of a covet1 anti-Semi tic doctrine being peddled in the 
pages of l)er leitende Angestellte. It is enough to take it at face value that the writers' 
hostility to impersonal share capital and a disillusiomne.nt with the performance of 
Germany's tycoons were what inspired this critique. What is important is that VELA 
was developing a political-economic analysis which matched that of the NSDAP \vhen 
it was stripped of its biological and racist pillars, an analysis which no other major 
political party of the right was promulgating. 
VELA's critique of capitalism could possibly be summed up by using a medical 
metaphor. The patient \vas sick and anaemic~ he probably required surgery and 
certainly needed an infusion of new blood, but he could and should be saved. The 
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prognosis for the current political system, however, was bleaker. Already, by 1930, 
Der leitende Angestel!Le was announcing that parliament had dug a grave for itself,l501 
and that the party-political system was breaking down.rsiJ An increasing number of 
calls were heard for a strong state to protect the interests of the middle classes and to 
elevate capable men with powerful leadership personalities into positions of 
responsibility. This culminated with an a11icle in September, 1932 arguing that 
Germany needed institutions which could compel people to work and co-operate in 
the national interest~ such compulsion would create mutual responsibility and 
revitalise the nation's industry. In October, another piece claimed that all policies 
would fail as long as government failed to take authoritarian scientific measures to 
reshape the economy. rs21 The next edition carried an article referring to the Reichstag 
as an Jnteressentenhal{[en (a heap of special interests), a phrase notable for the fact 
that it was one employed by Hitler in his diatribes against parliamentary democracy.r531 
This san1e article declared that the dissatisfaction with the present parliamentary 
system was near-universal in the country. The German Volk were expressing not just 
discontent with their Reichstag representation, but had lost faith in democracy and the 
Weimar constitution.r54l This was the second time in six months that [)er /eitende 
Angestellle had declared that the Gennan people had come to the conclusion that 
fundamental change was needed. rss] 
By the close of 193 2, VELA' s political analysis had caught up \Vith its 
ideological Weltanschauung. It was now advocating radical political change in order 
to implement the economic and stuctural business reforms it had long held were 
necessary for Germany's well-being and national strength. It had demonstrated clearly 
that it had lost all belief in leading statesmen such as Chancellors Bruning and von 
Papen, although both men were of very right-wing persuasions. It had denounced the 
bourgeois parties as beholden to big-business owners and the powers of the mass 
trade unions. It had expressed a lack of faith not only in the present development of 
capitalism, but a]so in the political and constitutional system of Weimar Germany. It 
had been praising the virtues of strong, personality-infused leadership for years and 
now wanted to see that quality in the political world. It was looking for a solution 
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which promised to transcend divisive self-interests, a crusade to create a community 
of the Volk where the interest of the Fatherland was put first. It wanted talent and 
new blood to be given greater opportunity. In the light of this, it does not seem all 
that remarkable to suggest that, by the time van Papen was conniving with 
I--Tindenburg and his entourage to appoint Hitler as Chancellor at the close of 1932, 
many leitende Angeste/lten had already opted for the NSDAP as the party which was 
most likely to deliver all of the above. 
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Chapter 9 
1933: VELA and the Coming of the Third Rei eh 
Deu tsche Vo!ksgenossen I 
lis ist heute ein ganz hesonderer Tag, an detn wir hier 
zusannnengekon1men sind .... Der heutige Tag [wirdj. .... m it grossen 
Lettern in den Annalen der Veta geschriehen werden. .... Es ist kein 
all!iigliches Ereignis, dass ein Verhand .... pliHzlich zu111 politischen 
Machtjaktor wird [!nd dies sind wir heute geworden, da 1nan uns.fi1r 
wiirdig befunden und berujen hat, an den1 neuen 5/taatsat!fbau in 
wirtschaftlicher ... .. Beziehung milzuarbeiten. Mitzuarbeiten als 
(IReich.\1'erband der Wirtschqftsleiter" in der FachJ.,rruppe 
'
1Wirtschqft" des Bundes Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Jurist en. 
Bedenken Sie, dass wir nur zwei Instanzen iiher uns haben, zwei 
Jnstanzen zwischen uns und unseren1 grossen Fiihrer Adolj 
lfitler .... .1st es nicht ein erhebendes Ge.fiihl, 1nitarbeiten zu d1J1.fen an 
den erhahenen Zielen, die sich unser Fiihrer, unser Reichskanz!er, 
geste/11 hat? 
Jahrelang ha ben wir angeklimpft gegen die lviacht der Masse ..... und 
inuner wieder hat man uns hDhnisch ins Gesicht gen{/en: fhr seidja 
nichts, euer Wirken ist nichts, euer Geist is/ nichts, eure Leislung ist 
nichts! Hi er zdhlt nur jene Gruppe ..... die von uns A1arxisten und 
Liberalisten ge_fiihrt wird l!nd da kan1 ein A1ann und hat den (Jeist 
1vieder zu seinem Recht verho[fen, der Verantwortung, der Leistung, 
der PerstJnlichkeit. 
German racial comrades! 
Today is a very special day on which we are gathered here ..... This 
day will be written in large letters in the annals of VELA ..... lt is not 
eve1y day that an association ..... suddenly emerges as a political power 
factor. Yet this is what we have now become, because we have been 
deemed worthy to collaborate on economic matters in the rebuilding of 
the state: to collaborate, under the name of the "Reich Association of 
Economic Leaders", in the specialised category "economy" within the 
Association of National Socialist German Jurists (BNSDJ). Just think 
about it~ only two levels of authority stand above us, two levels 
between us and our great leader, Adolf Hitler .... .Isn't it an uplifting 
feeling to be allowed to work towards the lofty goals \vhich we have 
been set by our Fi.ihrer, by our Reich Chancellor? 
For years we have struggled against the power of the m as se~ ..... and 
again and again they have mocked us to our face: you are nothmg, you 
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amount to nothing, your intellect is of no account, your achievements 
are non-existent! The only group that counts here ..... is the one led by 
us Marxists and liberals. And then there came a man who had the spirit 
and intelligence to set about restoring to their rightful piace 
responsibility, achievement and personality. 
Dr Alfred Helzel, Chairman of VELA, 
addressing the General Assembly, August 
6th, 1933.111 
This chapter looks at events within VELA in I 933 and considers how and why 
the organisation, which had always declared itself resolutely non-party-politica1, 
finally lined up behind the NSDAP. The phenomenon of G!eichschaltung, the 
near-universal nazification of organisations, large and small, across Germany in the 
spring and summer of 1933, is central to this question.12J Was the event unwelcome 
and imposed upon VEL~ as was, for example, the case with most trades unions and 
their members on May 2nd,l31 or was it the cul1nination of a political and ideological 
process which made the . principal organisation of German senior management 
amenable to such a happening? Was the emerging Een~f of leitende Angestellten and 
its reaction to National Socialism in any way representative of a wider trend apparent 
in other German professions, or indeed among the upper middle classes as a whole, in 
the years leading up to the Nazi Machliihernalune? 
In June of 1933 VELA' s in-house periodical was renamed Mitteilungsbkitter der 
Vela (Information Paper of VELA), and was thereafter issued only once a month. At 
the same time, however, VELA members began receiving a second magazine every 
fortnight, Die Deutsche Volkswirtschqjt (The German Political Economy), an NSDAP 
publication which had been twinned with VELA' s periodical as a part of the process 
of Gleichschallung. This had been done, declared the announcement in the last-ever 
edition of J)er leitende Angestellle, for the purpose of ensuring that VELA members 
were well-versed in contemporary political and economic questions and equipped 
with National Socialist insight into these isssues, because VELA was soon to be 
entrusted with important new tasks and responsibilities in the rebuilding of both state 
and economy.Hl Such political and structural closeness between VELA and the 
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NSDAP in the summer'of 1933 had not, however, been so apparent just five months 
earlier. 
In January and February of that year, Der leitende Angestellte avoided discussing 
current political events beyond making a few generalised observations and expressing 
a desire to see an end to party hatreds and the emergence of a strong leader to unite 
the econoJnically-battered nation.151 It contained almost no references to the NSDAP. 
The first four editions of that year also contained only one article of substance dealing 
with socio-economic theory, which previously had been a favourite vehicle in which 
to express and justifY the claims to importance for the occupation of leitende 
Angestellle. 
The central focus of that particular article was upon the argument that the 
German economy should be viewed and treated as an organism and not as a 
mechanical system. To treat economic activity as tantamount to a machine, whose 
individual parts - human beings - were interchangeable, was to destroy the geistig 
spirit by denying, and thereby severing, the link between the visible material world and 
the invisible world from whence came the actuating spirit of creativity. The author 
called upon the philosophy of Leibniz and the recently-published 'The End of 
Capitalism' by Ferdinand Fried,l61 a well known contemporary conservative vtJlkisch 
writer and editor of [)ie Tat,f71 in support of this metaphysical claim and to refute the 
spirit of Adam Smith with its emphasis upon quantifiable wealth as the measure of a 
nation's virility and greatness. Not only were econotnies organic, but so too were 
nations and races. Thus it was impossible to revive either by using merely 
one-dimensional economic tools such as a policy of reflation or credit manipulation. 
Living organisms regenerated from within and so it was essential to tap into the living 
spirit beyond the surface of economic phenomena. In an organism such as a race or a 
nation, only a truly penetrating, comprehensive and steely po)jtical wi11 could reach 
and act upon the moral and spiritual resources of its people, wherein lay the true 
measure of its vvorth and its ability to regenerate itself. 1 ~ 1 
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The filth edition of Der leitende Angestellte appeared at the beginning of March 
and was most certainly composed before the Reichstag election of March 5th. It 
studiously avoided any mention of this event despite its tremendous significance, 
which must have been palpable even in advance of the day. However, a prominent 
article praised the NSDAP for its advocacy of an organic state, that concept which 
had, curiously, cropped up unexpectedly in the pages of the magazine just a few 
weeks previously. It also approved of the fact that the NSDAP realised the 
itnportance of retaining and utilising economic organisations like VELA for the 
purpose of rebuilding the economy. The Party, it claitned, recognised the important 
strategic position of leitende Angestellten between profit-seeking capital and 
self-interested labour. Thus VELA should work closely with the new government, not 
just because so many of their views coincided, or because Hitler's government 
embodied so many of the strengths of the German nation, but because it was doubtful 
whether the present political and constitutional system was going to last much 
longer.19J 
That tirst-ever overt praise and unequivocal support for any political party in the 
pages of the magazine was swiftly followed in the second March edition by the 
reproduction on the front page of telegran1s sent on behalf of VELA to President 
Hindenburg and Reich Chancellor Hitler. These expressed a willingness and strong 
desire to work with the new government for the rebuilding of Germany, and especially 
welcomed the Reich Chancellor's emphasis upon the value and rights of personality. 
The /eifende Angestellten would now be able to utilise their nationalist work ethic 
more efTectively for the greater good of Germany. 1101 Immediately below the 
telegratns, in this first edition to be composed and published after the Tvlarch election, 
the very next article wasted no time in praising the policies of the Hitler government. 
and in declaring that the NSDAP's attitudes and aims were the same as those which 
VELA had been espousing since 1919: a rejection of parliamentary de1nocracy~ a new 
spirit of community, repudiation of collectivism and proletarianisation in favour of a 
system rewarding personality, personal responsibility and Leistung - and support for 
an organic state. 1'' 1 
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The articles in Der leitende Angestellte after March 5th 1933, and even after the 
subsequent late-spring (J/eichschaltung, are significant not so much for what is new, 
but for the sheer amount of material which 1nirrors and continues the ideas, concepts 
and aims which were being published in the magazine in the 1920s and early 1930s. 
Whole sections of articles appearing in 193 3 were lifted almost verbatim from ones 
printed up to ten years earlier. It was only to be expected that, post-C}leichschaltung, 
the periodical and VELA as a whole "vould have been praising the NSDAP and its 
Weltanschauung; and indeed they did - wholeheartedly. Some new ideas appeared, 
such as the concepts of the organic state and the Aryan race, the infallibility of Hitler 
and support for a one-party state. However, what is remarkable is the quantity of 
VELA's past history and its thinking which was enlisted to show how supportive it 
was of the NSDAP and how its critique of society had always been the same as that of 
National Socialism. This was not simply an attempt to pander to, or curry favour 
·with, the new regi1ne. What \:vas claimed in the last-quoted article from Der leitende 
Angestellte was essentially correct: that the ideology or T~Veltanschauung, developed 
over the previous 14 years and already largely in place by 1924-1925, did not need to 
undergo fundamental change after the Machtiibernahme. It merely required to amplify 
some themes, demote some others and add a few bolt-on Nazi hobby-horses. 
Of the five themes shown in chapter 7 to have originated in the early l920s, and 
to have permeated the pages of Der !eitende Angestellte between 1925 and 1932, two 
were pursued far less frequently in 1933 - differential rewards and the concept of a 
specially-endowed Schicht being made up of leitende Angestellten, free professionals 
and high state officials. Larger salaries were still implied but rarely spoken out loud, 
an understandable development when the SA, with its powerful current of 
anti-bourgeois egalitarianism, was still a force on the streets and within the NSDAP. 
ln addition, with all the talk of a comradely Volk~gen1einschq(L filling the air, to have 
demanded more money at a time of economic crisis and political 'revolution' would 
have seen1ed, at best, opportunist, and, at worst, an example of materialist liberal 







responsibility and power, then with those would automaticaiJy come enhanced 
reward. 
For political reasons the special Schicht was also played down, because, from 
May 30th, VELA became a component part of the BNSDJ and was thus bracketed 
with economists and jurists. There was still an affinity and identity with the legal 
Ben~(, but, in the emerging multi-centred polyocracy of the Third Reich, doctors, 
architects, chemists and university professors found new homes, representation and 
power bases in other NSDAP organisations and fiefdoms.[l 2J High state officials had 
the added disadvantage that the old Weimar regitne had been painted so black by Nazi 
propaganda that many people associated with its upper executive levels were tarred 
with the same brush of political unreliability.ruJ This did not cause Der !eitende 
Angestellte writers to abandon the idea of a special Schicht, but to narrow it back 
down to the pre- l 924 emphasis on the economically and ideologically strategic 
position which upper management held between capital and labour in the world of 
private business. The relevance and importance of senior managers for the better 
working, efficiency and creativity of the German economy were stressed, but so too 
was their commitment to the Volk and the Vo/ksgemeinschc_~ji, references to which 
theme multiplied enormously in 1933. Politically, spiritually and ideologically in 
harmony with the new regime's Weltanschauung, they focused upon pot1raying 
themselves as warriors against class war in the new order. 
The theme of Geistigkeit stil1 suffused the underlying ideology, self-definition and 
self-justification of VELA' s writers in 1933. The concepts of personality, will, 
creativity, Leistung and the Fiihreq;rinzip were scattered copiously throughout their 
m1icles - boldly so, because these virtues were clearly endorsed and promoted by the 
NSDAP.Il-lJ A new, if somewhat cumbersOJne, term was even coined to express the 
extent of the grasp that VELA's members had of the leadership qualities required by 
National Socialist ideology - Gen7einschaftsperstinlichkeit, or the community-oriented 
personality.1 15l At VELA' s general assembly in August, yet another prescribed virtue 
was added to the character specifications of the National Socialist new man and the 
280 
ideal leitende Angestellte - faith. It was stated that national recovery was only 
possible through trust and belief in the Nazi Weltanschauung and through sincere 
acceptance of its methods.1 16l This had particular relevance for the concept (and 
practical application) of the Fiihrerprinzip in the Third Reich, where faith elided easily 
into loyalty, and loyalty could quickly become a de1nand for unquestioning obedience. 
Expectations of unreflective obedience could be reinforced by calling upon the 
concept of duty\ a traditional Prussian/German virtue and a term much invoked by 
NSDAP leaders in their exhortations to the German people.1 171 
It is probable that VELA members would initially have been thinking largely in 
terms of the quiescence among lower-level employees which the latter's adherence to 
faith and duty would bring, and of the consequent increase in their own fi·eedom and 
power which would result from this. However\ blind faith, absolute loyalty and 
unreflective duty cut two ways, and those who accepted them as tenets and tools of 
leadership found themselves, in turn, subject to their demands and implications when 
obeying higher authorites. Freedom of conscience and the constraints of morality then 
became subject to competing imperatives. A doctrine of the ends justifying the means 
arose from the combining of the much-exalted virtue of.Leistung or achievement with 
the phenomenon of 'working towards the Fiihrer'. This \vas the term used by I an 
Kershaw to describe the methods employed to curry favour, exett leverage or 
second-guess Hitler's intentions or will among the lesser leadership cadres in the 
Third Reich.fiRI A resultant malleable morality, based on a certainty of belief in the 
rightness and righteousness of one's vision and goals, and on an overheated faith in a 
man touched by an even greater Geist than the one which underpinned belief in their 
own specialness and superiority, must have contributed towards providing the 
rationale, the justification and a psychologically-effective framework for those vvho, at 
VELA's general assembly in August l 933, colluded in depriving their Jewish 
colleagues of their right to pursue the career of leitende Angestellte. Within less than 
ten years, upper management in Nazi Germany's larger firms would be applying their 
special skills to negotiating the hire of slave labour from the SS and working these 
people to death for the greater good of the Fatherland1191 - a somewhat less than noble 
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or edifying variation on the theme of the leitende Angestellten providing a bridge 
between capital and labour. 
The fifth and last theme of the position and influence of upper mangement in 
German society and economy, and of the need for VELA members to be 
knowledgeable of, and active in, politics, took on a whole new dimension and urgency 
after March 193 3. It permeated almost every article, no matter what the ostensible 
subject matter, because now it was very much a matter of practical politics, of 
alliances and manoeuvring in the fast-evolving new Nazi state. This is best 
detnonstrated by showing what happened to, and within, VELA between April and 
September 1933. 
Forewarning of the coming Gleichschaltung of VELA appeared in an article in 
the second April edition of Der /eitende Angeste/lte. It reported that, just a few days 
earlier, the board of directors of Gau Berlin-Brandenburg, VELA's largest regional 
organisation, had resigned en bloc, to be replaced by a team of National Socialists and 
one member of the Stahlhelm, the right-wing, vt.ilkisch veterans' association with links 
to the DNVP, the NSDAP's short-lived partner in government. This process was 
being repeated across the country in other Gaue and Ortsgruppen (local groups)., and 
the article called upon the rest of VELA to follow Berlin's example. Only by instilling 
itself with ideological foundations in tune with the present national uprising (nalionale 
Erhebung) cou1d VELA hope to take part in the coining momentous events. Thus, it 
suggested, it was necessary for the whole of VELA to be co-ordinated in order to 
give a guarantee to the government that it was politically and ideologically reliable. 1201 
This ominous article was written by Fritz Limberger, only his fourth-ever contribution 
to the periodical. However, he was not a newcomer to" the organisation, having first 
been mentioned in an article in 1930 as working in the head office in Berlin. On that 
occasion he was acting as translator for a party of 70 Italian senior mangers, members 
of the National Fascist Organisation of Industrial Managers, who were making a 
goodwill visit to VELA.P11 Later articles, and a photograph of him in Nazi uniform in 
the July issue, make it clear that he was also a well-established NSDAP member. 
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Within days of writing this article, Limberger was elevated to the board of directors of 
VELA, and when Der leitende Angestellte was united with Die . Deutsche 
Vo/kswirlschaft in June, he was appointed as the VELA representative on the latter's 
editorial board. 
The anticipated Gleichschaltung took place towards the end of April, the report 
on the event in the first May edition being terse and short on details of vvhen and how 
it took place. H merely announced that, by agreement with the board of directors Dr 
' 
Meyer-Busche was resigning his position as chainnan of the board of directors. l-Iis 
position had been taken over by Dr Alfred Helzel, a long-standing VELA member and 
contributor to Der leitende Angestel/te for many years. Dr Helzel was not only an 
NS"DAP member, but had been the leader of the Gleichschaltung coup in Berlin just a 
few \veeks earlier. Five other Nazi VELA members were eo-opted on to the board of 
directors, and three more on to the executive committee of the board. Dr 
Meyer-Busche's fall from power was not absolute, since he was retained on the board 
of directors and made deputy chairman of the executive committee - apparently the 
ideological and political gap between him and the newly-elevated Pa1ty members was 
not so great that they did not trust him in an executive position. 
Dr Muffehnann, who had been active in the leadership since the founding of 
VELA in 1919, was retired from the board of directors and from his position as 
business manager of the organisation. Although the a11icle did not mention it, he was 
also removed as editor and publisher of VELA's periodical and never wrote another 
atiicle for the magazine. Mi.iffelma.nn had long displayed much ideological affinity 
with certain aspects of the Nazi Weltanschauung, so either it was considered that he 
upheld VELA' s traditional declaration of party-political neutrality too conscientiously 
or for too long, or else the disagreements with certain strands of Nazi thinking on the 
future role of the trade unions in a Vo/ksstaat (see chapter 6) had aligned him vvith the 
wrong factions of the NSDAP, or, it is just possible, even if not too likely, that he was 
JewishY21 VELA's new conformity to the Nazi Party's thinking on race would very 
shortly become apparent. Muffelmann's place on the board and his job as business 
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manager were taken over by Limberger, described as a representative of VELA who 
had not only championed the interests of the organisation and fought for an enhanced 
role for leitende Angestellten within various political committees during the Weimar 
years, but was also a member of the top committee for social-politics in the highest 
echelons ofthe NSDAP.1231 
During the month of May, it is apparent, there was a struggle for the future 
location of VELA within the nexus of NSDAP umbrel1a organisations which existed 
parallel to (and often in competition with) state bodies, and which were engaged in 
empire-building in the new Third Reich. The two contenders for VELA's 31,000 
tnembers1241 were Robert Ley's Deutsche ArheiL~front (DAF) and rrans "Frank's Bund 
Nationalsozialistischer Deutscher Juris/en (BNSDJ). Since its very inception, VELA 
had always vehemently resisted being forced into larger organisations which included 
lower-level white-collar workers, while alignment with manual workers' 
representatives was regarded as illogical, unproductive and completely beyond the 
pale for executive gei~..,·tig employees. The prospect of being absorbed into the largely 
proletarian OAF was also opposed by the new NSDAP-dominated leadership.'25 l This 
was made apparent in the second May edition of Der leitende Angestellte, where a 
lengthy memorandum, issued in the name of VELA, was prominently displayed in its 
pages. 
The memorandum welcomed the recent formations of a united Farmers' Front 
and a united Labour Front comprising all manual and white-collar workers. Now was 
the time to create an equivalent (]eistesarbeiteJ:fi·ont for economic leaders, and VELA 
wished to offer some suggestions on the concept, advantages and sttucture of such an 
organisation. It condemned the previous Weimar political-econoJnic system as a 
Marxist one which had stifled geistig work, and quoted Hitler's support for 
unleashing the undervalued powers of creative personality from their shackles for the 
benefit of the German economy. All the claims of the special talents and Geistigkeit of 
/eitende Angeste!lten, which had been heard coming from VELA for years, \vere then 
reiterated and ascribed to that PersiJnlichkeit to which Hitler had been referring. 
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Several paragraphs were devoted to illustrating the differences of functions and 
interests between upper management and both lower eJnployees and employers. Only 
by maintaining senior management's unique position between capital and labour could 
a unifYing bridge between the two be sustained, a circumstance which was vitally 
important for preventing class conflicts and building the unity of the 
Volksgetneinschajt. In addition, only leitende Angestellten were in a position to make 
objective judgements on assessing what was in the greater economic interests of the 
nation~ employers and lesser employees were far more guided by their own 
self-interest because of their structural position in a market economy. Senior 
managers were not only free of such narrow thinking, but were also willing, able and 
strategically well placed to spread National Socialist economic principles throughout 
the economy. 
For these reasons, the memorandum went on to suggest, the separate identity of 
leilende Angestellten should be reinforced, their responsibilities and areas of operation 
should be enlarged, and they should unite with other professional and salaried 
economic leaders to become national economic-policy makers. These measures would 
not only benefit individual businesses and the economy in general, but, by accepting 
and adopting the political-economic guidance and goals of the National Socialist 
govermnent, a more productive and responsive form of capitalism could be created in 
Germany. Accompanying these grandiose assertions was a proposal to institute a 
system of qualification certificates for those wishing to take up the occupation of 
leitende Angestellte.l261 This can be seen as a tactic to bolster VELA's case for 
avoiding absorption into DAF and for being accepted into the far less proletarian and 
far more upper-middle-class, professionally-qualified ranks of the BNSDJ, but it can 
also be viewed as a further stage in the professionalisation project which VELA had 
been pursuing since 1919. 
It appeared initially as if VELA' s efforts had been in vain when Robert Ley 
rejected its proposals and ordered that the organisation be dissolved and its members 
distributed among the vanous occupational subdivisions of the NSA 
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(Nationalsozialistische Angestelltenschqft), the white-collar-employee division of 
OAF. Ley had decided that the fact that upper managers were employees was 
sufficient and decisive reason for adding their numbers to his already large domain. At 
the last moment, just a few days before the order was due to cotne into effect, 
VELA' s leadership petitioned Hans Frank directly to be incorporated into his Front 
zur 5'chl~[fung eines neuen deutschen Wirtschaftsrechts, or Front for the Creation of a 
New German ComJnercial Law. Frank, in turn, immediately presented the proposal to 
Hitler, whose swift response suggests that in May 1933 his stock was still very high 
with the F1'ihrer. On the very day that had been set for VELA's dissolution, Hitler 
issued a decree announcing the integration of 14 organisations into the BNSDJ in 
order to create what he referred to as the Front for the Reconstruction of German 
Law (Front zur Neugestaltung eines l)eutschen Rechtes). VELA, now temed Vela, 
Reichsverband der Wirtschc~ftsleiter (VELA, the Reich Association of EconOinic 
Leaders), was among these organisations - whose members included judges, lawyers, 
notaries, prosecutors, high-level tax officials, auditors, academic and business 
economists, and qualified business graduates. 127' After all these years of arguing the 
case, VELA had at last been officially recognised as a group above and beyond 
ordinary employees, as a profession which had a distinct and nationally-important task 
to fulfil, and as part of a special Schicht comprising fellow professionals and similarly 
geistig men. With a barely suppressed tone of triumph, the article in 
Mitteilungsbllilter der Vela which reported these developments announced that this 
decree showed that the Reich Chancellor himself recognised that /eitende 
Angestellten, or Wirtschlrftsleiter (econ01nic leaders) as they were now to be called, 
were part of a very special group of people enttusted with the sacred task of building 
the new economic order. 1281 
An Extraordinary General Assembly of VELA was organised for August 5th and 
6th in the ballroom of the City Opera I-Iouse in Berlin-Charlottenburg to ratify the 
faits accomplis of the change of leadership and affiliation to the BNSDJ. A proposal 
to amend the organisation's constitution was also on the agenda. This gathering was 
extremely well attended~ and the hundreds of VELA representatives and ordinary 
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members received the opening pro-Nazi speech of the new chairman, Dr HeJzel, with 
great enthusiasm and applause. As soon as his paeon to the NSDAP and his promises 
of a wonderful future for a reconstructed VELA in a reconstructed state were over, 
Dr I-Ielzel immediately put forward a motion to alter the organisation's constitution. 
l-Ie called tor a vote, without discussion or debate, to accept in full the 
recommendation of a special constitutional comtnission which had produced a new set 
of rules for the organisation and operation of VELA. This was passed with a huge 
majority, easily exceeding the 75% threshold required by the I 919 constitution for 
such an act. Thus Iegaiiy, constitutionally and democratically, VELA's representatives 
at their general assembly adopted, amongst lesser changes, a clutch of thoroughly 
illiberal, National Socialist measures into their constitution - and enthusiastically 
abolished their own internal democracy for good measure.'29l 
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the new constitution stated quite unambiguously: 
Zweck der Vela ist die Verwirklichung des nationalsozia!islischen 
Progranunes a1!l de1n gesamten Gehiet der J;Virtsch(.rfi und des 
Rechtes. 1301 
The purpose of VELA is to implement the National Socialist 
programme throughout the entire sphere of the economy and the la-vv. 
Article 3, paragraph 3 honed the focus somewhat more: 
.lnsbesondere hezweckt die Vela die l)urchdringung der 
Wirtschaftsleiter mit nationalsozialislischer Wirlschqf!.\gesinnung und 
die Mitarbeit der Wirtschcrftsleiter bei der Neuordnung des l)eutschen 
Wirtschaflslehens. fJJ l 
In particular, VELA ai1ns to penetrate and inculcate the economic 
leaders [the new term employed to describe leading salaried employees 
in business] with the fundamental beliefs of National Socialist 
economics, and to encourage them to collaborate in the new ordering 
of German economic life. 
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Vela was thus promising to take on board, and carry out, any and all Nazi 
policies. ln the following section of the constitution the very first, and possibly most 
sinister, example of VELA doing just that became reality. This was the 
Arierparagraph, or Aryan paragraph, as Dr Helzel called it. It stated simply: 
Mitglied der Vela kann jeder inz Besitz der biirgerlichen Ehrenrechte 
befindliche Volksgenosse deutschen Blutes werden, der innerhalb der 
deutschen Wirtschaft eine verantwortlich geistig-leitende Tiitigkeit 
(Wirtschajtsleiter) ausiibt.1321 
Anyone who is in possession of the civil rights which are to be found 
only in racial comrades of German blood, and who engages in work of 
a responsible, managerial and spiritual/intellectual nature in the 
German economy (economic leaders), can be a member ofVELA. 
This definition of who could join the only officially-representative body for 
leitende Angestellten or Wirtschajtsleiter clearly had one overriding purpose. It was 
designed to exclude Jews from what was now a Nazi-led and Nazi-approved 
organisation which, to all intents and purposes, was snared within Hans Frank· s 
NSDAP satrapy. 
A11icles 12 & 13 ofVELA's amended constitution put the Fiihre11Jrinzip into full 
practice and provided the method by which internal democracy was extinguished in 
the organisation. The logic of the organisational structure and authority of the 
leadership cadre, defined by the new constitution, provides a perfect illustration of 
that circular reasoning which also informed the F'iihrerprinzip's ideological 
foundations (see chapter 2). VELA's leadership now comprised the 
Reichsverhands·vnrsteher (I-Iead of the Reich Association) and the 
Reichsverbands-geschiift.~fiihrer (Reich Association Executive Leaders), the latter 
being chosen by the former without any requirement to have them approved by the 
n
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embership. The Reichsverhandsvorsteher also named all the regional Gau chiefs, 
selected the heads of all the specialised associations within VELA (e.g. 
insurance-industry managers, banking employees, engineers and so forth), and 
appointed the secretary of every Reich-wide subcommittee of the organisation. He 
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had the right to chair any meeting of any organ or cotnmittee within VELA, to call 
them into session or dissolve them, and to lay down their agendas. 
The actual process of choosing the Reichsverbands·vorsteher required that he be 
elected by a representative assembly of the membership, but only upon the 
recotnmendation of himself(!), the Reichsverhandsge.w.:hc~ft.~fiihrer and the (]au 
leaders, collectively known as the Fiihrerring, or leadership circle. Thus, as soon as 
someone managed to lay their hands on the top office, he could then choose the rest 
of the leadership, the body which decided whether and when any election should take 
place, and who the single candidate should be. Just to round off the perfection of the 
Fiihre1prinzip in action, the new constitution gave the leader of the BNSDJ the 
power to de1nand a new election for Reichsverhandsvorsteher at any time_!331 This 
regulation serves to confirm the dominance which politics held over socio-economic 
interests in Nazi Germany, as well as the degree of control which the NSDA.P accrued 
and reserved to itself by the process of Gleichschaltung. The simple model, or 
formula, adopted by VELA shows not only the tautological logic inherent in the 
Fiihretprinzip, but also gives an example of how the self-perpetuating leadership 
cadres, which came to dominate the Third Reich, operated and were structured. 
Within minutes of the motion to amend VELA's constitution being passed, Dr 
Helzel was nominated unopposed for the position of Reichsverband\vorsteher by a 
fellow Nazi, Or Splettstosser, who was a senior leader in the BNSDJ. lie was s·wiftly 
elected by an overwhehning tnajority. His first act as leader was unde11aken there and 
then with his announcement that he was appointing Dr Zellien and I-Ierr Limberger as 
the new Reichsverbandsgescht.f/f.~fiihrer. Three NSDAP members now comprised the 
entire Reichsverhand~·leitung der Vela (Leadership of the Reich Association, VELA). 
Or Meyer-Busche, who had been removed as chairman of the board in the 
Gleichschaltung of late April, now found hitnself given the title of Honorary 
Chairman of VELA in recognition of his long (and presumably ideologically-sound) 
service to the organisation. He returned the complitnent by closing the assembly with 
'three ._\''ieg Heils to the German Reich and to its "People's Chancellor", Adolfl-Iitler!' 
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('dre{fache Sieg 1-Iei/ C11{[ das Deutsche Reich und seinen Volkskanzler Ado(f 
flit/er' )Y41 
In the middle of September, the Fiihrerring of VELA attended its first 
conference of the Deutsche Rechtsfront. Reichsverbandsgeschiift.sfiihrer, Dr Zellien, 
used the opportunity to deliver a somewhat b01nbastic speech, which he began by 
talking about rassejren1de jiidisch-marxistische Gedanke, or alien/racially-hostile 
Jewish-Marxist thought, an archetypal example of the ideologically-laden idiom of 
National Socialism.P5l Perhaps he was a bit excited by the prospect of Hitler 
addressing the conference from the same platform a few hours later, or perhaps he 
was acting as a warm-up man for the main attraction, one of whose main themes that 
night was impressing upon his audience the need to grasp the concept of the racial 
foundations of German 1aw.P61 Whatever the motivation, the rest of his speech was 
thoroughly peppered with similarly splenetic utterances blaming volk.~fremde jiidische 
(Jewish enemies-of-the-people) and blut.~[ren1de asoziale (anti-social 
enerr1ies-of-the-blood) elements for creating class conflict among the German Volk, 
and for allowing the Geist-destroying cancer of Marxist socialism to inflict misery and 
poverty upon the nation. Liberalism, equality, political democracy and economic 
democracy were all foreign ideas dating back to the 1789 revolution in France, and 
were responsible for creating a 'me-i1rsf culture. These morally destructive doctrines 
had permeated and polluted the Weimar Republic where, because of the undervaluing 
of personality and achievement, a misguided working class was lured into suppotiing 
the alien and racially-hostile idea of an international dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Only the timely arrival on the scene of the heroic National Socialist movement 
prevented Germany from plunging permanently into a sink of materialism and class 
war, where the creative, nationalist personality was sidelined. Now, however, the 
rallying cry, 'Genu-?innutz geht vor Eigennutz', would guide the structures and 
practices of the Third Reich. Armed with the spirit of this ne\V Weltanschauung, 
equipped with their own inherent powers of personality (referred to at one point as 
the aristocracy of the spirit), and justified by their Leislung, the creative 
T~Virtschc.([fsleiter of VELA, within the J)eutsche Recht.~fronl, could rightfully lay 
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claitn to the leadership and management of German work and of the German 
economy. Dr Zellien's gung-ho, racist tirade, his effusive praise for the NSDAP and 
its god-like leader, and his use of Nazi terminology as well as Nazi concepts, marked 
a point where VELA, or at least the leadership which its members had enthusiastically 
endorsed in the previous month, could be said to have become a willing, co-operative 
and pro-active component part of the National Socialist Third Reich.J371 
It could, of course, be contended that what was being witnessed was merely the 
utterances and actions of a co-ordinated organisation taken over by an 
unrepresentative clique of Nazi members whose beliefs and politics were untypical of 
the wider membership or inconsistent with VELA's previous histo1y. However, this 
interpretation can be shown to be flawed by examining what VELA writers, who can 
be positively identified as NSDAP members, were saying from April 1933, and 
comparing that vvith the themes which appeared in the pages of L)er leilende 
Angestellte prior to that date. Even more significant are their views and opinions on 
VELA's past history and Weltanschauung. Seven major articles were published by 
known Nazis between April and December of 1933 ysJ It is instructive to examine in 
some detail two of those, both written by Fritz Limberger during the period when 
VELA was undergoing the process of Gleichschaltung. 
In both these articles Limberger made specific references to VELA's 
long-standing opposition to economic levelJing and the influence of the collectivist 
trade-union movement, and to its anti-Marxism and anti-parliamentarism. These, he 
pointed out, were positions which were adopted and developed over the period from 
1919 to 1933, the same titne-frame during which Adolf Hitler took up and advanced 
the stn1ggle against the political decline and degeneration of Germany using much the 
same critique. Both Hitler and VELA were prominent in the fight against materialism 
and self-interest~ both appreciated and promoted the importance of the 
geistig-schopjerisch personaJity and the need for a spiritual and intellectual 
commitment to the national interest. 
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Limberger argued that, although VELA still neeeded to undergo change in order 
that all its members become wholly in tune with the principles of the NSDAP, 
principally by adopting the Fiihrel]Jrinzip and restricting its tnembership to Aryans, 
nevertheless the organisation and its ethos were sufficiently advanced to be able to 
provide a platform for VELA's elevation into a position of greater responsibility and 
power in the leadership of the new economic order. Its members, he said, were 
possessed of the qualities required for such a great patriotic task - personality, 
Geistigkeit, creativity, ethical idealism, a suitable philosophy of life, educational 
background, and the ski11 and knowledge for operating in that most vital of economic 
locations, the layer between capital and labour. Most important of all, as a result of all 
these factors and of the continuing dependent relationship of /eitende Angeste/lten as 
employees, senior managers were intrinsically and structurally the sector of business 
which was most inclined towards the NSDAP's guiding aim and principle, 
'Genwinnutz gehl vor Eigennutz '. I-I ere then, coming straight from the horse's mouth, 
is corroboration of the contention, made both in this thesis and in the claims of 
VELA' s periodicals, that the organisation's Weltanschauung and political beliefs were 
compatible with, and similar to, those of National Socialism. 
Limberger went on to say that, because of their strategic economic position and 
their spiritual, ideological and political reliability, it made both economic and patriotic 
sense for leitende Angestellten to take on the implicitly-wider role of Wirtschqjisleiter 
by expansion of their responsibilities in three areas. In the realm of business 
management they should have a large say in the questions of salaries, bonuses, 
profit-sharing, dividend distribution, working hours, holidays, redundancies and plant 
c1osures. In the sphere of the national economy they should take on the tnantle of 
agents and trustees of the general public and the general good to counter the often 
narrow profit-seeking tendencies of entrepreneurs, thereby helping to create a new, 
more rational capitalism in the interests ofthe Volksgemein.r.;chaft. This policy-making 
role would involve having the power to prevent unhelpful monopolies from being 
formed, and drafting new patent and copyright laws to reward inventors and ensure 
that Gennan technology was the beneficiary of these advances. In the socio-political 
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arena, the task of Wirtschcrfts/eiter would be to bridge the gap between the employers 
and employees by adjudicating how reasonable, practical and in the national interest 
each party's demands were. Creating the social solidarity required for the evolution of 
a true Volksgen1einschaft was the goal of this function. Limberger proposed further 
that VELA should follow the example of Fascist Italy where the Dirigenti, or 
workleaders, had fully professionalised their occupation by requiring their membership 
to be authenticated by a diploma or certificate.r:w1 
These two articles thus show an NSDAP me1nber of VELA not only praising the 
organisation's past record as compatible and congruent with Nazi thinking and aims, 
but also putting forward aspirations and proposals for expanding the areas of 
responsibility and the powers of upper management, suggestions ve1y si1nilar to those 
which pre-1933 VELA writers had been pushing for many years. Limberger may have 
been party to a political coup within VELA, but not to an ideological one, since there 
was no need for it. Additionally, while it has been shown that VELA began to adopt 
the ve1y idiom of National Socialism, this particular Nazi was still employing much of 
VELA's self-laudatory terminoloi:,ry. This last observation also holds true for the other 
five major articles written by NSDAP members fi·om March until the end of 1933. 
The major conclusion which can be drawn fi·om this and previous chapters on the 
history of VELA and the evolution of its thinking, concerns the course and causes of 
the organisation's eventual alignment with, and support for, the NSDAP. While there 
was indeed a process of Gleichschaltung, it was comparatively mild, was generated 
almost entirely from within, and does not appear to have met substantial resistance. 
This tends to rule out any analysis which suggests that it was a sudden or unexpected 
event which was forced upon a resistant, or even reluctant, organisation of senior 
managers. However, while moving the origins of the affinity back in time, it still 
leaves open the question of whether it simply arose as a reaction to crisis. 
While it is something of a generalisation, the Inflation Crisis of 1923 had a far 
greater effect upon the middle classes as a whole, and the upper 1niddle classes in 
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particular, than did the Depression vvhich swept through Germany beginning in 
1928/29.'40 1 The huge job losses of the second economic crisis were concentrated to a 
much larger degree upon the lower middle classes and the working classes than upon 
senior managers and most professionaJs; and because the vastness of the slump 
created negative inflation, managerial salaries and savings actually increased in 
value. 1411 It is true that increasing numbers of upper managers began to be laid off 
from about 1930, but the job losses were not at all proportionate to those being borne 
by less senior employees; nor was the emerging Beruf of leitende Angestelllen 
experiencing the internal and structural crises which affected lawyers, academics and, 
above all, doctors in the middle and later Weimar years. 
The formally certified Ben((e suffered throughout the Weimar period fi·om a 
surfeit of graduates in their specialised fields as a result of a great expansion in the 
numbers of German university students after the Great War. This led to near-chronic 
graduate unemployment and underemployment over the whole period, except for a 
brief spell in the mid- and later 1920s. This was greatly exacerbated by the inflation of 
1923 which ·wiped out the value of many retired professionals' savings and pensions, 
forcing them back on to the market in competition with new graduates, war veterans 
and the limited but growing number of women who were achieving professional 
qualifications. The re-entry phenomenon was not repeated during the inflation-fi·ee 
Depression, but the fact of job losses, diminution of income and increased graduate 
unemployment, coupled with the experience and me1nory of the far more devastating 
effects of the 1923 crisis, created a sense of fear and anxiety out of proportion to the 
reality of the plight of the Ben!fe. 1421 
In the particularly extreme case of doctors, a doubling of the number of medical 
students between 1925 and 1932 led to thousands of graduates having to wait for up 
to three years to be registered to practice. As insurance and social fi.mds declined on 
account of the slump, the number of patients being treated decreased, causing a 
contraction of doctors' incomes. Their negative experiences and negative perceptions 
of the situation were greatly exacerbated by their fi11strated hostility towards, and 
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filtile resistance against, the social-insurance funds which were set up after the Great 
War and continued by successive Weiznar governments. Besides its econotnic 
problems and political enmity towards the Republic, the medical profession was riven 
by an inter-generational struggle between newly-qualified physicians and the older, 
established practitioners who monopolised the hugely-shrunken, but still lucrative, 
sector of private practice. 1431 These circumstances appear to lend substance to the 
argument that it was crisis which turned the medical profession to the political right 
and drove them into the arms of the ·NSDAP, an argument which could also be 
applied to other Weimar professions. 
However, MichaeJ Kater took issue with this analysis, which he saw as part of a 
self-serving medical myth of Nazi indoctrination of physicians and their coercion into 
participation in unethical behaviour. He refuted the argument that German physicians 
were either unpolitical or politicaiJy naive by showing how virulently right-wing, 
anti-democratic, nationalist and anti-Weimar Republic most medical men were 
throughout the entire l 920s: by demonstrating the valkisch and anti-Semitic activities 
of many weiJ-established doctors who joined the NSDAP in the middle J 920s and 
swiftly moved up its ranks; by highlighting the rush of young doctors into the Nazi 
Party in the early 1930s (despite the internecine inter-generational hostilities); and by 
pointing to the foundation of the Nationalsozia/istischer f)eutscher Arztehund 
(National Socialist German League of Physicians) as early as 1929. It vvas not just 
crisis which drove doctors into support for the NSDAP, but an ideological and 
political disposition towards its world-view.f441 
Konrad Jarausch supported much of Kater's analysis and extended it to 
encompass the whole spectrum of Weimar Germany's professions. l-Ie demonstrated 
that significant numbers within the Ben(le turned to the Nazi Party long before 1933. 
By the end of 1932, he estimated, 7% of the legal profession, 3% of engineers and 9% 
of doctors were NSDAP members.1451 These percentages may not seem large but, in 
December 1932, the approximately 1.2 mi1lion members of the NSDAP amounted to 
only 2% of the German population.1461 Even more significant than those figures was 
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his clai1n that 7% of the entire Nazi Party meJnbership was made up of professionals, 
who in turn comprised only 1.9°/o of the German population, a 270% 
overrepresentation. He agreed that there was indeed a crisis at the lower entry-level to 
the professions, where, from 1929, 30,000 university graduates per year were chasing 
the 10-12,000 replacement posts which became available annually.1471 This helped to 
explain why university students, faced by the prospect of imminent unemployment, 
were atnong the most enthusiastic and nutnerous of NSDAP adherents from within 
the Bildungshiirgertum. Not only were there enough NSDA.P students to form a 
specialised Party organisation in 1926, but in 1931 the national organisation of 
university students, the students' union, was taken over by a Nazi leadership after the 
NSDAP won a majority in their national election'481 - probably the very first instance 
of Gleichschaltung, t\VO years before Hitler came to power. Jarausch also showed 
how lawyers were financially affected by Chancellor Bri.ining cutting the fees of jurists 
in public service, by the general downturn of the economy, and by the superfluity of 
law graduates. This led their professional organisations to call for a rnunerus clausus, 
or a restriction on numbers~ which very quickly became a demand to exclude women 
from the legal profession, and then a call for the expulsion of Jewish lav1yers and 
judges. Similar prejudicial demands were soon emanating from almost all the Weimar 
professions. 1491 
However, Jarausch also asserted and demonstrated that political and ideological 
affinity with the NSDAP went much deeper and further back in time among the 
professional classes than a mere response to the socio-economic and political crises of 
1929-1933. Like Kater, he pointed to the culture of vti/kisch, nationalist and 
anti-democratic thinking which permeated every one of Germany's professions all 
through the 1920s. His analysis was that the professions as a whole, with the 
honourable exception of a small minority on the political left, were never bonded or 
even reconciled to the Republic, and that they blamed the existing Weimar system 
rather than the rigidities of Empire or the Great War for both the 1923 and the later 
crisis. He argued that their self-image and 'social-aristocratic arrogance' led them to 
interpret the Depression as a crisis of culture. This arose as a result of a general 
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attitude, originating in the Wilhelmine era, of academic i11iberalism, socially-exclusive 
corporative sub-cultures, a sense of national mission and a deep-seated elitism - all of 
which attitudes were equally characteristic of VELA and the emerging Beruf of 
leitende Ange.\·tellten who, in addition, had put forward a general~crisis-of~culture 
analysis of the Weimar Republic as early as 1925 (see chapter 7). The professions, 
argued Jarausch, rejected the perceived ideological egalitarianism of the Weimar 
Republic, which the traumatic economically-levelling effects of the Great Inflation 
helped to convince them was a reality, and also rejected liberal competitive solutions 
in favour of authoritarian statist remedies. When Bri.ining's and von Papen's 
authoritarian measures failed, they flocked to the NSDAP in huge numbers. National 
Socialism appeared to agree with their interpretation that this was a cultural crisis, 
and it offered a patriotic, non-egalitarian solution. Jarausch's overall interpretation 
was that the move to the political far right among the professions arose fi·om the 
interaction of crisis, ideological predisposition and response, and the converging 
appeal of the NSDAP. 1501 
The occupation of leitende Angestel/te, by contrast with the fi.dly-fledged, 
regulated and certified professions, was not dependent upon possession of a diploma 
or a higher-education degree,!51J even allowing for the fact that a signi-ficant 
proportion of VELA's me1nbers \Vere qualified engineers, lawyers, accountants and so 
forth. This meant that, while there were indeed numbers of senior managers who had 
been made redundant from existing jobs, there was not a long queue of 
formally-qualified leilende Angeste/lten pressing at the door to enter the occupation. 
Thus the problem of underemployment and unemployment at their entry-points, which 
hit the professions hardest, was one which scarcely applied to senior management. 
Neither, of course, were leitende Angestellten dependent upon the number of clients 
or patients who could afford their services to make up their monthly salaries. Overall, 
the economic effects of the Depression upon upper managers were nothing like as 
ferocious as what had occurred in 1923 when VELA' s regional periodical, 
) \,.~as filled with horror stories about the plight of unemployed and ( rganisator, rv 
destitute leitende Angestellten. [
521 
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Thus, vvhile it cannot be denied that the Great Depression must have played some 
pati in inclining VELA members towards the NSDAP, any analysis which simply sees 
such a collective move to the far right as a defensive reaction to the economic effects 
of that debilitating crisis is thoroughly inadequate. Because of the lesser economic 
impact of the Depression upon leitende Angestellten, political and ideological affinity 
must, in fact, have played a larger role in inclining senior managers towards the Nazis 
from about 1929, than did that factor of crisis for the older, academically-qua'litied 
professions. More persuasive would be to argue that the Depression's accompanying 
political paralysis and the perception, however misplaced, of a revolutionary threat 
from the left caused a self-defensive movement towards the virulently anti-socialist 
NSDAP. Its growing number of members and voters and its uncompromising direct 
action all served to enhance its credibility as a determined and viable political (and 
physical) force which would stand up to menacing, levelling, unpatriotic Marxists. As 
a causal factor in the convergence of VELA members and the Nazis, political 
considerations and political crisis undoubtedly played a substantial part in the 
Depression years. On the other hand, it can equally be argued that~ in the final 
analysis, the element of crisis-reaction was more important in 1923 than it was over 
the period 1929 to I 933 for the development within VELA of political and ideological 
affinity with National Socialism. 
Important though economic~ political and crisis reaction factors were, it is within 
the realm of thought - of Weltanschauung and ideology, and even of philosophy and 
metaphysics - that one must look for the most significant causal factor of congruence 
and agreement. Like their professional counterparts, with whom VELA sought social 
and cultural identification from about 1924, the roots of that ideological 
predisposition, to which Jarausch referred, lay much deeper and further back in ti1ne 
than 1 93 3 or the Depression years - although not quite as far back as the 19th 
century, since the emergence of the leitende Angestellten was a much more recent 
development than that of lawyers, doctors or even engineers. The parallel and 
congruent developments of the philosophy and ideology of VELA and the NSDAP 
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have been demonstrated in the prevtous five chapters, showing the existence of 
significant sirnilarities of basic assumptions about matters as diverse and yet 
all-encompassing as human nature, the natural order, community, the nation and race, 
personality, creativity, leadership, the power of the will and the existence of externa] 
metaphysical forces. Out of such dose and compatible world-views the political 
philosophies of VELA and the NSDAP developed in a similar direction, but at quite 
different speeds, an understandable occurrence since VELA was the representative 
organisation of a socio-economic group, while the Nazi Party's raison d'etre was 
politics. 
The roots of the NSDAP's thinking ultimately go well back into the 19th 
century, and although, logically speaking, so too must those of VELA, for practical 
purposes the organisation's elitist ideology can be dated as first appearing in a choate 
form in the pages of its periodical and official journal, [)er Ieitende Angestellte, 
around 1923/24. This suggests that such ideas were probably circulating among senior 
managers for a longer period of time, until that year of crisis provided the impetus 
towards their rapid crystallisation. Certainly the concept of the special location of 
leitende Angeslellten between capital and labour, and its corollary of the special 
character required of an individual to fill it, were being discussed as early as 1921. In 
this analysis there is a factor of crisis precipitating ideologic~al congruence, but it is 
the Great Inflation of 1923 rather than the later Depression which contributes most to 
that process. The Depression,s effect was to generate and accelerate political 
convergence, which, by 1933 at the very latest, had become party-political support for 
the NSDAP. If leitende Angestellten are not to be regarded as atypical of the upper 
middle class as a whole, then, bearing in mind Rjchard Hamilton's study of electoral 
class-voting patterns (see chapter 3), thai support had probably already materialised in 
the shape of very large numbers of senior managers voting National Socialist by the 
f 1932 ·However the question of whether the move to the far right was summer o . , 
purely defensive and a reaction to perceived threats or crisis, or whether it was a 
. · f h · notivated not just by fear but also by ambition and vision, is 
postttve move o c 01ce, 1 
I 
· h 1 be answered by looking closely at the ideological basis of that 
one w 11c can on Y 
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choice. Were the leitende Angestellten looking fo1ward or backward? Why were they 
inclined to\vards the extreme radicalism of National Socialism rather than a more 
conventional right-wing conservatism? 
The emphasis upon ideological factors taking precedence over economic ones in 
a causal explanation of the growing identification between VELA and the NSDAP 
does not~ however, automatically lead to the complete rejection of the theory, most 
closely associated with Marxism, that ideology is a product of socio-economic 
reality.' 531 This is stiJI a useful and enlightening conceptual tool, but only if it is 
recognised that the relationship between economic developments and ideological 
evolution is one of interaction rather than dependence or one-way derivation, and that 
ideas and beliefs can be generated or influenced by factors other than the structure of 
the means of production. The occupation of leitende Angestellte and the fast-growing 
number of such upper managers were, without a shadow of a doubt, the product of an 
industrialised, modern, capitalist economy, and these senior employees did, as they 
themselves claimed, occupy an increasingly strategic position between capital and 
labour. 1t is easy to see how notions of their own importance could arise from this 
socio-economic phenomenon, how they might be inclined to regard trade unions and 
economic detnocracy as impediments to efficiency, and how they might transpose 
their belief in the efficacy and desirability of an authoritarian managerial regitne into 
support for authoritarian political measures. However, ideas such as those about the 
nature of the ideal national Volk community, and even more so those metaphysical 
beliefs concerning the will, creativity, personality and the touchstone of Geistigkeit~ 
are a bit more difficult to see as being wholly, or even largely, economically 
derived.'541 The process of developing an ideology similar to much of National 
Socialism did not arise as a result of economic determinism, nor did it happen in a 
vacuum. It was informed by the everyday concerns, ambitions and beliefs of leitende 
Angeste/lten and by the traditions of German culture and intellectual thought which 
provided much of the raw material for their "YVeltanschauung~ which in turn guided 
their choice of political path. 
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In many cases, discussion of first causes in human historical events is about as 
useful as debating the chicken-and-egg question. Of greater analytical utility is judging 
the relative strengths of influence of the multiplicity of causal factors which 
contributed to the phenomenon under study, whether these factors are economic, 
political, ideological, social, social psychological, individual, contingent, 
meteorological or whatever. The analysis in this thesis holds that ideological 
congn1ence was the singfe most important factor contributing to the eventual political 
alignment of VELA and substantial numbers of the German leitende Angestellten with 
the NSDAP. Long-term economic factors set the stage for the emergence of a sector 
of upper management in the German capitalist economy, while defeat in the Great 
War provided many of the conditions which led to repeated economic crises in 
Weimar Germany. These in turn contributed to the recurring political crises of the 
1920s and early 1930s, but the actual political directions taken by individuals and 
groups within that flux and turmoil were informed by belief systems and ideological 
inclinations, even allowing for a strong element of correlation between class and 
left/right tendencies. Significant for VELA in this respect was a gro\.ving conviction 
that one of the outcomes of the war had been political democracy which had 
exacerbated, or even caused, economic problems~ economic failure, it was believed, 
was due to political weakness rather than the other way round. 
For senior managers, their future security lay not in turning back the clock of 
socio-economic development, but in pursuing the path of capitalist and, above all, 
industrial and commercial modernising trends which _were consolidating and 
expanding their type of occupation. While they were strong upholders of the rights of 
property and the efficacy of capitalism, their belief in pure laissez-faire economics, 
that fundamental credo of liberal individualists, increasingly ebbed away as they 
identified it as a practice which most favoured business owners. Far more attractive to 
them than the existing system, where capital was perceived to be the main beneficiary 
of improved performance, and where executive management was undervalued, was 
the notion of a Leistung.sgemeinschaft, a meritocracy where knowledge, skill and 
achievement were properly rewarded. However, a meritocracy works best when there 
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are clear and defined aims to be achieved. This a11ows performance to be measured by 
a more universally-recognisable yardstick demonstrating how much progress has been 
made towards reaching those goals. VELA's members eventually found such a goal, 
through their nationalism and their sense of community, in the Arbeitsgen1einschajt 
concept of the middle 1920s, which had transmuted into the Volksgemeinschqft by 
1933. Thus, in terms of both the socio-economic reward system and the broad, if 
somewhat vague, goals which it served, VELA and the NSDAP appear to have been 
in close agreement from the mid-1920s. 
In the highly politicised atmosphere of Weitnar Germany, VELA's writers soon 
catne to the conclusion that a political solution was the key to achieving their evolving 
vision of progress, both for themselves and for the German nation. The nature of that 
vision included not only the concepts of Gemeinschqft and Leistung, but also a desire 
not to alter too radically the socio-economic status quo of society. This further set 
them on a convergent course with National Socialism, through the latter's objective of 
altering consciousness without dramatically changing class structures, weahh 
distribution or the system of differential rewards and status.'5'1 The Nazi claim that 
political will could and should prevail over economics, chimed well with both the 
self-interest of senior management vis-d-vis capitalist business o\:vners, and with their 
developing ideology of the importance of Geistigkeit, personality and will, which they 
claimed to possess in above-average quantities The idea of a primacy of politics was, 
in any case, one which was deeply ingrained in right-wing German politics, and the 
NSDAP certainly believed in it more strongly, and trumpeted it more loudly, than 
tnost other Weitnar parties. 
Combining the idea of a Leistung.s'Ken1ein.schqft with the concept of the power 
and the rights of will and personality created the ideological foundations for the 
adoption, in turn, of the Fiihreq;rinzip. This was an idea which developed in VELA 
during the last years ofthe Weimar Republic, reinforcing, and being reinforced by, the 
draining away of any remaining faith in the institutions and very concept of universal 
democracy. Although it took the organisation many years to reject democracy, by the 
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time of the Depresion at the very latest, its members had come to believe that poJjticaJ 
democracy was not necessarily part of the forces of progress. The Fiihrerprinzip was, 
of course, also the siren call which lured men, especially well-educated, reflective and 
potentially powerful men with their well-thought-out rationales for the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of strong, authoritarian leadership, towards the party most closely 
associated with that idea. Faith in a strong leader worked in both directions, and no 
leader came over as strong and dynamic as Hitler. With these last and very important 
strands woven into the ideological fabric which increasingly bound VELA's thinking 
to that ofNational Socialism, it was with eyes open that senior managers, in a similar 
fashion to doctors, lawyers, engineers, and indeed great nUJnbers of the upper midd1e 
class in general, cast their political support towards the NSDAP in 1 932 and 1933. 
Ambitious self-interest, a profound sense of nationalism, a belief in strong-willed 
political solutions, a modern (and modernising) fon.vard-looking vision, and a 
confident and coherent Weltanschauung - all these contributed more to the political 
thinking of VELA and senior managers, w·hich ultimately led them to support the 
NSDAP, than did fear or a backward-looking mentality. It was not, however, simply 
greed, power-seeking, opportunism or arrogance (although those were undoubtedly 
present) vvhich led the leitende Angestel!ten and other members of the German upper 
middle classes to adopt, for positive as opposed to negative reasons, what is 
nowadays generally termed reactionary or unprogressive politics. There was also a 
genuine belief that authoritarianism, wielded by a new, modern and enlightened 
political-economic leadership, was a progressive step and in the national interest, and 
that democracy was a blind alley or an unsuitable choice that Germany had erringly 
chosen. Wise and strong men would put that right. Thus, in order to understand the 
ideological factors which led to the congruity of leitende Angestel/fen thinking and 
that of the NSDAP, one has to admit the existence not only of a paternalistic 
dimension, but of an element of idealism within \TELA - just as one has to recognise 
the same element in National Socialism, and crucially, in the motivation \Vhich drove 
so many millions of Germans of all classes to support what turned out to be a 
monstrously barbaric regime.1 561 
303 
[ 1] Mitteilungsblatter der Vela (hereafter MV), H~ft J 5, J 933, p.157. 
[2]_ ~udy Ko~har, Social Life, Local Politics, and Nazism, NC/London, 1986, pp.251-263; 
Wllliam Shendan Alien, The Nazi Seizure of Power: the Experience of a Single German 
Town (revised ed.}, New York, J 984, pp.222-232~ Ian Kershaw, Hitler, J 889-1936: Hubris, 
London, 1998, pp.4 78-483. 
[3] Kershaw, flit/er, pp.475-476. 
[4] LA, 1-lefllO, 1933, p.97. 
[5] LA. H~/i l, 1933, pp.l-2 & 2-3. 
[6] Ferdinand Fried, Das Ende des Kapitalismus, Jena, 1931. 
[7] Jcffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism, Cambridge, 1984~ p. J 79~ Waiter Struve, Elites 
against Democracy, Princeton, 1973, p.365. 
[8] LA. Heft l, 1933, pp. 7-8. 
[9] LA. H~/i 5, 1933, pp.47-48. 
[1 0] LA, H~/i 6, 1933, p.55. 
[11.1 LA, Heft 6, 1933, p.56. 
[12] Charles E. McLelland, The German E.v:perience of Professionalisation, Cambridge, 
1991, pp.217-230. 
f 13] Jane Caplan, 'Speaking the Right Language: The Nazi Party and the Civil Service Vote 
in the Weimar Republic' in Thomas Childers (edJ The Formation of the Nazi Constituency 
1919-1933, London, 1986, pp.l82-20 I. 
[14] References to Geistigkeit, Personlichkeit and the Fiihrerprinzip appeared at least 20 
times in the pages of VELA's periodicals during 1933 (excluding editions of Die Deutsche 
Volks·wirtschc{/i). These included: LA, He.ft I, 1933, pp.l & 7-8; LA, He.fi 2, p.19; LA, H~ft 3, 
pp.25-26 (reprinted from Der Tatkreis): LA, Heft 6~ p.55~ LA, Heft 7, pp.67-68. 68-70 & 
70-72; LA, H~ji 8, p.75~ pp.76-77 & 77-80; LA, H~/i 10, pp.98-101~ MV: 1-/e.fi ll/12, 
pp.1Jl-114;MV, H~ft 13. pp.I.26-128 & 128-l34;.t\1V, l!~ji 14) pp.l42-147~MV, He.fi 15, 
pp.l57-162 & 167- l 68~ MV, 1-/~(1 16, pp.l73-179~ MV, H~ji 17, pp.l92-l97. 
[15] MV. Heji 13, 1933, p.I32. 
[ 16] MV. !-left I 5, J 933, p.158. A call for the German people to put faith in Hitler, first 
appeared in an article on the creative and volkisch nature of German technology in the 
previous edition, MY, He.fi 14, 1933, pp.J47-151. 
[ 17] Wolfgang Benz, 'V am .freiwilligen Arbeilsdienst zur Arbeitsdienstpjlicht' in 
Vierteljahrshefte .fi.lr Zeitgeschichle, 16, 1968, pp.346-347; Joa.n Ca.mpbell, Joy in Work, 
German Work, Princeton, 1989~ pp.339 & 345-346. 
[18] Kershaw, Hitler, pp.527-591 ~ Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 'Profiles in Power' series, Harlow, 
1991~ pp.87-l06. 
[ 19] Helm ut Krausnick & Martin Broszat, Anatomy of the SS .s·tate, St AI bans, 1970, 
pp.227-238 (first published as Analomie des ... ~·S-5'taates, Munich, 1965). 
[20] LA, Hefl8, 1933, p.75. 
[21] LA. 1-l~ji 17, 1930, pp.I66-167. 
[221 It is also possible that Or Muffelmann may have been a member of the DNVP. 
[23] LA, H~ji 9, 1933, p.88. . . 
[241 Car! Totschek, Der Begr(ffdes leilenden Angestellten, Le1p~1g, 1932, p.2. ~ ~. ~ . . . . 
[25) On the social composition of OAF, see Franz F. Wunn, W1rtschaji und (Jesellschajt m 
Deulschland 1848-19-18, Opladcn, 1969, p.255. 
[26] LA, H~(19, 1933, pp.98-l 0 l. . "' 
[27] The till! list of the 14 organisations absorbed mto the BNSDJ on May oOth 1933 was as 
follows: Deutsche Richterbund, Leipzig 
Richterverein beim ReichJ:finanzhof Miinchen 
Preussische Richterverein, Berlin 
304 
V ere in Sachsischer Richter und .. <,•taatsanwalte, Leipzig 
Bayerische Richterverein, Manchen 
Bund Deutscher Rechtspjleger, Berlin 
Deutsche Notarverein, Berlin 
Deutsche Anwallverein, Berlin 
Verband Wirtschaftswissenscha.filicher hiJhererF'inanzheamter, Berlin 
Bund Akademischer Volkswirte, Berlin 
Jnstitut der Wirtschajtspriifer, Berlin 
Reichsverband der deutschen Volkswirte, Berlin 
Verband Deutscher Diplomakaufleute, Berlin 
Reichsverband leitender Angestellter, (Vela), Berlin 
[28] .MV, Heji J l/12, 1933 pp.11 0-111. 
[29JMV; Heji 15, 1933, pp.162-l63 & 166. 
f30]MV. Heft 15,1933, p.l63. 
[31] Mv, Heji 15, 1933, p.163. 
[32] MV; Heft 15, 1933, p.l63. 
[33] MV, Heji 15, 1933, pp.l64-l65. 
[34] MV, He.fi 15, 1933, p.l66. 
[35] MV, Heft 17, J 933, p. 192. 
[36] At[V, Hejl 11, 1933~ p.191. 
[37]MV. He.fi 17,1933, pp.l92-l97. 
[38] Limbcrgcr: LA, Hejl 1, April, 1933, pp.68-70; MV, He.ft 13, July, 1933, pp.126-128~ 
MV, Heft 17, November, 1933, pp.190-l9. Helzel: LA, He.ft 9, May, 1933, pp.90-92; MV. 
Heft 15, September, 1933, pp.l57-162. Zehler: A1T< flefi 13, July, 1933, pp.l28-l34. 
Zellicn:N/V, Hefi I?, November, 1933, pp.192-197. 
[39J LA, H~ji 7, 1933, pp.68-70 &MV, He.fi 13, 1933, pp.I26-128. 
[40] Thomas Childers, 'The Middle Classes and National Socialism' in David Black bourn & 
Richard Evans (eds.), The Cierman Bourgeoisie, London/New York, 1991, pp.325-327. 
[ 41] 1. Heinz Mlillcr, Nivellierung und D(fferenzierung der Arheitseinkommen in 
Deutschland seil 1925, Berlin, 1954, p.l40. 
[ 42] Konrnd Jarausch, 'The Crisis of Gennan Professions 1918-1933' in Journal of 
Contemporcny History, Vo/.20, No.3, 1985~ pp.383-390. 
[43] Michael Kater, ;Physicians in Crisis at the End of the Weimar Republic' in Peter D. 
Stachura (ed.), Unemployment and the Great Depression, London, 1986, pp.49-77. 
[44] Michael Kater, 'The Nazi Physicians League of 1929. Causes and Consequences' in 
Thomas Childers (ed.), 111e Formation (?(the Nazi Constituency, London, 19R6, pp.l47-l81. 
[45] Ja.rausch, 'Crisis ofGennan Professions', pp.39l-392. 
[46] Kershaw, Hitler, pp.410 & 720. The figure of 1,200,000 is based upon Ian Kershaw's 
statement that the issuing of Nazi Party membership numbers had reached 1,414,975 by the 
end of December, 1932. In a footnote to this passage, he wrote, 'Since the membership 
numbers were given out in continuous series and numbers of those leaving the party not 
renewed. the figures for members actually in the party were substantially lower.' My figure 
removes 215,000 individuals, or 15o/o of the cumulative membership total - an arbitrary, but 
probably extremely conservative, estimation. 
[47] Jarausch, 'Crisis of Gennan Professions', p.388~ Michael Kater~ 'The Work Student: A 
Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Early Weimar Germany' in Journal of Contemporary 
1-!istory, Vol. 10. No. I. 1975, pp. 71-94. 
[48 J Geoffrey J. Giles, 'National Socialism and the Educated Elite in the Weimar Republic' in 
Peter Stachura (ed.), The Nazi Machtergre(jimg, London, 1983, p.50. 
f49l Jarausch, ;Crisis ofGennan Professions', pp.389-390. 
305 
f50] Jarausch, 'Crisis ofGennan Professions', pp.392-394. 
[5 I] Up to 1933, Germany experienced a limited development of business schools and the 
teaching to university level of business administration, applied economics and· theoretical 
economics. These were, however, as much aimed at entrcp.Jeneurs as managers. David F. 
Lindenfeld, 'The Professionalization of Applied Economics: Gem1an Counterparts to Business 
Administration, in Gcoffrey Cocks & Konrad Jarausch (eds.), German Professions, 
1800-1950, Oxford, 1990, pp.213-231. 
[52] Articles on the plight of unemployed leitende Angestellten carried on appearing in the_ 
periodical until 1926 (eg LA, Heft 1, 1926, pp.2-3 & 3-4; LA, Heflll, 1926, pp.85-86); then, 
from the summer of that year, they completely vanished until 1930. In December, 1930, the 
first article to address unemployment for more than four years talked about the advantages 
which restored colonies would give to Germany in its battle against rising unemployment, but 
it did not single out the leitende Angestellten as being particularly affected by job losses (LA. 
Heft 23, 1930, pp.219-220). Only in 1931 did managerial unemployment once again become a 
regular topic in the pages ofVELA's periodical (eg LA, Hefl5, 1931, pp.39-40 & 40-43), but 
not with the frequency (or stridency) of 1923/24. 
[53] Man1ie Hughes-Warrington, F~fty Key Thinkers on His/my, London, 2000, pp.217-218. 
[54] See John Hi den & John Farquharson, Explaining Hitler's Germany. Historians and the 
Third Retch: Totowa, NJ, 1983, pp.l59-160. 
[55] Martin Broszat, Der Staats Hillers, Munich, 1969, p.l8; Ian Kershaw, The Nazi 
Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives r~l Interpretation, 2nd edition, London, 1989, 
p.l42. 























VELA continued as a corporate body until December of 1934, when it was 
formally dissolved in line with a decision taken at a specially-called general 
assembly in the previous month. CIJ Its individual members and social-welfare 
organisations were then absorbed into DAF. This may seem like it was a defeat for 
its members and leaders who had fought to stay out of this perceived plebeian mass-
organisation 1.8 months earlier, but is impossible to glean from the pages of 
Mitteilungsbliitter der Vela why this occurred. By 1934 VELA's periodical had 
become a propaganda mouthpiece for National Socialism, and it certainly was not 
going to report on any power struggle, presuming that there was one. Up until the 
end, and including the edition which came out in the n1onth after the decision to 
dissolve VELA was taken, articles in the magazine were upbeat and full of 
confidence for the future. It is true that even during the darkest years of the 
Depression there was always a hopeful, forward-looking ethos running through Der 
leitende Angestellte, but this was of a different, bright-eyed-and-bushy-tailed variety, 
an ethos of purpose and crusade. 
Throughout 1934, VELA's leadership launched itself enthusiastica11y into co-
operation with the the Nazi regime, working in the various cotnmittees of the 
BNSDJ. Its principal undertaking was to contribute to the drafting of major reforms 
of labour law following the promulgation of the Law for the Regulation of National 
Labour in January, 1934.121 Positive reports on this project continued to appear until a 
month before the demise of VELA, extolling the idea of spreading the principle of 
Leistung across the economyY1 It is probable that there was disappointment at the 
absorption into DAF) but it is also possible that this was only a setback within a 
much greater gain. All these concepts which VELA had been discussing for years -
achievement, meritocracy, leadership and community- were now supposed1y part of 
the new order or new Weltanschauung in Germany. However, the history of senior 
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salaried managers in the Third Reich (and the·question of whether Nazi Germany can 
be characterised as some form of a technocracy) has yet to be researched. AJthough 
VELA's periodicals provide a good source of material for the Weimar years, a wholly 
different research approach is needed for the post-1933 years. The focus of this thesis 
has been upon the creation of an ideology among Germany's upper business managers 
which was converging with National Socialism during the Republic. 
That ideology was rooted in the modern industrial and business world and drew 
its ideas largely from a tradition of liberalism, elitism and nationalism. It was also 
intertwined with the professionalisation process of senior business managers. The 
route to convergence with National Socialism lay down the path of developing several 
strands of thought, or themes, whose original impulse was a defensive desire for 
self-detinition in the uncertain political and socio-economic climate of the immediate 
postwar years. Through a process of extolling vi1tues which they claimed were 
inherent within leitende Angestellten, and also \vithin a perceived special ,)'chicht of 
other upper-middle-class groups, VELA's members developed a somewhat arrogant 
and conceited sense of their own importance. Seeing themselves not only as the 
possessors of a metaphysical (]eistigkeit, but also as a component part of the sacred 
'culture-bearers' of Germany, they began to pursue the idea that personality, 
leadership and wil1 were what produced both economic and cultural goods. 
This developing doctrine of elitism in a modern setting inevitably intersected with 
the highly-charged political atmosphere of Weimar Germany. Within VELA, the 
Great Inflation of I 923 began, or at least greatly accelerated, an undennining of faith 
in the existing middle-class parties and in political democracy itself. The second great 
crisis of Weimar, the Depression, led to a critique of capitalism. Armed with a belief 
in their own importance and indispensability, VELA' s managerial membership 
castigated the owners of big busines as lacklustre, conservative and devoid of the 
entrepreneurial spirit of their grandfathers. Capitalism was a necessity, but it needed 





g the economy - men like thetnselves. All these ideological 
greater say m 
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constructs were interwoven with, and buttressed by, the argument that giving greater 
responsibility, power and reward to geistig tnen was in the national interest; such men 
were motivated solely by the self-fulfilment of creative work, by altruism, selflessness 
and, most importantly, patriotism. Out of this mixture of genuine idealism and 
self-justifying hyperbole grew ideas about the creation of a Volksgemeinschaft, where 
class war would be banished and everyone wouJd be pulling together in the same 
direction. 
By the last years of the Republic, the critique of the ineffectivenes of 
contemporary econon1ic leadership was being applied to the political situation in 
Germany. Disillusioned with all the so-called bourgeois parties, and innately hostile to 
both Btiining and von Papen, who was there left to turn to? Given the ease and lack 
of resistance with which the modest Gleichschaltung of VELA took place, and given 
the enthusiasm which greeted the replace1nent of the organisation's constitution with 
one which not only enshrined the theory and practice of the F'iihreJprinzip, but also 
included an Aryan clause, this suggests that many senior salaried managers had been 
supporting the NSDAP for more than just a few months. 
Exatnination of the literature on Weimar Germany's Ben(fe and Vereine, which 
illustrates the activities and beliefs of economic and social upper-middle-class 
organisations, showed that a similar phenomenon of ideological alignment and 
political support for the NSDAP was also occurring in these arenas. Within the 
professions, support for the Nazis was already bec01ning established as early as 
1928/29, nowhere more so than among engineers, the profession with which VELA 
had the strongest ties and which supplied many of the organisation's members. 
Engineers' long quest to reconcile Technik und Kultur had led many among them to 
claim that the metaphysical force of creativity endowed them and their work with a 
spirituality that was reliably 'German'. Their pursuit of the idea of the power of the 
\viiJ and their belief that they had a 'costnic mission' to the nation, produced a strain 
of anti-democratic vDlkisch technocrats, or reactiona1y modernists, who eventually 







self-imp011ance, its vJsJon of an ideal community for the Volk, and its eventual 
advocacy of authoritarian government in 1 932, are remarkably simjiar to the 
engineers' experiepce. 
The stated aims of this thesis can now be briefly addressed. The first aim was to 
demonstrate the links between liberalism and National Socialism. Drawing on the 
ideas of cultural elitism and the concept of an open-yet-authoritarian elite, it was 
argued that the right-wing liberalism of early 20th-century Germany was essentially 
elitist, while its adherents were not at aiJ convinced that democracy was a progressive 
idea. Nazism too was 'an elitist politics for a mass age' and eschewed democracy.141 
The concept of meritocracy being a part of National Socialist thought, as well as 
constituting a cherished liberal ideal, \Vas demonstrated, as was a shared belief in 
achievement (Leistung). The combination of elitism and Leistung proved to be a 
powetful brew, out of which was distilled ideas of the Fiihrerprinzip. In such a 
world-view, what rewards were due to the successful or effective individual? \Vhat 
power? What differential 1ights? During the 1920s and l93 Os, the developing, refining 
and proselytising of such ·self-justifying doctrines of self-interest went on within 
VELA, ideas which eventually took on a very political and authoritarian nature. Yet, 
at the same time, notions of the Volksgemeinschc!ft, born out of a strong sense of 
nationalistn, virulent hostility to the trade unions, a desire for a new socio-economic 
order and a professed opposition to class struggle, \Vere emerging. The logical 
destination for that combination of thinking was surely National Socialism. 
Thus it was argued that one particular strand of liberalism - rooted firmly in 
liberalism's basic ontology of the individual, retaining its belief in progress, moulded 
by its late 19th-century attitudes to state and nation, and implacably hostile to 
egalitarianism, socialism and trade unionism - transmuted into National Socialism. 
This, of course, does not mean that all liberals harbour the proclivity to be Nazis, 
either then or now, despite the incorporation into the National Socialist belief system 
of some of the most basic fundamentals of liberal thinking. The strand in question is 
the one which has given rise not only to liberal elitistn and Nazistn, but also to 
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/aissez-.faire economics, possessive individualism, right-wing libertarianism and 
Liberal Parties of the sort led by Vladimir Zhirinovski, the neo-Fascist 
Greater-Russian nationalist and racist.l51 Each of these is different from German 
National Socialism, but they al1 subscribe to a rather compassionless dog-eat-dog 
philosophy of life and a!Jow liberty to beco1ne licence for the stronger and more 
powerful. Just as socialism has been saddled with being a tributary of the regimes of 
Josef Stalin and Nicolae Ceaucescu, so too does liberalism have to face up to its 
contributions to the achievements of I-Iitler and Zhirinovski. Most modern-day 
socialists and liberals deplore the undetnocratic beliefs of these four villainous 
characters (with socialists also stressing their inegalitarianism, while liberals decry 
their lack of liberty), but neither can deny that, latent within certain components of 
their underlying philosophies, lies the potential for the development at: or contribution 
to, harsh and brutal political ideologies. 
The second aim was to see whether there was evidence pointing tovvards the 
German upper middle class as a whole being more pro-Nazi than other classes in 
Germany. This class tended to be largely liberal voters in Wilhelmine times and during 
the first years of the Weimar Republic. Analysis of the election results and voting 
patterns of the later Weitnar years showed that liberal voters did not find it at all 
difficult to switch allegiance to the NSDAP, while a class analysis of the voting 
patterns within German cities in July 1932 demonstrated that upper-middle-class 
residential areas cast a far higher percentage of votes for the NSDAP than any other 
urban districts. Widespread Nazi sentiment and suppo1t among the upper-middle-class 
Bert{(e and Vereine were also apparent from the evidence of other historians' studies 
on these organisations. Additionally, a reappraisal of some of the material in Michael 
Kater' s The Nazi Party suggested a very large overrepresentation of this class within 
the Nazi Pa1iy, massively so in the upper-leadership levels. The study of VELA itself, 
avowedly non-party political until 1933, nevertheless demonstrated a close affinity 
with National Socialist ideology as the organisation developed its elitist 
Weltanschauung over the course of the 1920s and early 1930s, while the ease of 
Cleichschaltung, and the enthusiasm with which it vvas greeted, suggested the 
3 11 
existence of a very vvidespread pro-Nazi senti1nent mno11g its senior-tnanager 
n1embership. 161 
The third ailn \vas to de1nonstrate that the appeal of the Nazis for VELA and the 
upper 1niddle classes in general \Vas their perceived and actual modernity. The 
e1ectora1 and financial organisation of the pre-1933 NSDAP, its style:: image and 
dynamis1n were all shown to have been innovative and up to date. However, more 
in1portant than appearances, were the 1nodern ideas of National Socialisn1. Chief 
a1nong these, especially for VELA, were the vaunting of the concept of leadership~ 
the prmnotion of expertise over entrenched interests, and the vision of a 1nodern~ 
industrialised, politica11y-directed capitalist econotny. In the i1nagination. of n1any 
senior 1nanagers hovered the vision of themselves, strategically placed between 
capital and labour, playing a larger role in the 1nanagc1nent of their firms and taking 
part in the fonnulation of national econmnic policy. These 1nen w·anted to i1nprove 
cap1tali.stn~ not overthro\v it, and this \Vas what the Nazis appeared to be offering. It 
\Vas not the 13/ut-und-Boden atavistic \Ving of the NSDAP to wh01n the upper middle 
class were listening or responding~ but to the '1nodernisers', \Vho also happened to be 
the real1novers and shakers in the Party. 
The fourth aim was to investigate the degree of cotnplicity of the upper 1niddle 
class in the very genesis and spread of National Socialist ideology and politics. The 
first indication that this .might have been significant can1e ]n the reassess1nent of the 
class cotnposition of the NSDAP leadership. This proved it to be greatly and 
disproportionately skewed in favour of the upper middle class. The studies of the 
Ben~f'e sho,ved a deep and early penetration by the NSDAP, whjJe the 1naterial on the 
Vereine revealed that these were hotbeds of right-wing politics among a supposedly 
fractured and passive c1ass. Often disguised as taking an above-party or apolitical 
stand .. both the Beru.fe and the Vereine were in fact active diffusersand proselytisers 






Perhaps the most important finding of this study, tracked in the course of the six 
chapters dealing with VELA., was that the ideas which led senior salaried managers 
eventually to support National Socialism were not apparently being imported into the 
organisation by NSDAP metnbers, but were being generated from within. Just as 
Vereine members tended to join the Party and not the other way around, so it seemed 
to be the case that the NSDAP was a last stop rather than a boarding point for those 
upper managers who eventually became Nazis. VELA developed a Weltanschauung 
which was c01npatible, contemporaneous, congruent and convergent with NSDAP 
thinking, a 'Nazi' ideology that was almost wholly developed from within. National 
Socialism was not a cosmic or alien force which infected a group of zealots who, with 
great propagandist skilJ, then converted huge swathes of the German population.111 
Similar or compatible ideologies were developing in many sectors of German society 
in the Weimar years. The principal claim of this thesis is that the social, economic and 
occupational organisations of Germany's upper middle classes were major breeding 
grounds for the development of such ideologies which crystallised by about 1924 or 
1925. Under the crisis conditions of the Depression, and amidst a widespread 
disillusionment with all the so-called bourgeois parties, these ideologies formed the 
basis for a political critique which inclined disproportionate numbers of the upper 
middle class to find confirmation of their opinions in the politics as \veil as the basic 
Weltanschauung of the NSDAP. For these reasons, the overall conclusion of this 
thesis is that the co1nplicity of the upper middle class in the National Socialist 
phenomenon v.;as substantial and fundamental. 
[l] Afitteilungsblatterder Vela, He.ft 11, 1934, p.l75~M~~ He.fi 12, 1934, pp.l93-195. 
[2] Avraham Barkai, Nazi Economics. Ideology, Theory, and Policy, Oxford, 1990, p.124. 
r3] MV, H~/i I 0, 1934, pp.l65-167. 
r4J Alan Milward, 'Fascism and the Economy' in Waiter Laqueur (ed), Fascism: a Reader's 
Guide~ Berkeley, I 976, p.408, quoted in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
[5] Other, less virulent examples of contemporary Liberal parties which exhibit very 
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right-wing politics are those of Japru1 ru1d Australia. . . 
161 These factors effectively created a rather rough correlation between soc1al class and 
support for National Socialism. The lower the social class, then the less likely one was to vote 
NSDAP or to believe in Nazi ideology: the higher the social class, the more likely one was to 
endorse the NSDAP or embrace its world-view. Only at the very pinnacle of the German 
socio-economic class system does this model deviate from its trajectory. Among the half a 
percent or so of the population consisting of the old aristocracy, landowners, capitalist moguls 
and the extremely wealthy, there were many ardent Nazis~ but there were also mru1y who 
found them repugnant because of their foul morality, their vulgarity or their perceived lower 
social status, while perhaps even more saw them as rivals for, or a threat to, their positions of 
power and status. Substantial numbers of dyed-in-the-wool traditional conservatives of this 
cast of mind preferred their own brand of anti-democratic authoritarianism. 
[7] 'Nazis did not have to dress up apolitical burghers and march tl1em in the streets. The 
Nazis were not outsiders or intruders who triumphantly conquered bourgeois conmmnities: on 
the contrary, the populist temperament, the public bearing, the rhetoric, and above all the 
confidence that the National Socialists assumed so effectively were already indigenous to 
bourgeois neighbourhoods. Nazis did not so much seize power as express the ambitions and 
pr~judices of burghers, while transcending the limitations of their political organisation', Peter 
Fntzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilisation in Weimar 
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Handel und lndustrie, Berlin, J 9 I 9, 1920, 1921 , 1922, 1924, 1925, 1 926, I 927, 
1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932 & 1933. Source: (iniversitlits- und 
Stadtshibliothek, Koln; reference: I-Iaa-762. 
Organisator, Westdeutsche Zeitschrift der leitenden Angestellten. Jvfitteilungsblatt 
fiir den Westgau der Vereinigung der leitenden Angestellten, VELA e. V, Cologne, 
1923. Source: lfniversitdls- und Stadtsbihliothek, Koln; reference: Haa-762. 
Organisator, Westdeu/sche Zeitschrijl der leitenden Angestellten. Mitteilungsblatt 
jar die (Jaue Rheinland-Wes((alen, Hessen und Saar der Vereinig11ng der leitenden 
Angeslellten e. V, Cologne, 1924. Source: (iniversikils- und Sladtshihliothek, 
K<Jin; reference: I-faa-762. 
Milleilungsbkitter der VELA, Berlin, 1933 & 1934. 
Stadtsbihliothek, Ka/n~ reference: I-laa-762. 
Source: (iniversitdls- und 
J)ie Deutsche Volk\lvirtsclurft. National-sozialistischer Wirtschqfisdienst, Berlin, 
1933 & I 934. Source: (iniversitc'ils- und S'tadt.r.:hibliothek, J(ti/n~ reference: 
Haa-762. 
Jnternationalen HandwiJrterbuch de,s (]e'rverkschaft~\1-tJesen, Ludwig Heyde, Verlag 
Werk und Wirtschq(t, Berlin, 1931-32. Source: from the collection of Bernd 
Anders, Hamburg. 
rexicon zur Parteiengeschichte. Die hiirgerlichen und kleinbiirgerlichen Parteien 
und Verbiinde in Deutschland (J 789-1945), Band .:f. DDR (place and date unknown). 
Source: Deutsche Angestel/ten Gewerkschaji, Bibliothek und Archh', f!aJnhurg~ 
reference: 18221 dN. 
Die leitenden Angestellten in der gegenwiirtigen Wirtschqftsgesellschaft, 
Schrfftenreihe der (Inion der leitenden Angestellten (l!LA), Ktiln, 1954 (Gisela 
316 
1 
I Kleine). Source: Deutsche Angeste/1/en Gewerkschaft, Bibliothek und Archiv, 
f/amhurg: reference: 7168A 
Der Begr~[( des leitenden Angestellten, unpublished inaugural dissertation by Carl 
· Totschek, Leipzig, 1932. Source: Stiftung Wes~falisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, 
DortJnund; reference: G753. 
Secondary Sources 
(1] Abel, Theodore, Why Hitler Can1e into Power: An Answer Based on the Original 
L(fe Stories qf Six Hundred {?f his F'o!lowers, New York, 1938; reissued as The Nctzi 
Movenwnt: Why Hitler Came to Power, New York, 1966. 
[2]Abraham, David, The Collapse of the Weinuu· Republic, Princeton, 1981. 
[3]Adorno, Theodor W. (ed.), Spiilkapitalismus oder Jndustriegesellschqji, Stuttgart, 
1968. 
[4]AJber, Jens, 'Nationalsozialismus und Moderrdsierung' in KiJlner ZeitschrUi fiir 
Soziologie und ... ~'ozialp.\ycho/ogie, No.41, 1989. 
(5]AJbertin, Lothar, 'German Liberalism and the Foundation of the Weimar Republic' 
in Anthony Nicholls & Erich Matthias ( eds.), Gernu~n J)en?ocracy and the Ti·hnnph (?f 
Hitler, London, 1971. 
[6]AJbertin, Lothar, Liheralismus und Demokralie an1 At?fang der Weitnarer 
Republik, DOsseldorf, 1972. 
[7]Allen, William Sheridan, The Nazi .)'eizure of Power: the Experience of a Single 
German Town (revised ed.), New York, 1984. 
[8]A1Ien, William Sheridan, 'Farewell to Class Analysis in the Rise of Nazism: 
Comment' in Central E~uropean Hislory, Vo/.17, No.1, 1984. 
[9] Angermund, Ral ph, Deutsche Richterschajt 1919-1945. Kriset!fahrung, Illusion, 













[I O]Arblaster, Anthony, l'l1e Rise and Decline (?[Western Liheralisn1, London, 1984. 
[ 11 ]Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianisn1, New York, 1960. 
[ 12]Aron, Raytnond, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vol.2, New York, 
1967. 
[13]Aut:,'llstine, Dolores L., 'Arriving in the Upper Class: the Wealthy Business Elite 
of WilheJmine Germany' in David Black bourn & Richard Evans ( eds. ), The German 
Bourgeoisie~ London!New York, 1991. 
[14]Barkai, Avraha1n, 'Sozialdarwinismus und Antiliberalismus in Hitler.\· 
Wil'fschajtskonzept: Zu Hen1y A. Turner, Jr., Hitlers Einstel/ung zu Wirtschajt und 
Gesellschc~ft vor 1933' in Geshichte und Gesel!scajt, 3, 1977. 
[15]Barkai, Avraham, 'Wirtschqftliche Gntndanschauungen und Ziele der NSDAP: 
Ein unveri~ffentlichtes Dokument aus den1 Jahre 1931' in Jahrhuch des Institutsjilr 
Deutsche Geschichte, 7, 1978. 
[1 6]Barkai, Avraham, Nazi Economics. Ideology, The(Jiy, and Policy, Oxford, 1990. 
[ 17]Barkai, A vraham, 'The German Volk.\gemeinschc~ft fr01n the Persecution of the 
Jews to the "Final Solution"' in Michael Burleigh (ed.), Cor?fronting the Nazi Past. 
New Dehates on Modern Gennan Hisl<ny, London, 1996. 
[18]Beetham, David, Max Weher and the Theo1y of lv!odern Politics, 2nd ed, 
Cambridge, I 985. 
[ 19)Bendix, Reinhard, Max Weber: Anlnte/lectual Portrait, Garden City, I 960. 
[20]Benjamin, Waiter, 'Theorien des deutschen Faschismus' in Waiter Benjamin, 
Gescnnmelte Schr(ften, Vol .3, Frankfurt, I 977. 
[2 1 ]Benjamin, Waiter, 'Theories of German Fascism' in New German Critique, 17, 
1979. 
[22]Benz, Wolfgang, 'Von1 .freiwilligen Arbeitsdienst zur Arheitsdien.,_·tpflicht' m 
Vierre!Jahrshefte .Fir Zeitgeschichte, 16, 1968. 
[23]Bessel, Richard, ' Violence as Propaganda: the Role of the Storm Troopers in the 
Rise of National Socialism' in Thomas Chi1ders (ed.), The J:;onnation of the Nazi 
Constituency 1919-1933, London, 1986. 
[24]Bessel, Richard, 'The Formation and Dissolution of a German National 
Electorate: from Kaiserreich to Third Reich' in Larry Jones & James Retallack (eds.), 













[25]Bessel, Richard (ed.), Fascist Jtaly and Nazi Gern1any: Con1parisons and 
Contrasts, London, 1996. 
[26]Bessel, Richard & Feuchtwanger, E.J. (eds.), 5'ocial Change and Political 
Development in Wein1ar Gern1any, London, 1981. 
[27]Beyrau, Dietrich, 'Liheraler Adel und Refortnbiirokratie im Russland Alexanders 
11' in Dieter Langewiesche (ed.), Liberalisnnts im 19. Jahrhundert, Gottingen, 1988. 
[28]Biedenkopf, Kurt, 'Sozia/politik und Arheitsrecht' in I-Jans Mom1nsen, Dietrnar 
Petzina & Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), Jndustrielles Systen1 und politische Entwicklung in 
der Wein1arer Repuhlik, Di.isseldorf, 1974. 
[29]Blackbourn, David, 'The German Bourgeoisie: An Introduction' in David 
Blackbourn & Richard Evans (eds.), The Gern1an Bourgeoisie, London/New York, 
I 991. 
[30]B1ackbourn, David & E1ey, Geoff. The Peculiarities of German HistrJly, Oxford, 
1984. 
[3 I ]Biackbourn, David & Evans, Richard ( eds. ), 77Je German Bourgeoisie, 
London/New York, 1991. 
[32]Biinkhorn, Mat1in (ed.), Fascists and Conservatives, London, 1990. 
[33]Boak, Fielen L., 'Women in Weimar Germany: The "f/·auer?ftage'' and the 
Female Vote' in Richard Bessel & E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), Social Change and 
Political Development in Weimar Germany, London, 1981. 
[34]Booms, I-lans, 'Die Deutsche Volk.spartei' in Erich Matthjas & Rudo1f Morsey 
(eds), Das Ende der Parteien 1933, Di.isseldort: 1960. 
[35]Braatz, W.E., 'Two Nee-conservative Myths in Germany 1919-1932' in Journal 
of the 1-Jistory of Ideas, 1971. 
[36]Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Die Auf/ijsung der Weimarer Repuhlik, Stuttgart, 1955. 
[37]Bracher, KarJ Dietrich, Die Deutsche Diktatur. Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des 
Nationalsozialisn7us, Cologne, 1969: English translation (Jean Steinberg), The 
German Dictatorship, London, I 971. 
[38]Bracher, Karl Dietrich, Sauer, Wolfgang & Schulz, Gerhard, Die 
nationa!sozialistische l\1achtergre{fung, Cologne/Opladen, 1960. 
[39]Brady, Robert A., The Rationalisation Moven1ent ;n German !ndustty, Berkeley, 
1933. 
319 
[ 40]Briefs, Goetz, 'Rationalisierung der Arheil' in !ndustrie- und Handelskanuner zu 
Berlin, J)ie Bedeutung der Rationalisierung .fiir das deutsche Wirtschaj/.sleben, 
Berlin, 1928. 
[ 41 ]Broszat, Martin, Der Staats Hitlers, Munich, 1969. 
[ 42]Bullock, Alan, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, 2nd edition, London, 1962. 
[43]Burleigh, Michael (ed.), Confronting the Nazi Past. New Debates on Modern 
German History, London, 1996. 
[44]Burleigh, Michae] & Wippermann, Wolfgang, The Racial State: Germany 
1933-1945, Cambridge, I 991. 
[ 45]Campbell, Joan, Joy in Work, German Work, Princeton, 1989. 
[ 46]Caplan, Jane, 'Bureaucracy, Politics and the National Socialist State' in ·Peter 
Stachura (ed.), The Shaping (~f the Nazi Stale, London, 1978. 
[ 47]Caplan, Jane, 'Civil Service Support for National Socialism: an Evaluation' in 
Gerhard I-Iirschfeld & Lothar Kettenacker ( eds. ), IJer Fiihrer.s·taat: Mythos und 
Realitdt, Stuttgart, 1981. 
[ 48]Caplan, Jane, 'Speaking the Right Language: The Nazi Party and the Civil 
Service Vote in the Weimar Republic' in Thomas Childers (ed.), The Formation of 
the Nazi Constituency 1919-1933, London, 1986. 
[49]Caplan, Jane, (]overrnnent without Ad1ninistration. State and Civil Service in 
Wein1a1· and Nazi Germany, London, 1988. 
[SO]Caplan, Jane, 'The Rise of National Socialism 1919-1933' in Gordon Mart e) 
(ed.), Afodern Gennany Reconsidered, 1870-1945, London, 1992. 
[51 ]Chcllnhers Biographical DictionaJJl, F{jih Edition, London, 1990. 
[52]Chanady, ·Attila A., 'The Dissolution of the German Democratic Par1y in 1930' in 
An1erican Historical Revue, lxx, 1968. 
(53]Childers, Thomas, The Nazi Voter. The Social Foundations of F'asci.wn in 
Gennany, 1919-1933, NC/London, 1983. 
[54]Childers, Thomas, 'Who Indeed Did Vote for Hitler?' m Central European 
History, Vol.17, No.1, 1984. 
[55]Childers, Thomas, Review of Richard Hamilton, JtVho Voted .fbr Hitler? m 
Journal qf lvfodern HislO!Jl, Vo/.56, No. 3, 1984. 
320 
[56]Childers, Thomas (ed.), The Fonnation r~f the Nazi (~onstituency 1919-1933, 
London, 1986. 
[57]Childers, Thomas, 'Languages of Liberalism: Liberal Political Discourse in the 
Weimar Republic' in Konrad Jarausch & Larry Jones (eds), In Search qf a Liberal 
Germany, Berg, 1990. 
[58)Childers, Thomas, 'The Social Language of Politics in Gennany; the Sociology of 
Political Discourse in the Weimar Republic' in American Histo1y Review, Vo/.95, 
No.2, 1990. 
[59]Childers, Thomas, 'The Middle Classes and National Socialism' in David 
Blackbourn & Richard Evans (eds.), The German Bourgeoisie, London/New York, 
1991. 
[60]Clark, Vincent, 'A Struggle for Existence: The Professionalization of German 
Architects' in Geoffrey Cocks & Konrad J arausch ( eds. ), German Prqfessions, 
1800-1950, Oxford, 1990. 
(6I]Cocks, Geoffrey & Jarausch, Konrad (eds.), Gennan Prr~fessions, 1800-1950, 
Oxford, 1990. 
[62]Conze, Werner, 'Der Verein als Leben~fonn des /9. Jahrhunderts' in !Jie lnnere 
lvfission, 50, 1960. 
[63]Dahrendorf, Ralf, Society and J)en7ocracy in Germany, London, 1968. 
[64]Dascher, Ottfried, 'Problen1e der Konzernorganisation' in Bans Mommsen, 
Dietmar Petzina & Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), lndustriel/es .. ))Jsten7 und politische 
Entwicklung in der Weimarer Repuh/ik, Dusseldorf, 1974. 
[65]Deutsches Fiihrerlexicon 1934-35, Berlin, 1935. 
[66]Dipper, Christof, 'Ade/sliheralisnnts in f)eutsch!and' m Dieter Langewiesche 
( ed.), Liberalisn1us in1 19. Jahrhundert, G<:Htingen, 1988. 
[67]Dohn, Lothar, Politik und Interesse. J)ie lnteressen5;truktur der Deutschen 
Vollwpartei, Meisenheim, 1970. 
[68]Dorpalen, Andreas, Heinrich von Treitschke, New Haven, 1957 
[69]Dulffer, J., 'BonapartisJn, Fascism and National Socialism' m Journal of 
ConteJnporal}' History, 11, 1976. 
[70]Dunkmann, Karl, 'Werksgemeinschc.~ft a!s ()rganisation~problen7. Eine 





vVerksgemeinschqft in historischer und soziologischer Beleuchtung, Berlin, 1928. 
[71 ]Eiey, Geoff, From (!n{fication to Nazisn1 - Reinterpreting the Gennan Past, 
London, I 986. 
[72]Eley, Geoff, 'Liberalismus /860-19 I 4. Deutschland und Gross Brilannien in1 
Vergleich' ·in Dieter Langewiesche (ed.), Liheralismus im 19. .Jahrhundert, 
Gottingen, 1988. 
[73]Eiey, Geoff, 'Conservatives and Radical Nationalists in Germany: the Productjon 
of Fascist Potentials, 1912-1928' in Martin Blinkhorn (ed.), Fascists and 
Conservatives, London, 1990. 
[74]Eley, Geoff, 'Notable Politics, the Crisis of German Liberalism, and the Electoral 
T~·ansitio~ of the 1890s' in Konrad Jarausch & Larry Jones (eds.), In .Search qf a 
L1beral Germany, Berg, 1990. 
[75]Eiey, Geoff, 'Liberalism, Europe and the Bourgeoisie 1860-1914' in David 
Blackbourn & Richard Evans (eds.), The (Jerman Bourgeoisie, London, 1991. 
[76]Eiey, Geoff, 'Bismarckian Germany' in Gordon Martel (ed.), Modern Gennany 
Reconsidered, London, J 992. 
[77]Elm, Lud\vig, Zwischen F'ortschri/1 und Reaktion: Geschichte der Parteien der 
lihera/en Bourgeoisie in Deutschland /893-1918, Berlin, 1968. 
[78]Falter, Ji.irgen, 'The National Socialist Mobilisation of New Voters: 1928-33' in 
Thomas Childers (ed.), The Formation of the Nazi Constituency 1919-1933, London, 
1986. 
[79]Falter, Ji.irgen, ''(Anfiilligkeit' .. der Angestellten - ''l!nmunitat" der Arbeiter? 
Mythen iiber die Wiihjer der NSDAP' in U. Backes, E. Jesse & R. Zitelmann (eds.), 
Die .S'chatten der Vergangenheit. !ntpulse zur Historisierung de,\' 
Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt/Berlin, I 990. 
[80]Falter, Jilrgen, Hitters With/er. Die Anhc'inger des Nationalsozialisntus 
1928-1933, Munich, 1991. 
[81 ]Falter, Jurgen, 'The Social Basis of Political Cleavages in the 'vVeitnar Republic 
1919-33' in Larry Jones & James Retallack (eds.), Elections, Mass Politics and 
Social Change in Modern Germany, Cambridge, 1992. 
[82]Falter, Jurgen, Lindenberger, Thomas & Schumann, Siegfried (eds.), Wahlen und 
A hstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik. Materia lien zun1 Wahlverha/ten 
1919-1933, Munich, 1986. 
322 
T 
[83]Falter, Jurgen & Zintl, Reinhard, 'The Economic Crisis of the 1930s and the Nazi 
Vote' in Journal of lnterdisciplinaJy 1-fistoly, Vo/.19, 1988-89. 
[84]Feldman, Gerald D., 'German Business between War and Revolution: The 
Origins of the Stinnes-Legien Agreement' in Gerhard A. R1tter ( ed.), Entstehung und 
Wandel der modernen Gesellschaft, Berlin, 1970. 
[85]Feldman, Gerald D., Von1 Weltkrieg zur Wirtschqftskrise. Studien zur deutschen 
fVirtschqfts- und Sozialgeschichte, Gottingen, 1984. 
[86]Feldman, Gerald D., 'Das deutsche [!nternehmertum zwischen Krieg und 
Revolution. Die Entstehung des Stinnes-Legien Ahko1nn1ens' in Gerald Feldman, Vom 
Weltkrieg zur Wirtschaftskrise. Studien zur deutschen Wirtschajts- und 
Sozialgeschichte, Gottingen, 1984. 
(87]Feldman, Gerald D., 'A.~pekte deutscher /ndustriepolitik c.nn E'nde der Weinzarer 
Republik 1930-1932' in Gerald Feldman, Vom We/tkrieg zur Wirtschaftskrise. 
5'tudien zur deutschen Wirtschqfis- und Sozialgeschichte, Gottingen, 1984. 
[88]Feldman, Gerald D., 'The Weimar Republic: A Problem of Modernisation?' in 
Archiv.fiir 5vozialgeschichte, Band 26, 1986. 
(89]Feldman, Gerald D. & Steinisch, lnngard, <Die Wein1arer Repuhlik zwischen 
Sozial- und Wirtschqftsslaat. Die Entscheidung gegen den Achtstundentag' in Archiv 
fiir Sozialgeschichle, Vol. 18, 1978. · 
[90)Fest, Joachim C., The ]~'ace of the Third Reich, London, 1970; first published as 
Gesicht des dritten Reiches. Profile einer totalitiiren Herrschqft, Munich, 1963. 
[91]Feuchtwanger, E.J. (ed.), l.lpheaval and Continuity. A CenttJJy r~( German 
Histc)Jy, London, 1973. 
[92]Feuchtwanger, E.J., Fron1 WeiJnar to Hitler. Germany, 1918-33, London, 1993. 
(93)Fischer, Conan, 'The Occupational Background of the SA's Rank and File' m 
Peter Stachura (ed.), The Shaping c~fthe Nazi State, London, 1978. 
[94 ]Fischer, Conan, Storm troopers: a Social, Econon1ic and ideological Analysis 
(1925-1935), London, 1983. 
[95]Fischer, Conan, 'Workers, the Middle Class and the Rise of National Socialisn1' 
in German Histo1y, 9, 1991. 
[96]Fischer, Conan ( ed.), 77w Rise (?f National Socialism and the Working Class in 





[97]Fischer, Fritz, Gr{ffnach der Weltmacht, Diisseldorf, 1961. 
[98]Frenz, Gustav, Kritik des Taylor-5)Jstems, Berlin, 1920. 
[99]Friedrich, Carl Joachim & Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Totalitarian Dictatorship and 
Autocracy, Cambridge, Mass., 1956. 
[ 1 OO]Fritzsche, Peter, Rehearsals for Fa .... ·cism: Populism and Political Mobilisation 
in Weilnar Gern1any, New York, 1990. 
[1 01 ]Fritzsche, Peter, 'Weimar PopuJism and National Socialism in Local 
Perspective' in Larry Jones & James Retallack (eds.), Elections, Mass Politics and 
Social Change in Modern Germany, Cambridge, 1992. 
[1 02]Frye, Bruce B., 'The Gennan Democratic Party, 1918-1930' tn Western 
Political Quarterly, xvi, 1963. 
[ 1 03]Gaertringen, Friedrich Hill er von, 'Die [)eu/schnationale Volk.S]Jartei' in Erich 
Matthias & RudolfMorsey (eds.), [)as Ende der Parteien 1933, Dusseldorf: l960. 
[1 04]Gall, Lothar, '5'iide!?fall des liberalen Gedanken..,· oder Krise der 
biirgerlich-liberalen Bewegung? Zun1 Verhliltni .. \' von Liherali.wnus und 
Jmperiali .. <.·mus in J)eutschland' in K. Holl & G. List ( eds.), Liberalism us und 
imperialistischer Staat: !Jer Jmperialismus als Problem liheraler Parteien in 
Deut.s·chland 1890-1914, Gottingen, 1975. 
[1 OS] Gall, Lothar, 'Liberalismus und '?n'irger/iche Gese/lschqfi ''' m Lothar Gall 
( ed.), Liberalismus, Cologne, 1976. 
[1 06]Gall, Lothar (ed.), Liberalisnnts, Cologne, 1976. 
(1 07]Geary, Dick, 'The Industrial Elite and the Nazis in the Weimar Republic' m 
Peter Stachura ( ed. ), The Nazi Machtergre[fung, London, 1983. 
[I 08]Geary, Dick, 'Employers, Workers, and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic' in 
lan Kershaw (ed.), Weimar: Why Did Germanf)emocracy Fail?, London, 1990. 
[ 1 09]Geary, Dick, 'The Industrial Bourgeoisie and Labour Relations in Germany 
1871-1933' in David Blackbourn & Richard Evans (eds.), The (]ennan Bourgeoisie, 
London/New Y ark, 1991. 
[ 11 O]Gies, Horst, 'NS1JAP und landwirtschaftliche Organisationen in der E!1dphase 
der ~'eimarer Repuhlik' in Vierte!jahrshefte fiir Zeitgeschichte, 15, 1967. 
[11 1 ]Giles,Geoffrey, 'National Socialism and the Educated Elite in Wei1nar Germany' 
in Peter Stachura ( ed. ), The Nazi MachtergreijilfJg, London, 1983. 
324 
[ ll2]Gillis, John R., 'Aristocracy and Bureaucracy in Nineteenth-Century Prussia' in 
Past and Present, 41, 1968. 
[ 113]Gispen, Kees, 'Engineers in Wilhelmian Germany: Professionalization, 
Deprofessionalization, and the Development ofNonacademic Technical Education' in 
Geoffrey Cocks & Konrad Jarausch (eds.), German Pr(~fessions. 1800-1950, Oxford, 
1990. 
[114]Gispen, Kees, New Profession, Old Order, London, 1991. 
[115)Gispen, Kees, 'National Socialistn and the Technological Culture of the Weimar 
Republic' in Central European History, Vo/.25, No.4, 1992. 
[116]Gispen, Kees, 'Visions of Utopia: Social Emancipation, Technological Progress 
and Anticapitalism in Nazi Inventor Policy, 1933-1945' in Central European 1-Jisf(ny, 
Vo/.32, No.l, 1999. 
[ 117]Goldhagen, Daniel, /-lit/er's Willing Executioners, New York, I 996. 
[ l18]Gottl-Ottlilienfeld, Fried rich van, Fordismus. Von Frederic:k W Tay for zu 
!Jen!JJ Ford, 2nd rev. ed., Jena, 1925. 
[ 119]Grunberger, Richard, A Social Hisloty qf the Third Reich, London, 1971. 
[ 120]H:alperin, S. William, (]ermany Tried Dentocracy: a Political 1-JistoJJ! qf the 
Reic:hfi·om 1918 to 1933, New York, 1965. 
[1 21 ]Ha1nerow, Theodore S., Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and 
Politics in Gernu111)', 1815-1871, Princeton, 1958. 
[ 122]Hatnilton, Richard, Who Votedfor Hitler?, Princeton, 1982. 
[123)Halni1ton, Richard, 'Braunschweig 1932: Further evidence on the Support for 
National Socialistn' in CentraL European Histo1y, 17, No. 1, 1984. 
(124]Hartenstein, Wolfgang, Die At(/iinge der Deutschen Vo!kvxrrtei 1918-1920, 
Dlisseldorf, 1962. 
[ I25]Herf, Jeffrey, Reactioncuy Modernism, Cambridge, 1984. 
[ 126]Herf, Jeffrey, 'The Engineer as Ideologue: Reactionary !vlodernists in Weitnar 
and Nazi Germany' in Journal {?[Contemporary Histo1y, Vo/.19, No.4, 1984. 
[ 127]Hertzmann, Lewis, DNVP: Right-Wing Opposition in the Weimar Republic, 
Lincoln, Nebraska, 1963. 
325 
[ 128]1-Iess, Jurgen, 'Das ganze Deutschland soli es sein. ' Demokratischer 
Nationa/ismus in der Weimarer Republik am Bei~\piel der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Partei, Stuttgart, 1978. 
[129]Heuss, Theodor, Friedrich Neumann: [)er Mann, das Werk, 2nd ed, Stuttgart, 
1949. 
[130]Heuss, Theodor, 'Mea Weber in seiner Gegemvart, introduction to Max 
Weber, Gesammelte politische Schrijten, 2nd ed., edited by Johannes Winckelmann, 
Tubingen, 1958. 
[131 ]Hiden, John & Farquharson, John, Explaining Hitler's Germany. Historians 
and the Third Reich, Totowa, NJ, 1983. 
[132]Hildebrand, Klaus, The Third Reich, New York/London, 1984. 
[133]Hirschfeld, Gerhard & Kettenacker, Lothar (eds.), J)er Fiihrerstaat: Mythos und 
Realitat, Stuttgart, 1981. 
[134]1-Iitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, translated by Ralph Manheim, London, 1969. 
[135]Hobsbawm, Eric J., The Age t?{Capital, 1848-1875, London, 1975. 
[ 136]Holborn, Hajo, 'Origins and Political Character of Nazi Ideology' in Political 
5'cience Quarterly, 79, 1964. 
[137]Fioll, K. & List, G. (eds.}, Liheralismus und imperialistischer .)'taat: Der 
Imperialisnnts als Problem libera!tJr Parteien in f)eut.w.:hland 1890-1914, Gottingen, 
1975. 
[138]Honderich, Ted (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford/New 
York, 1995. 
[139]Honigsheim, Paul, 'Max Weber und die deutsche Politik', in KtHner Zeitschr{ft 
.fiir Soziologie und .S'ozialp.~ychologie, 13, 1961. 
[ 140]:Horkheimer, Max & Adorno, Theodor, Dialectic (~f Enlightenment, ·New York, 
1972. 
[ 141 ]Hubinger, Gangolf, 'Hochindustrialisierung und die Kulturwerte des deutschen 
Liheralisn1us' in Dieter Langewiesche (ed.), Liheralisnnts in1 19. Jahrhundert, 
Gottingen, 1988. 
[ 142]Hughes-Warrington, Marnie, F{fty Key Thinker .. ~· on History, London, 2000. 
[143]Hullbusch, Ursula, 'Der Ruhreisenstreit in gewerkschajilicher Sicht' in Hans 
Mommsen, Dietmar Petzina & Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), lndustrielles System und 
326 
politische Entwicklung in der Weimarer Republik, Dusseldorf, 1974. 
[144 ]Jackel, Eberhard, J-litlers Weltanschauung, Tubingen, 1969. 
[145]Jarausch, Konrad, 'The Crisis of the German Professions' m Journal (~( 
Cunle1nporary History, Vo/.20, No.3, 1985. 
[146]Jarausch, Konrad, 'The Perils of Professionalisation: Lawyers, Teachers and 
Engineers in Nazi Gennany' in German ,5,'tudies Review, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1986. 
[147]Jarausch, Konrad, The Ut!free Professions, Princeton, 1988. 
[148]Jarausch, Konrad, 'The Decline of Liberal Professionalis1n; Reflections on the 
Social Erosion of German Liberalism 1867-1933' in Konrad Jarausch & Larry E. 
Jones (eds.), In Search of a Liberal Germany, Berg, 1990. 
[149]Jarausch, Konrad & Jones, Larry E. (eds.), In Search (?fa Liheral Gennany, 
Berg, 1990. 
[150]Johnson, Jeffrey A., 'Academic, Proletarian, ...... Professional? Shaping 
Professionalization for German Industrial Chemists, 1887-1920' in Geoffrey Cocks & 
Konrad Jarausch (eds.),German Pn?fessions, 1800-1950, Oxford, I 990. 
[151 ]Jones, Larry E., '"The Dying Middle": Weimar Germany and the Fragmentation 
of Bourgeois Politics' in Central European HisfOIJ', Vo/.5, No. 1, 1972. 
[152]Jones, Larry E., 'The Crisis of White-Collar Interests: J)eutschnationaler 
Handlung.\gehi(fen-Verband and Deutsche Volk.r..partei in the World Economic Crisis' 
in Hans Mommsen, Dietmar Petzina & Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), fndustrielles S'ysten1 
und politische Enhl'icklung in der Weimarer Repuhlik, Di.isseldorf, l974. 
(153]Jones, Larry £., 'The Dissolution of the Bourgeois Party System in the \Veimar 
Republic' in Richard Bessel & E.J. Feuchtwanger (eds.), .S'ocial Change and Political 
Developn1ent in Weilnar Gennany, London, 1981. 
[ 154]Jones, Larry E., German Liberalism and the Dissolution (~f the rVeimar Party 
S)Jstem, 1918-1933, Chapel Hill, 1988. 
[155]Jones, Larry E. & Retallack, James (eds.), Election.\·, lvfass Polilics and Social 
Change in Modern Germany, Cambridge, 1992. 
[ 156]Kaelble, 1-Iartmut, !ndustriel/e Inreressenpo!itik in der . Wilheln1ischen 
Gese!lschaft: Centralverhand J)eutscher lndustrieller 1895-1914, Berhn, 1967. 
[ I57]Kaelble, Harttnut & Spode, Hasso, 'Sozialstruktur und Lebensweisen deutscher 
l.lnternehmer, 1907-1927' in Scripta A1ercalurae, 24, !-/eft 112, 1990. 
327 
[158]Kaschuba, WoJfgang, 'Zwischen Deutscher Nation und J)eulscher Provinz. 
Politische liorizonte und soziale Milieus in1 .friihen Liberalisnnts' in Dieter 
Langewiesche (ed.), Liberalisnuts im 19. Jahrhundert, Gottingen, 1988. 
[159)Kater, Michael, 'Zur Soziographie der friihen M)1JAP ', in Vierte(jahrshejte fiir 
Zeitgeschichte, XIX. 1971. 
[160]Kater, Michael, 'The Work Student: A Socio-Economic Phenomenon of Early 
Weimar Germany' in Journal ofConten?porary Histo1y, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1975. 
[ 161 ]l(ater, Michael, 'Sozialer Wandel in der NSJJAP in1 Zuge der 
nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung' in Wolfgang Schieder (ed.), Faschisn1us als 
soziale Bewegung, Hamburg, 1976. 
[162]Kater, Michael, The Nazi Party. A Social PJY!flle qf Members and Leaders 
1919-1945, Oxford, 1983. 
[ 163 ]Kat er, Michael, 'The Nazi Physicians' League of 1929. Causes and 
Consequences' in Thomas Childers (ed.), The Fonnation qf the Nazi Constituency 
1919-1933, London, 1986. 
[164]Kater, Michael, 'Physicians in Crisis at the End of the Weimar Republic' in Peter 
Stachura ( ed.), (lnen1ployment and the Great [Jepression, London, 1986. 
[l65]Kater, Michael, Doctors under Hitler, NC/London, 1989. 
[ 166]Kehr, Eck art, ,_\'chlach(flottenbau und Parteipolitik 1894-/90 I: Versuch eines 
Querschnills durch die innenpolilischen, sozialen und ideologi,\·chen 
Voraussetzungen des deutschen Imperialisntus, Berlin, 1930. 
[167]J(ellenbenz, H., 'l!nternehmertmn in Siidwestdeutschland' tn Tradition, 10, 
1965. 
[168]Kershaw, Ian, '.Ideology, Propaganda, and the Nazi Patty', in Peter D. Stachura 
( ed.), The Nazi Machtergre{fung, London, 1983. 
[ 169]Kershaw, I an, The Nazi IJictalorship. Problems and Per.,pectives of 
Interpretation, 2nd edition, London, 1989. 
[170]Kershaw, Ian (ed.), Weimar: Why Did German l)emocracy Fail?, London, 
1990. 
[17l]Kershaw, Ian, Hitler, 'Profiles in Power' series, 1-Iarlow, 1991. 
[172]Kershaw, Ian, Hitler. Hubris: 1889-1936, London, 1998. 
328 
[ 173 ]Kettenacker, Lothar, 'Hitler's Impact on the Lower Middle Classes' in David 
Welch (ed.), Nazi Propaganda, London, 1983. 
[ 1 74]Kitchen, Martin> Fascism, London, 1976. 
[ 175]Knickerbocker~ Herbert R., Germany- Fascist or Soviet?, London, 1932. 
[176]Knoll, Joachim H., F'iihrungsauslese in Liberalismus und Dentokratie: Zur 
politischen Geistesgeschichte der letzten 100 .Jahre, Stuttgart, 1957. 
[ 177]Koch, Rain er, 'Liberalismus und liberate Idee vom Vormlirz bis zun1 Ersten 
rVeltkrieg' in Hans Vorlander (ed.), Ve1:fall oder Renaissance des Liberalisnnts?, 
Munich, 1987. 
[178]I<ocka, Jurgen, 'Zur Prohlematik der deutschen Angestellten, 1914-1933' in 
Hans Mommsen, Dietmar Petzina, & Bernd Weisbrod (eds.), Jndustrielles .S'ystent und 
politische Entwicklung in der Weilnarer Repuhlik, Dusseldort: 1974. 
[1 79]Kocka, Ji.irgen, Angeslellte zwischen Fctschismus 11nd Demokralie, Gottingen, 
1977. 
[ 180]Kocka, Jurgen, 'Entrepreneurs and Managers in German [ndustrialisation' m 
Cambridge Econontic Histrny r~f Europe, Vol. VII, Part I, 197R. 
[ 181 ]Kocka, Jurgen, '[!rsachen des Nationalsozialismu .. r,·', in A us Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte, June, 1980. 
[I 82]Kocka, Jurgen ( ed.), Angestellte in europc'iischen Vergleich, Gottingen, 1981. 
[ 183 ]Kocka, Jurgen, 'German History before Hitler: the Debate about the German 
Sonderweg' in Journal of Contempora!JJ His!OJ)J, Vo/.23, No.1, 1988. 
[184]Kocka, Jurgen (ed.), Das Biirgertunt in1 19. Jahrhundert. Deutschlund im 
euoptii,schen Vergleich, 3 vols., Munich, 1988. 
[185]Kocka, Ji.irgen, 'Biirgertwn und biirgerliche Gesel/schaft iln 19. Jahrhundert: 
Europiiische Entwicklungen und deutsche Eigenarten' in Jlirgen Kocka ( ed.), Das 
Biirgertum im 19 . .Jahrhundert: Deutschland i1n euopliischen Vergleich, Munich, 
1988, Vol. I. 
[I 86]Kolb, Eberhard, Die Wein1arer Repuhlik, 3 rd ed, Munich 1993. 
[1 87]Kornhauser, William, The Politics qfMass Society, Glencoe, 1959. 
[1 88]Koshar, Rudy, 'Contentious Citadel: Bourgeois Crisis and Nazism in 
Marburg/Lahn, 1880-1933' in Thomas Childers ( ed.), The Forn1ation of the Nazi 
329 
Constituency 1919-1933, London, 1986. 
[ 189]Koshar, Rudy, Social Ltf'e, Local Politics, and Nazism, NC/London, 1986. 
[ 190]Koshar, Rudy, 'Political Gangsters and Nazism: Some Comments on Richard 
I-Iatnilton's Theory of Fascism' in Contparative 5'tudies in Society and History, 
Vo/.28, 1986. 
[191 ]Koshar, Rudy, 'From Sta1nmtisch to Party: Nazi Joiners and the Contradictions 
of Grass Roots Fascism in Wei1nar Germany' in Journal r~f Modern 1-/istoly, Vo/.59, 
No.1, 1987. 
[ 192]Krausnick, Helm ut & Buchheim, Hans & Broszat, Martin & J acobsen, 
Hans-Adol£ Anatr)fny of the SS State, London, 1968. 
[1 93)Krieger, Leonard, The German Idea r~f Freedom, Chicago, 1957. 
[194]Laffan, Michael (ed.), The Burden of German HisiOIJJ, London, 1989. 
[195]Lagarde, Paul de, 'Die Reorganisation des Adels' m [)eutsche .)'chr~ften, 
Ge.w.untau.sgabe letzter Hand, 2nd ed, Gottingen, 1892. 
[1 96]Lane, Barbara MiiJer & Rupp, Leila J. (eds.), Nazi Ideology hefore 1933. A 
Documentation, Austin, I 978 . 
[ 197]Langewiesche, Dieter, 'Gesellschc~f!s- und ve!.fassung5politi.s·che 
1-land/ungsbedingungen und Zielvorslellungen europi.iischer libera!er in der 
Revolution von 1848' in Geschichte und Gesellschqft, Sonderhe.ft 9, 1983. 
[198]Lange\viesche, Dieter (ed.), Liberali.wnus iln 19 . .lahrhundert, Gottingen, I 988. 
[199]Langewiesche, Dieter, Liberalismus in [)eufschland, Frankfi1rt, 1988. 
[200]Langewiesche, Dieter, 'German Liberalism in the Second Empire' in Konrad 
Jarausch & Larry E. Jones (eds.), In Search (~fa Liberal Germany, Berg, 1990. 
[20 1 ]Langewiesche, Dieter, 'The Nature of German Liberalism' in Got·don Martel 
( ed. ), Modern Gernuzny Reconsidered, London, 1992. 
[202]Lederer, Emil, Die Privatangestellten in der modernen Wirtschc?fisenlwicklung, 
Ti.ibingen, 1912. 
[203]Lepsius, M. Rainer, 'Demokratie in Deutschland als historisch-soziologi .. ,.,·ches 
Problem' in T. W. Adorno ( ed.), S/JtitkapitalisJnus oder lndustriegesellschaft, 
Stuttgart, 1968. 
330 
[204]Lepsius, M. Rainer, 'Parteiensysten1 und SozialsLruklur: z1m1 Problen1 der 
Dentokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschafl' in Gerhard A. Ritter (ed.), Die 
deutsche Parteien vor 1918, Cologne, 1973. 
[205]Lepsius~ M. Rainer, 'MachtiihernahJne und Machtiibergabe. Zur 5'trategie des 
Regimewechsels 1918/19 und 1932/33'(written 1971) in Den1okratie in Deutschland 
Soziologisch-historische Konstellationsanalysen. A usgewdhlle A 1{f.s'iitze, Kritische 
Studien zur Geschichtswissenschajt, 100, Gottingen, 1993. 
[206]Lewinsohn, llichard, Das Geld in der Politik, Berlin, 193 1. 
[207]Liebe, Werner, Die Deutschnationale Volk.vJartei 1918-1924, Di.isseldorf. 
[208]Lindenfeld David F., 'The Professionalization of Applied Economics: German 
Counterparts to Business Administration' in Geoffrey Cocks & Konrad Jarausch 
(eds.), Gern1an Prqfessions, 1800-1950, Oxford, 1990. 
[209]Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man. The Social Basis of Politics, New 
York, 1960. 
[210]Low, Alfred D., The Men around Hitler. The Nazi Elite and ifs Collahorators, 
New York, 1996. 
[21 1]Lutzh6ft, H. J., J)er nordische Gedanke inl)eulschland 1920-1940, Stuttga.1, 
1971. 
[212]Macpherson, C.B., The Political TheoJJJ (?f Possessive lndividualisn1, Oxford, 
1962. 
[21 3]Maier, Charles S., 'Between Taylorism and Technocracy: European ideologies 
and the vision of industrial productivity in the I 920s' in Journal (?l ContentporaJy 
Histo1y, Vo/.5, No. 2, 1970 . . 
[214]Maier, Charles S., Recasting Bourgeois Europe. .Stahilisation in France, 
Gern1any and Italy in the 1)ecade after World Warl, Princeton, 1975. 
[21 S]Martel, Gordon (ed.), Modern Germany Reconsidered, London, 1992. 
[216]Mason, Tim, 'Zur Entstehung des Gesetzes zur Ordnung der nationalen Arbeil 
von1 20. .Januar 1934: Ein Versuch iiber das Verhdltnis "archaischer'·' und 
''moderner" Motnente in der neueren deutschen Geschichte' in Hans l\1ommsen, 
Diet mar Petzina & Bernd Weisbrod ( eds.), !ndustriel/es System und politische 
Entwicklung in der Weimarer Repuhlik, Dlisseldorf, 1974. 
[217]Matthias, Erich & Morsey, Rudolf (eds.), Das Ende der Parteien 1933, 
Di.isseldorf, 1960. 
331 
[218]Matthias, Erich & Mersey, Rudolf, 'L)ie Deutsche Staa/.\fJCtrtei' in Erich 
Matthias & RudolfMorsey (eds.), !Jas Ende der Parleien 1933, Dusseldorf, 1960. 
[219]Matthias, Erich, 'f)ie .)'ozialden7okratische Partei f)eutschlands' in Erich 
Matthias & RudolfMorsey (eds.), Das El1de der Parteien 1933, Dusseldorf, 1960. 
[220]Mayer, Arno J., The Persistence of the Old Regin1e, London, I 981. 
[221]McLelland, Charles E., The German Experience qf Projessiona/isation, 
Cambridge, 1991. 
[222]Meinck, Jurgen, Weimarer Staatslehre und Nationalsozialismus, Frankfurt, 
1978. 
[223 ]Mensch, Gerhard & Schnopp, Reinhard, (Stalemate in technology, 1925-193 5; 
the interplay of stagnation and innovation' in William H. Schroder ('£ Richard Spree 
(eds.), Historische Kot?funktmforschung, Stuttgart, 1980. 
[224]M.ilward, AJan, 'Fascism and the Economy' in Waiter Laqueur (ed.), Fascism: a 
Reader's Guide, Berkeley, 1976. 
[225]Moellendorf, Wichard van, Konservative Sozia!isn7us, Hamburg, 1932. 
[226]Mommsen, Hans, '[)er Nationalsoziali.\'JJ711S: K~tmulative Radikalisierung und 
L)'elbstzersfi.)rung des Regimes, in Jvfeyers Enzyklopddisches Lexicon, Band 16, 
Mannheim, 1976. 
[227]Mommsen, 1-fans, 'National Socialism: Continuity and Change' m Waiter 
Laqueur ( ed.), Fascisn1: a Reader's Guide, Berkeley, 1976. 
[228]Mommsen, Hans, 'The Breakthrough of the National Socialists as a Mass 
Movement in the Late Weimar Republic' in Michael Laffan (ed.), The Burden (?f 
German Histo1y 1919-45, London, 1988. 
[229]Mommsen, Hans, 'Cumulative Radicalisation and Progressive Self-Destruction 
as Structural Determinants of the Nazi Dictatorship' in I an Kershaw & Moshe Lewin 
( eds.), S'talinism and Nazisn1: Dictatorships in CompariL\·on, Cambridge, 1997. 
[230]Mommsen, Hans, Petzina, Dietmar & Weisbrod, Bernd (eds.), Jndustrielles 
.S]Jstemund politische Entwick/ung in der Weimarer Republik, Dusseldorf, l 974. 
[231 ]Mommsen, Wolfgang J., Max Weber and Ciennan Politics, 1890-1920, 
translated by Michael Steinberg, Chicago, 1984~ translation of W.J. Mommsen, j\4ax 
Weber und die deutsche Politik, 1890-1920, 2nd ed, Tl.ibingen, 1974. 
[232]Mommsen, Wolfgang J., 'Wandlung der liberalen Idee i1n Zeitalter des 
Jmperialismus' in K. 1-Ioll & G. List ( eds.), Liberalisnnts und intperialistischer Staat: 
332 
Der ltnperialismus als Problem liheraler Parteien in Deulschland 1890-1914 
. ' G6ttingen, 197 5. 
[233]Mommsen, Wolfgang J., 'Die deutsche Revolution 1918-1920' in (]eschichte 
und Gesellschaft, 4, 1978. 
[234]Moore, Barrington, Origins of Dictatorship and Den1ocrat.y, London, 1967. 
[235]Mosse, George, The Crisis ofGern1an Ideology, London, 1966. 
[236]Mliffehnann, Leo, 'Vela, Vereinigung der leitenden Angestellten' in Ludwig 
Heyde, lnternationalen Handw(jrterhuch des Gewerkschaji.\wesens, Berlin, 1931-32. 
[237]Muh1berger, Detlef, 'The Sociology of the NSDAP: the Question of Working 
Class Membership' in Journal ofConten1porary Histoty, 1980. 
[238]Ml"lhlberger, Detlef, flit/er's Follolvers . ..S1tudies in the Sociology qj' the Nazi 
Movement, Routledge, London~ 1991. 
[23 9]Muller, Tngo, Hitler's Justice. The Courts qf the Third Rei eh, London, 1991. 
[240]Naumann, Friedrich, 'Da.-..· Konigtum' ( 1909) in Naumann, Werke, Band If, 
edited by Waiter Uhsadel, Theodor Schieder & Heinz Ladendorf (6 vols.), Cologne, 
1964-69. 
[24 I ]Naumann, Fried rich, 'Die politische A l!fr;aben im lndustrie-Zeitalter' ( 1904) in 
Naumann, Werke, Band 111, edited by Waiter Uhsadel, Theodor Schieder & Heinz 
Ladendoli' (6 vols.), Cologne, 1964-69. 
[242]Neebe, Reinhard, Gro.~:\'indu.\·trie, Staat und N5'DAP 1930-33, Gottingen, 1981. 
[243JNeufeld, Michael J., 'Weimar Culture and Futuristic Technology: The Rocketry 
and Spaceflight Fad in Germany 1923-33, in Technology and Culture, 31, 1990. 
[244]Neumann, Franz, Behemoth. The Structure and Practice r?f National Socialism, 
London, 1943. 
[245]Neumann, Sigmund, Die deutsche Parteien: Wesen und rVandel nach dem 
Kriege, Berlin, 1932. 
[246]Nichol1s, Anthony & Matthias, Erich ( eds. ), Gern1an J)emocracy and the 
Triumph (~f Hitler, London, 1971. 
[247] Nichols, J.A., Ciermany t.!fler Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890-1894, New 
York, 1968. 
333 
[248]Nipperdey, Thomas, Die ()rganisation der Deutschen Parteien vor 1918, 
Dl.isseldorf, 1961. 
[249]Nipperdey, Thomas, 'V ere in als soziale Struktur in Deulschland im ,\pdlen 18. 
und friihen 19 . .lahrhunderl' in Nipperdey, Gesellschaji, Ku/lur, Theorie, Gottingen, 
1976. 
[250]Noakes, Jeremy, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony 1921-1933, London, 1971. 
[251 ]Noakes, Jeremy, 'Nazism and High Society' in Michael Burleigh (ed.), 
Confronting the Nazi Past. New Debates on Modern Gernurn History, London, 1996. 
[252]Noakes, Jeremy & Pridham, Geoff(eds.), Nazisn71919-1945, Vo/.1, The Rise to 
Power 1919-1934, Exeter, 1983. 
[253]Noakes, JereJny & Pridham, Geotf (eds.), Nazisn1 1919-1945, Vo/.2, State, 
Econo1ny and Society 1919-1945, Exeter, 1984. 
[254 ]Nolte, Ernst, 'Max We her vor dem Faschi.\'J1111s' in Der Staat, Vol. 2, 1963. 
[255]Nolte, Ernst, Three faces (!f Fasci.wn, New York, 1966. 
[256]0benaus, Herbert, 'Region und politisches Interesse im Vormdrzliberalismus 
Preussens' in Dieter Langewiesche ( ed.), Liberalisn711S im 19. Jahrhundert, 
Gottingen, 1988. 
[257]0ffermann, Toni, 'Preussischer Liheralisnnts zwischen Revolution und 
Reichsgriindung in1 regionalen Verg!eich. Berliner und Kolner 
Fortschrittsliberalisnnts in der Konjliktszeit' in Dieter Langewiesche (ed.), 
Libera/i.wnus iln 19 . .Jahrhundert, Gottingen, 1988. 
[258]0rlow, Dietrich, A Histoty (~f the Nazi Party, Pittsburgh, 1969. 
[259]0very, Richard, The Nazi Economic Recovet)J 1932-1938, London, 1982. 
[260]0very, Richard, Cioedng. The 'Iron Man', London, 1984. 
[261 ]Overy, Rjchard, War and Economy in the Third Reich, Oxford, 1994. 
[262]Peukert, Detlev J.K., Inside Nazi (Jern7a!ly. Cot!formity, Opposition and 
Racism in Eve1yday L~fe, London, 1989. 
[263]Preller, Ludwig, Sozialpolitik in der Weimarer Republik, DUsseldorf, 1978. 
[264]Preuss, Hugo, 'Sozia/denu;kratie und ParliaJnentarisnnts' in his Staat, Recht 
und Freiheit: A us 40 Jahren deutscher Politik und Geschichte ( ed. Theodor Heuss), 
334 
Ti.ibingen, 1926. 
[265]Prinz, Michael, 'Das Ende der ~..\'tande .. \po/itik' 111 Jurgen Kocka (ed.), 
Angestellte in europaischen Vergleich, Gottingen, 1981. 
[266]Prinz, Michael & Zitelmann, Rainer ( eds.), Nationalsozialismus und 
Modernisierung, Darmstadt, 1991. 
[267]Proctor, Robert, Racial Hygiene. Medicine under the Nazis, London, 1988. 
[268]Puhle, Hans-Ji.'trgen, Von der Agrarkrise zun1 Prq(aschisnn1s, Wiesbaden, 1972. 
[269]Radkau, Joachim, Technik in Deutschland: Vom 18. Jahrhundert his zur 
Gegernvart, Frankfurt a.M., 1989. 
[270]Raeff. Marc, 'Einige (iherlegung zum Russischen Liberalistnus' in Lothar Gal] 
( ed), Liberalismu.\·, Cologne, 1976. 
(271 ]Rathenau, Waiter, Autonomie Wirtschajt, Jena, 1919. 
[272]Rathenau, Waiter, Gesammelte Schr{ften, 6 vols., Berlin, 1925-1929. 
[273]Rauschning, Hermann, Germany's Revolution qf f)estruclion, London, 1939. 
(274]Rempel, Gerhard, flit/er's Children: the Hitler Youth and the SS, London, 
1989. 
[275]Richter, Werner, Gewerkschq[len, Monopolkapital und Staat im 1. rVeltkrieg 
und in der Novemberrevolution, Berlin, DDR, 1958. 
[276]Rieppel, Paul, Ford-Betriehe und Ford-Methoden, Munich, 1925. 
[277]Ritter, Gerhard A. (ed.), 'Einleitung', Historisches Lesebuch 1871-1914, 
Frankfurt, 1967. 
[278]Ritter, Gerhard A. (ed.), Die deutsche Parteien vor 1918, Cologne, 1973. 
[279]Roseman, Mark, 'National Socialism and Modernisation' in Richard Bessel 
( ed.), Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: Cotnparisons and Contrasts, London, 1996. 
[280]Rupp, Hans, 'Die Aufgaben der P.sychetechnischen Arheitsrat.ionalisierung' in 
P.sychotechnische Zeit.s·chr!ft, 3, 19 28. 
(28l]Schneider, Michael, 'The Development of State Work-Creation Policy in 
Germany, 1930-33' in Peter D. Stachura ( ed.), (lnen7ployment and the Great 
Depression in Weimar Germany, London, 1986. 
335 
[ [282]SchoenbaUln, David, Hitler's ,<,'ocial Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi Germany, London, 1966. 
[283 ]Schweizer, Arthur, Big Business in the Third Rei eh, Bloomington, 1964. 
[284]Schwerber, Peter, Nationa/sozialismus und Technik: l)ie Geistigkeil der 
nationalsozialistischen Bewegung, Munich, 1930. 
[285]Seidel, Richard, 'Angeste/lte im Wandel der Zeit' m Gewerkschqftliche 
Monatshefte, Jahrgang 1951. 
[286]Se11, Friedrich C., Die Tragt>die des deutschen Lihera/ismus, Stuttgart, 1953. 
[287]Shanahan, William 0., 'Friedrich Naumann: A German View of Power and 
·Nationalism' in E.M. Earle (ed.), Nationalism and internationalism, New York, 
1950. 
[288]Shanahan, William 0., 'Friedrich Naumann, a Mirror of Wilhelminian Germany' 
in Review (?f Politics, XIII, 1951. 
[289]Sheehan, Ja1nes J., 'Liberalism and the City in 19th Century Germany' in Past 
and Present, 51, 19 71. 
[290]Sheehan, James J., German Liberalism in the Nineteenth CentlfiJl, Chicago, 
1978. 
[291 ]Snyder, Louis L., i)J(.yclopedia (?l the Third Rei eh, Leicester, 1995. 
[292]Sombart, Werner, l)eutscher S'ozia!isnnt5:, Berlin, 1934. 
[293]Sontheimer, Kurt, 'Der Tat-Kreis' in Vierte!Jahrshefie .fiir Zeitgeschichte, 7, 
1959. 
[294]Sorel, Georges, R4flexions sur la violence (written 1908), 11th ed., Paris, 1950. 
[295]Speier_, Hans, (]erman White Collar Workers and the Rise (~f Flit/er, New Haven 
& London, 1986 (written 1933). 
[296]Stachura, Peter D. (ed.), The .)'haping c~f the Nazi ...\'tare, London, 1978. 
[297]Stachura, Peter D., 'Who were the Nazis? A Socio-Political Analysis of the 
National Socialist Afachtiihernahn1e' in European Studies Review, 11, 19R I. 
[298]Stachura, Peter D. (ed.), The Nazi A1achtergre{fung, London, 1983. 
336 
(299]Stachura, Peter D., 'The Nazis, the Bourgeoisie and the Workers during the 
Kan1pfzeit' in Peter D. Stachura (ed.), The Nazi Machtergre{fung, London, I 983. 
[300]Stachura, Peter D. (ed.), (!nen7ploymenl and the Great [)epression in Wei1nar 
Germany, London, 1986. 
[30 1 ]Stegmann, Dirk, Die Er ben Bistnarcks: Parteien und Verhdnde in der 
S'patphase des Wi/helnzinischen Deutschlands. SaJnn71ungspolitik 1897-1918, Berlin 
& Cologne, 1970. 
(302)Stern, Fritz, The Politics of Cultural DeL\pair, Berkeley, 1961. 
[303]Stolper, Gustav, Deutsche Wirtschaft, 1870-1940, Stuttgart, 1950. 
(304]Strandmann, Hartmut Pogge von, 'The Liberal Power Monopoly in the Cities in 
l1nperial Germany' in Larry Jones & James Retallack (eds.), Elections, lvfass Politics 
and 5'ocial Change in Modern Germany, Cambridge, 1992. 
(305]Struve, Waiter, Eliles against [)en?ocracy, Princeton, 1973. 
(306]Suss, Werner (ed.), (ibergiinge. Zeitgeschichle zwischen Utopie und 
Machbarkeit, Berlin, 1990. 
[307]Taylor, James & Shaw, Warren, A Dictionc.uy r~j'lhe Third Reich, London, 
1987. 
[J08]Torn1in, Waiter, Geschichte der deutschen Parleien seil /8../cS), Stuttga11, 1966. 
[309]Treitschke, I-Ieinrich van, .S'ozialismus und seine Gi.Jnner, Berlin, 1875. 
(31 O]Turner, Henry Ash by, Gern1an Big Business and the Rise qf Hitler, Oxford, 
1985. 
[31l]Tyrell, Albrecht, 'Gottfried Feder and the NSDAP' in Peter D. Stachura (ed.), 
The ... ~'haping (?lthe Nazi .State, London, 1978. 
[312]Volkmann, Heinrich, 'Modernisierung des Arbeil5.·kc1Jnpfes? Zum F'ormwandel 
11011 Streik und Aus.~perrung in DeutLr.,·chland 1864-1975' in Hartmut Kaelble (ed.), 
Probleme der A4odernisierung in Deutschland. SozialhisLorische Studien zum 19. und 
20 . .Jahrhundert, Opladen, 1978. 
(313]Vorlander, Bans (ed.), Ve!:fall oder Renaissance des Liberalismus?, Munich, 
1987. 
[314]Weber, Marianne, A1ax ~Veher: Ein Lehensbild, Tubingen, 1926. 
337 
[315]Weber, Max, Die prates/ante Ethik und der t(reist' des Kapitalis1nus, Tubingen, 
1922~ translated into English: Talcott Parsons, Protestant Ethic and ihe Spirit (~f 
Capitalisn1, London, 1930. 
[316]Weber, Max, 'Wirtschafl und Gesellschaft', part 3 of Grundriss der 
Sozialokonomik, Tubingen, 1922. 
[317]Weber, Max, Gesan1melte At{f\'tilze zur Wissenschqftslehre, Tubingen, 1922. 
[318]Weber, Max, 'Der Sinn der 
okonomischen Wissenschajlen' in 
Wissenscha.ftslehre, Ttibingen, 1922. 
''Wertjreiheit" der soziologischen 
Max Weber, Gesanunelte A ujsdtze 
und 
zur 
[319]Weber, Max, 'Deutschlandr; kiir{ftige Staatsfornt' in Max Weber, Gesamn1elle 
A1~js·atze zur Wissenschajt .. \·lehre, Ti.ibingen, 1922. 
[320]Weber, Max, Gesamme!te politische Schr~ften, 2nd ed., edited by Johannes 
Winckelmann, Tubingen, 1958. 
[321 ]Weber, Max, 'Zur Griindung einer national-sozialen Partei' in Max Weber, 
Gesanunelte po!itische Schr~ften, 2nd ed., edited by Johannes Winckelmann, 
Tubingen, 1958. 
[322]Weber, Max, 'Die Lehren der deutschen Kanzlerkrisis' in Max Weber, 
Gesanunelte politische .Schr~ften, 2nd ed., edited by Johannes Winckelmann, 
Tubingen, 1958. 
[323]Weber, Max, 'Parlatnent und Regierung in1 neugeordnelen J)eutsch!and' in 
Max Weber, Gesanunelte politische Schr{fien, 2nd ed., edited by Johannes 
Winckehnann, Ti.ibingen, 1958. 
[324]Weber, Max, 'Politik als Beruf in Max Weber, Gesannnelte polili .. -.,·che 
Schrtften, 2nd ed., edited by Johannes Winckelmann, TObingen, l 958. 
[325]Weber, Max, 'Der Nationalstaal und die T~olks1virtschqftvx;/it~k' in Max 
Weber, Gesammelte politische Schr{ften, 2nd ed., edited by Johannes Wmckelmann, 
Tubingen, 1958. 
[326)Weber, Max, c Wahlrecht und Demof..Tatie' in Max We.ber, Gesatmnelte 
politische Schriften, 2nd ed., edited by Johannes Winckelmann, TObtngen, 1958. 
[J27]Weber, Max, 'Der Reich.sprasident' in Max We?er, Gesan1mefte polilische 
Schr(ften, 2nd ed., edited by Johannes Winckelmann, Ti.ibmgen, 1958. 
[328]Wegner, Bernd, 'The "Aristocracy" of National Socialism' in H.W. Koch (ed.), 
A.spects (~(the Third Reich, London~ 1985. 
338 
(329]Wegner, Bernd, The Wa.ffen-,SS: Organisation, Ideology and Function, Oxford, 
]990. 
[330]Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, Das Kaiserreich, 1871-1918, Gottingen,. 1973; English 
translation (Kim Traynor)~ The German Empire 1871-1918, Leamington Spa, 1985. 
[331 ]Welch~ David, 'Hitler. Who voted for hi1n?' in History Review, k)'epte1nber, 
1995. 
[332] Wer ist 's?, Berlin, 1935. 
[333]Winkler, Heinrich August, Mittelstand, Den1okratie und Nationalsozialismus. 
Die politische Entwicklung von Handwerk und Kleinhandel in der Webnarer 
Repuhlik, Cologne, 1972. 
[334]Winkler, Heinrich August, (German Society, Hitler and the Illusion of 
Restoration 1930-33' in Journal c?(Contemporcuy Histo1y, 11. 1976. 
[335]Winkler~ Heinrich August, 'From Social Protectionism to ·National Socialistn. 
The Gennan Small Business Movement in Comparative Perspective' in Journal (~( 
Modern Hist(Hy, No.48, 1976. 
[336]Winkler, Heinrich August, 'Biirgerliche Emanzipation und nationale Einigung: 
zur Entstehung des Nalionalliberalisn7us in Preu.\:s·en' in Winkler, Liberalisnnts und 
Antili"heralismus. 5'tudien zur politischen Sozialgeschichte des 19. und 20. 
Jahrhunderts, Gottingen, 1 979. 
[337]Winkler, Heinrich August, Der Schein der Normalittil. Arheiter und 
Arbeiterbewegung in der Weilnarer Republik 1924 bis /930, Berlin/Bonn, 1985. 
[338]Wistrich, Robeti, Who's Who in Nazi Gennany, London, 1982. 
[339]Wurm, Franz F., Wirtschqft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 1848-1948, 
Opladen, I 969. 
[340]Zitelmann, Rainer, Ado[( Hitler. Eine politische Biographie, Gottingen, 1989. 
[341 ]Zitelmann, Rain er, 'Nationalsozialismus und Mode1-ne. Eine Zwischenbilanz' in 
\Verner Suss (ed.), (Jhergdnge. Zeitgeschichte zwischen lltopie und Machbarkeit, 
Berlin, 1990. 
[342]Zitelmann, Rainer, 'Die totalitare Seite der Moderne' in Michael Prinz & Rainer 
Zitelmann (eds.), Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, Darmstadt, 1991. 
339 
